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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates the regulation of fiduciary duties of directors towards company 
property in England and Saudi Arabia. The analysis concentrates on the statutory law of both 
countries as the main legal instrument to prevent exploitation of company property by 
company directors. The study follows a functionalist approach to compare the legal systems 
of England and Saudi Arabia, taking into account the socio-cultural ramifications for the 
application of law to regulate the fiduciary duties of company directors towards company 
property. The study argues that despite belonging to different law families and having 
developed in different socio-cultural environments, the legal systems of both countries face a 
similar issue of effective prevention of company property exploitation by company directors. 
Further, it is noted that the statutory provisions aimed at regulating the fiduciary duties of 
company directors towards company property are not completely effective. The main 
contribution to knowledge provided by the thesis consists in making suggestions for statutory 
amendments in England and Saudi Arabia for a more effective regulation of directors‟ 
fiduciary duties towards company property. A further original contribution of the study is in 
exploring the different features in each legal system that can be effectively transferred and 
applied to the other system in order to improve the regulation of directors‟ fiduciary duties 
towards company property.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1. Background of the Study  
Good practices of corporate governance should be one of the major goals of the company law 
in each country, because such practices ensure effective and practical management of a 
company‟s assets that can boost investors‟ confidence, increase competitiveness, and promote 
long term success. However, as recent history shows, corporate governance models, even in 
the most developed countries, are far from being ideal
1
. An inevitable consequence of the 
events connected to the collapse of companies like Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, and 
Madoff Investment Securities has been an increased interest in the further development of 
legal means to promote more effective corporate governance models. The focus of these 
models has been better protection of corporate assets from inappropriate behaviour of 
company directors linked to asset manipulation, non disclosure, and fraud resulting from the 
conflicts of interest between personal benefits and what is best for the company
2
.  
Even though recognised as separate legal entities in many countries, corporations are 
governed by human beings through the institution of the corporate board of directors. 
Corporate directors are normally given full powers in managing company assets, which, in 
turn, should bring a certain degree of responsibility and care on their side
3
. However, there is 
always a possibility that directors may act in their own interests, which are in contrast with 
                                                        
1 For a comprehensive discussion on the limitations of the contemporary corporate governance models in the 
wake of the current recession see, in general: Sun W, Stewart J and Pollard D (eds) Corporate Governance And 
The Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (Cambridge Press, 2011); also see Kirkpatrick G, „The 
corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis‟ (2009) OECD Publications: Financial Market Trends 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf>, accessed 1 October 2011. 
2 See, for example, the reports of the Treasury Committee discussing government efforts in different countries to 
improve corporate governance environment: HC 416 (2009) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/416/416.pdf>; accessed 1 October 
2011, HC 462 (2009) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/462/462.pdf>, 
accessed 1 October 2011. 
3 Whether the interests of the company match those of the company shareholders is debatable, as it is 
questionable whether shareholders are legally associated with a company. Many countries, including England 
and Saudi Arabia, which are considered in this study, have recognised that companies are separate legal entities. 
Both English and Saudi legal systems acknowledge that company directors owe duties to the company alone, 
while considering the interests of other parties, including shareholders. See, in this regard, Section 172 of the 
English Companies Act 2006 and Articles 1 and 76 of the Saudi Companies Law 1965.  
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those of their companies
4
. Resolution of such conflicts cannot be left entirely to the 
employment contract, because, eventually, due to cognitive limitations, all of such contracts 
remain incomplete
5. Nor can the power of the company members to vote on directors‟ 
dismissal or replacement be considered sufficiently strong, because in public companies it is 
common that there are many shareholders with small stakes in the company
6
. As a result, the 
corporate governance framework established within a particular legal system has to include 
provisions that ensure that company directors act in a way that does not compromise what is 
entrusted to them by the nature of their position in the company.  
The fundamental duties of directors, based on their position of trust
7
 to act in the best 
interests of the company and not to acquire, without the consent of the company, material 
benefits from that position, are referred to as fiduciary duties
8
. The critical aspect of imposing 
and regulating fiduciary duties within a corporate governance framework is that directors, as 
fiduciaries, agree to act on behalf of the company in exercising their powers to use the assets 
that do not belong to them, but to the company. The company in this case is in a vulnerable 
position because it entrusts its assets into the hands of the directors. Therefore, the goal of 
regulating fiduciary duties of company directors is to oblige company directors to act in the 
interests of the company.  
According to the law and economics school of thinking in corporate law, regulation of 
fiduciary duties is important not only from the legal, but also from the economic perspective. 
                                                        
4 For the reasons named above, the interests of the company are considered as separate from the shareholders. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide more detailed discussions distinguishing companies from shareholders in both 
England and Saudi Arabia. 
5 See Andrew Keay and Hao Zhang, „Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries, and a Director‟s Duty to 
Creditors‟ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 141: „…cognitive limitations of contracting parties and 
asymmetric information between these parties. In other words, the contracting parties are not able to foresee the 
future perfectly, although some may know more about something than others. Because of these problems, 
contracting parties (who are inherently self-interest seeking) cannot make complete provisions in a contract for 
every eventuality and all contracts are, therefore, incomplete‟. 
6 This results in individual shareholders having very weak voting power.  
7 This thesis follows the argument that while directors are recognised as agents in both England and Saudi 
Arabia, some aspects of the relationships between a company and its directors closely resemble relationships 
under a constructive trust. See Section 4.5 in this thesis. 
8 Cary Cooper and Chris Argyris, The Concise Blackwell Encyclopedia Of Management (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishing 1998) 221. The extent of fiduciary duties to the parties beyond a company and its shareholders 
depends on the legal system, which may or may not recognise third parties such as employees, suppliers, 
customers, or society in general as the parties to whom company directors owe fiduciary duties.  
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According to Macey
9, regulation of fiduciary duties serves as a „device uniquely crafted to 
fill in the massive gap in [the] open-ended bargain between shareholders and corporate 
officers and directors‟. The outcomes of such regulation, however, extend far beyond the 
context of corporations within which fiduciary duties are regulated. In the wake of economic 
crises and the scandals related to mismanagement of corporate assets by company directors, 
studies have demonstrated the negative social and economic impact resulting from the breach 
of fiduciary duties
10
.  
As seen above, the demand for effective regulation of fiduciary duties of company directors 
is dictated by various factors of a legal and economic nature. However, both England and 
Saudi Arabia are still encountering challenges in defining the scope of these duties, their 
application, and, most importantly, effective codification in their major company law statutes. 
In England, the concept of fiduciary duties has existed for over two centuries
11
. However, the 
concept itself has remained rather elusive
12
, and the main principles of what can be 
considered a breach of fiduciary duty were never codified until their introduction in the 
Companies Act 2006 (hereinafter CA 2006)
13
. Some of the Act‟s provisions, however, differ 
from what has been considered the standard in English case law for some time.  
As for Saudi Arabia, regulation of fiduciary duties within the framework of corporate 
governance remains very unclear. There have always been obligations to follow for each 
individual as prescribed within the Shariah; however, Islamic law provides little guidance in 
relation to corporate governance per se, because corporate forms of business historically did 
                                                        
9 Jonathan Macey, „An Economic Analysis Of The Various Rationales For Making Shareholders The Exclusive 
Beneficiaries Of Corporate Fiduciary Duties‟ (1991) 21 Stetson Law Review 23, 41. 
10 Gerald Vinten, „The Corporate Lessons Of Enron‟ (2002) 2 (4) Corporate Governance 4; Cheryl Wade, 
„Fiduciary Duty And The Public Interest‟ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 1191; Robert Sitkoff, „The 
Economic Structure Of Fiduciary Law‟ (2009) 91 Boston University Law Review 1039; Robert Flannagan, „The 
Economics Of Fiduciary Accountability‟ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal Of Corporate Law 393; Robert Nolan, 
„Controlling Fiduciary Power‟ (2009) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 293.  
11 Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman, „The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character And Legal 
Consequences‟ (1991) 66 NYU Law Review 1045.  
12 Deborah Demott, „Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis Of Fiduciary Obligation‟ (1988) Duke Law Journal 879; 
William Heath, „The Director's Fiduciary Duty Of Care And Skill: A Misnomer‟ (2007) 25 Company And 
Securities Law Journal 370. 
13 The CA 2006 itself does not refer to the duties outlined in sections 170-177 as „fiduciary‟. However, in 
section 178(2), they are mentioned in the context of consequences for the breach.  
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not exist in Islam
14
. In addition, the company law regulating, inter alia, directors‟ duties has 
not been developed within the Kingdom, but transplanted with few modifications from 
Egyptian/French company law
15
. Granted, the Kingdom has recently introduced a number of 
its own statutes to regulate the issues related to corporate governance in publicly held 
corporations; however, none of them directly addresses fiduciary duties of company 
directors. The Companies Law 1965 (hereinafter CL 1965), which is the main statute adopted 
from Egypt, does include certain provisions to regulate the fiduciary duties of company 
directors
16
; however, those provisions are extremely vague and inconclusive
17
.  
The absence of full cohesion of the company law statutes with the existing case law in 
England and the lack of inclusiveness of the statutes in Saudi Arabia inevitably bring the 
question of the effectiveness of statutory regulation of fiduciary duties in both countries. At 
the same time, it is clear that the two countries have approached the same problem 
differently: while in England the nature of fiduciary duties has been developed and actively 
applied based on the vast experience of court decisions, Saudi Arabia borrowed legislation in 
the absence of its own experience in managing corporate forms of business, but consequently 
amended that legislation. Other differences exist as well. For example, the English system of 
common law, which continuously evolves as a result of case decisions, starkly contrasts with 
the Islamic law system in Saudi Arabia, where a certain portion of law (the Shariah) is 
considered divine and immutable. Over the course of history, the two systems have 
developed somewhat different views on the role of business in the economy and society, 
which have influenced the dominant corporate governance models existing in each country
18
.  
The analysis of the treatment of fiduciary duties in England and Saudi Arabia can help not 
only to see the points of convergence and divergence between the two legal systems, but also 
                                                        
14 See Nicholas Foster, „Islamic Perspectives On The Law Of Business Organisations: Part 1: An Overview Of 
The Classical Shariah And A Brief Comparison Of The Shariah Regimes With Western Style Law‟ (2010) 11 
(1) European Business Organisational Law Review 3. 
15 Maren Hanson, „The Influence Of French Law On The Legal Developments Of Saudi Arabia‟ (1987) 2 Arab 
Law Quarterly 272. 
16 Although, as in the CA 2006, the duties are not listed as „fiduciary‟. 
17 Chapter 6 of this thesis deals exclusively with the Articles under the CL 1965, where many potential problems 
with interpretation are identified.  
18 Lilian Miles and Simon Goulding, „Corporate Governance In Western (Anglo-American) And Islamic 
Communities: Prospects For Convergence?‟ (2010) 2 Journal of Business Law 126; also see Mervyn Lewis, 
„Islamic Corporate Governance‟ (2005) 9 Review Of Islamic Economics 5, 11. 
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to identify certain elements of law within each jurisdiction that may help to enhance the 
effectiveness in regulating fiduciary duties. According to the influential corporate governance 
studies theory of convergence, all corporate governance systems will eventually converge 
along the lines of the Anglo-American model
19
. This is because this model is often 
considered as the way to ensure high standards of governance, even by the governments of 
countries that have different legal traditions
20
. Evidence shows that this statement is at least 
partially true, as many countries, including those with Islamic law tradition, have been 
actively adopting various corporate governance practices of the Anglo-American system, 
such as enhancement of reporting and transparency, assignment of independent directors to 
company boards, establishing auditing committees, and other practices
21
. Some of these 
practices have been successfully adopted in the Middle East countries
22
. Saudi Arabia itself 
has recently introduced stock exchange listing rules for publicly traded companies, which is a 
common practice in Anglo-American corporate governance systems
23
. This means that the 
best corporate governance practices developed in England could be useful in the context of 
Saudi Arabian law. 
At the same time, certain principles of Saudi law could potentially add value to English 
company law regulating fiduciary duties of company directors. This is particularly true in 
relation to moral and ethical dimensions of corporate governance practices. Many Western 
scholars have been advocating a new approach to business conduct, which would place more 
emphasis on these dimensions
24
. In addition, recent trends in Anglo-American company law 
                                                        
19 See, for example, John Coffee, „The Future As History: The Prospects For Global Convergence In Corporate 
Governance And Its Implications‟ (1999) 93 (3) Northwestern University Law Review 641; Sanford Jacoby, 
„Corporate Governance In Comparative Perspective: Prospects For Convergence?‟ (2000) 22 (5) Comparative 
Labour Law And Policy Journal 5; Cally Jordan, „The Conundrum Of Corporate Governance‟ (2005) 30 
Brooklyn Journal Of International Law 983. 
20 Miles and Goulding (n 18) 128. 
21 This is particularly evident in East Asian markets, such as China, Malaysia, and South Korea. See, for 
example, Wiparat Chuanrommanee and Fredrik Swierczek, „Corporate Governance In ASEAN Financial 
Corporations: Reality Or Illusion?‟ (2007) 15 (2) Corporate Governance 272; Han Kim and Woochan Kim, 
„Changes To Korean Corporate Governance: A Response To Crisis‟ (2008) 20 (1) Journal Of Applied Corporate 
Finance 47; Datuk Shim, „Governance In The Markets: Malaysian Perspective‟ (2006) 13 (3) Journal Of 
Financial Crime 300.  
22 Egypt, UAE, and Kuwait have made serious advances in this regard.  
23 The Capital Market Authority introduced the Listing Rules in 2004.  
24 Masudul Choudhury and Sofyan Harahap, „Decreasing Corporate Governance In An Ethico-Economic 
General Equilibrium Model Of Unity Of Knowledge‟ (2007) 7 (5) Corporate Governance 599; Miles and 
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have marked a shift towards a „socially responsible corporation‟ – one in which the directors‟ 
decision making process has to take into account the consequences of their actions for third 
parties
25
. Still, the idea of a socially responsible corporation has yet to be applied in English 
law: the CA 2006, for example, preferred the enhanced shareholder value approach instead of 
the stakeholder approach in relation to directors‟ duties. In this sense, Islamic law can be 
considered more advanced, because the ideas of social responsibility, ethics, and morality are 
inherent in the Shariah. Some of these principles have been also applied within the statutory 
framework of Saudi company law
26
. Therefore, these traditions of Islamic law can be found 
useful for application in the statutory framework of English company law.  
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the ways that English and 
Saudi legal systems regulate fiduciary duties of company directors towards company 
property. While there is a sufficient number of studies that investigate corporate governance 
in these countries in general, regulation of fiduciary duties is often ignored, especially in the 
studies pertaining to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, comparative research concentrating 
specifically on fiduciary duties towards company property in England and Saudi Arabia is 
virtually absent in the legal literature. This study aims to fill this gap in knowledge. To meet 
this objective, the study answers three research questions: 1) What are the similarities and 
differences between English and Saudi legal systems in the regulation of company directors‟ 
fiduciary duties towards company property? 2) Are the statutory provisions regulating these 
duties effectively in tune with the other sources of law? 3) Based on the answers to the first 
two questions, what changes to the law can be suggested to make the regulation of fiduciary 
duties in each legal system more effective? 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Goulding (n 18) 129-130; Felix Pomeranz, „Ethics: Toward Globalisation‟ (2004) 19 (1) Managerial Auditing 
Journal 8. 
25 Subhabrata Bannerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar 2007); Peter Drucker, Management Challenges In The 21st Century (2nd edn, New York, NY: 
Harper Collins 2007); David Hawkins, Corporate Social Responsibility: Balancing Tomorrow’s Sustainability 
And Today’s Profitability (New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Dima Jamali, „A Stakeholder Approach 
To Corporate Social Responsibility: A Fresh Perspective Into Theory And Practice‟ (2008) 82 (1) Journal Of 
Business Ethics 213. Consideration of the third parties‟ interests is also mentioned in the CA 2006 Section 
170(2). 
26 Arguably, the existing provisions of, for example the Companies Law 1965, only slightly touch upon the vast 
array of ethical and moral responsibilities imposed by the Shariah. Still, unlike English statutory law, the 
Companies Law 1965 has specific provisions extending directors‟ duties beyond the corporate context and 
imposing penalties for failure to comply with these duties. See, for example, Article 76 of the CL 1965. 
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1.3. Significance of the Study 
Perhaps one of the major challenges faced by legal systems in regulating fiduciary duties of 
company directors lies in how to ensure the effectiveness of best management practices in 
relation to a company‟s assets and interests while at the same time protecting these assets 
from possible exploitation. As such, a fine balance has to be established between protectionist 
measures related to the company property and flexibility of the decision making process that 
allows company directors to take reasonable risks in achieving company related goals. The 
search for this balance in English law has been an ongoing effort, as the courts have 
continuously reviewed and revised the way that certain aspects of fiduciary duties have to be 
treated. Much less effort seems to exist in Saudi law where only statutory provisions have the 
power to regulate fiduciary duties of company directors, and these statutory provisions often 
lack clarity and comprehensiveness
27
. Therefore, by choosing English company law with its 
strong practical basis of statutory interpretation as a peer to Saudi company law, this study 
will provide a number of suggestions that the researcher  believes will be able to contribute to 
the development of a new, more comprehensive and better company statute in the Kingdom. 
At the same time, it was found that some elements of the Saudi legal system could provide 
useful suggestions for improving English statutory law, thus making the work practical for 
both jurisdictions. The main contribution of the study, therefore, is in the insights into the 
issues of managing the fiduciary duties of company directors towards company property in 
England and Saudi Arabia and practical suggestions to reforming statutory codes in both 
countries. 
1.4. Background: England 
The choice of England as a peer country to Saudi Arabia for the purposes of the study is 
justified by the fact that it has a rich history in regulating corporate affairs in general and 
fiduciary duties of company directors in particular. Ultimately, it can be said that the 
country‟s flexible and constantly evolving company law has contributed to its economic 
growth and establishment as one of the leading business centres in the world. England is the 
largest economy in the United Kingdom and the eighteenth largest economy in the world in 
terms of average GDP per capita
28
. The capital of England, London, is considered the largest 
                                                        
27 Chapter 6 of the thesis provides a comprehensive discussion of this issue.  
28 £22,907 as of 2010, according to the International Monetary Fund. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/>, accessed 3 October 2011.  
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financial centre in the world
29
. The London Stock Exchange is the largest in Europe, and 20% 
of Europe‟s largest 500 companies are based in London30. Finally, the UK is ranked in the top 
ten countries for doing business
31
, an achievement which can be attributed, among other 
factors, to its well developed company law.  
Thus the current financial and economic power of England can be largely attributed to its 
well developed company law system, which was established in the 19
th
 century. Many 
associate the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 with the beginning of the 
modern limited liability company and the companies‟ articles of association32. Consequent 
company law statutes added and extended many of the provisions of the original act, but the 
fundamental principles of the Act of 1856, such as the rules regarding shareholders‟ meetings 
and voting, transactions with the shares, and certain aspects pertaining to directors‟ 
disqualifications remain largely intact. Eventually, English company law served as the basis 
for many legal jurisdictions across the world which initiated reforms to introduce new 
business entities (limited liability corporations with a legal personality) and regulate them
33
. 
While England was the legal frontrunner in establishing and regulating corporations as 
business entities, it also implemented a set of rules and provisions that addressed the issue of 
company directors‟ accountability. Although the process of introducing the legal rules to curb 
directors‟ powers within the corporate context was not without obstacles34, eventually 
English law introduced statutory provisions that regulated directors‟ duties and imposed 
liabilities in case of misconduct
35
. The list of fiduciary duties that directors owe to a company 
was finally introduced in the CA 2006, the major statute regulating corporate affairs. In 
                                                        
29 The Global Financial Centres Index (2011) <http://www.zyen.com/GFCI/GFCI%209.pdf>, accessed 3 
October 2011.  
30 London. „London As A Financial Centre‟ (2011) <http://Legacy.London.Gov.Uk/London-Life/Business-And-
Jobs/Financial-Centre.Jsp>, accessed 3 October 2011.  
31 International Finance Corporation, „Doing Business: Economy Rankings‟ (2011) 
<http://www.Doingbusiness.Org/Rankings>, accessed 22 October 2011.  
32 Julie Cassidy, Concise Corporations Law (5th edn, Sydney, The Federation Press 2004) 4; also see Stephen 
Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (Essex: Pearson Education 2006) 5-6. The history of English 
company law goes even further: the first companies (Hudson‟s Bay Company, Bank of England, British East 
India Company) were established as early as the seventeenth century.  
33 Examples of such countries are Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia.  
34 For example, the Bullock Report 1977 suggesting inclusion of employees in the process of selecting the board 
of directors did not succeed.  
35 The Insolvency Act 2000 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  
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addition, the Corporate Governance Code 2010 (hereinafter CGC 2010) established a number 
of recommendations in relation to internal mechanisms to control directors‟ acts, which 
include the separation of the roles of the board chairman and the CEO, auditing, and 
establishing remuneration committees to control directors‟ compensation. While the CA 2006 
distinguishes public from private companies, Part 10, which deals with directors and their 
duties, is intended to apply to both types of companies in similar fashion
36
. Therefore, the 
majority of directors‟ duties, as well as their relationships with the general meeting, do not 
vary much between the two types of company. 
Where English statutory law lacked strictness in relation to regulating fiduciary duties of 
company directors, the courts have been quite stringent in this regard. Historically, English 
case law has been relentlessly opposing not only conflicts of interest between directors and 
their companies, but even the possibilities of such conflicts. Although the CA 2006 seemed to 
provide some relaxation to this approach, it is unclear whether the courts are still quick to 
change the general attitudes regarding treatment of directors‟ fiduciary duties37.  
1.5. Background: Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is a unique country in many respects: cultural, political, religious, economic, 
and, eventually, legal. Consequently, the modern corporate governance framework that exists 
in the Kingdom can be considered as a product of the fusion of Islamic traditions and modern 
business trends. First and foremost, Saudi Arabia is a country where religion plays the most 
prominent role in all spheres and aspects of life. Islam, which originated in the lands of the 
modern Kingdom, is not only the official religion of the country: it is also the supreme law of 
the land
38
. As such, any law issued in the Kingdom, without exception, has to be compliant 
with Islamic law principles (the Shariah) derived from the Holy Texts of the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. Importantly, unlike the supreme laws in the majority of other countries, the Shariah 
                                                        
36 Clear distinctions are made in section 154, which deals with the required number of directors, and sections 
200-201, which prohibit the issue of loans, quasi-loans, and credit transactions for directors‟ benefits in public 
companies. 
37 Chapter 5 will provide details on this.  
38 Dennis Campbell and Christian Campbell (eds), Legal Aspects Of Doing Business In The Middle East (2nd 
edn, Yorkhill Law, 2007) 265. 
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cannot be changed or amended, because it is considered divine. However, government may 
issue additional laws in areas where the Shariah cannot provide sufficient guidance
39
.  
Corporate governance has been one of the areas where government-issued decrees have 
played a more significant role than traditional Islamic Law. The pressing need for the 
creation of the appropriate legal framework arose as a result of the rapid transition of the 
Kingdom from a poor country inhabited primarily by nomadic tribes into one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world, within just few decades. The rapid transformation of the 
country occurred after the discovery in the 1930s of oil, which would eventually become the 
major source of the country‟s revenues, provide economic prosperity, and ensure significant 
political and economic leverage for the Kingdom in the global arena
40
. As oil revenue soared, 
the Saudi economy started attracting foreign capital in the Kingdom; however, the business 
entities popular in the West, such as limited liability corporations, were completely alien to 
the Saudi legal system, which traditionally only recognised various forms of partnerships
41
. 
Feeling the need to streamline legal governance of the new business entities and having 
virtually no experience in creating an appropriate framework on its own, the Saudi 
government chose to transplant the company law system from Egypt, which resulted in the 
issuance of the CL 1965.  
Since its adoption, the CL 1965 has been amended numerous times; however, a fully updated, 
new statute to regulate company law in the Kingdom has yet to be introduced. The continued 
delay in the issuance of the much needed new statute can be explained by the rigidity of the 
Saudi government system. The Kingdom is an absolute monarchy, with all reins of political 
power vested in the hands of the King. The legislative bodies, the Council of Consultation 
and the Council of Ministers consist of individuals appointed by the King, and their main 
function is to assist him in carrying out the duties of ruling the Kingdom
42
. As such, the 
                                                        
39 This is allowed under the principle of almasalih almursalah (public good): it allows the governing body of the 
country to establish new laws and regulations for which there are no clear answers in the Holy Texts, if these are 
dictated by the pressing needs of society, and if they are not in conflict with the Shariah. See Section 3.2.2 for 
more details.  
40 The Saudi Gazette, „The story Of Oil In Saudi Arabia‟ (2008) 
<http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=200805186773> accessed 3 
October 2011.  
41 Foster (n 14) 28.  
42 CIA World Fact Book, „Saudi Arabia‟ (2010) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html> accessed 3 October 2011. 
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legislative bodies have no powers or functions on their own and cannot engage in the creation 
of laws without the consent of the King. The judicial branch cannot contribute to the 
development of the new statute either, because the court decisions in the Saudi legal system 
create no judicial precedent.  
However, to say that the development of company law in the Kingdom has not occurred 
would be a mistake. The government made a serious move towards the establishment of an 
independent Saudi stock market and, eventually, regulation of publicly listed companies with 
the creation of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003. The CMA, in turn, issued a 
number of groundbreaking policies such as the Listing Rules 2004 (LR 2004) which 
established provisions that have to be followed by all companies listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange (Tadawul). Still, the problems with regulating corporate governance framework in 
the Kingdom persisted, and resulted in the market crash of 2006, prompting the CMA to 
review the policies related to reporting and disclosure of the companies‟ actions43. However, 
in relation to the treatment of fiduciary duties of company directors towards corporate 
property, Saudi law remains largely silent. The rules issued by the CMA do not mention 
fiduciary duties at all, although some provisions exist within the CL 1965 statutory 
framework.  Nevertheless, these provisions are far from being either comprehensive or free 
from ambiguities and loopholes, as the analysis in this thesis will demonstrate.  
1.6. Setting the Study Ground 
At the heart of comparative methodology is the issue of comparability of the legal 
phenomenon in question
44
. Consequently, a comparison can be considered meaningful when 
some common features are present in the objects of the comparison, upon which it can be 
based
45
. These features, in turn, are commonly identified and analysed at the preliminary 
stage of the comparative process that establishes structure, purposes, and the environments of 
the legal institutions or rules subject to comparison
46
. The general analysis of the economic, 
                                                        
43 George Buchanan, „The Saudi Capital Market‟, in Ramady M The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York, NY,  
Springer 2010) 145-177. 
44 Walter Kamba, „Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework‟ (1977) 23 International And Comparative Law 
Quarterly 485.  
45 George Mousourakis, „Comparability, Functionalism, And The Scope Of Comparative Law‟ (2008) 41 (1) 
Hosei Riron 1. 
46 ibid 9. 
12 
 
political and legal environments of England and Saudi Arabia provides that both countries 
seek to regulate the same type of fiduciary duties within their major company law statutes. 
The purpose of such regulation converges in the sense that both countries need to effectively 
regulate corporate governance within their legal systems, while it diverges in the sense that 
English statutory provisions also aim to resolve the inconsistencies in case law decisions, 
whereas even though these might be present in Saudi courts, they are not available for public 
inquiry. The environments under which the regulation of fiduciary duties is applied are also 
different: the free market, democratic and secular system of England based on common law 
principles is very different from the deeply religious legal framework operating within the 
absolute monarchy rule in Saudi Arabia. Still, in the era of globalisation, the interactions 
between the two systems may provide a sufficient amount of legal diffusion to justify the 
comparison of regulations of directors‟ fiduciary duties towards property within these legal 
systems. Besides, the recent trends in Saudi company law indicate that it is more Western-
oriented that one might think
47
. On the other hand, the movement towards socially 
responsible corporations in England, such as recognition of the interests of the third parties in 
Section 172 of the CA 2006, which fits well within the Shariah principles, indicates that 
English law might have some points of legal convergence with Islamic law in this regard. For 
these reasons, the comparison of the two systems in terms of regulating fiduciary duties of 
company directors is fully justified.  
1.7. Study Limitations and Difficulties 
The major limitations and difficulties faced by the researcher were related to the scarcity of 
information on various aspects of regulating fiduciary duties of company directors towards 
property in Saudi Arabia. The most important aspect in this regard is the virtual absence of 
publicly available case law related to the matter, in the form of either original court 
publications or analysed case studies in secondary sources, such as books, journals, or 
reports. This makes it extremely difficult to determine how various statutory provisions and 
rules are treated by the judges and applied in practice. Where the publicly available decisions 
of English courts of all levels can be examined to see whether any problems of interpretation 
exist, the absence of readily available information about court decisions in Saudi Arabia 
sometimes left the writer with no choice but to speculate in this regard.  
                                                        
47 Chapter 6 provides details on this.  
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The absence of case law reporting in the Kingdom can be traced to the principles of Islamic 
law and the origins of the transplanted company law that the country borrowed from Egypt. 
Islamic law, by nature, shows little consideration for judicial precedent, which plays a key 
role in common law systems. Whereas case law in England plays an important part in 
formulating the legal rules
48
 and binding future court decisions, the judges in Saudi courts, 
which are heavily reliant on the Shariah, do not add to the existing jurisprudence: they may 
consult the existing legal texts to formulate the decisions, but the law itself is considered 
untouchable and immutable due to its divine nature. Second, by adopting the French-based, 
Egyptian company law code, Saudi Arabia also inherited attitudes towards law reporting that 
the French model engenders. In France, consistent case reporting only applies to the decisions 
of the Cours de Cassation – the highest appellate court in the country49. The practice of 
limited case reporting, however, has been extended in Saudi Arabia to virtually avoid the 
publishing of court decisions at any level. In the opinion of the researcher, this is a serious 
omission in the Saudi legal system, as it prevents scholars from analysing the application of 
law in practice and suggesting improvements
50
. No matter how comprehensive statutory 
provisions might be, they are not capable of covering every aspect of related law, thus there is 
always room for improvements. In the absence of public access to the court decisions in 
Saudi Arabia, the provisions of statutory law can be only meaningfully analysed within the 
Shariah framework, but not on the basis of how these provisions are interpreted and applied 
by the courts.  
Another serious difficulty faced by the researcher has been the absence of codified Shariah 
rules and principles in the Saudi legal system in general and its company law in particular. 
Because the Shariah law a priori plays such a fundamental role in the Kingdom‟s legal 
system, it inevitably influences all matters within company law, including directors‟ duties 
and behaviour towards company property. However, the absence of a clear and 
comprehensible set of rules imposed by the Shariah hardly makes it readily applicable in all 
                                                        
48 We will see, for example, that the previous court decisions heavily influenced the wording of some of the 
provisions in the CA 2006.  
49 Pascale Portier, „Media Reporting Of Trials In France And Ireland‟ (2006) 6 (1) Judicial Studies Institute 
Journal 197; on the specifics and consequences of transplanting French civil law to middle eastern countries, see 
Ian Edge, „Comparative Commercial Law Of Egypt And The Arabian Gulf‟ (1986) 34 Cleveland State Law 
Review 129. 
50 Since the codified company law in Saudi Arabia is not based on the Shariah, but only compatible with it, this 
allows the possibility of modifying it. The CL 1965 is a good example of this: the code has been amended 
several times since its adoption in the Kingdom.  
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situations, especially, in cases concerned with relatively new legal fields such as corporate 
governance. For these reasons, this study, apart from the main goal of investigating regulation 
of fiduciary duties of company directors toward corporate property, makes a strong case for 
introducing major codified Shariah principles for company law regulation in the Kingdom.  
1.8. Structure of the Study 
This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter sets the basis for the research by 
providing the general background of the study, describing the study purpose, significance, 
and motivation behind it. It also reviews the major study limitations and difficulties of the 
research. The second chapter outlines the study methodology, which is comparative 
functionalism. The third chapter compares the main sources of law in England and Saudi 
Arabia, noting along the way the main similarities and differences between the two systems. 
The fourth chapter discusses the legal treatment of directorships in England and Saudi 
Arabia, with the focus on the legal definition of the term „director‟, the types of directors 
recognised by law, and the legal position of a company director under both jurisdictions. The 
fifth and sixth chapters analyse how, respectively, the English and Saudi legal systems 
regulate the fiduciary duties of company directors towards property. Finally, the seventh 
chapter compares these regulations and, on the basis of comparison, provides suggestions for 
statutory amendments in both legal systems to ensure a higher degree of protection of 
company property from directors‟ exploitation on the one hand while preserving a reasonable 
degree of flexibility in directors‟ decision-making on the other.  
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Chapter Two: The Methodology of the Research 
2.1. Introduction 
Comparative research is a critical method of inquiry that is applicable in many fields of 
scientific knowledge. Comparative Law, like other sciences, „remains a science as long as it 
acquires knowledge and regardless of whether or not the knowledge is put to any further 
use‟51. Zweigert observes that legal sciences in general are beset by methodological 
weaknesses that may be aptly remedied by Comparative Law
52
.  In a similar context, Örücü 
asserts that the twenty-first century is the „age of the comparative law‟ research53. Further, 
Lord Goff argues that in the English legal system „comparative law may have been the hobby 
of yesterday, but it is destined to become the science of tomorrow; we must welcome rather 
than fear its influence‟54.  
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in comparative law research, which has 
been demonstrated in the significant growth in the volume of publications
55
. Thus, the 
significance of comparative law research is nowadays less subject to dispute. Nonetheless, 
there is still ongoing debate over the meaning of comparative law research. Part of the debate 
relates to the outcomes of new emerging paths of research in Comparative Law
56
. Most 
comparative legal scholars agree that the choice of the method depends on the primary aim of 
                                                        
51 Rodolfo Sacco, „Legal formants: A Dynamic Approach To Comparative Law (Part 1)‟ (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 4. 
52 Konrad Zweigert, „Methodological problems in comparative law‟ (1972) 7 Israel Law Review 465, 466. 
53 Esin Örücü, The Enigma Of Comparative Law: Variations On A Theme For The Twenty-First Century 
(Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 7. Examining the history of comparative law is beyond the scope of 
this study; for more information on this, see Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz , An Introduction To Comparative 
Law (3rd edn., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998) 48-62; see also Christopher Whytock, „Legal Origins, 
Functionalism, And The Future Of Comparative Law‟ (2009) 6 Brigham Young University Law Review 1879. 
54 Lord Goff, „The Future of the Common Law‟ (1977) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 745, 
748. 
55 For example, as will be discussed below, Örücü states that in the last ten years there has been a growing 
interest in using comparative research for different objects such as aiding law reform and policy developments. 
She observes that there is an increase in the number of journals relating to comparative law and the articles 
published on comparative research are numerous. She says „not only that but it has become indispensable for all 
doctoral research‟. See Örücü (n 53) 8. 
56 Vernon Palmer, „From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples Of Comparative Law Methodology‟ (2005) 53 (1) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 261.  
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the comparison itself.
57
 This chapter proceeds with a review of some contemporary 
approaches in comparative law with a deeper focus on the chosen methodology for the 
research.  
2.2 Contemporary Approaches in Comparative Law  
Comparative scholars have applied a range of different comparative methodologies in the 
literature. There are, for example, historical comparison, comparison of legal transplants, 
cultural comparison, critical comparison and functional comparison
58
. While it is outside the 
scope of this study to conduct an in depth examination of these methods, an analysis will be 
undertaken of the most influential approaches in the recent literature on comparative legal 
methodologies: cultural and critical approaches and functionalism
59
.  
Contemporary approaches in comparative law are mainly derived from three influential 
schools: culturalism, criticism and functionalism. Pierre Legrand, a leading proponent of the 
cultural school, argues that the main aim of Comparative Law is to explain the deep cultural, 
moral and ideological dimensions of law
60
. His main arguments orbit around the divergence 
and uniqueness of each legal culture which is „incommensurable and untranslatable except 
through a deep understanding of the surrounding social context‟ and he argues that 
comparison must involve „the primary and fundamental investigation of difference‟61. Further, 
he posits that when attempting to conduct a comparison with foreign law, the purpose of the 
                                                        
57 Harold Gutteridge, Comparative Law (2nd edn., London, Cambridge University Press 1949), reprinted 
(London, Wildy & Sons 1974) 73; Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 33; see also Kamba (n 44) 511; see Palmer (n 56) 
290; Esin Örücü, „Methodological Aspect Of Comparative Law‟ (2006) 8 European Journal Of Law Reform 29. 
However, some comparative legal scholars claim that it is reductive to talk of a variety of comparative law 
methodologies while comparative law itself is a method: Hans Baade, Peter Herzog and Edward Wise, „The 
Comparative Method‟ in Schlesinger R, Comparative Law: Cases-text-materials (6th edn., New York, 
Foundation Press 1998). 
58 See Ralf Michaels, „The functional Method Of Comparative Law‟ in Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006) 339, 341. Other types of 
method are evolutionary, structural, thematic, empirical and statistical comparisons, see Palmer (n56) 263. 
59 Palmer (n56) 263. 
60 Pierre Legrand, „How To Compare Now‟ (1996) 16 (2) Legal Studies 235. 
61 Pierre Legrand, „The impossibility of legal transplants‟ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European & 
Comparative Law 123, 123-124. 
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comparison must be to criticise one‟s own law, not to propose a reform of the foreign law, as 
each legal culture is untranslatable and irreplaceable
62
.  
Seemingly, this view suggests total incommensurability and thus incomparability between 
different legal cultures
63. It is derived from Legrand‟s observation that legal systems in 
Europe are not converging
64
. Nonetheless, giving due attention to socio-cultural and 
traditional consideration of law, does not preclude comparisons between different legal 
systems
65
. Moreover, the focus on differences rather than similarities appears to be non-
neutral whereas a balanced comparison should examine both the difference and the sameness 
in the given jurisdictions. From a methodological point of view, cultural comparison has little 
to offer for the comparative researcher, given that it is mainly concerned with the differences 
and uniqueness of each legal culture.  
Critical comparison, developed by Gunter Frankenberg, is another strict approach in 
comparative law. Frankenberg‟s theory is concerned with questioning why law should be 
studied comparatively
66
, in addition to asking how the comparison should be made
67
. 
Consequently, his approach dismisses the presumptions of the universality, necessity and 
functionality of law, and focuses on applying comparative law for the critique of law. The 
main weakness of the Critical School is that it diverts the attention of the comparative 
researcher from comparing laws of the given systems to comparing their cultures, history and 
politics
68. Frankenberg‟s view is that attempts to compare different systems are „bound to fail‟ 
                                                        
62 ibid. 
63 See Anne Peters and Heiner Schwenke, „Comparative Law Beyond Post Modernism‟ (2000) 49 (4) 
International and Comparative Law Journal 800, 802.  
64 See Pierre Legrand, „European Legal Systems Are Not Converging‟ (1996) 45 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 52-58; Pierre Legrand, „The Return Of The Repressed: Moving Comparative Legal Studies 
Beyond Pleasure (2001) 75 Tulane Law Review 1033. 
65 Olivr Brand, „Conceptual Comparisons: Towards A Coherent Methodology Of Comparative Legal Studies, 
(2006) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405, 431-432; see also Palmer V (n 56) 266. 
66 Gunter Frankenberg, „Critical Comparison: Rethinking Comparative Law‟ (1985) 26 Harvard Law Journal 
411, 416. 
67 Jaakko Husa, „Farwell To Functionalism Or Methodological Tolerance?‟ (2003) 67 Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 15 < http://ssrn.com/abstract =1488669>, accessed 3 October 
2011. 
68 Gunter Frankenberg, „Stranger Than Paradise: Identity And Politics In Comparative Law‟ (1997) 2 Utah Law 
Review 259; David Kennedy, „New Approaches To Comparative Law: Comparativism And International 
Governance, (1997) 2 Utah Law Review 545. 
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unless the researcher is aware that each society is „shaped and dominated by a grid of 
concepts, research techniques, professional ethics, and politics, by which the prevailing 
culture imposes on the individual scholar its canons of how legal scholarship is conducted‟69. 
Importantly, while Frankenberg‟s critical approach provides some useful guidelines in 
analysing conventional comparative studies, thus reducing their explanatory power, it fails to 
provide a viable alternative for solid comparative research. The three step analysis approach 
introduced by him cannot be considered a fully fledged framework, because it is grounded 
within the Critical Legal Studies approach, which lacks the theorising tools
70
.  
It is clear that the cultural and critical approaches are influenced by the assumption of 
„difference‟ and „uniqueness‟71. Both views exaggerate the examination of deep cultural-
political and moral structures of the compared legal systems and oppose the idea of the 
convergence of law, and therefore come to the result of incommensurability of laws. 
Moreover, both of them lack a well developed theory that can be successfully applied within 
the comparative law framework. One may view such approaches as strict and odd, as they 
oppose the desirable and possible attempts at unification and development of laws. Peters and 
Schwenke argue that, according to postmodern approaches
72, legal comparison is „trapped‟ in 
„inescapable and incommensurable epistemic, linguistic, cultural and moral frameworks‟ that 
determine language, reasoning, and judgment
73
. Therefore, the irreducible differences lead to 
„incommensurability‟ between different cultures74. Thus, an approach which creates as many 
obstacles as possible to legal comparison and sees any comparative attempt as a futile
75
, and 
                                                        
69 ibid 270 
70 See Guyora Binder, „Critical Legal Studies‟ in Patterson D (ed) A Companion To Philosophy Of Law And 
Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1999) 280–82, where the Critical Legal Studies approach is 
analysed and criticised.  
71 Brand (n 65) 433. 
72 In general, the post-modernist perspective welcomes the experience of plurality and difference as a basis of 
knowledge. It argues that there are many different forms of knowledge, behavioural patterns, and systems of 
morality, further noting that their discordance is inevitable and absolute. For more on post-modernism see 
Elizabeth Ermarth, „Postmodernism‟ in Craig E (ed) Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy (New York, NY, 
Routledge 1998) 587. 
73 Peters A and Schwenke H (n 63) 802. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
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which does not leave much hope for the comparative researcher
76
, is unacceptable. If the 
researcher is driven by the ideas of the „convergence of law‟ and the possibility of „transplants 
of legal solutions‟, he or she would do better to explore alternative flexible approaches.  
While not detracting from the validity of those two approaches for specific purposes, the 
researcher has chosen Functionalism as the methodology for this study. As will be shown 
below, the nature of the comparison being undertaken prompts the use of such a method, as it 
is apt for comparing between various legal jurisdictions at the micro-level. Furthermore, it is 
an appropriate methodological tool where the harmonisation and modernisation of private law 
is the purpose of the comparison
77
. Recently, however, the critical comparative law literature 
has featured reservations about the functional approach. Some scholars have called for the 
creation of a new orientation to make the functional comparative approach more realistic and 
reliable
78
. The primary issue of contention is that functionalist comparative researchers should 
look beyond law to consider non-legal factors affecting legal rules and institutions. Part of 
this concern is related to the postulate of functionalism that the practical results of the 
comparison must be similar in the given jurisdictions. It has, therefore, been recommended 
that to allow for more rigorous, broader and realistic comparisons through functional analysis, 
the inherent social, political and economic contexts of law must be taken into account. These 
issues will be discussed further in the following sections.  
2.3. Functionalism in Comparative Law 
The functional approach can be considered one of the most dominant approaches in 
comparative law
79
. At the core of functionalism are the premises that: 1) countries face 
similar social problems; 2) countries make laws to resolve these problems; 3) despite 
differences in laws, they work towards a solution of the problems
80
 .According to Zweigert 
                                                        
76 Husa (n 67) 15.  
77 Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 45; Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattie, „The Function Of Trust Law: A Comparative 
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and Kötz, each comparative study starts from the question of whether a better solution to a 
concrete problem can be achieved than the one existing under the country‟s legal system81. 
This solution can be sought in other legal systems. This, in turn, requires the study of 
similarities and differences between the rules and institutions in these systems
82
. 
Consequently, three main elements are indispensible for functional comparison: the 
universality of the social problems in different societies; the similarity of function of legal 
rules and institutions to each problem; and the functional equivalence between the rules and 
institutions in given legal systems. 
The significance of the functional approach can be witnessed in various comparative law 
projects. For example, it can be used to serve the purpose of harmonization and modernization 
of laws whether regionally or worldwide
83
. If the comparative researcher aims to unify 
different legal rules of different jurisdictions, the functional method plays a decisive role in 
the harmonization and unification process. For unifying private law, for instance, it is helpful 
to use the functional approach when comparing different legal systems such as common law 
and civil law on topics related, for example, to trust law
84
. 
Functionalism is the most appropriate method to be adopted in this study for several reasons. 
First, functionalism presupposes the universality of social problems across different systems 
and therefore supports the idea of the „convergence‟ of law85. Second, it is an effective 
method if the purpose of the study is to primarily concentrate on law as rules (micro-level 
comparison)
86
. Third, the functional approach suggests a frontier between legal norms, rules, 
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created for the purpose of solving human problems, most of which are shared‟ Esin Örücü, „Methodology Of 
21 
 
and principles on the one hand and a set of factual situations on the other
87
. Fourth, it studies 
the similarities and differences between the compared rules and institutions
88
. Fifth, it serves 
the purpose of the present research which aims at developing the law related to directors‟ 
duties towards company property in Saudi Arabia. Sixth, by adopting this approach 
comparability will be achieved, since the essence of functionalism is that foreign solutions are 
comparable if they deal with a common challenge
89
. Accordingly, functional comparative 
analysis will be adopted as the method for this study. Nevertheless, some concerns about this 
method have been expressed by recent critical comparative scholarship. 
2.3.1 Concerns Regarding Functionalism and Application of Other Theories  
While functionalism is one of the most popular research tools in a Comparative Law context, 
a number of methodological limitations have created a strong wave of criticism regarding its 
approach
90
. This criticism mainly comes from three directions: 1) the failure of this approach 
to extensively examine social, economic and political dimensions of law; 2) the assumption of 
the universality of social problems in different legal systems; and 3) the presumption of the 
similarity of legal solutions in the compared legal systems. The following sections examine 
each of the criticisms and discuss how they can be resolved by applying other relevant 
theories.  
2.3.1.1 Functionalism and the Socio-Cultural Considerations of Law 
The opponents of pure functionalism criticise the ignorance of this method when considering 
the social dimensions of law. They urge that comparative research must look beyond the mere 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Law‟ in Smits J (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia Of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 
447-449 
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90 See Michaels R (n 58) 352-355: for certain prominent comparative law scholars, functionalism represents 
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examination of „black letter law of code and statute‟, „judicial decisions‟ and „doctrinal 
writings‟91. Instead, they suggest that in order to build a comparative framework adequately 
and reliably, and therefore to achieve a successful comparison, one must realise that law 
involves much more than just studying rules and institutions
92
. Thus a researcher will be 
required to account for the socio-cultural framework „to avoid ethnocentricity and 
superficiality‟ and to „reach into the ill-defined region of „deeper structures‟ where the law 
perhaps meets philosophy, sociology and social culture‟93.   
It is true that functional comparison‟s main concentration is on the legal rules and institutions 
at micro-level, and it seeks to list similarities and differences between the compared rules and 
institutions. However, it must be borne in mind that this focus, in a functional sense, does not 
limit the comparative study to legislative rules or judicial decisions only. According to 
Zweigert and Kötz, in order to reach the comparability of legal rules and institutions, 
functionalist comparative researchers must study them as a part of the socio-legal context and 
place them in an external comparative framework
94
. Hence, by taking other non-legal contexts 
into consideration it will be possible to construct the function of legal rules, and therefore the 
comparability of different laws can be achieved
95
.  
There is no doubt that the socio-cultural environment should be seriously considered by 
comparative legal scholars, including those who undertake studies from a functionalist 
perspective. Granted, no analysis can be an all-encompassing feat, which takes into account 
every contextual factor. According to Tushnet, such an approach is almost unrealistic. At the 
same time, ceteris paribus, the more context factors are introduced into the analysis the 
greater the depth that is achieved and the more certainty that is produced in the inferences 
regarding the legal rules existing in the compared countries. It is, perhaps, wrong to think that 
the application of legal rules developed in foreign countries will fail in contrast to those that 
                                                        
91 Palmer (n 56) 266. 
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are developed within the society in question
96
. On the other hand, it is equally wrong to claim 
that there are legal institutions and rules that would be applicable in any society. It follows 
then, that the functionalist scholars have to consider the appropriateness of each legal 
institution and rule for each country in the context of its socio-cultural factors. In other words, 
a nuanced analysis of the law‟s interaction with economic, social and political factors is 
preferred instead of a deterministic one-size-fits-all approach.  
2.3.1.2 Assumption of the Universality of Legal Problems  
Another point of criticism is functionalism‟s assumption that „the legal system of every 
society faces essentially the same problems‟97. Central among these criticisms is the already 
mentioned culturalist view, which implies that each society has historically conditioned, 
deeply rooted views on the nature of law and the appropriate structure and operation of a legal 
system
98
. Based on this view, it is contended that the rules of every legal system are rooted in 
local unique cultures, which are different from each other. Consequently, it is argued that 
unique cultures cannot face problems which are similar in nature. Opponents of the 
universality of social problems
99
 have, however, failed to recognise the reality of this 
assumption. The shared social problem between the jurisdictions being compared is the 
theoretical starting point for the comparative researcher to build his comparative framework. 
The functional comparatist has to ensure that the social problem in the jurisdictions under 
comparison is common in order to build his/her theoretical analysis. Otherwise, it would be 
difficult for her/him to find similar functions and therefore, comparability between the 
selected legal systems for comparison will be unattainable100.  
                                                        
96 Mark Tushnet, „Returning With Interest: Observations On Some Putative Benefits Of Studying Comparative 
Constitutional Law‟ (1998) 1 (2) University Of Pennsylvania Journal Of Constitutional Law 325, 333. The 
claim that legal borrowings are bound to fail is especially prominent among organicist scholars. 
97 Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 34. 
98 Henry Merryam and David Clark, Comparative Law: Cases And Materials (London: Bobbs-Merrill 1978) 28. 
99 Pierre Legrand Claims That Universalism Does Not Exist In Different Socio-Legal Systems: see Legrand (n 
64) 52-58; Legrand (n 64) 1033; Legrand (n 61) 111, 113; see also Gunther Teubner, „The King‟s Many Bodies: 
The Self-Deconstruction Of Law‟s Hierarchy‟ (1997) 31 (4) Law & Society Review 763; Gunther Teubner, 
„Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay Of Legal And Social Systems‟ (1997) 45 American Journal Of 
Comparative Law 149. 
100 Husa (n 67) 10. 
24 
 
Comparative scholars who propose the idea of „universalism‟ and „convergence‟ and oppose 
the idea of „incommensurability‟ and „divergence‟ agree on the same basis. Markesinis and 
Glenn emphasise that human beings and their societies share similar or even identical social 
problems. The reason for the universality of problems, as they see it, lies in human nature and 
the common social demands in different societies
101
. Gordly argues that different legal 
systems in the world today may be consistent with the same legal principles. Hence, they 
seem to respond to the same common problem with quite similar circumstances and provide 
different solutions to this social problem
102
.  
Therefore, there is at least a certain amount of universality of social problems in various 
societies. In this study and through the forthcoming discussion, it will be shown that English 
and Saudi systems respond to the same problem even if they reach different legal solutions. 
The common problem in England and Saudi corporate environments is the exploitation of 
company property by directors. Both jurisdictions deal with this particular problem in order to 
protect the interests of the company from the misconduct of its board of directors and also to 
protect the interests of its shareholders as well as investors as a whole. However, the two 
jurisdictions each have their own approach to this problem. They may reach the same or 
different legal solutions, but this, theoretically, is not an important element. The most 
important theoretical element in functionalism is to assume that different societies face the 
same social needs and to ensure the functional equivalence of the legal rules and institutions 
under comparison that meet these needs
103
. 
2.3.1.3 Presumption of the Similarity of Legal Systems 
The notion of „functional equivalence‟ means that the rule in one legal system has its 
equivalent function in another
104
. To put it another way, comparative researchers should find 
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the legal rule that functionally responds to the same social problem in the given jurisdictions. 
However, this presumption of similarity has been severely criticised as it indicates the 
contrary. De Cruz, even though one of the proponents of functionalism, claims that „... it is 
too much of a generalisation to suggest that there should be a presumption that the practical 
result will invariably be the same in every, or even most, legal systems‟105. Quite the contrary, 
the hardcore of the functional approach in comparative law does not agree with the idea of 
similarity; instead, it supports the idea of both similarities and differences
106
. 
The universality of a legal problem prompts the similarity of function of the compared legal 
rules and institutions to solve this problem. However, this does not mean that the practical 
results will necessarily be similar
107
. On the contrary, the existence of the common problem 
requires the existence of functional equivalence between rules and institutions in the 
compared jurisdictions. This means that if there is no common problem between the 
compared societies, there will be no functional equivalence of legal rules and institutions and 
consequently, the comparison will be invalid. Therefore, the legal rules may seem similar 
with regard to the functions they fulfil, not in the similarity of solutions that they may 
propose. The solutions proposed by the compared legal systems may be similar or different, 
which does not affect the comparability between different legal systems. However, what does 
really matter is the functional equivalence of legal rules to solve the problem in question. 
Therefore, functionalism without the strict approach of „Praesumptio Similitudinis‟ seems 
better
108
 and this is what has led Kötz recently to confirm that this presumption is „a 
rebuttable presumption, and rebutted it must be when there is evidence for doing so‟109.   
2.3.1.4 A Balanced Approach: Application of Other Theories 
As seen above, functionalism in its pure and strict form is not the best approach for 
comparing legal systems of different countries. Considering the most common criticisms of 
functionalism, a number of comparative law scholars have been seeking new directions for 
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functional legal comparison. They argue that, when using other methods, the functionalist will 
better understand and enrich his/her own method and therefore, a successful comparison, 
epistemologically and methodologically, may be reached
110
. One of the fast developing areas 
of law in this regard is Socio-Legal Studies, which promotes an interdisciplinary approach to 
law. 
Socio-legal theory is based on the idea that the „law operates in a social context, that many 
factors interacted in the development of legal rules, and that law, therefore, needs to be 
studied and understood mainly as a social phenomenon‟111. According to Banakar112, socio-
legal studies should not be confused with legal sociology scholarship, which is popular in the 
West and is built upon much stronger disciplinary ties of law with social studies. Rather, 
socio-legal studies are regarded more as a subfield of social policy that focuses on resolving 
the issues in law and developing theories about the policy process
113
. Considering the work 
that has been conducted within socio-legal studies in the past years, it is possible to 
distinguish two major approaches. Banakar referred to them as „Studies of Law in Context‟ 
and „Policy Research‟114. Studies of Law in Context are conducted within the setting of social 
theory to represent the context in which law exists
115
. Policy Research, on the other hand, 
focuses on the way that law influences social conditions and behaviours
116
.  
Importantly, socio-legal studies often focus on the gaps that exist between the intention of 
legislatures behind the laws and the reality of the application of such laws, as interpreted by 
the courts and legal officials. Fredman showed this in an example of ethnic discrimination, 
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where the intent of the law did not match its real life applications
117
. Within the context of 
socio-legal studies, the law that is not applied in accordance with its original purpose is 
technically flawed
118
. Consequently, the notions of who interprets the law become as 
important as the law itself.   
The focus of the current research was on the examination of legal rules and institutions while 
not neglecting the influence of socio-cultural factors on them. It comparatively analysed legal 
rules as enacted by the legislator, case law as created by the judiciary and scholarly writings 
as produced by scholars. It also took into account the plurality of legal rules and institutions 
prevailing in the legal systems of England and Saudi Arabia. It also attempted to uncover 
patterns of convergence and similarities as opposed to divergence and differences between the 
compared jurisdictions. The functionalism approach, combined with the Socio-Legal Studies, 
in this sense represents the most realistic and applicable methodological tool for Comparative 
Law research
119
.  
2.3.1.5 The Study Process 
The process of comparison proceeded in accordance with the process of functional 
comparative law as developed by Zweigert and Kötz while considering some helpful 
methodological means from Socio-Legal Studies. Specifically, the following steps were 
applied: 
1) Justification of the comparative research by analysing the two legal systems under 
investigation with the goal of determining the points of convergence and divergence;
120
 
2) Introduction of the problem that both systems face; 
3) Presentation of the systems‟ approaches to solving the problem in question;121  
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121 „..this may be sufficient where each of the jurisdictions gives a clear and easily comprehensible solution to 
the problem in question‟ Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 43. 
28 
 
4) Conducting an inquiry into the similarities and differences between the legal systems as a 
pathway to solving the problem; 
5) At the final stage, „the comparatist must proceed to a critical evaluation of what he has 
discovered‟122.  
These steps were applied in the current research. The first step involved the review of the 
English and Saudi Arabian legal systems and determined how the systems are similar and 
how they are different. Socio-cultural environment was considered in this step, due to its 
tremendous impact on the way that the law operates in both countries. Further, justification 
for the comparison of the two systems was provided. The second step involved the 
introduction of the common problem that the systems in both countries have to address by 
legal means: directors‟ exploitation of corporate property. The third step in the research 
process presented the ways in which the English and Saudi legal systems regulated the duties 
of company directors towards corporate property. The fourth step introduced a comparative 
analysis of the approaches that both systems used for regulating the fiduciary duties of 
directors towards corporate property, and an assessment of their effectiveness. The final step 
in the analysis was the critical evaluation of the discovery and subsequent proposals for 
improving the regulations of the issue at hand in both legal systems. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the research process used in this research. The steps in the functional analysis in 
the table are matched with the corresponding chapters of the thesis, and the use of the Socio-
Legal approach is indicated where it was applied.   
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Table 1 
The Research Process 
Step in Functional Analysis Corresponding Chapter of the 
Thesis 
Application of Socio-Legal 
Studies Approach 
Justification of the 
comparative research 
 
Chapter 3 Applied 
Introduction of the common 
issue 
 
Chapter 4 Applied 
Presentation of the legal 
approaches used to resolve 
the issue 
 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 Applied 
Analysis of the approaches 
used to resolve the issue 
 
Chapter 7 Applied 
Discovery of the ways to 
improve the legal approaches 
Chapter 7 Applied 
 
2.4 Data Collection and Analysis  
This research was based on legal materials from English and Saudi law, in general, and on the 
company law of England and Saudi Arabia, in particular. The data collection was conducted 
by using library-based resources and electronic sources. The library resources used in the 
thesis can be divided into two types: printed collections and online databases resources. The 
printed resources included primary and secondary materials. The primary sources included 
codes of law, written constitutions, and law reports. The secondary sources included 
textbooks, scholarly legal and non-legal journals, and other relevant published works.  
The library of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and the library of the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) at the University of London as well as the official 
sites of Saudi Arabian Ministries were used to gather information about the legal and socio-
cultural environment in Saudi Arabia. Due to the recent accession of the Kingdom to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), many official regulations and statutes are available on 
these sites in English. Consulting the relevant government departments in Saudi Arabia was 
conducted in cases where the documents in question lacked translation. 
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The analysis of the collected data was conducted using the deductive method: first the socio-
cultural environments of both countries were reviewed to determine the major factors that 
influenced the applications of law. After that, the study looked into the specific sources of law 
regulating the fiduciary duties of corporate directors towards company property. The codified 
company law was the major focus of the analysis at this level, because of the possibility of 
introducing changes into it and its influence on company law in both countries in general.  
This chapter reviewed the methodological approach to be applied in this study and introduced 
the sequential steps of the inquiry method. Following the introduced method, the next chapter 
accordingly presents the legal systems of England and Saudi Arabia and makes the case for 
their comparison.  
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Chapter Three: The Legal System of Saudi Arabia – Sources of Law, Authorities and 
Judiciary in A Comparative Perspective  
3.1. Introduction 
Comparative lawyers have always given special attention to the classification of the legal 
systems under comparison. They are particularly concerned with examining the sources of 
law of the chosen jurisdictions, before comparing the relevant rules and institutions or 
concepts
123
. However, any comparison involving the sources of law presents special 
difficulties which are compounded if the compared systems have fundamental differences
124
. 
Nevertheless, Zweigert and Kötz argue that in any comparison „…the comparatist must treat 
as a source of law whatever moulds or affects the living law in his chosen system, whatever 
the lawyers there would treat as a source of law, and he must accord those sources the same 
relative weight and value as they do…‟125.  
The received wisdom is that every attempt to compare different legal systems, legal cultures 
or legal traditions should accord due cognisance to the relevant sources of law and legal 
institutions or concepts, otherwise such comparative studies may run into methodological 
quandaries
126
. Examining sources of law within the chosen legal systems is beneficial from 
both theoretical and practical perspectives
127
. Theoretically, the sources of law are a critical 
criterion to be applied when classifying the world‟s legal systems into distinct legal 
families
128
. In practical terms, knowing the sources of law helps the comparatist to 
understand which types of legal sources constitute the law under comparison, and therefore to 
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be able to find a solution to the challenges at hand, whether in case-law, codes or other types 
of sources
129
.   
According to the methodological approach chosen for this study
130
, the second step in the 
inquiry is to prepare a report on the legal systems under comparison. The report is often 
divided into three main parts: the sources of law, legal methodology, and the legal concepts 
or institutions of each legal system. According to the classification of legal families, English 
law is classified under Common law, while Saudi law belongs to Islamic law. Taking into 
consideration that the English legal system is well-researched and understood, this chapter 
focuses on the sources of law, legal authorities, and judiciary in Saudi Arabia with references 
to English law, where appropriate, to demonstrate similar features or differences between the 
legal systems of the two countries.  
3.2. The Legal System in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
For the majority of western societies, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is quite enigmatic. 
Some would argue that the nature of law in this country seems inconsistent and reflects the 
conflict between traditions and modernity
131
. The same difficulty is seen also in 
understanding the legal system of most Islamic countries, as it is seen as a complex family of 
laws rather than one single legal system
132
. However, others claim that Islamic law is capable 
of meeting the demands of societies in different aspects of life whether social, political, 
economic or legal, and therefore is amenable to modernity and globalization
133
. Glenn, for 
instance, opines that „while globalization has been going on above, Islamic law has been 
expanding on the ground‟134. In any case, Islamic Law should represent a genuine interest for 
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a comparative lawyer due to its unique nature, distinct sources of law, different structure and 
legal methodology.  
Islamic law, or Shariah
135
, is based on rules and provisions embodied primarily in the Qur’an 
and the customary traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnah. There are also 
supplementary sources of law, such as the Ijma and Qiyas. Finally, due to evolving 
developments in the laws of the Kingdom, government-issued laws have been gaining ground 
in the areas where the primary and supplementary religious sources fail to provide clear 
explanations. This chapter proceeds by examining the primary and secondary sources of 
Shariah law first. Further, it examines the modern sources of law that have an influence on 
the contemporary Saudi legal system. Then it moves on to shed some light on the authorities 
of the state and illustrates the most recent developments. The entire discussion is conducted 
with the elements of a comparative analysis: where appropriate, parallels with the English 
legal system are drawn. 
3.2.1 The Sources of Law 
The sources of law in Saudi Arabia can be classified into three categories: primary, secondary 
and ancillary: 
1) Primary sources are the main binding sources in Saudi law which comprise: 
a) The Qur’an: the book of God; and 
b) The Sunnah: the tradition of His Prophet  
2) Secondary sources are those which are seen as supplementary to the primary sources 
and have varying degrees of applicability. They consist of: 
a) Ijma (the consensus of Muslim jurists)  
b) Qiyas (judgement upon juristic analogy) 
3) Ancillary sources comprise: 
a) Regulations: enacted by government; 
                                                        
135 The general term for law in Arabic is Shariah, which means „the path or way which God wishes for men to 
follow‟. See Glenn P (n 126) 173.  
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b) Borrowed laws: the laws that have been developed by other countries, usually 
developed ones, and adopted by Saudi law.  
3.2.1.1 The Primary Sources of Law: the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
As Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, in fact the birth place of Islam, the Islamic tradition is the 
basis for its social, political and legal systems. Its legal system is Shariah which is primarily 
based on two sources: the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance 
1992, states that „the religion of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Islam; its constitution is the 
Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of His Prophet, May God bless him and give him 
peace‟136. Article 7 of the same regulations lays down that the rule in the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia draws its authorities from the Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of his Prophet. 
These two are sovereign over this regulation and all regulations of the state
137
.  
The Quran
138
, the speech of God revealed to the Prophet Mohammed fourteen centuries ago, 
is considered as the first and the most important source of law in the Islamic legal system. It 
contains more than 6,200 verses organized in 30 chapters that cover every aspect of life. 
Approximately eight hundred of the verses concern a range of issues, such as moral, ethical, 
criminal, social, political and economic matters. The most relevant to this study are the 
regulation verses related to financial matters, business activities, commerce and trust
139
.  
For Muslims, the law of God is the supreme legislation, and the Quran is „the real law‟140. 
Allah says in the Qur’an: „obey God and obey His Prophet‟141 and also „take what the 
                                                        
136 The Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, 1 March 1992. In fact, prior to the passing of this law, Saudi 
Arabia had no written constitution, the same as in England. Since 1 March 1992, however, the kingdom can be 
characterised as one of the countries which have a written constitution in a recognisable modern form, such as in 
France and Germany. For further information, see Ali Almehaimeed, „The Constitutional System Of Saudi 
Arabia: A Conspectus‟ (1993) 8 Arab Law Quarterly 30. 
137 ibid. 
138 The meaning of „Qur’an‟ is „reading‟ and the first revealed verse of the Qur‟an starts with the word (eqra’a 
beism rabik) which means 'Read in the name of your Lord', the Qur’an (96:1). 
139  These verses contain provisions that regulate different legal aspects. Some of them are related to civil and 
commercial transactions such as civil and commercial contracts, sales, loans, leases and mortgages. Some were 
revealed to deal with criminal issues and punishments such as murder, robbery, adultery, highway robbery and 
false accusation.  Some others concern marriage, divorce, revocation, maintenance, dowry, custody of children, 
fosterage, paternity, inheritance and bequests. Additionally, some were revealed to repeal objectionable 
customs, such as gambling, usury, infanticide and unlimited polygamy. For further information, see Mohamed 
Kamaly, Principles Of Islamic Jurisprudence (The Islamic Texts Society 2003) 26. 
140 Menski (n 111) 283. 
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Messenger assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you‟142. It is 
explicit, therefore, in the Qur’an, that the word of God is to be treated in the same way as the 
word of the Prophet, which is described in the Sunnah. 
The Sunnah literally means the traditions and the spoken words of the Prophet Mohammed 
received through his companions and then transmitted from generation to generation
143
. This 
source includes approximately thirty thousand Hadiths (Narrations) from the anecdotes, acts 
and sayings of the Prophet during his lifetime
144
. The prophetic Sunnah plays an important 
role in Islamic jurisdiction as it is considered as the main interpreter of the passages of the 
Qur’an and elaborates or explains other verses of it. The Prophet, as a recipient of the divine 
law and as Head of the early Islamic community, acted as a guide and an interpreter of the 
Qur’anic concepts and textual principles. In addition to this interpretative role, the 
significance of the Sunnah lies in playing a legislative role where the Qur’an provides no 
clear provision regarding a particular case. This authority was given by God to His Prophet, 
as the Prophet was the legislator, ruler, judge and leader of the early Islamic community
145
. 
Amongst all Muslims, including Saudis, the Prophet‟s practices, actions and way of life are 
seen as a model to be followed in all ways of life. 
The Qur’an and the Sunnah are divine legal rulings and the primary sources of legal rights 
and duties. The Qur’an is seen by Muslims as much more than human-made law in codes 
such as the case of Napoleonic code of law or in case law developed by the notion of stare 
decisis
146
. It is, rather, revealed as a comprehensive guidance for a Muslim‟s life, and as an 
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 The Qur’an (5:92) 
142 The Qur’an (59:7) 
143 It should be noticed that the transmission of the Sunnah must be followed by very strict criteria and 
requirements that have been set by leading Muslim jurists (Ulama).  
144 The prophet‟s sayings and actions (the Sunnah) have been edited and published in a number of publications 
and several volumes called books of Hadith (Narration). The most important of these books are: Sahih Bukhary 
and Sahih Muslim, and each book is named after the jurist who compiled it. There are other famous books of 
Hadith, such as Almusnad, Tirmidi and Abu Dawod. 
145 Menski (n 111) 284. 
146Menski (n 111) 284; Nicholas Foster, „Islamic Commercial Law: An Overview (I)‟ (2006) 3, 
<http://www.raco.cat/index.php/InDret/article/viewFile/122208/169328>, accessed 3 October 2011. 
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ethical, moral and legal code that „covers every aspect of life and every field of law: 
international, constitutional, criminal, civil, family, personal, and religious‟147.  
It has been observed that the main difference between the primary sources of Western law 
and Shariah law is as follows. The Western view of the content of law holds that the law is 
made by „legislators, judges and other social forces‟, and hence secular, and considered as a 
response to the needs for regulating different social, political and legal issues in a particular 
society
148
. Shariah law, however, is considered divine in nature and, therefore, immutable
149
. 
This view starts from a proposition that this law was given by God, and it reflects His 
intention rather than the intention of any earthly law-maker
150
. It was revealed to regulate 
every single issue in society; and, therefore, society must adapt itself to it rather than creating 
its own laws. From a conservative Islamic view, rulers, leaders and judges must apply this 
law and never resort to any human source of law where Islamic rules exist. However, if no 
definite guidance or clear provision about a particular legal matter is found within the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah, supplementary sources of law, namely the Ijma and Qiyas, can be used.  
3.2.1.2 The Secondary Sources of Law: the Ijma and the Qiyas 
151
 
Although it is believed that divine revelation covers the totality of human life, its full content 
needs to be extracted, understood and interpreted clearly and correctly by human effort. The 
Prophet was the only man who had the privilege to understand the intention of God directly 
and to act primarily as an interpreter of the words of God on one hand, and as the legislator 
for the Islamic community where the Qur’an remains silent, on the other152. While the 
Prophet faithfully fulfilled this role during his life, since his death Islamic scholars have had 
to continue ascertaining legal rules and interpreting the intention of the divine law and 
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 JND Anderson, „Law As A Social Force In Islamic Culture And History‟ (1957) 20 Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 14. 
148 Harold Berman and Samir Saliba, The Nature And Function Of Law (New York, NY, Foundation Press 
1972) 6-7; see also Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 304. 
149 Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 304. 
150 ibid. 
151 There are other additional sources of law that can be referred to as Subsidiary sources, such as; Qawl 
Alsahabi  (decision of a companion), Istihsan (equity in Islamic law), Istishab (legal presumption) and Urf 
(local custom). On secondary sources of the Islamic legal system, see generally Mohamad Kamil, The 
Beginning Of Islamic Legislation (Amman, Dar Althaqafah, 1989) 45-130. 
152 Menski (n 111) 294. 
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turning it into „living law‟. The primary sources of law may not be very clear or may not 
answer all legal questions directly and in detail. Instead, they give a broadly guiding legal 
framework. Hence, Islamic jurists have to find the answer within the primary sources of 
guidance. However, they do not attempt to create new rules but rather to discover, understand 
and interpret „the law which already exists‟153. This effort can be practised through the 
principles of either Ijma or Qiyas. 
The Ijma means the „unanimous agreement of Muslim jurists‟ on a particular matter, in any 
period following the death of the Prophet Mohammed‟154. During the Prophet‟s lifetime there 
was no place for any human-made endeavour as the only applicable sources were the Qur’an 
and Sunnah, while the Prophet was the community leader and the administrator of justice 
who applied, decided and interpreted legal rules. However, since his passing, it is clear that 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah do not always directly address certain aspects of human life. In 
this case, the consensus of Islamic scholars over a given issue became another important 
source of law. The Ijma is not available in resolving a potential problem, but rather for those 
that have arisen at a particular time
155
.  
The contributors to the Ijma are usually scholars who have knowledge of Shariah law and are 
expected to understand the provisions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah and, therefore, be able to 
reach a decision or solution for the problem in question. The validity of the Ijma is 
determined by strict and rigorous requirements. First, the Ijma must be in strict accordance 
with the principles of the primary sources of law. Second, the decision must be approved by 
the majority of the relevant scholars at the time of deciding the legal issue
156
.  
In contemporary Saudi Arabia, the Ijma can be witnessed in the role shared by the members 
of the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council
157
. Among other powers, these two 
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councils have the authority for regulating and reforming the laws in the Kingdom. Hence, any 
decision or any regulation to emerge from these councils should be treated as an Ijma of 
scholars and therefore as binding. The role of the Ijma can be understood from the 
perspective of Western law-making as well. For example, Parliament, as a legislative body in 
England, has to provide consent to a given law or decision before it is approved and comes 
into force as law. This is simply the Ijma as applied in Shariah law.  
Qiyas (analogical reasoning) is another supplementary source of law in Saudi Arabia. Qiyas 
may be best defined as „equivalence between a novel case and a principal case in respect to a 
rule-occasioning factor [illah] gleaned from a rule governing the principal case‟158. This 
principle holds that where there is no clear indication about a legal issue within the primary 
sources, the judge, by using analogical reasoning may look to the entire law, applying the 
most appropriate rule to the case at hand. Qiyas can be practised by the method of 
ascertaining the Illah (effective cause) of any given legal rule or case and applying it to the 
new case. The Illah may be defined as the reason for which a particular rule is believed to 
have been established by a law-giver
159
.  
Interestingly, Qiyas, through ascertaining the Illah or effective cause, is almost identical to 
the legal reasoning in common law, through determining the ratio decidendi of a case; 
although there may be differences between them in respect of the pillars and criteria of the 
decision making process
160
. In both jurisdictions, the judge has a practical role in 
promulgating legal determinations more than in other legal systems in the world. The 
common law judge applies the law to the case before him by examining the relevant previous 
case law, determining its ratio decidendi and applying the ratio analogically to reach his 
decision. Likewise, the Shariah judge in Saudi Arabia has a similar practical role which 
arises in situations where he is not able to find a clear answer in Shariah law for the matter at 
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hand.  The law permits the judge to look beyond the primary sources and reach a 
determination by using Qiyas
161
. 
The Qiyas, much like ratio decidendi, has a significant practical role as it gives the judge or 
Islamic scholar the right, in fact the obligation, to extract, interpret and apply legal 
provisions. This can be performed through the implementation of the doctrine of Ijtihad 
(personal reasoning or endeavour). This doctrine can be defined as „the method of seeking to 
establish a proper legal opinion by Islamic jurists, based on the interpretation of the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah‟162. While some scholars see Ijtihad as a source of law added to the 
secondary sources of Shariah law, most Islamic scholars consider it as a legal method or 
technique in ascertaining and interpreting the law rather than an acknowledged source of 
law
163
. As is the case in English jurisdiction, in Sharia law the purpose of interpretation is to 
discover the main intention of the legislator in respect of what has not been expressed clearly, 
as a matter of necessary inference from the surrounding circumstances
164
.  
The above are seen as mechanisms used by scholars to interpret and derive law from the 
primary sources. It is therefore significant to note that the Ijma and Qiyas must be reached in 
accordance with the Islamic principles contained in the main two sources; otherwise they will 
not be accepted as valid sources. In addition, to interpret and ascertain legal rules it is 
necessary for the interpreter to obtain the necessary knowledge in order to be qualified to 
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clearly understand the legal texts provided in both of them. In the Kingdom, the interpretation 
of the divine sources is done through the „Supreme Council of Senior Ulama165 (a 
government body of religious scholars), those who possess a knowledge of Islamic 
jurisprudence (Fiqh)
166
. These scholars are responsible for maintaining Shariah law in its 
pure form by deducing and interpreting the law according to the Hanbali school, the school 
of interpretation in the kingdom
167
.  
3.2.2 The Legislative Authorities in Saudi Arabia 
3.2.2.1 The Role and Treatment of Secular Law 
From the Islamic perspective, Shariah is an applicable and a comprehensive law that covers 
all aspects of human life in all times and all places
168
. Hence, in this law there is significant 
restriction on innovation, which is to be rejected if it is not based on a traditional textual 
source of Islamic principles. However, as a result of globalisation and the pressing need for 
legal development, the Shariah legal system has had the flexibility to consult and even 
„import‟ any legal rule complementary to it which deals with any legal matter where the 
Islamic sources of law provide no answer. This follows the fact that, while conforming to the 
primary sources and the principles contained in Shariah, Saudi Arabia is attempting to 
harmonise the principles of Shariah law with social, economic and legal development by 
evolving a form of legal system capable of meeting the needs of modern demands
169
. Similar 
to England and other nations in the globalised world, Saudi Arabia has had, and continues to 
face, the challenge of social, economic and political realities. It is, therefore, attempting to 
develop the law and to move forward to meet these challenges by passing regulations or 
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adopting foreign law rules which can supplement and be consistent with Shariah principles. 
The Saudi government has followed two principles in developing and applying secular law in 
the Kingdom: al-siyasah al-sharyiah (public policy) and almasalih almursalah (public 
interests).  
The doctrine of al-siyasah al-sharyiah is defined as „the administration of the affairs of 
subjects, executed by caring for their well-being and needs, their property and honor, and the 
dispatch of justice between and amongst them‟170. Under this principle the ruler (the king) is 
given the legitimate authority to enact regulations in the best interests of the society and its 
people
171
. In addition, it allows him to borrow, adopt and adapt foreign law in order to solve 
any legal issue for which no applicable rule is found in Shariah law.  
The dualism of traditional and borrowed law in contemporary Saudi Arabia is a product of 
two factors, historical and economic. From a historical perspective, Saudi Arabia underwent 
certain legal changes at the end of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, when legal reforms took place and several laws from Western countries 
were introduced
172
. It has been argued that this time is considered as the most decisive 
moment in bringing legal reform to most Islamic countries and introducing the notion of the 
codification of laws
173
. Furthermore, most of the countries neighbouring the current Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia were either previous British or French colonies, and thus were influenced by 
common law and civil law traditions
174
. Consequently, some parts of French codes of private 
law in Saudi Arabia came through Egypt, which began its relationship with the French legal 
system more than a century before any other countries in the region
175
. A prime example of 
this influence, as will be discussed later, is seen in the Saudi CL 1965 which was directly 
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copied by the Egyptians from French company law before the amendments of July 1966 and 
also adopted by the Saudis
176
.  
Another reason for the existence of modern legal rules within current Saudi law is the fact 
that the Kingdom is driven by pressures to create laws which are capable of meeting the 
modern legal and economic challenges, globally and regionally. At the global level, one of 
these pressures is being one of the most important crude oil exporting countries. This makes 
the Kingdom an influential nation in the global economy
177
. A further reason is its accession 
to the WTO and the legal process following this accession. These factors impelled the 
government to create modern laws which can meet international requirements by regulating 
foreign investment rules, promoting transparency, and ensuring a free market. At the regional 
level, the same requirement is derived from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its 
initiatives
178
. The GCC requires the Member States, such as the Kingdom, to cooperate in the 
harmonization process of certain areas of law
179
. This has consequently led the government to 
promulgate laws which are consistent with Shariah principles on the one hand and capable of 
meeting all of these demands on the other.      
The blending of foreign law rules, particularly those of developed nations, with Islamic legal 
principles can be seen as an inevitable outcome of the Kingdom‟s historical development and 
contemporary economic realities
180
. However, Western law, from an Islamic perspective, is 
secular in nature. Shariah, on the other hand, is divine and, therefore superior to it. This 
results in the requirement that all man-made laws conform to the rules of Shariah. More 
importantly, statutory rules enacted by government, or adopted from other jurisdictions, 
contribute as gap-filling and reformatory instruments within non-codified Shariah law
181
. 
                                                        
176
Hanson (n 15) 66. 
177 Saudi Arabia is one of the most powerful countries in the global economy; it is one of the G20 Members 
among such countries as the USA, China, UK, Japan and India: see BBC News, „G20: Economic Summit 
Snapshot‟ (2010) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/business/2009/g20/7897719.stm>, accessed 11 October 
2011.  
178 The members of the GCC are the Arabian Gulf countries: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia.  
179 Stovall (n 133) 842. 
180 ibid 840. 
181 In this regard, see Frank Vogel, Islamic Law And Legal System: Studies Of Saudi Arabia (Brill, Boston 
2000) 322: „In most Islamic states other than Saudi Arabia, the legal system is bifurcated: one part is based on 
man-made, positive law; the other part is Islamic law. The first part usually exists in the form of comprehensive 
43 
 
This is in sharp contrast with Western countries, including England, where secular law plays 
the primary role in governing human affairs. Unlike England, where the laws are issued to 
regulate all aspects of human life, only Shariah is granted such privilege in Saudi Arabia: 
secular law only carries a role of „patching the holes‟ in Islamic law.  
3.2.2.2 The Legal Authorities 
Article 44 of the Basic Law of Governance 1992 (BLG) confirms that „the authorities of the 
state consist of the following: the legislative authority, the executive authority and the judicial 
authority. These authorities cooperate in carrying out their functions, in accordance with the 
provisions of this and other regulations; the king shall be the point of reference for all these 
authorities‟. The „authorities‟ are similar to what are called the „Arms of Government‟ in 
other countries.  
Since Saudi Arabia acknowledges that only God has the real authority to legislate
182
, it is 
particularly true that there is no real legislative body which has the authority to enact laws in 
the Kingdom, as the English Parliament has. However, as mentioned earlier, the legislative 
process can be performed through the Islamic principles of public policy (alsiyasah 
alshar'iyyah) and public interest (almaslahah almursalah)
183
. Under these two doctrines 
numerous regulations have been promulgated to aid the administrative and legal 
developments in the Kingdom over the past decades. The King has the power to enact, 
approve and amend regulations by a Royal Decree or Royal Order. Royal Orders can be 
issued by the King to regulate most fundamental laws such as the Basic Law of Governance 
1992 (BLG)
184
; the Council of Ministers Law (1993)
185
 and the Law of the Consultative 
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Council (1992)
186
. A Royal Order comes into force as soon as it is established, without other 
legislative institutions being consulted. 
The legislative authority in the kingdom is shared by the King, the Council of Ministers and 
the Consultative Council
187
. The Council of Ministers has regulatory, administrative and 
executive authority and the power to decide the country‟s policy. With regard to regulatory 
authority, the council shares this function with the king where any of its members can 
propose a law concerning his or her Ministry‟s affairs. Then, after considering the proposed 
law, the council reaches its decision by the approval of two-thirds of its members. The 
council then will be responsible for sending its decision to the king to have his final approval 
and to issue the Royal Decree. The Consultative Council also shares a regulatory role through 
consulting its members regarding the proposed law. The decision of this council is subject to 
amendment by the king, and once he ratifies it the final Royal Decree can be created and the 
new law announced
188
.  
Arguably, Article 44 of the BLG 1992 has confirmed the separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities for the first time in the history of the Kingdom. 
Yet there is no clear separation of powers in its true meaning and therefore two important 
points should be made
189
. On the one hand, while this Article confirms clearly the separation 
of powers between legislative and executive authorities, the Council of Ministers enjoys both 
of these. Hence, according to the principle of separation of powers, when more than one 
authority rests solely in one single branch of government this could create less accountability 
and therefore abuse of power may occur
190
. On the other hand, Article 67 of the same law 
laid down that the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council could share the 
legislative function while in fact the role of the Consultative Council is seemingly of an 
advisory nature rather than a legislative one
191
. In any event, whether the Consultative 
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Council plays the legislative or consultative role, the total and ultimate approval of the 
proposed law resides with the King, and hence laws cannot be issued without his consent.    
The King also heads the Council of Ministers, which plays an essential role in conducting and 
directing the Kingdom‟s internal and external policies and affairs. As the Prime Minister, the 
King is the final authority in deciding state policy and has legislative, executive and 
administrative authority
192
. These include control of the financial, economic, educational and 
defence policies. In addition to its legislative role, the council is the direct executive 
authority, and once it establishes regulations it has the power to monitor the enforcement of 
these laws
193
. In doing so, the council is given the authority to create committees and councils 
such as the Higher Committee for Administrative Reform, the Supreme Council of Higher 
Education, the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs and the National Security Council. The 
main task of these committees and councils is to review the conduct of the ministries to 
ensure proper implementation of the laws and to improve the administrative function
194
. The 
only concern in this regard, however, is that both legislative and executive powers are 
concentrated in a single arm of the government, which may be seen as a contradiction to the 
notion of separation of powers which are typical for Western democracies including England.   
As is seen, the king is the ultimate authority in deciding state policies and approving 
regulations. Since the foundation of the Kingdom in 1932, King Abdul-Aziz and his 
successors have played a significant role in influencing the legal infrastructure of the 
Kingdom. The government, in all these reigns, has set five-year development plans that 
resulted in various regulations, most notably commerce-related enactments. The CL 1965
195
, 
for instance, is the largest piece of legislation that the government introduced in the era of 
King Faisal (1964-1975). Furthermore, during the reign of King Fahad (1982-2005) 
significant steps were taken to improve the Kingdom‟s laws when the king approved three 
significant written laws. He established fundamental commercial regulations such as the 
Arbitration Law (AL1993)
196
, the Foreign Investment Law (FIL2000)
197
 and the Capital 
                                                        
192 Article 1 of the Council of Ministers‟ Law, issued by Royal Decree No A/13, Aug 21st 1993.  
193 Council of Ministers‟ Law, article 19 and 29. 
194 Ansary (n 166). 
195 Royal Decree No M/6, 1965.  
196 Issued by Royal Decree No M/46, 1993. 
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Market Law (CML2003)
198
. Further, the long awaited law of Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CGRs 2006),
199
 when approved by King Abdullah (the current king), was 
lauded by judges as well as the business community
200
. 
It is therefore evident that since the late twentieth century and continuing into the first decade 
of this century, there have been feverish and largely government-promoted legislative 
activities with the aim of codification. Yet the codification of laws is a contemporary 
challenge that has both proponents and opponents in the Kingdom. The opponents maintain 
that codification denies the fact that „Islamic law being a doctrine and a method rather than a 
code.....is by its nature incompatible with being codified, and every codification must subtly 
distort it‟201. The proponents of codification, however, observe that the purpose of 
codification is to overcome „unwieldiness and ambiguity of classical Islamic law by reducing 
the multitude of authoritative legal interpretation to a single standardized code‟202. The 
government in turn tries to reconcile the views of traditionalists and modernists towards the 
codification of laws. 
The current judicial system of Saudi Arabia is based on the Judiciary Statute of 2007
203
. This 
law classifies courts in the kingdom into a three-tiered system composed of the Shariah 
courts system, the administrative courts system, and the civil and commercial tribunals. 
According to Article 7 of the Judiciary Act 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council is the main 
supervisor of the judicial system in the Kingdom and has several functions over all courts 
including administrative and consultative responsibilities
204
. The administrative function is to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
197 Royal Decree No M/1, April 2000. 
198 Established by Royal Decree No M/30, 2003. 
199 Established in 2006 by the Board of Capital Market Authority (CMA), Resolution No 1/212/2006.  
200 Further examination of these regulations will be carried out in the next chapter. 
201 Joseph Schacht, „Problem Of Modern Islamic Legislation‟ (1960) 12 Studia Islamica 99, 108. 
202 Jackson S, quoted from Moghul (n 154) 196. 
203 The old Judiciary Statute was enacted in 1975 and has been subject to many amendments to meet new needs 
and challenges. The new law was established by a Royal Decree, issued by King Abdullah on October 1st 2007. 
It is aimed at reforming the judicial system in the kingdom. A budget of 7 billion Saudi Riyals (approx £1200 
million) has been allocated to this project. It is seen as a serious and the most extensive attempt to shape the 
Saudi Judiciary to meet the highest standards of the judicial system. This came about as a result of pressing 
social and economic demands to improve the whole legal system of the kingdom.  
204 Judiciary Statute 2007, article 7 states that „the Supreme Judicial Council has a supervisory role over the 
courts in as much as is designated by this Act‟. 
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supervise the internal system of the courts, the judges and their employment-related affairs 
and to appoint and dismiss them
205
. The consultative role is where the King or the Minister of 
Justice requires consultation on a particular legal matter; the council‟s role is to provide legal 
advice regarding the issue. In addition, the council has the power to resolve issues of 
jurisdictional conflict between the Shariah courts.  
Shariah courts have general jurisdiction over a wide range of cases including criminal, civil, 
commercial, labour and personal status cases
206
. The Shariah court system consists of three 
levels established as follows: the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the First Degree 
Courts
207
. The First Degree Courts consist of five types: General Courts, Criminal Courts, 
Personal Status Courts, Commercial Courts and Labour Courts. The Court of Appeal has the 
same structure of several panels, and its main function is to review rulings issued by the 
lower courts and to monitor the implementation of Shariah law. The High Court is the 
highest authority in the Shariah court system. Its main judicial role is to review judgments 
and decisions made by the Court of Appeal on important cases.  
Modern developments in the economic and social life of the Kingdom have brought many 
new aspects that have to be covered by law. Sometimes Shariah is not able to provide 
succinct answers to regulation of these aspects, and therefore additional legal institutions 
have been introduced for these matters. The Board of Grievances, Diwan Almadalim, which 
is known as Conseil d’Etat in France and Majlis alDawla in Egypt, was established to settle 
administrative and commercial disputes
208
. It has a similar hierarchical structure to that of the 
Shariah courts: High Administrative Court, Administrative Court of Appeal, and 
Administrative Courts. In addition, the Judiciary Act 2007 has set down specialised 
committees to settle other civil and commercial disputes that fall outside the jurisdiction of 
the Shariah courts and the Board of Grievances: the Committee of Customs, the Committee 
                                                        
205 Judiciary Statute 2007, article 7.  
206 Judiciary Statute 2007, article 26 indicates that „the Shariah courts shall have a jurisdiction over all types of 
disputes and crimes except those excluded by law‟. Article 49 of the Basic System of Governance 1992 declares 
that „Observing what is stated in Article 53 of this law, the courts shall arbitrate in all disputes and crimes‟. 
207 Article 2-25 of the Judiciary Statute. 
208 Board of Grievances Statute 1982, article 8. The following types of cases are decided by Diwan Almadalim: 
cases related to the rights of employees; compensation cases; objections to administrative decisions; contract 
related issues; disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation; penal cases regarding bribery 
and forgery; and requests for implementation of foreign judgments. 
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of Settlement of Labour Disputes, the Committee of Settlement of Banking Disputes and the 
Committee of Commercial Disputes Settlement
209
.  
Importantly, however, none of these institutes and boards function independently. The Board 
of Grievances is responsible directly to the King
210
, while the Committees are considered as 
parts of the executive authority, the Council of Ministers
211
. This is a further indication of the 
fact that, in reality, there is no separation of powers in the Kingdom: while Article 46 
confirms the independence of the judiciary from other authorities in the state, the entire 
judicial system is subordinate to the King
212
. Further, each board and committee has auditors, 
who observe the compliance with Shariah. Article 48 of the Basic Law of Governance lays 
down that all courts in the kingdom are obliged to apply Shariah law to cases brought before 
them, and the regulations issued by the king if they do not contradict the principles of 
Shariah law.  
The reason for the absence of independence of judicial authority in Saudi Arabia can be 
explained by the fact that most Islamic scholars are in consensus that the head of the state 
also has authority over the judiciary
213
. Therefore, the king in Saudi Arabia is the ultimate 
source for all of the state‟s authorities including the judiciary214. He exercises authority over 
the judiciary by appointing and dismissing judges according to recommendations made by the 
Supreme Judicial Council
215
. He also can intervene in any court judgment to ensure the 
implementation of Shariah law and has the right to intervene in any major judicial decision 
related to certain serious crimes
216
. One can conclude therefore that in Saudi Arabia, and 
                                                        
209 The decisions of these committees do not have finality and should be reviewed by the Board of Grievances in 
order to reach finality. Al-Jarbou (n 191) 34. 
210 Board of Grievances Statute 1982, article 1 establishes the Board‟s full subordination to the King. 
211These committees are established under the authority of one of the ministers. Al-Jarbou (n 191) 29. 
212 It should be noted that in recent years and due to the increase in the number of civil and commercial disputes, 
there has been a tendency to assign the boards and committees full judicial authority. This may be an indication 
that the Saudi government is considering establishing more specialised courts with qualified judges to handle 
these different civil and commercial matters. These developments can be seen as the beginning of an 
improvement in the Judiciary System of Saudi Arabia. 
213 Al-Jarbou (n 191) 15. 
214 BLG 1992, article 44 
215 BLG 1992, article 52 states that the appointment and dismissal of judges is carried out by royal orders. 
216In serious criminal cases such as brigandage (Hiraba) or other criminal acts which threaten the safety of the 
state and its people such as terrorist acts, the court‟s authority is to identify the type of the crime and to propose 
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despite the fact that the separation of powers has been recognised in the Basic Law of 
Governance, the king has the „supreme power‟ and he is the final resort of the authorities of 
the state. 
3.2.2.3 The Authorities of the Courts 
As was demonstrated above, the Saudi Judicial system is not independent in a sense that is 
understood in the West. Consequently, the authorities of Saudi courts are also quite different 
from, for example, English courts. In England, even though there is a tendency to give the 
acts of Parliament supremacy over case law, important bodies of law are almost entirely 
judge-made, which is the main characteristic of this type of law. In Saudi Arabia by contrast, 
the law is governed by the Qur’an and the Sunnah as primary sources and the Ijma and Qiyas 
as secondary sources, and these four have always been held as the uppermost sources of law. 
Consequently, the courts do not make or adjust the law: they only interpret it.   
Second, English law applies the principle of „stare decisis,‟ which requires the judge, when 
deciding a new case, to look at the facts of prior case law and compare them with the facts of 
the case at hand, then decide accordingly. Saudi law, however, does not bind the judge in this 
way: Shariah law, especially the primary sources, formulates the law. This means that Saudi 
judges do not look at precedents; rather, they treat each case on a separate basis based on the 
applicable rules of secular law and in compliance with Shariah. This puts Saudi courts closer 
to their counterparts in civil law systems. 
At the same time, judges in both jurisdictions have a practical role in promulgating legal 
determinations. The common law judge applies the law to the case before him by examining 
the relevant previous case law, determining its ratio decidendi and applying the ratio 
analogically to reach his decision. Likewise, the Shariah judge in Saudi Arabia has a similar 
practical role which arises in situations where he is not able to find a clear answer in Shariah 
law for the matter at hand. The law permits the judge to look beyond the primary sources and 
reach a determination by using Qiyas (analogical reasoning). In the view of the researcher 
therefore, this feature is one of the key motivations driving the rejection of codification as it 
would deprive the judges, in both legal systems, of their legislative role.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
the appropriate punishment. The final decision is within the King‟s authority as he may ratify the decision or 
reject it as he deems fit. See Ibrahim Zafir, Criminal Procedures (Riyadh, King Fahad National Library 1999) 
393.  
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3.3 Codification of Law: Present Situation and Future Prospects 
The codification of laws has been a challenge for both English and Saudi law. However, 
while English law has overcome this challenge
217
, in Saudi Arabia there is still strong 
resistance to the codification of Shariah law. In fact, there is a huge ongoing debate among 
the legal authorities and the religious scholars about the possibility of codifying Shariah law. 
On the one hand, opponents of codification argue that codification means legislation and this 
is un-Islamic and will erode the key distinguishing feature of Shariah law. Consequently 
people will rely on other codified laws rather than the Shariah and this in turn challenges the 
supremacy of the divine law
218
. On the other hand, proponents of codification of the Shariah 
principles maintain that the lack of codification has contributed to a certain degree to the 
inconsistency and uncertainty in court judgments in the Kingdom
219
. Safeir contends that the 
codification of Shariah law is the overarching theme for the development of law which will 
bring about an effective legal reform for the legal system of Saudi Arabia
220
. Codification 
also helps practitioners in understanding the law, as it is not easy to understand, especially for 
a foreign lawyer who needs to acquire the related rules from different sources of Shariah law. 
These sources are generally included in large numbers of volumes available only to the 
experts of Shariah law and are seen by other practitioners as a sophisticated art
221
.   
The option of codifying Shariah law overcomes the „unwieldiness‟ of classical Shariah 
principles to be provided in an accessible and single code of law. Even in England, a common 
law country, where the law is not based on legal codes, enormous numbers of codifications 
                                                        
217 Up to the second half of the twentieth century, codification of law was not welcomed in England. See, for 
example, Harlan Stone, „Some Aspects Of The Problem Of Law Simplification‟ (1923) 23 Columbia Law 
Review 319 (quoted from Cappalli R The American Common Law Method (Transnational Publishing 1997) 62. 
However, today codes and statutes comprise the primary source of law in the country. The importance of 
parliamentary Acts is particularly noteworthy with legislation relating to commerce. For example, The CA 2006, 
The Directors‟ Disqualification Act 1986, and the Insolvency Act 1986 are the key regulations in the area of 
corporate affairs. 
218Frank Vogel, „Prospects For A Restatement: The Codification Of Commercial And Contract Law In Saudi 
Arabia‟ in Ruttley H and Mallat C (eds) Commercial Law In The Middle East (London, Kluwer Law 
International Incorporates 1995) 34. 
219This evidence is provided by a Shariah court judge who is calling for the codification of the Shariah law in 
particular in civil and commercial issues. Nasser Bin Dawood, „The Codification Between Acceptance And 
Resistance‟. (2006) (Arabic) <http://www.cojss.com/article.php?a=68>, accessed 20 September 2010. 
220 George Sfeir, „The Saudi Approach To Law Reform‟ (1988) 36 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
729, 757-758; Esmaeili (n 132) 30-31.  
221 David Karl, „Law In Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know‟ (1992) 25 George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics 131.  
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have been passed by Parliament as a means to help people to understand the law and to 
enable judges to be less variable in their judgments. Although the English judiciary has 
played a great part in developing the law in the country, codification is also recommended as 
promoting legal certainty. The prime example, as will be seen later on in this research, is in 
the new codified duties of directors under the English Companies Act 2006. Moreover, the 
attempts taken by some Islamic countries, such as Egypt in codifying its civil law in 1949, 
Lebanon in codifying commercial rules in 1965, and Kuwait in codifying its civil law in 1980 
and commercial law in 1981, are seen as successful examples in codifying Shariah law in 
these particular areas of law
222
. These codes adopt and adapt Islamic legal principles that are 
compatible with modern law
223
.  
Codification is therefore an important step to be taken to improve the legal system in Saudi 
Arabia, and it is recommended that the government accords this project top priority status and 
moves towards the codification of Shariah law. It is suggested that the codes should include 
the relevant Shariah rules in each specific area of law and where there is no clear provision in 
Shariah, the gap should be filled by legal rules established by royal decrees and orders or 
borrowed from other countries‟ legal systems. This will render the legitimacy of the rules 
indicated in the codes certain, as they combine Shariah rules with human-made law and 
therefore should be applicable in the country. This consequently obliges the judges of 
Shariah courts to be more accurate in their judgement and to gradually accept the idea of 
codification on the one hand, and to help other courts‟ judges to assimilate the viable Shariah 
rules and apply them in a proper way, on the other. The interpretation of the codes, as well as 
decisions that the codes do not provide, will be left to the Ulama (religious scholars)
224
.  
Second, the current legal scholars in the Kingdom are usually criticized for lack of familiarity 
with the changing styles of the modern legal demands, in that they cannot relate the principles 
of Shariah law to contemporary jurisdictions and judicial practice. This criticism may be 
attached to the lack of effort by the Ulama (religious scholars) to ascertain legal rules from 
Shariah law that are more responsive to the demands of the modern economy. The issue, 
                                                        
222 Prior to these codifications there was the Ottoman Majalla, which constituted the first modern codification of 
certain areas of Shariah law concerning the law of contract, obligation and some other commercial and civil 
rules. It was promulgated in 1877 by the Ottoman government and remained in force until the dismantling of the 
empire in 1918.   
223 Sfeir (n 220) 757. 
224 Esmaeili (n 132) 30. 
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perhaps, lies in a failure to use available Islamic legal methodologies to extract the relevant 
rules to specific legal issues from the sources of Islamic law. Certain areas of law such as 
family law, inheritance, criminal and other different areas of law such as public law have 
been developed by Islamic scholars over time, from the medieval ages until recent times. 
However, other particular subjects such as that of private law need to be developed further, in 
order to meet the current legal challenges. Although Islamic law has gradually become 
established as a source of reference in Banking law (Islamic Banking) for instance,
225
 it is not 
so developed in the area of company law
226
. While Shariah law is a comprehensive code that 
leaves nothing uncovered, ascertaining the legal rules related to this area is the main task of 
Shariah scholars. 
As has been seen, effective codification of law is of the utmost importance for Saudi Arabia. 
First, it follows from the fact that judges are not capable of making law or changing it. 
Second, it is dictated by the constantly evolving socio-economic sphere of life. Third, and 
this is also applicable to England, effective codification of law should resolve inconsistencies 
between legal decisions. Therefore, this study focuses on the codified law in both countries in 
an attempt to distinguish the best areas of legislative practice and to identify the areas that 
require a better formulation of law.  
 
                                                        
225 Ashraf Kazi and Abdel Halabi, „The Influence Of Qur‟an And Islamic Financial Transactions And Banking‟ 
(2006) 20 (3) Arab Law Quarterly 321. 
226 Timur Kuran, „The Absence Of The Corporation In Islamic Law: Origin And Persistence‟ (2005) 53 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 785. 
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Chapter Four: The Board of Directors in English and Saudi Jurisdictions: A 
Comparative Analysis  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the legal system of Saudi Arabia with comparative references 
to England. It was shown that while the legal systems in these countries belong to different 
legal families (Islamic and common law respectively) and exist in different socio-cultural 
environments, they still can be usefully compared from the functionalist perspective due to 
their existing strong similarities in terms of legal institutions regulating the corporate 
governance framework and statutory provisions that create the major laws of governance. 
Following the functional approach introduced by Zweigert and Kötz as the research method 
of this study, the next step presents the common issue that these legal systems face.  
This chapter begins by arguing that both Saudi and English legal systems face the common 
problem of effective law codification to regulate the fiduciary duties of company directors 
towards company property. Prior to conducting the analysis itself, however, it is important to 
understand exactly what (and whom) the corresponding provisions in the statutory law are 
created to regulate, as well as why and how. By answering these questions, it will be possible 
to analyse the effectiveness of statutory codes in relation to their main tasks and functions. 
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter is structured to provide a discussion about those who are 
targeted by the statutory provisions in question: the company directors and their positions, 
roles, and interaction with other parties in the corporate governance framework. Remaining 
with the comparative nature of the research, the discussion is conducted in relation to both 
England and Saudi Arabia, noting any similarities and differences between the systems as the 
discussion moves along. 
The second section of the chapter analyses the structure and types of ownership of companies 
in England and Saudi Arabia to present the environments in which regulation of the fiduciary 
duties of company directors takes place. The third section discusses the legal concept of a 
director in each legal system and reviews various forms of directorship that exist within them. 
Since the thesis concentrates on statutory law in both countries, only the types of directors 
recognised in the company law statutes of each country will be considered (bearing in mind 
that neither in England nor in Saudi Arabia is a comprehensive definition of the term 
„director‟ provided). The fourth section analyses the legal position of a company director in 
England and Saudi Arabia, and the chapter concludes with a brief summary.   
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4.2 The Issue Faced by the Legal Systems 
One of the current and most pressing demands in both the English and Saudi legal systems is 
the notion of law codification. This legal challenge is seen as a result of the pressing domestic 
needs for a healthier legal climate. Although there are different reasons that have led to this 
demand (and these will be demonstrated in this chapter), the importance of it has not 
diminished in either country.   
As was examined previously, although English law, being a common law system, does not 
depend much on legal codification, there has recently been a considerable interest in taking 
this approach seriously. For instance, company law is seen as an excellent example of legal 
codification in this area. In the mid-nineteenth century, the provisions related to companies in 
England were included in a short statute that was combined with certain existing concepts 
from case law and further developed to create a basis of modern company law: the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict.c.110) expanded access to incorporation of joint-
stock companies, while the later Limited Liability Act 1855 created limited liability 
companies, and the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 created a basic legal system of company 
law. Over decades, the legal developments have continued and caused a significant increase 
in the scope of statutory codification resulting in the CA 2006: the longest statute in English 
legal history
227
. This series of Acts has long guided legal development in corporate 
regulations in England and even beyond
228
. By contrast, in Saudi Arabia, where the 
accelerating economic growth meets socio-political developments, there is a public „thirst‟ 
for legal reform and, consequently, an increase in the scope of codifications. Despite the lack 
of support for codification from religious scholars in the kingdom, this notion has found 
somewhat greater favour from Saudi lawyers in the area of commercial and company law. 
Under the pressure of legal reform demands, the Saudi legislators deferred and employed the 
                                                        
227 John Armour, „Codification And UK Company Law‟ In Association Du Bicentenair Du Code De Commerce 
(ed) Bicentenair du Code de Commerce 1807-2007: Les Actes des Colloques (Paris, Dalloz 2008) 287-310. 
<http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/conference/legal/2008%20Company%20Law%20Codification%20Dalloz.pdf>, 
accessed 11 January 2011. 
228 Mohammad Salim, „Legal Transplantation And Local Knowledge: Corporate Governance In Malaysia‟ 
(2006) 20 (1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 55. While the CA 2006 has been in force for only five years, 
the series of Companies Acts, starting from the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, have essentially retained the 
same fundamental features which have influenced corporate governance in England.  
55 
 
codification technique, which is considered the most important and effective tool for 
improving corporate legal environment in the Kingdom
229
.  
As far as company law is concerned, England is generally regarded as having one of the most 
comprehensive legal systems today. After the long history of legal developments, the 1300 
sections and 16 schedules of the CA 2006 include provisions related to the formation of 
companies, their businesses and the rights and duties of a company‟s shareholders and 
directors. One of the main changes introduced by the Act to company law was related to the 
codification of the directors‟ fiduciary duties and the common law duty of care and skill. This 
is important, considering that prior to the Act; directors‟ duties were regulated in a 
disorganised manner by certain statutory requirements, equitable principles, and pieces of 
common law
230
. The Act and the later introduced CGC 2010 had the goal of codifying and 
simplifying directors‟ fiduciary duties by listing and explaining them in one place. It is, 
however, by no means clear that all the duties have been codified and whether or not there is 
potential to expand the range of duties. In addition, as will be seen from the following 
chapters, even the CA 2006 has been incapable of resolving many of the issues that remain 
present in the country‟s company law. This rests in particular with the traditional approaches 
that English courts have taken in resolving the problems related to regulation of the fiduciary 
duties of company directors. Many of the historic decisions regarding various matters in this 
regard have been controversial and even contradictory, as the courts took different 
approaches to similar matters. The CA 2006 is the first attempt by the English legislature to 
regulate the fiduciary duties of company directors; therefore, it is not free from certain 
omissions and ambiguities.  
In Saudi Arabia, the major law regulating business practices is the 1965 Companies Law. 
Unlike the CA 2006, the CL 1965 was not developed in its entirety by Saudi legislators, since 
                                                        
229 See Thabet Korateym, „The Islamic Nature Of The Saudi Regulations For Companies‟ (2000) 15 (1) Arab 
Law Quarterly 63, 64-65. While Shariah Law, which is the Supreme Law in the Kingdom, has been considered 
the most competent in regulating unchanging aspects of human relations, such as family law, criminal law, or 
property relations, it has not been found such for the ever-changing aspects of business governance. At the same 
time, the booming Saudi economy after the oil discovery demanded solutions in law codification for the good of 
society. This resulted in the Companies Act being signed into law in 1965. Until recently, the Act has remained 
the only legal tool for governing the corporate legal environment in the Kingdom.  
230 See Lee Roach, „The Legal Model Of The Company And The Company Law Review‟ (2005) 26 The 
Company Lawyer 98 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754679>, accessed 11 January 
2011. In order to obtain a picture of the nature and scope of directors‟ duties, one had to review „a confusing and 
compendious mass of case law and the occasional statutory measure;‟ also see Ron Harris, Industrialising 
English Law: Entrepreneurship And Business Organisation, 1720–1844 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 2000). 
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its major provisions have been borrowed from Egyptian-French company law. The CL 1965, 
however, also lays out the legal framework regulating the board of directors, and their rights, 
duties and responsibilities in conducting the business of the company. In 2006, the Saudi 
government introduced its own version of a company soft law
231
: the CGR 2006, which 
contains a comprehensive list of the best governance practices for listed companies. As the 
main company law document in Saudi Arabia, the CL 1965 has supremacy over other statutes 
and legal provisions except for its subservience to Shariah law
232
. Nevertheless, despite 
numerous amendments, the CL 1965 itself has never been revised as a whole. To many legal 
scholars and practitioners of company law, the CL 1965 represents an outdated mechanism of 
corporate governance, which does not effectively match the realities of modern times. The 
analysis of the CL 1965 provided later in this thesis, in relation to the fiduciary duties of 
directors towards corporate property, reveals numerous unresolved issues and loopholes that 
make the effective application of the law quite difficult. Therefore, the issue of effective 
codification of law is present in Saudi Arabia as well.  
Both laws, the CL 1965 and the CA 2006, have imposed certain provisions concerning a 
company‟s board of directors, its functions, legal status, structure, and composition, and they 
outline the duties and responsibilities of the board and individual directors. While the focus 
of this study is to deal with the duties of directors in respect of company property that arise 
from their fiduciary relationship,
233
 the nature of this relationship is worth identifying and 
explaining before moving on to examine these duties. Even more importantly, the majority of 
large companies face two main obstacles to the proper implementation of the fiduciary duties 
of directors: one arising from the ownership structure and the powers of controlling 
shareholders, and the other dealing with the legal identification of a company director who 
can be considered as a fiduciary. Therefore, before analysing the duties of directors in the 
compared jurisdictions it is pertinent to consider the theories and approaches related to the 
ownership structure and the classification of companies under both legal systems.  
                                                        
231 The term „soft law‟ is generally applied to the quasi-legal instruments that do not have the binding status of 
laws and regulations. Although pieces of soft law play an important role in improving corporate governance 
standards, they are generally of an advisory nature, providing guidance on best practice. See, for example, Jean 
Du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles Of Contemporary Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 170; also see Jonathan Charkham and Helen Poix, Keeping Better Company: Corporate 
Governance Ten Years On (Oxford University Press 2005) 298-299. 
232 As noted in Chapter 3, every human-made law in the Kingdom has to be Shariah compliant in order to 
become active.  
233 This will be dealt with extensively in the following two chapters. 
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4.3 Ownership Structure and the Classification of Companies 
Most corporate governance regulations in the world agree that there are two primary 
institutions within a corporation: the board of directors, or managers, and shareholders
234
. In 
addition, these regulations are always concerned with how the corporation is managed and 
the interrelationship between these institutions
235
. However, the ownership structure of a 
company, as well as the different countries‟ jurisdictions, creates a diversity of patterns 
governing these interrelations. For example, in civil law jurisdictions, the concentrated 
ownership is prevalent. It is characterised by a small number of investors who have an 
influence on the company‟s management. In contrast, in common law jurisdictions the 
dispersed ownership is more popular. It is characterised by the presence of a large number of 
shareholders, none of whom has too much controlling influence. As will be shown below, 
England and Saudi Arabia differ from each other in terms of corporate ownership to a large 
degree, and this fact creates different patterns of corporate governance in each country.  
4.3.1 Theories of Corporate Ownership and Control 
It is an acknowledged fact today that the modern corporate world is divided into two systems 
of ownership: dispersed and concentrated
236
. Consequently, why ownership structures in 
some countries fall into a dispersed category and in others into a concentrated one, largely 
depends on the quality of law, the protection of property rights, and the effectiveness of legal 
institutions
237. The groundbreaking work in this matter is widely considered Adolf Berle‟s 
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and Gardiner Means‟ „The Modern Corporation and Private Property‟, written in 1932. From 
an empiric investigation of two hundred of the largest non-financial public companies in the 
United States, the authors argued that their capital needs could only be fulfilled by the 
presence of a large number of investors with a small number of shares, which does not give 
anyone significant control over the company
238
. This, in turn, created a gap in corporate 
control, which was filled by the corporate executives. In the end, according to Berle and 
Means, the executives had a small share in the company, but full functional control, while 
shareholders had neither means nor incentives to control the executives
239
. 
The two primary concerns raised by Berle and Means were that corporate management might 
not have the same objectives as directors and that it might not be accountable to shareholders. 
As a result, the authors argued that the main purpose of corporate governance regulation was 
to align the interests of corporate managers, directors and the owners
240. Berle and Means‟ 
book generated a vast amount of literature on „managerialism‟, which addressed the 
objectives of corporate managers within a publicly held corporation
241
. The general 
assumption of the „managerialism‟ theory was that shareholders were the lawful owners of 
the company because they provide capital
242. Therefore, the „managerialism‟ theory posited 
that corporations should be managed so as to advance shareholders‟ interests. At the same 
time, since corporate managers hold functional powers, it becomes necessary to establish 
incentive structures to converge the interests of shareholders and managers.  
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„Managerialism‟ still remains an important theory on corporate governance in some countries 
(including the USA and Britain)
243
, as governance reform programmes are generally 
concentrated on the role of boards of directors, and takeovers and derivative actions are 
common ways to discipline managers
244
. However, since the 1970s, researchers have begun 
to question the empirical validity of Berle and Means‟ conclusions. A number of studies have 
showed that concentration of ownership is present even in the largest American companies
245
. 
Studies also found significant ownership concentration in other developed countries like 
Germany
246
, Japan
247
, Italy
248
, and a number of OECD countries
249
. Further, heavy 
concentration of ownership was discovered in many developing countries
250
. Therefore, the 
concentrated form of corporate ownership became considered a norm in the modern corporate 
world
251
.  
Whether a country has a concentrated or dispersed type of shareholding as the dominant one 
can be explained by the prevailing legal system. This thesis was developed following the 
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Berle-Means study, as researchers attempted to answer the question as to whether dispersed 
ownership in the United States was a product of legal evolution or simply a historical 
accident
252
. Numerous studies in the late 1990s seemed to confirm the former
253
. This 
brought up an important concept, that a country‟s legal system was integral to its ownership 
structure
254. Empirical investigations by La Porta et al. gave the „law matter‟ theory a 
considerable boost. In their comprehensive analysis of dominant ownership types around the 
world, the authors classified countries as being of either common law or civil law origins. 
While dispersed ownership was more typical in the countries with the common law family 
origins, the countries with civil law origins were more likely to have a concentrated form of 
ownership
255
.  
Whether companies have a dispersed or concentrated type of ownership greatly influences 
their governance. As a result, the roles of directors and managers vary as well. When 
concentrated ownership is present, large block holders of shares are believed to have enough 
incentive and the power to influence managerial decisions, when these would go against their 
interests
256. These incentives and the perceived „ownership‟ rights stemming from dominant 
shareholding mean that the shareholders retain a powerful right: to appoint and dismiss 
directors, and this becomes a form of indirect control over the corporation
257
. However, 
practical application of these powers in companies with dispersed ownership is problematic. 
The dispersed shareholding structure creates a collective action problem, coupled with 
management‟s agenda control, proxy voting machineries, and controlling pyramids, all of 
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which lead to an even stronger separation of corporate assets from shareholders
258
. On the 
other hand, if powers are concentrated in the hands of the directors, there is a need for a legal 
regime that focuses on making them accountable and redressing possible director-shareholder 
conflicts. 
4.3.2 Comparison of Ownership and Control in England and Saudi Arabia 
Understanding the structure of ownership and control is crucial to defining the roles of 
directors that are present in different countries. In essence, corporate governance answers the 
two fundamental questions: who ultimately controls the company and who derives the main 
benefits from it. The analysis conducted in this section showed that England and Saudi 
Arabia seem to offer different answers to these questions. Significant differences exist in the 
dominant types of ownership, prevailing company structures, and the ways that laws defining 
corporate governance are followed. 
England‟s present form of corporate governance has been developed within the common law 
legal system, which prompted the creation of dispersed shareholding and the emergence of 
the Berle-Means company as the dominant corporate form
259
. In the past few years, the 
system of corporate governance in English companies has been characterized as an „outsider 
arms-length‟, which can be defined as one with a highly dispersed share ownership and run 
by professional managers who collectively own a small percentage of shares, insufficient to 
influence the outcome of shareholders‟ votes260. In his most recent comprehensive review of 
corporate ownership in England, Cheffins claimed that such a structure is likely to be a 
durable arrangement for English companies in the near future
261
. 
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Dispersed shareholding in the majority of large public corporations in England created an 
agency problem, which has been well documented in the literature
262
. In order to curb 
excessive powers of directors, the protection of shareholders has been emphasised in the 
creation of the list of directors‟ duties. As a counterbalance measure, directors are given 
significant powers in English law to perform business on behalf of the company, and 
shareholders have limited powers to „supervise‟ them. This separation of ownership and 
control in England has been emphasised in both legislation and the courts‟ decisions. The 
courts recognised two core powers in English companies as being the shareholders in general 
meeting and the board of directors
263
. In Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v 
Cunninghame
264
 and Quin & Arxtens Ltd v Salmon
265
 the powers of the board were described 
as being given by provisions in the corporate articles, and the members were not to interfere 
in directors‟ actions, nor could they direct the way that the board operates. Subsequently, the 
courts established that it is acceptable for the board to have powers free from interference by 
the company shareholders. As such, the courts may refuse to allow shareholders to take the 
power of conducting the business out of the directors‟ hands266, force the directors to pursue 
certain actions such as company property sale or ceasing legal proceedings in the name of the 
company
267, and interfere in the directors‟ appointment of executives268. At the same time, in 
cases where directors are unable or unwilling to use powers conferred upon them by the 
articles of association, the general meeting is allowed to perform the duties which directors 
fail to perform
269
. Further, the courts established that the general meeting has wide powers to 
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sanction directors‟ acts beyond the authority vested by the articles, as well as act in cases of 
breach of duty, to cure an abuse of power by directors
270
.  
Contrary to the position in England, corporate ownership in Saudi Arabia is regarded as 
highly concentrated
271
. The evolution of the existing system has been shaped by three sets of 
factors: political, financial and legal. From the political perspective, small private investors 
have never been favoured by Saudi authorities
272
. In terms of finances, concentrated 
ownership in Saudi companies can be explained by the way that the Saudi Arabian stock 
market emerged and progressed: the initial high trading costs have turned many small 
investors away, while wealthy family blockholdings have become very common in the 
investment landscape of the Kingdom
273. Finally, Saudi Arabia‟s move towards a market 
economy and modern company law has been taking place within the French tradition of civil 
law
274
. This tradition is commonly characterised by a concentrated form of ownership in 
contrast to that of common law systems.  
With large blockholdings by the government and wealthy families in the overwhelming 
majority of Saudi companies, the influence of these types of shareholders is not only 
financial, but managerial as well: the government tends to appoint executives by royal decree, 
while families typically give their members a seat on corporate boards and put them into top 
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management positions
275
.  The concentration of control is furthered by the use of interlocking 
directorates and interlocked share ownership. The fact that controlling functions over Saudi 
corporations is exercised by blockholders and not directors simply makes the theory of 
separation of ownership and control misplaced in the context of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the 
primary focus of researchers has been not the conflict between directors and shareholders, but 
the issue of the minority shareholders‟ rights276.   
Legal regimes in England and Saudi Arabia have also determined the dominant company 
types in these countries. Here, again, significant differences are present. In England, 
companies are either private or public
277
, with large public companies playing a significant 
role in the country‟s economy. In Saudi Arabia, public limited companies, with similar, 
dispersed ownership represent only a very small part of all corporations
278
. These are also 
small companies, which are considered less safe than highly profitable and well-financed 
companies with significant government stakes
279
. Ironically, the structure and governance of 
the largest companies in Saudi Arabia can be paralleled to private limited companies in 
England, where large blockholding by the company founders is common. Due to 
capitalisation requirements, however, such companies in England are rarely large.  
It has not been conclusively pinpointed in literature whether companies with concentrated 
forms of ownership have a higher incidence of corporate abuse. There is an important 
distinction between the company types in terms of the distribution of powers between 
directors and shareholders. In companies with a concentrated ownership, blockholders have 
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significant financial interest and perceived „ownership‟,280 and they are more likely to 
exercise the ultimate power of appointing and removing directors. At the same time, it is 
more likely for these companies to have directors with substantial shareholding power, which 
brings the issue of conflict of interest. On the other hand, in companies where dispersed 
shareholding is common, these powers are difficult to achieve and exercise in practice. The 
dispersed shareholding structure brings the problem of collective action, which is added to by 
likely directors‟ control over meeting agendas, proxy machineries, and, sometimes, usage of 
pyramids to further detach shareholders from corporate assets
281
. 
Nevertheless, directors‟ powers have to be regulated in either case. Whether controlling 
shareholders or not, there is always a possibility that directors might have little concern about 
maximising the interests of all shareholders. There is also the risk that directors may use 
company resources or information or their position to promote their own interests. In general, 
the absence of concrete mechanisms to enforce appropriate directors‟ behaviour and punish 
them for misconduct leads to the corporate governance system. 
Attempts to effectively regulate directors‟ behaviour in both England and Saudi Arabia have 
included the creation of legal authorities and implementing legal statutes. In England, there is 
a clear indication of the legislator‟s intent to apply various rules of governance for different 
types of companies. With regard to directors‟ duties, this has resulted in different applications 
of certain duties for directors of companies, in the CA 2006
282
, depending on whether the 
company is public or private. The same cannot be said about Saudi Arabia. The major 
regulation, the CL 1965, does not distinguish between private and public companies. A 
relatively new set of regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority – the CGR 2006 and 
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the Listing Rules 2004 – are targeting only public companies, and even here practical 
implementation of the principles declared in the CGR 2006 has been problematic in Saudi 
Arabia due to its soft law nature, many generalizations, and the absence of a clear distinction 
of powers in the companies.  
With the clear lines drawn between ownership and control in English and Saudi companies, it 
is time to look in-depth into the meaning of directorship according to the legal systems in 
both countries and determine the key differences in terms of duties and roles outlined there.   
4.4 Board of Directors 
A company, as an artificial entity, operates through natural persons who have the authority to 
exercise the day-to-day management on its behalf
283
. Those persons are known as the 
directors of the company who have the power to manage its affairs and represent it to a third 
party. The representatives of the company cannot possess such recognition unless they are 
legally appointed to the company‟s board of directors284. The board of directors is the 
ultimate decision making entity on behalf of the company, which exercises important powers 
in conducting its business. However, the members of the board are obliged by law to conduct 
business in a good faith and for the best interest of their company. 
From a comparative perspective, various jurisdictions have different regulations controlling 
the board of directors, its structure and composition, and different rules concerning their legal 
meaning, roles and positions. In their settings, both English and Saudi legislators have 
recognised the powers and roles of the board of directors and imposed a number of statutory 
duties upon the persons who fall within the ambit of the legal definition of „director‟.  
Identifying the meaning of the term „director‟ as well as distinguishing between the types of 
directors is vital for several reasons. First, it can help establish the role and the managerial 
activities that each director is obliged to perform. Second, it is crucial in differentiating 
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between the roles, legal position and duties of insider and outsider directors. Third, it enables 
a third party who deals with the company in good faith to recognise the person(s) who has the 
authority to bind the company. Fourth, it helps the court recognise the nature and scope of the 
duties of each director in order to establish his/her liability in the case of wrongful acts. Fifth, 
it helps in identifying the fiduciary relationship that a director owes towards his or her 
company in addition to other general duties.  
Given the strategic importance of directors in the management of the company, their legal 
definition, legal position and role must be identified in order to establish the scope of their 
duties towards the company, as these are seen in English and Saudi legislations. Therefore, 
the following part of this chapter examines the legal definition of the term „director‟, and the 
composition and the structure of the boards in English and Saudi jurisdictions.  
4.4.1 English law  
4.4.1.1 Composition of the Board of Directors  
Traditionally, English company law has adopted a one-tier board system, which is typical for 
most common law jurisdictions. As mentioned, the CA 2006 requires a private company to 
have at least one director and public companies to have at least two directors. Adopting the 
notion of „one size does not fit all,‟ the number of directors in the boardroom differs from 
company to company according to its size and businesses. An English company board is 
composed of different types of directors with a variety of functions and experiences. Some of 
these types of directors are recognised in the CA 2006 (such as shadow directors), and some 
of them are recognised in the CGC 2010 (such as executive and non-executive directors). De 
jure and de facto directors are not recognised by statute, although they have been well 
recognised and developed by case law. The following sub-sections examine the concept of 
each type of director in order to provide a clear distinction between them and to identify the 
nature of each type‟s relationship with the company management. 
4.4.1.2 Legal Concept of Company Director 
The CA 2006 in section 154 requires every company to have directors: a public company 
must have at least two directors, and a private company must have at least one director. The 
CA 2006 broadly defines a company director as ‘any person occupying the position of 
director by whatever name called‟285. The same definition is adopted by the Insolvency Act 
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(IA) 2000, s 251; the Company Director Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1989, s 22 (94); and 
the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSAMA) 2000, s 417 (1). Through this brief 
definition, the English legislator seems to follow a wide and flexible approach in defining a 
company director. However, such an approach is hardly helpful in identifying those who can 
be considered directors and, hence, the scope of their roles and duties with the company. By 
its nature, the statutory definition of „director‟ is not exclusive; therefore, its interpretation is 
not intended to stand on specific formalities when considering who is a director of a 
company.  
This lack of formality in the statutory definition of „director‟ in English law is important. It as 
if the English legislator‟s intention is to leave it to the company and its articles of association 
to generally determine the identities of those who are going to sit in the boardroom and 
occupy the position of directorship. By providing a much broader definition of those who 
„occupy‟ the position of a director, the CA 2006 leaves room for consideration of other 
persons, not formally registered by the company articles but allowed by the company to act in 
the role of or as directors. As such, it follows that for statutory purposes, it is more important 
for someone to occupy the position of a director than to be registered as a director, in order to 
be recognised as one. While this seems to provide the courts with some room for identifying 
special cases of directorship, the meaning and the scope of the phrase „occupying the position 
of a director‟ is not delivered either. This does not assist either in identifying the true 
meaning of a director or the role that a director plays in the company‟s management286.  
While formally English case law has recognised a variety of directorship forms in practice
287
, 
the CA 2006 only recognises shadow directors as a distinct category from de jure directors. 
This secondary type of directorship is clearly distinguished from a „director‟ per se by the 
fact that this director would most likely not be registered by the company articles and would 
remain unseen by the third parties dealing with the company. Implicit in this fact is the notion 
that directors are those who direct the company and participate in the decision making 
process at the top level, not necessarily those who are registered as a director. However, 
                                                        
286 In Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd, Sir Nicholas Brown-Wilkinson pointed out that this definition „does not 
purport to define the meaning of director but merely provides that certain persons are to be included in the 
definition‟. [1988] 4 B.C.C. 477  
287 As well as the types of directors mentioned, the courts have acknowledged the existence of de facto, nominee 
and non-executive directors, and also alternate directors. See, for example, Alan Dignam and John Lowry, 
Company Law (5th edn., Oxford University Press 2008) 269. 
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whether de jure and shadow directors can be viewed as being within the same legal concept 
of directorship needs to be seen. The next section addresses this issue.  
4.4.1.2.1 De Jure Directors  
The case law recognises a de jure director as a person who is properly appointed as a director 
of the company and is freely accepted to be in this position
288
. This person takes his or her 
authority from the office and has the ability to act on behalf of the company. Once a de jure 
director has consented to becoming a director, s/he will be considered as a fiduciary and 
subject to the fiduciaries‟ obligations289. From that point on, until his or her appointment 
ends, the director is accountable at law for all actions and inactions. English courts have 
rejected such defences as forgetting having being appointed a director
290
, believing oneself to 
have resigned, although that was not the case
291
, doing nothing as a director
292
, and following 
other‟s orders293,  if there was a reasonable expectation that the director could or should have 
acted to prevent such occurrence.  
It should be noted here that the de jure director must meet all the legal requirements to be 
eligible to act as a director; otherwise the appointment will be void. Although the CA 2006 
does not clearly indicate these requirements, except for the minimum age of the director
294
 
and holding a specific number of shares
295
, the CDDA 1986, further amended by the  IA 
                                                        
288 CEM Connections Ltd, Re [2000] B.C.C. 917.  
289 „.... It is of greatest importance that any individual who undertakes the statutory and fiduciary obligations of 
being a company director should realise that these are inescapable personal responsibilities‟. Westmid Packing 
Services Ltd, Re [1998] 2 All E.R. 124 at 130a-b, 131e . 
290 Kaytech International Plc, Re [1999] B.C.C. 390 403H: the director held many directorship positions in 
different companies.  
291 Promwalk Services Ltd, Re [2002] EWHC 2688. 
292 Simon Box (Diamonds) Ltd, Re [2000] B.C.C. 275. 
293 Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No.2) [1994] 1 All E.R. 261. 
294 CA t 2006, s 157. There is an exception from the minimum age requirement as indicated in s 158 of the same 
Act as follows: 1) The Secretary of State may make provision by regulation for cases in which a person who has 
not attained the age of 16 years may be appointed a director of a company. 2) The regulation must specify the 
circumstances in which, and any condition subject to which, the appointment may be made.; 3) If the specified 
circumstances cease to obtain, or any specified conditions cease to be met, a person who was appointed by 
virtue of the regulations and who has not since attained the age of 16 years ceases to hold the office. Otherwise 
the appointment of a person under the age of 16 is void.  
295 This is an important requirement which must be met by the person who wishes to be appointed as a de jure 
director, otherwise this person cannot be appointed as such. For instance, in the case of Canadian Land 
70 
 
2000, laid down the required qualifications for the person who wishes to be appointed as a 
director. One of the requirements is that the person must not be held insolvent or have a 
disqualification order by the court to act as a director
296
. Another requirement is that the 
appointee must not be a director or shadow director of an insolvent company
297
.  
The de jure directors can be easily recognised by their status as full time directors involved in 
day-to-day management of the company and by the records of the company held by the 
companies‟ registrar. The identification of de jure directors does not raise any concern in 
respect of their legal relationship with the company as they are recognised as fiduciaries and 
have duties of a fiduciary nature towards the company. However, the concern is with regard 
to the types of directorship that have not been recognised at law but are considered 
sometimes as one type of de jure directorship such as nominee directors and alternative 
directors. A nominee director is a person appointed by internal or external shareholders to 
represent them on the company board and to make decisions that serve the interests of the 
appointer/s. Nominee directors are a common feature of the English corporate landscape in 
both private and public companies
298
, especially in cases where the smooth running of 
interlocked businesses is necessary or when large shareholders have little or no expertise in 
running the business themselves. In fact, this type of director has not been given due attention 
legally or judicially, but it has been recognised in commercial practice, as will be shown 
below
299
.  
The statutory law in England makes no reference regarding the concept of nominee directors. 
As the legislature has not grappled with the matter, it has been left to the courts to outline the 
boundaries of nominee directors‟ duties and responsibilities. Here, the two sides of the matter 
have to be considered. On the one hand, as the appointed directors of the company, nominees 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Reclaiming & Colonizing Co, Re, [1880] L.R 14 Ch. D. 660, two appointees were accepted as de jure directors 
and appointed as such. The company‟s articles stated that each person should hold at least 100 shares whereas in 
fact they never held any shares. The court then held that both appointments were invalid and the two persons 
could not act as de jure directors but they could serve as de facto directors. 
296 CDDA 1986, s 1 and s 11. 
297 IA 1986, s 216/1. 
298. See Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 Q.B. 606 at 626, 
where Lord Denning, M.R., acknowledged that nominee directors were „appointed every day‟ and there „is 
nothing wrong in it‟ 741(1). Also see Promwalk Services Ltd, Re [2002] EWHC 2688. 
299 Dan Prentice, „Duties Of Directors‟, in Hannigan B and Prentice D (eds) The Companies Act 2006: A 
Commentary (London, LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) 34. 
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have to act in promoting the success of the company pursuant to section 172 of the CA 2006 
and, hence, they have the same duties and liabilities as the formally appointed directors
300
. 
On the other hand, being appointed by other natural or artificial persons, nominee directors 
may find themselves under pressure of being expected or even obliged to act in the best 
interests of their appointors. This consequently raises confusion as to whether the nominee 
director has a distinct legal status and duties towards the appointor to the same degree as to 
the company.  
Although English courts have acknowledged the legality of nominee directors, they have also 
pointed out that the nature of the director‟s office does not differ based on the source of their 
appointment. In this regard, Lord Denning explained: 
„… [T]ake a nominee director, that is, a director of a company who is 
nominated by a large shareholder to represent his interests. There is nothing 
wrong in it. It is done every day. Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the 
director is left free to exercise his best judgment in the interests of the 
company which he serves. But if he is put upon terms that he is bound to act 
in the affairs of the company in accordance with the directions of his patron, it 
is beyond doubt unlawful, or if he agrees to subordinate the interests of the 
company to the interests of his patron…‟301 
The notion of exercising the best judgment is especially important to note in cases where the 
conflict of interests exists between the nominee directors‟ company and his/her appointor. In 
essence, for a nominee, the question of how to act in such cases is no mean feat. While the 
commercial and social expectation would be for such a person to act in the interests of the 
appointor party, the question remains whether such latitude can be given to a nominee as a 
matter of legal principle. In the context of English law, the general principle is to act in the 
company‟s interest, and this, as demonstrated above, is quite clear. At the same time, in the 
absence of direct statutory provisions pointing clearly to the duties of nominee directors, the 
recent court decisions have somewhat pragmatically recognised the dual role that nominee 
directors play.  
Two recent cases considered the duties of nominee directors in the light of the conflict of 
interests existing between the company and the appointor(s). In Hawkes v Cuddy, the court 
held that: 
                                                        
300 See also Deirdre Ahern, „Irish Legislative Proposals For Clarification Of Nominee Directors‟ Best Interests 
Duties‟ (2010) 31 (9) Company Lawyer 291. 
301 See Boulting (n 298) 626-627. 
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„an appointed director, without being in breach of his duties to the company, 
may take the interests of his nominator into account, provided that his 
decisions as a director are in what he genuinely considers to be in the best 
interests of the company; but that is a very different thing from his being 
under a duty to his nominator by reason of his appointment by it‟ .302 
This view basically reiterates the existing legal position toward nominee duties in England, 
which entitles them to consider the appointor‟s interests only to the extent that these do not 
become incompatible with the general duty to act in the interests of the company. It is 
important to note, however, that the court recognised that the nominee director may owe 
certain duties to the appointor by reason of the terms of the appointment, but this fact does 
not create a duty as a director of a company. This can be seen as a useful clarification in 
relation to the duties owed and is consistent with the view that some duties can be owed to 
the appointor.  
In another recent case, Cobden Investments v RWM, the court, among other things, 
specifically addressed the issue of independent judgment exercised by a nominee director. 
The court acknowledged that a company is entitled to expect the best independent judgment 
from a nominee director, but, in some matters of specific interest, the latter can be released 
from this duty in the case of unanimous agreement by all shareholders
303
. Whereas the 
applications of the Cobden Investments decision in terms of modification of nominee 
directors‟ duties are hard to anticipate in the public company settings due to dispersed 
ownership, such a possibility can be borne in mind for smaller companies with few 
shareholders. Of course, nominees‟ duties cannot be completely overridden, but the 
possibility of modifying their duties, even though only in certain matters and to a narrow 
extent, seems real. The rulings in Hawkes and Cobden Investments, however, clearly 
represent some recognition of circumstances where nominee directors should be 
distinguished from de jure directors in terms of duties owed. This notion will be discussed in 
details in the chapter dealing with the fiduciary duties of the directors.    
Another special case of de jure directorship is an alternative director. This is the director who 
replaces a company‟s director at the latter‟s discretion. Alternative directors, however, have 
                                                        
302 [2009] EWCA Civ 291 (Para. 33). 
303 [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) [67]. 
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to be authorised to act as directors by the company‟s articles304. Once appointed, an 
alternative director is warranted to perform all director‟s duties in the absence of his 
appointor
305
. In essence, alternative directors substitute their appointors, but the law 
recognises them as independent directors in their own right, not as the agents of their 
appointors. At the same time, an alternative director‟s tenure in terms of time completely 
depends upon the appointor: as soon as the appointor notifies the board of the end of the 
tenure
306
, or if the appointor, for whatever reason, ceases to be the director
307
, the alternative 
director loses his or her office.  
4.4.1.2.2 Shadow Directors  
The CA 2006 in section 251 clearly identifies the term „shadow director‟: a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed 
to act
308
.  Shadow directors often maintain that they are not directors at all: they tend to act 
behind the de jure directors, thus making their actions less obvious than those of de facto 
directors
309
. Typically, when defining whether a person is a shadow director, English courts 
consider the communications between the person and the company board and determine 
whether it can be regarded as being of a directive or an instructive nature. This was clearly 
outlined in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell: it is not required to show 
that the provider of instructions to the board expects them to be followed, but if the board is 
subservient to these orders, the fact of shadow directorship is present
310
. The courts have also 
                                                        
304 See Kaytech International Plc, Re [1999] B.C.C. 390, at 401H. It is quite common for English companies to 
regulate alternative directorship within their articles as they deem fit, in relation to their interests. In general, 
provisions for the appointment of alternative directors by the acting directors are embedded in the articles.  
305 See Richborough Furniture Ltd, Re [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 507 524. 
306 Secretary of State for Trade v Tjolle [1998] B.C.C. 282 290D. 
307 Secretary of State for Trade v Jones [1999] B.C.C. 336. 
308  CA 2006, s 251.  
309 See Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 16 163. Also see Re PFTZM Ltd [1995] BCC 280 (Baker) 292. 
310 [2001] Ch 340; [2000] 2 WLR 907; [2000] 2 BCC 133. It is worth pointing out that the actual behaviour of 
both accused directors in the case was closer to de facto directorship, considering their active participation in the 
matters of the company. However, the initial allegation by the Secretary was based on the „shadow director‟ 
definition, not the de facto one. Further attempts by the plaintiff to add de facto directorship were dismissed by 
the court in the light of prejudice toward the defendants and the case process, which was based on the shadow 
directorship platform [22].  
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ruled that it has to be shown that the directors acted on such orders more than once
311
 and 
were „accustomed‟ to act under the instructions of the alleged shadow director312. In Re 
Unisoft Group Ltd (No3), the court stated that the company directors‟ acts based on 
instructions of the alleged shadow director are a matter of regular practice
313
. In fact, the 
courts admitted that the very use of the term „shadow director‟ was just a way to convey the 
fact that a person was acting through the medium of real directors to govern the company
314
.  
Section 251 of the CA 2006 was established to distinguish those who govern the company 
from professional advisers. Specifically, according to the Act, „A person is not to be regarded 
as a shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him in a 
professional capacity‟. As such, people such as legal consultants, auditors or accountants, and 
representatives of other professional services, have to be excluded as shadow directors. What 
seems to be critical here is the professional nature of advice as a service provided by an 
expert. The advice is offered not as a mandatory order, but as a suggestion to act, which can 
be freely accepted or rejected by the company directors. However, statutory law does not 
mention this fact. Therefore, the interpretation of the word „advice‟ is apparently left to case 
law to consider. An important aspect here is to distinguish genuine professional advice from 
manipulating the board while veiling this as advisory services. A hypothetical situation 
arising from the wording of section 251 is that of giving directors orders to act while covering 
this as consulting. Based on the wording of section 251 only, such behaviour may free the 
manipulator from responsibilities under shadow directorship. Therefore, each particular case 
                                                        
311 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Becker [2003] 1 BCLC 555. The court admitted that it did not 
matter whether following the instructions by the board lasted over the course of the company lifetime or just 
during a substantial period of time. 
312 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell [2001] Ch 340; [2000] 2 WLR 907; [2000] 2 BCLC 
133. The courts also held that a shadow directorship is established only when the majority of the board follow 
the instructions of the alleged shadow director. 
313 [1994] 1 BCLC 609 620. 
314 See Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] Ch 477 (Morrit) 421-422. Morrit LJ specifically stated that the use of 
epithets such as „shadow‟ could be misleading when applied to different cases, and that it was not the factor that 
the courts should explicitly rely upon. Rather, evidence of instructions and accustomed acting on them was 
important.  
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of consulting should be subject to scrutiny by the courts, although distinguishing consulting 
from manipulating may be extremely hard sometimes
315
. 
The courts have also held that a company can be a shadow director, as long as it issues 
directions to the board of another company and those directions are customarily followed
316
. 
However, the courts do not readily associate a membership of the shadow company board as 
being a shadow director
317
. Rather, it can be observed that each relevant case would be based 
on its own merits and the degree of involvement of the individual concerned with the 
directors of a subject company. For example, where a company was in financial crisis, the 
bank was able to be a shadow director and the board of directors had no option but to follow 
the financial policy of the bank that was imposed upon it
318
.  However, in Re PFTZM Ltd, the 
court held that laying down the terms for further crediting does not make the bank a shadow 
director
319
.  This is an important distinction to make, since companies often pursue different 
interests when entering into contractual relationships. As such, does it mean that pursuing its 
own interests at the expense of another company creates a shadow directorship? Apparently, 
English case law says it does not, as long as the offers made to another company are of such a  
nature that they can be easily accepted or rejected. 
There is still much uncertainty in the English legal system as to whether shadow directors 
owe the same duties as directors in general. Section 170(5) of the CA 2006 indicates that the 
shadow directors owe the general duties where, and to the extent that, corresponding common 
law rules and equitable principles so apply. It has been contended that the Act treats shadow 
                                                        
315 Some cases have managed to distinguish instructing from consulting. See, for example, Deverell (n 312); 
also see Re Tasbian Ltd (No.3) [1992] BCC 358.Akai Pty Ltd v Ho [2006] FCA 511. Still, the issue will most 
likely remain unresolved until further clarified by statutory law. 
316
 See Hydrodan, (n 309); also see Official Receiver v Brady [1999] B.C.C. 258. 
317 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 [51]; also see Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish 
Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 A.C. 465 475. In Hydrodan, (n 309), Millet J. explained: „It is possible … that the 
directors [of Company A] as a collective body gave directions to the directors of … [Company B] and that the 
directors of … [Company B] were accustomed to act in accordance with such directions. But if they did give 
such directions as directors of [Company A], acting as the board of [Company A] (or more accurately as the 
appropriate organ of [Company A]) and the result is to constitute [Company A], but not themselves, shadow 
directors of … [Company B]‟. 
318 A company (No. 005009 of 1987)[1988] 4 BBC 424. 
319 [1995] BCC 280 292. The court stated that the company had the liberty to decide whether to accept the 
bank‟s terms in order to obtain another credit line. See also the recent Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 233, where the creditor‟s financial power 
based on a loan policy was not considered sufficient for a shadow directorship. 
76 
 
directors as validly appointed directors, and they are subject to the same obligations as those 
which apply to the latter. Accordingly, they may also be subject to wrongful trading 
provisions, according to the IA 1986 and therefore could be disqualified under the CDDA 
1986 for their „unfit conduct‟320. A case in point is the decision in Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v 
Rendsburg Investment Corp of Liberia, the Rialto
321
, where the court held that the shadow 
director was considered as a real director and held liable for the breach of his duties toward 
the company.  
However, in the case of Ultraframe (England) Ltd v Fielding 
322
 it was held that the shadow 
director owes only the duty of care and skill and he is not liable as a constructive trustee to 
owe fiduciary duties to his company. Lewison J stated that shadow directors are only 
indirectly involved in the acts concerning the company‟s assets, and that was the reason to 
not impose fiduciary duties upon them
323
. However, there is no reason not to treat a shadow 
director as an accountable person and subject to the same fiduciary duties as properly 
appointed directors. In some cases, English courts treat directors other than de jure as 
constructive trustees although not formally appointed
324
. It also seems logical to apply the 
same duties to shadow directors as to the company directors through whom they govern. On 
the other hand, it could also be argued that the acting directors have the choice of whether to 
be directed or not. Following the decision outlined in Ultraframe, it is now accepted in 
English law that the general scope of duties of shadow directors is the following: 1) the duties 
do not apply retrospectively to the time when real directors began to follow the instructions; 
2) a shadow director does not owe any fiduciary duties if he or she does not deal with the 
assets of a company; 3) a shadow director still has to declare his or her interest in any 
contract with the board of directors; 4) a shadow director has to disclose the interest in shares 
or debentures of the company if any; 5) any transaction by a shadow director equal to 
                                                        
320  Martha Bruce, Rights And Duties Of Directors (9th edn., West Sussex, Tottel Publishing 2009) 6. 
321  [1998] 2 BCLC 485. The decision was linked to Insolvency Act 1986, s 212, and the actions of the 
defendants were classified as „misfeasance‟.  
322  [2005] EWHC 16389 (Ch). 
323 ibid 1289. 
324 John Birds „The Duties Of Directors, General‟ in Birds J, Boyle A, Clark B, MacNeil I, McGormack G, 
Twigg-Flesner C and Villiers C (eds) Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (6th edn., Bristol, Jordans 2007) 607. 
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£100,000 or 10% of the company value has to be approved by the shareholders‟ meeting 
first
325
.  
4.4.1.2.3 Executive and Non-Executive Directors  
Although the CA 2006 does not mention executive and non-executive directors, the two 
terms are distinguished in practice and mentioned in self-regulatory documentation and the 
CGC 2010.  English courts have also readily accepted the terms and the differences between 
the two. Executive directors are those directors who are involved in company activities on a 
full-time basis; they could have been appointed to their posts and they perform specific 
governance tasks for the company on a daily basis. These directors are likely to have 
contracts with the company and be granted extensive managerial powers
326
. Typically, one of 
the executive directors is appointed as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), with general 
responsibility to manage the company‟s business. In contrast to this, the non-executive 
directors (NEDs) are rarely engaged in the company‟s business on a full-time basis; nor are 
they commissioned with the task of managing the company‟s operations327. NEDs are 
normally appointed to attract lenders or customers, or add to the reputation of the company‟s 
business
328
. Quite often, former executives are appointed as NEDs due to their skills and 
expertise.   
While the importance of executive directors is easily observed due to their full participation 
in company‟s activities, the role of NEDs should not be underestimated. The various 
corporate governance reports (including the CGC 2010) and codes have emphasised the 
importance of NEDs to the process of corporate governance. There is an extensive amount of 
literature that suggests that the corporate board should have a substantial number of NEDs for 
effective governance process. Some studies have emphasised the beneficial role of NEDs due 
                                                        
325 ibid 559; see Paragon Finance v D B Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v 
Salaam, [2002] England HL 48; also, see CA 2006, s. 191. 
326 John De Lacy, „The Concept Of A Company Director: Time For A New Expanded And Unified Statutory 
Concept‟ (2006) 3 Journal of Business Law 267, 270. 
327 Executive and non-executive directors are defined and their roles are outlined extensively in literature. See, 
for example Solomon (n 272) 84-85; also see David Campbell and Tom Craig, Organizations And The Business 
Environment (2nd ed., Oxford, Elsevier Butterworth-Hannemann 2005) 73-74; Patrick Dunn and Glynis Morris, 
Non-Executive Director’s Handbook (2nd edn., Oxford, Elsevier 2008); Mark Goergen, Christine Malline, Eve 
Mitleton-Kelly, Ahmed Al-Hawamdeh and Hse-Yu Chiu, Corporate Governance And Complexity Theory 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2010) 33-34 
328 See Daniels v Anderson [1995] 13 ACC 614 662. 
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to their significant expertise as well as their firm specific and market specific information
329
, 
while others have stressed their role in making the board act in the shareholders‟ interests330.  
The two primary roles of the NED in corporate governance have been identified as 
monitoring the acts of executive directors and supervising the executive directors in 
developing the overall company strategy
331
. As a result, companies should look to NEDs for 
their presumed independence of judgement and relationship with the shareholders. In 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley, the court specifically recognised these roles of 
the NED
332. The NED‟s independence was also emphasised in the Cadbury, Hampel, and 
Higgs Reports, which defined it as „independent from management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgement’.  
However, the view that NED in English companies really achieve independence of 
judgement has been widely challenged. Substantial amount of empirical data shows a large 
number of „insider‟ NEDs, who are appointed by or have strong relationships with executive 
directors
333
. There are several arguments as to why the independence of NEDs and their 
effective supervision of executive directors are not fully achieved in the UK. NEDs have 
been reported as lacking incentives and time to be active in managing the company; being 
specifically chosen for potential inactivity; or being controlled by the executive board or the 
                                                        
329 Charu Raheja, „The Interaction Of Insiders And Outsiders In Monitoring: A Theory Of Corporate Boards‟ 
(2005) 40 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 283. 
330 Kenneth Borokhovich, Robert Parrino and Teresa Trapani, „Outside Directors And CEO Selection‟ (1996) 31 
(3) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 337; Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Weisbach, 
„Endogenously Chosen Boards Of Directors And Their Monitoring Of The CEO‟ (1998) 88 (1) The American 
Economic Review 96; James Brickley, Jeffrey Coles and Rory Terry, „Outside Directors And The Adoption Of 
Poison Pills‟ (1994) 34 Journal of Financial Economics 371. 
331 Cadbury Report 1992 was the first to emphasise the monitoring role of the NED. This function was also 
emphasised in the Hampel Report 1998, which stressed the importance of NED independence. More recently, 
the Higgs Review 2003 and the Tyson Report 2003 focused specifically on the role of the NED in the corporate 
governance process. The Corporate Governance Regulations 2010 emphasised both the monitoring and strategic 
management functions of the NED.  
332 [2003] EWHC 2263 (Comm); [2004] I BCLC 180 [41]. 
333 Andy Cosh and Alan Hughes, „The Changing Anatomy Of Corporate Control And The Market For 
Executives In The United Kingdom‟ (1997) 24 Journal of Law and Society 104, 111 and 121. See also Victor 
Brudney, „The Independent Director - Heavenly City Or Potemkin Village?‟ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 
597; John Lowry, „Directorial Self-Dealing: Constructing A Regime Of Accountability‟ (1997) 48 North Ireland 
Law Quarterly 211, 234-235; Solomon (n 272) 93-95; Roberto Mura, „Firm Performance: Do Non-Executive 
Directors Have A Mind Of Their Own? Evidence From UK Panel Data‟ (2007) 36 (3) Financial Management 
81-112. 
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CEO
334
. In addition, it has been a common practice to appoint NEDs based on friendship, 
business connections, or relationships. Even with the recent attempts to clarify the roles and 
functions of NEDs in reports and corporate governance codes, it still remains doubtful that 
NEDs are effective in monitoring and supervising the executives. 
While NEDs are not actively engaged in company affairs like executive directors, English 
legislation does not distinguish between these two types of directors in terms of duties and 
obligations, although the courts have separated these in practice
335
. The court has also ruled 
that inactivity by NEDs does not exempt them from the duties that directors owe to 
shareholders
336
. However, in terms of duties, different levels of engagement are expected 
from executive and non-executive directors due to the different levels of involvement in 
company affairs
337
. In recent cases, the courts have taken into account this fact and the 
limited responsibilities of NEDs. For instance, in the case of Re Stephenson Cobbold Ltd
338
 
the court ruled that although the non-executive director was a cheque signatory, he was not 
responsible for deciding which creditors were paid where preferential treatment had been 
given. Further, in Daniels v AWA, Rogers CJ stated that NEDs would normally rely on the 
executives who manage the company and trust them to do so in a competent manner, thus 
lowering the bar for the monitoring duty of NEDs
339
.  
                                                        
334 Goergen and others (n 327) 34; see also Laura Lin, „The Effectiveness Of Outside Directors As A Corporate 
Governance Mechanism: Theories And Evidence‟ (1996) 90 Northwestern University Law Review 898, 898-
903 and 914-917 
335 This was referenced in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley [2003] EWHC 2263 (Comm) at [35]; 
[2004] 1 BCLC 180.  
336
 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 444; Francis v United Jersey Bank [1981] 432 A 
2d 814; Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley [1990] 2 ACSR 405; 8 ACLC 827.  
337 Equitable Life (n 335); [2004] 1 BCLC 180 188-189: „There is a considerable measure of agreement about 
the duty owed in law by a non-executive director to a company. In expression it does not differ from the duty 
owed by an executive director but in application it may and usually will do so‟; see also Re Continental 
Assurance Co. of London Plc, [2001] B.P.I.R. 733, 850 (Ch.), „I accept that the managing director of a 
company. . .has a general responsibility  to oversee the activities of the company, which presumably includes its 
accounting operations.  But I do not think that those responsibilities go as far as to require the non-executive 
directors to overrule the specialist directors, like the finance director, in their specialist fields‟. 
338 [2001] BCC38, It is also important to mention that the court admitted the NED‟s high reliance on the 
information coming from auditors in terms of money distribution. Also see Re Peppermint Park [1998].  
339 Daniels v AWA Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; (1995) 16 ACSR 607; (1995) 13 ACLC 614 (NSWCA). See also 
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbings [1989] BCLC 498 
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To date, the role of NEDs and their liability still remains unclear
340
. On the one hand, 
legislation requires non-executive directors to show the same duty of care and fiduciary 
duties to a company as an executive director. On the other hand, the courts have remained 
unconvinced that non-executive directors have the same, full-scale responsibility as executive 
directors. This could become an issue, however, in the cases of competing directorships. If 
we consider, for example, looser fiduciary duties being imposed on NEDs, such as duties of 
loyalty and the duty of promoting the company's interests, there is a possibility in the latter 
situation of NEDs serving as directors of two or more competing companies
341
.   
Following the recent cases, it is clear, however, that it is important to ensure that non-
executive directors have the same access to information within the company as other 
directors. The development in the area of responsibility by NEDs is yet to be seen; however, 
at this point, it is likely that the courts would consider executive directors to be under stricter 
duties, meaning that they are more likely to be involved in legal proceedings. There are 
several reasons for this. First, the CA 2006 in s.1157 (2) (b) provides that the court may 
relieve directors from a breach of duty if they find that the directors acted reasonably and in 
good faith. There is a much higher likelihood (and this was confirmed in Stephenson Cobbold 
Re and Daniels) that the courts would consider NEDs acting in such manner, based on 
information provided by the executives. Second, NEDs may benefit from the indemnity 
provision of the CA 2006 (s. 234 and 239), which covers fines and penalties incurred by 
directors in cases of a breach of duty. Section 239 requires a more detailed investigation due 
to its possible ambiguous interpretation.  
Following the Equitable Life case, the amendments to the English legislation now allow 
companies to ratify such actions as negligence, breach of duty of trust, and default, which are 
subject to liability:
342
. The Act mentions that an appropriate resolution has to be issued by the 
„members of the company‟ to ratify such acts. At the same time, the act does not specify the 
number (or percentage) of the required signatories. Therefore, there is still uncertainty about 
how many of these „members‟ would be deemed appropriate for this purpose. It also remains 
                                                        
340 Lee Roach, 'Equitable Life And Director Liability' (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial Law 
Review 225, 227. The Higgs Report stated that the role of non-executive directors in the UK remains poorly 
developed and understood. Little, however, has changed since publication of the report in 2003.  
341 See the extensive discussion on competing directorships in section 4.4.3.3. and chapter 5, section 5.3.2.2.2.4. 
342 CA 2006, s 239 (1). 
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unclear whether the acts of shadow directors should be excluded from liability. On the one 
hand, shadow directors, who are unlikely to have direct relationships with the company, 
should be reasonably excluded from the duties of loyalty and acting in the company‟s best 
interests. On the other hand, their control over the company members may be strong enough 
to use the members‟ votes under Section 239(1) to exclude themselves from any duty at all. 
Arguably, Section 239(3) prevents the involved directors from voting on such matters either 
on their own or through “connected persons.” However, the definition of the “connected 
persons” as provided in Section 252 does not include the members that might be controlled 
by outside parties, such as shadow directors. Therefore, if the breaches of shadow directors 
may be subject to ratification by members‟ voting, shadow directors might be able to exclude 
themselves from almost any kind of liability by means of controlling the members and, 
therefore, the voting process. 
4.4.2 Saudi Law 
In Saudi Arabia, the board of directors is considered the main body governing a company‟s  
business and responsible for meeting the company‟s financial, social and business objectives. 
Consequently, Saudi legislation delegates broad authority to the board in terms of corporate 
governance
343
. At the same time, the primary Saudi company legislation does not clearly 
define the rights and obligations of the board
344
. In practice, however, the CL 1965 serves as 
the primary source outlining the duties of the board. The CL 1965 grants companies the right 
to make certain provisions related to the fiduciary duties of the directors within the 
company‟s by-laws; however, the supremacy of the CL 1965 is evident: where its provisions 
are violated, the company directors are held liable.  
4.4.2.1 The Board Structure and Composition 
The board structure in Saudi Arabia resembles the one typically applied in the common law 
countries. Specifically, all companies listed on Saudi Arabia‟s stock exchange have unitary 
boards, although the CL 1965 does not constrain companies in their choice of board structure. 
The widespread adoption of the unitary board structure in Saudi Arabia, however, can be 
                                                        
343 CL 1965, article 73. 
344 Even though the CL 1965 grants a „wide range of responsibilities‟ to the board, what these responsibilities 
consist of is nowhere mentioned in the Law. It has been left to the recently introduced pieces of legislation such 
as the LR 2004 and the CGR 2006 to define in detail the responsibilities of the company boards. However, the 
LR 2004 only apply to public companies, and the CGR 2006 carry a recommending, non-binding character. 
Therefore, even the introduction of these acts has not managed to fully deal with the issue.  
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explained by the main role given to the board, which is overseeing management of the 
company and ensuring their loyalty
345
. In the Saudi context, the board members are 
considered representatives of the issuer (company)
346
.  In other words, board members do not 
represent other entities, like company employees for example, and have to care only about the 
welfare of the company
347
.  
While the CL 1965 states the minimum number of the board members (three), there is no 
indication of the maximum number. This means that the legislation again leaves it to the 
company articles to determine the number of directors that it considers appropriate for the 
nature and size of the business
348
. It has been argued that such a system promotes more 
flexibility, as it is based on the principle „one size does not fit all,‟ largely because companies 
vary significantly in their size and type of activities, which requires the number of corporate 
directors to be adjusted accordingly
349
. Yet, given the nature of publicly traded companies in 
Saudi Arabia, the absence of an upper limit on the number of corporate directors may further 
exacerbate the degree of the blockholders‟ control, as they may use this to appoint their 
nominees. In England, for example, this issue is less acute, because of dispersed ownership, 
which is dominant in public companies. Therefore, the recently introduced CGR 2006 
suggested limiting the number of board directors to eleven
350
. The boards of currently listed 
companies on Tadawul (the Saudi stock exchange) vary from two to twelve members, with 
an average board size of 8.4
351
, which shows that CGR recommendations regarding this 
                                                        
345 Mohammed Al-Jeber, The Saudi Commercial Law (King Fahad National Library 1996) 325. 
346 LR 2004, article 28. CGR 2006, article 11(d), however, establishes that directors represent company 
shareholders, thus establishing an apparent conflict of laws. In view of the fact that the CGR 2006 is a soft law, 
LR 2004, article 28 is expected to prevail, although interests of shareholders are likely to be considered before 
the interests of any other group. A more detailed discussion is provided in Section 6.4.1. of this thesis. 
347 This is a common approach for the unitary board structure. See Christine Mallin (ed), Corporate Governance 
(2nd edn., Oxford, Ashford Colour Press 2007) 122; Solomon (n 272) 78; Cornelis de Groot, Corporate 
Governance As A Limited Legal Concept (Bedfordshire, Turbin Distributions 2009) 48. 
348 CL 1965, article 66. 
349 Almajid (n 275) 247. 
350 CGR, article 12(a). 
351 The National Investor Survey 2008, as reported in Chris Pierce, Corporate Governance In The Middle East 
And North Africa (Global Market Briefings 2008). 
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matter are generally followed. This also demonstrates that Saudi companies tend to follow the 
American-England compositions of the boards with relatively few members
352
.  
A distinctive feature of corporate board composition in many large companies in Saudi 
Arabia is domination by government representatives, which stems from the fact that the state 
holds the largest number of shares in these companies. In general, the government influences 
the selection process not only by having the majority of votes, but also by dictating its will to 
smaller shareholders
353
. Such influence should not be a surprise though, considering the 
state‟s dominating position in both the economy and politics of the Kingdom. In many cases, 
the government‟s selection of the board members is seen as an act of the state, not as another 
shareholder, which leaves little room for questioning or opposition
354
.  
While the government controls the largest corporations in the Kingdom, the majority of 
smaller businesses are controlled by wealthy families, as discussed above. In these 
companies, appointment to the board of directors is commonly based on family connections 
and/or business relationships
355
. Moreover, it is typical for the family-controlled companies 
to have what is called cross-directorship: where members of related families sit on the boards 
of each other‟s companies. As a result, many companies listed on Tadawul have the same 
representatives on their boards, appointed by either the state or wealthy families. In the end, 
there is a limited number of board members controlled by the limited number of large 
blockholders (families and government).  
Another particular feature of the Saudi company boards is the absence of other entities 
besides shareholders. Saudi legislation does not require any type of company to appoint 
employee representatives, clients, suppliers or creditors to the board (although it does not 
prohibit it either). This is one of the instances where Saudi company law diverges from the 
                                                        
352 Compare with France, for example, where an average board consists of fifteen members. See Yixi Ning, 
Wallace Davidson and Jifu Wang, ‘Does Optimal Corporate Board Size Exist? An Empirical Analysis’ (2010) 
20 Journal of Applied Finance 57-69; Du Plessis J, McConvill J and Bagaric M, Principles Of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 307; Charkham and Ploix (n 231) 197. 
353 Sometimes, the state appoints its representatives without following the procedures of the corporate articles.  
354 See Almajid (n 275) 249. 
355 Waleed Al-Ajlan, Corporate Governance In Saudi Arabia: The Roles And Responsibilities Of The Board Of 
Directors In The Banking Industry (DPhil thesis, University of Nottingham 2005) 363-366. The author posited 
that a few large blockholders in Saudi companies normally select the boards, because they have the ultimate 
voting power. According to The National Investor Survey 2008 (n 351), 33% of the companies in Saudi Arabia 
have at least two directors from the same family.  
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civil law principles: this practice, which means the absence of co-determination for the board, 
is also a common feature for the common law countries, including England
356
. This reflects 
the dedication of Saudi legislation to focus on one goal of the company directors: to increase 
shareholders‟ wealth357. As well as the legal factors contributing to this, researchers point to 
political and traditional reasons. Historically, the political structure of the Kingdom impeded 
the appearance of equally strong institutional and private entities to the official structures, 
which makes it hard to challenge their decisions. As a result, private and institutional 
activism in the country is virtually absent, which explains, when linked specifically to 
corporate governance, why there is little or no challenge of the appointed directors
358
.  
4.4.2.2 Legal Concept of Company Director 
The only place in the company law statutes of Saudi Arabia where directors are defined is the 
Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market 
Authority. It states that a director „in relation to a joint stock company, includes a member of 
the board of directors and in relation to any other company includes any manager or other 
senior executive who makes and implements the company‟s strategic decisions’359. Two 
points call for immediate attention here. From the definition, it is clear that the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) distinguishes between the legal concepts of director as applied to 
joint stock companies and other forms of business. This is different from the English 
approach to the legal concept of director, where the same definition is applied to all types of 
companies. In contrast, the CMA seems to assume that the type of company would allocate 
different functions to directors for the purposes of law.  
                                                        
356
 See Andrew Hicks and SH Goo, Cases And Materials On Company Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 22; 
also see Michael Lower, Employee Participation In Governance: A Legal And Ethical Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 136:„The shareholder value approach characterises British company law. It can be seen, 
for example, in the Companies Act provisions concerning the appointment and removal of board members, the 
duties of directors and the disclosure and accountability mechanisms provided for. In each of these respects, it is 
clear that the CA 2006 focuses on the needs of the shareholders‟.  
357 Unlike, for example, many European civil law countries, Saudi Arabia‟s corporate governance does not have 
the term „stakeholder‟, which applies to all parties potentially affected by the company‟s actions. The only party 
which is consistently mentioned throughout the Kingdom‟s major pieces of corporate legislation is 
„shareholders‟. This is in clear parallel to the legislation of the common law countries, including England. 
358 Almajid (n 275) 251. 
359 Capital Market Authority, „The Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital 
Market Authority‟ (2004) 10.  
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In the absence of any other definition of director in Saudi law, establishing clear guidelines 
regarding the legal concept of director may seem like a positive step. However, the CMA has 
been created to govern the listed joint stock companies only: it does not cover privately held 
business entities. For this reason, distinguishing between directors on the basis of company 
type may be logical only for contrasting purposes. Indeed, the definition of directors of 
publicly held companies is quite narrow: it includes only those individuals who are members 
of the board. As such, all other individuals, including those who may influence the decision 
making process in the company, but who are not officially considered members of the board 
of directors, are not directors for the purposes of law.  
In sharp contrast with this is the wide definition of directors of other forms of business, where 
individuals making „strategic decisions‟ for the company are included. To some extent, this 
definition is closer to the legal concept of director recognised in England. In both cases, the 
directors are not limited to only the persons serving in board positions, but include those who 
may influence the decision making process in the company. However, in the same manner, 
this definition provided by the CMA is not completely clear. It is unclear how far the 
definition extends since nowhere is it clarified what „strategic decisions‟ may mean. 
Consequently, the role and position of the director in non-public companies remain uncertain.  
4.4.2.3 Types of Directors in Saudi Arabia 
The CL 1965 does not distinguish between different types of directors in the same manner as 
the CL 2006 does. However, when considering companies listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange, the recent trend has been to recognise the non-executive type of directorship and 
distinguish it from the executive directorship. The role of the NEDs has been extensively 
covered in the CGR 2006, and the dominant number of companies in the Kingdom has them 
present on their corporate boards today
360
. With the recent legislation openly recognising 
NEDs and their roles in corporate governance, there is a clear trend in Saudi Arabia for 
increasing NEDs influence in the actions of the board. However, while this trend has been 
                                                        
360 See Al-Ajlan (n 355). According to him, the majority of banks in Saudi Arabia are required to have NEDs as 
their board members. CGR 2006, article 12(c) also specifically points out that the majority of board members in 
companies have to be NEDs.  
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evident in government-controlled enterprises, companies owned by families have not been so 
fast in increasing NED membership on their boards
361
. 
While the presence of non-executive directors has been on the rise in many Saudi companies 
recently, the real question remains whether their presence adheres to the roles and 
responsibilities outlined in the recent legislation. Indeed, the fact that Saudi companies are 
putting more NEDs on their boards does not alone mean that such boards will function 
successfully. From this point of view, the real contribution of NEDs in governing Saudi 
companies has yet to be confirmed. As Almajid mentioned, frankness in Saudi boardrooms is 
largely diminished by the intention of expressing politeness and courtesy, which often 
prevents NEDs from expressing their alternative opinion regarding different matters
362
. 
Further, as mentioned, due to the high level of blockholding control in Saudi corporations and 
cross-directorship the presence of independent judgement from the side of NEDs is unlikely.  
In terms of governance policies in Saudi companies, information is virtually unavailable for 
researchers, and the CL 1965 exclusively grants the right for the companies not to disclose 
this kind of information
363. Therefore, all assumptions regarding NEDs‟ role in corporate 
affairs in Saudi companies remain only assumptions. It is clear, however, that until 
monitoring and disciplining functions of NEDs in Saudi companies are fully established, and 
their independence from executive directors is instituted, there will be little effect from 
including NEDs in the corporate boards. Therefore, the current legislative activities oriented 
at including NEDs in corporate governance processes in the Kingdom should be coupled with 
the legislating activities aimed at ensuring the positive differences in strategic decision 
making processes that the NEDs may bring to the companies. The fact that Saudi company 
legislation does not recognise shadow directors has some important consequences in terms of 
the determination and application of directors‟ duties, as will be demonstrated below.  
4.5 The Legal Position of a Company Director 
In order to determine whether directors hold fiduciary duties toward their companies, it is 
necessary to identify the type of relationship existing between the directors, the company and 
                                                        
361 Almajid (n 275) 256. The author also notes that in many cases, when NEDs are appointed, there is a high 
likelihood of the appointments being based on cross-directorship principles. However, no particular evidence is 
presented in this regard. 
362 ibid 257. 
363 Al-Ajlan (n 355) 207. 
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the shareholders. A company has no physical existence of its own, although it owns property 
and is used for entering into contracts with other entities. Shareholders invest their capital in a 
company, but may or may not be actively engaged in the actual running of the company‟s 
business. It is the directors who actively manage the property owned by the company and the 
capital provided by the shareholders. Therefore, directors stand in a relationship with both the 
company and the shareholders
364
. The corresponding duties and responsibilities of directors 
are derived from the countries‟ statutory law codification and the obligations that have arisen 
in practice and have come to be widely accepted by all parties involved in the corporate 
governance process. Therefore, the nature of these relationships has to be explored in detail 
before moving on to a discussion of the duties that directors owe and to whom they owe these 
duties. 
4.5.1 Theories on Corporate Relations Arrangements 
Historically, two conflicting views on directorship have evolved: one considering directors as 
the agents of the company, and one considering them as trustees. The primary difference 
between the two theories is in the nature of the power and relationship existing between the 
parties in the corporate world, as well as the duties that directors owe to the company and its 
shareholders. As will be demonstrated, the agency theory considers directors to be more or 
less independent from their principals (read shareholders of the company): they are appointed   
to manage the company on behalf of the principals, while the principals control their actions 
in order to achieve desirable results for themselves. In contrast, the trusteeship theory posits 
that the directors are entrusted with the capital and/or property of the principal, who is the 
ultimate beneficiary through the equitable title. As will be demonstrated below, however, 
both theories assume the presence of fiduciary duties.  
4.5.1.1 Agency Theory 
An agency relationship arises when a principal hires an agent to act on his or her behalf. The 
principal relies on the agent to duly perform the duties outlined within the scope of an agency 
contract between the two parties. Even though potential issues arising in the agency theory 
were formulated as early as the 18
th
 century by Adam Smith, the paradigm of the agency 
                                                        
364 In many countries, the term „stakeholders‟ is more commonly used with regard to the relationships arising 
from the corporate governance process. However, as was shown in the previous section, neither England nor 
Saudi Arabia recognise the significance of other entities except for the shareholders. Therefore, this thesis does 
not include the discussion of other stakeholder types, although the researcher admits that they contribute to the 
process of corporate governance as well.  
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theory was theoretically defined in the economic studies conducted in the 1970s
365
. Since 
then, the theory of agency contract has become one of the most dominant theories of 
corporate governance upon which both corporations and legislators relied
366
.  
In the corporate context, the Agency Theory addressed the relationships between 
shareholders and managers (directors). The major focus of the theory has been the problem of 
aligning the interests of agents (the directors, who are willing to control the business) and the 
principals (the shareholders, who have the goals of maximizing their wealth)
367
. While in 
companies where large blockholding is common, shareholders are able to exercise the power 
of dismissal and monitoring of the directors, the problem is not easily resolved in 
corporations where dispersed shareholding is present. Without due control, the directors are 
more likely to pursue their own goals rather than those of the shareholders
368
. As a result, the 
shareholders are likely to incur the „agency costs‟ associated with the creation of incentives 
for the directors to act in their interests.  
While there is a conflict of interests between the principal and the agent in the Agency 
Theory, the issue of duties can be considered important. In this regard, Dodd argued that the 
way to resolve the conflict between shareholders and directors is in considering the latter as 
agents with fiduciary duties: „He, [the agent], on his part owes something more than a 
contract duty toward his principal. He is a fiduciary who must loyally serve his principal‟s 
interests’369. This idea that agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals has been widely 
supported by the Agency Theory scholars
370
.  It is more important, however, to determine 
who exactly is considered principal in the corporate agency problem. Directors can be 
                                                        
365 See Jensen and Meckling (n 241); also see Stephen Ross, „The Economic Theory Of Agency: The Principal‟s 
Problem‟ (1973) 63 American Economics Review 134. 
366 Edward Zajac and James Westphal, „The Social Construction Of Market Value: Institutionalization And 
Learning Perspectives On Stock Market Reactions‟ (2004) 69 American Sociology Review 233. 
367 Kathleen Eisenhardt, „Agency Theory: An Assessment And Review‟ (1989) 14 (1) The Academy of 
Management Review 57. 
368 See Berle and Means (n 238) 1049.  
369 Marrick Dodd, „For Whom Are The Corporate Managers Trustees?‟ (1932) 45 (7) Harvard Law Review 
1145.  
370 See, for example, William Gregory, The Law Of Agency And Partnership (3rd edn., St. Paul, MA, West 
Group 2001); Marianne Jennings, Business: Its Legal, Ethical, And Global Environment (London, Thompson 
Learning 2006) 709; Paula Dalley, „Shareholder (And Director) Fiduciary Duties And Shareholder Activism‟ 
(2006) 8 Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 301.  
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considered agents to the shareholders, thus justifying the existence of the agency problem, 
since the latter are interested in pursuing their own interests. From this standpoint, and by 
using Agency Theory terminology, it follows that shareholders should have wider control 
over directors, while the boards should focus primarily on the advancement of shareholder‟s 
interests
371
.  However, shareholders do not always have a complete control over the board 
and are not always considered liable for the acts of the latter, as the Agency Theory 
implies
372
. Further, directors manage assets, which are assigned to the company, not the 
shareholders
373
. Therefore, within the Agency Theory it is more logical to conclude that 
shareholders are the principals of directors through the company.  
4.5.1.2 Trustee Theory 
Trust is a term frequently applied in common law legal systems. It defines the relationship 
between two parties, a settlor (also referred to as a grantor or donor) and a trustee, where the 
settlor entrusts property to the trustee but retains the equitable title to it
374
. In a typical trust 
relationship, a settlor imposes a number of obligations on the trustee, which are fiduciary in 
nature
375
. While the settlor has the ultimate right to the property, the trustee is treated in 
common law as a holder of the „legal title‟ to it with the ability to use it in order to achieve 
the objectives of the trust. Therefore, in general terms, a trustee can be considered as the 
officer under a trust, who pursues the goals under the trust and owes fiduciary duties toward 
settlors. Modern trust practice recognises three types of trusts: express trusts, resulting trusts, 
and constructive trusts
376
. These types involve different purposes behind their creation and 
grant different powers to the trustees. 
An express trust is a trust which has been declared intentionally and openly by a settlor. In 
this type of trust, specific property is entrusted to the trustees under the terms identified by 
                                                        
371 Lucian Bebchuk L, „The Case For Increasing Shareholder Power‟ (2005) 118 (3) Harvard Law Review 833, 
835 and 843; Iman Anabtawi, „Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power‟ (2006) 53 Companies 
Law Review 561, 568-69.  
372 See Deborah DeMott, „Disloyal Agents‟ (2007) 58 Alabama. Law Review 1048, 1050-51. 
373 See Dalley (n 370) 312. 
374 Alastair Hudson, Equity And Trusts (6th edn., Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish 2010) 43. 
375 ibid 44. 
376 These are the three recognised by The Law of Property Act 1925. The Act also recognises a category known 
as implied trusts, although these kinds of trusts are very rare today. 
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the settlor
377
. It is, however, important that the property and the settlor be clearly defined and 
that the property title is transferred to the trustees before the trust is established; otherwise a 
settlor may simply declare him or herself a trustee, and no property transfer will take place. 
Resulting trusts are not created intentionally; instead, they are implied by the courts, where 
the rights to a property are transferred unintentionally, without clear identification of the 
beneficiary, or when it is implied that the property was held for the benefit of another 
person
378
. Finally, a constructive trust is a form of remedy established by the court to benefit 
the party who has been deprived of property due to the unconscionable behaviour of the 
trustee
379
.  
In relation to company law, the trustee theory holds that directors are trustees of the 
shareholders‟ property. Shareholders, in turn, are the trust beneficiaries, since they entrust the 
company property into the hands of the directors. The idea was originated by Berle, who 
regarded shareholders as beneficiaries and directors as their trustees as a way to resolve the 
principal-agent problem
380
. In favour of the trustee theory of corporate governance are the 
facts that directors do not always follow the orders of shareholders, while they possess 
significant control over the company assets and their use. Moreover, as is often the case with 
companies in common law countries, shareholders remain far from being actively involved in 
the company‟s affairs, and even their ownership of the company seems doubtful381.  
As seen above from the discussion of the agency and trustee theories, the terms „agents‟ and 
„trustees‟ are quite different in many aspects.  The application of each term to the company 
directors in their relations with the shareholders and the company would involve different 
principles of work and imply different responsibilities. It is, however, highly likely that 
different views of directors, as either agents or trustees, may emerge based on differences in 
countries‟ legal systems, the nature of the company boards, and historically established 
                                                        
377 English courts have readily recognised express trusts. See, for example Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279; Paul 
v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527; Bowman v Secular Society Ltd. [1917] AC 406.  
378 Westduetshce Landesbank Girotzentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669.  
379 Hudson (n 374) 46. 
380 Adolf Berle, „Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust‟ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049.  
381 These are typical features for the separation of ownership and control, which is prevalent in common law 
countries. The issue was extensively discussed in section 4.2 of this chapter. 
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corporate governance practices. The following section considers whether directors are treated 
more as agents or as trustees in England and Saudi Arabia.  
4.5.2 Fiduciary Relationships in Agency and Trusteeship 
From their origins in trust law and their embedding in agency relationships, fiduciary 
obligations have been evolving as exclusive benefit principles and prophylactic measures 
against the other party‟s self-dealing382. It has been established, therefore, that the fiduciary 
has to primarily serve the interests of the beneficiary
383
. To ensure the security of this 
relationship, the fiduciary is to refrain from any deals involving the beneficiary assets which 
could either bring the fiduciary personal gain or harm the beneficiary in some way. For this, 
the fiduciary is entitled to compensation for performing the duties regarding the beneficiary‟s 
property, based on confidence and trust. This notion of exclusive relationships and mutual 
benefits encompasses the nature of the fiduciary duties applied in corporate law, which 
determine the strictures that serve the purposes of retaining these relationships while 
restraining fiduciaries from engaging in self-aggrandizing behaviour
384
.  
When the fiduciary relationships are considered in the context of a company, a special 
configuration of interests and needs have to be considered. In essence, directors‟ fiduciary 
duties, even though not formally attributable to the concept of agency, are basically the same 
as those of agents. These duties can be considered as owed to the company itself, its 
shareholders, or both
385. Nevertheless, directors‟ fiduciary duties do require, at least 
theoretically, self-denying behaviour, which prohibits them from engaging in activities that 
undermine the company property or use it as a source of self-enrichment. Whether this notion 
is followed in practice depends on the specific legal, business and social circumstances 
surrounding the nature of the relationships between directors as fiduciaries and shareholders 
or companies as beneficiaries. This, in turn, is largely determined by the nature of the legal 
position of a director. Taking into account certain differences among different types of 
directors, as discussed above, the following discussion reviews the legal positions of different 
                                                        
382 For an extensive discussion on this topic, see Victor Brudney, „Contract And Fiduciary Duty In Corporate 
Law‟ (1997) 38 (4) Boston College Law Review 595. 
383 ibid 601. 
384 ibid 602. 
385 A detailed discussion of whom the fiduciary duties owed will be carried in the next two chapters.  
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types of directors in England and Saudi Arabia and identifies the limits of applicability of 
fiduciary duties to each directorship type.  
4.5.3 The Legal Position of a Company Director in England 
The legal position of a company director in England has undergone serious changes over the 
course of history. The early company cases tended to treat directors as trustees
386
. This was 
possibly because the early English companies were not incorporated, and the company 
property was vested in trustees
387
. However, even after the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 
the courts preferred to treat directors as trustees
388
. In Re Lands Allotment Co
389
, Lindley LJ 
stated that the law has been treating directors as trustees of the company money, which was 
under their control. A similar view was shared by Jessel G in Re Forest of Dean, Coal Mining 
Co
390
, who posited that ‘directors are called trustees. They are no doubt trustees of assets 
which have come into their hands, or which are under their control’391.  
Nevertheless, with the introduction of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, there was some 
shift in judicial thinking regarding the treatment of corporate directors. For example, in 
Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers
392
, Lord Cranworth stated that „a corporate body can 
only act by agents,‟ who have to promote the interests of the company, for which they run 
business affairs. The idea of treating directors as agents was expressed in Isle of Wight Rly Co 
v Tahourdin
393
, which established the shareholders‟ right to dismiss directors under the 
Companies Clauses Act 1845
394
. Earlier, in Smith v Anderson
395
, James LJ expressed the idea 
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that directors were clearly distinguishable from trustees, and a number of subsequent cases 
treated them as only „quasi-trustees‟396. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was still confusion as to whether directors 
were considered trustees. In Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley, Buckley LJ 
dismissed the idea of agency in relation to company directors: 
‘The directors are not servants to obey directions given by the shareholders as 
individuals; they are not agents appointed by and bound to serve the 
shareholders as their principals. They are persons who may by the regulations 
be entrusted with the control of the business, and if so entrusted they can be 
dispossessed from that control only by the statutory majority which can alter 
the articles. Directors are not, I think, bound to comply with the directions 
even of all the corporators acting as individuals‟397. 
However, in Re City Equitable Insurance Co
398
, Romer J observed that while directors were 
fiduciaries (like trustees), their duties were different from those of trustees. Romer argued 
that in the process of managing a company, directors are entitled to make investment 
decisions and take risks which could not be taken by trustees. As a result, directors have 
different roles from trustees‟ discretions and expectations to fulfill. He explained: 
„[i]t is sometimes said that directors are trustees. If this means no more than 
that directors in the performance of their duties stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with the company, the statement is true enough. But if the 
statement is meant to be an indication by way of analogy of what those duties 
are, it appears to me to be wholly misleading. I can see but little resemblance 
between the duties of a director and the duties of a trustee of a will or 
marriage settlement. It is indeed impossible to describe the duty of a director 
in general terms, whether by way of analogy or otherwise‟399. 
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Following the decision of City Equitable Insurance Co, directors are not trustees in the full 
sense. However, trust law is important in this case, since directors are still considered 
fiduciaries
400
, and fiduciary duties are embedded in trust law
401
.  
Modern English law tends to agree with the idea that company directors are agents rather 
than trustees. This notion has been developed because a) there is a duty of care and skill, 
which allows directors to take reasonable risks in conducting business
402
; b) directors do not 
own property on behalf of either shareholders or the company
403
; and c) they act as agents in 
conducting company business
404
. As agents, directors are, however, held as fiduciaries to 
their principal. Davies effectively put these ideas together: 
„to describe directors as trustees seems today neither strictly correct nor 
invariably helpful. In fact, directors are agents of the company rather than 
trustees of its property. But as agents they stand in a fiduciary relationship to 
their principal, the company‟405. 
It should be remembered, however, that the Agency Theory principles work well in cases 
where there is substantial controlling power of a principal. In relation to modern English 
corporate fabric, a high level of shareholder control over directors can be observed in private 
enterprises, where blockholding is more common. However, in large public corporations, as 
discussed above, there is a strong presence of dispersed shareholding, meaning that such 
control is nearly impossible. Therefore, in large public companies, directors occupy a pre-
eminent position in management, and this makes it harder for principals to control them. This 
was recognised in Gramophone and Typewriter v Stanley 
406
 and, recently, in Towcester 
Racecourse Co Ltd v Racecourse Association Ltd
407
. The position of the courts in these cases 
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was that neither the legislation nor shareholders could exercise sufficient powers over 
directors in order to create a true principal-agent relationship. That is, the idea of directors 
being agents cannot be uniformly applied within English corporate reality.  
Because directors in public companies are less controlled, the issue of shareholder protection 
arises. English courts recognised this matter by applying in some cases certain trustee duties 
to company directors. The key case in English company law in this sense is Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd v Gulliver, which involved the board of directors acquiring shares of another company, 
for which their company was legally but not financially in a position to acquire
408
. The court 
held that the profits obtained from the purchase of shares were to be attributed to the 
company, and that the directors were in breach of their duty of loyalty. A similar decision 
was reached by the court in Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley, where a director 
left his company and entered into a contract with another company without providing due 
information
409
. The court held that the director occupied a fiduciary position to his company 
and had, therefore to disclose such information. In Belmont Finance Corp v Williams 
Furniture
410
 and, later, in JJ Harrison (Properties) v Harrison
411
 the courts explained that 
even in the absence of express appointment of the director as a trustee, he assumes the trustee 
duties in relation to the company‟s property by virtue of his appointment to the office. Both 
cases involved the acquisition of properties by directors without due disclosure. Similarly, the 
court held that a director who tries to poach his company‟s clients, is in breach of his 
fiduciary duties and is liable to the company for all the resulting profits
412
.  
The cases discussed above demonstrate that English law tends to treat directors as owing 
certain duties under the trustee theory. Specifically, they can be linked to the doctrine of 
constructive trusteeship, which protects beneficiaries (in this case, companies) against the 
actions of trustees (directors) who lack due diligence and loyalty. Indeed, while in several 
cases this conclusion can be reached deductively based on trust law, in Industrial 
Development, JJ Harrison, and Regal, the courts explicitly pointed out that the directors‟ 
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actions were considered as a breach of constructive trusteeship. Here is an explicit note by 
Chadwick LJ:  
„A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not a trustee of its 
own property; it is both legal and beneficial owner of the property. […] 
the directors owe fiduciary duties to the company in relation to [their] 
powers, and a breach of those duties is treated as a breach of trust. […] It 
follows from the principle that directors […] in breach of their fiduciary 
duties are treated as having committed a breach of trust that a person who 
receives that property with knowledge of the breach of duty is treated as 
holding it upon trust for the company. He is said to be a constructive 
trustee of the property‟413. 
As seen above, the legal position of a director in England hints at the dual nature of the office, 
based on the fusion of some elements of agency and trusteeship. Specifically, it is clear that, 
while the courts widely recognise directors as agents of their companies (not as agents of 
shareholders, however), they are also considered to a certain degree to be in a constructive 
trustee relationship. This is reflected through the presence of certain duties and obligations 
pertaining to such a relationship as recognised by the English courts
414
. Both agents and 
trustees are subject to specific duties owed to either principal or beneficiary. However, the 
nature of these duties is not the same, and the nature of relationship between the two parties 
will depend on each particular case. The discussion above was applicable to the legally 
appointed directors, which makes it suitable for the de jure type of directorship. At the same 
time, as was demonstrated above, in the absence of a unified definition of „director‟ the nature 
of the directorship office somewhat varies depending on the type of directorship that an 
individual holds. Therefore, for further discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by the 
company directors, it is worthwhile reviewing the legal position of each directorship type 
present in England and identifying what duties, in general, each directorship position may 
owe. 
4.5.3.1 Legal Position of Shadow Directors 
As mentioned earlier, although the CA 2006 does not define the term „director,‟ it does define 
what shadow directors are. Further, section 170 (5) of the Act provides that the general 
(statutory) duties apply to these directors to the extent that common rules or equitable 
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principles apply. However, as English case law has clarified, shadow directors do not owe the 
same number of fiduciary duties as legally appointed directors do. Here, we are returning to 
the case of Ultraframe England Ltd v Fielding, which serves as a good illustration of the 
modern case law approach toward the duties owed by shadow directors. The case is a 
landmark decision in the sense that 1) it separated shadow directors from de facto directors; 2) 
based on the distinctive nature of shadow directors it determined their unique position in 
relation to the company and its assets; and 3) it narrowed the scope of the fiduciary duties 
owed by shadow directors, based on their unique position. 
By creating a tradeoff between de facto and shadow directors, the court in Ultraframe laid a 
foundation for a different approach to the latter‟s legal position in a company. This approach 
seems logical, taking into account the fact that the statutory law clearly distinguishes shadow 
directors from the legally appointed directors. As Lewison J held, „If the intention of 
Parliament had been to equate „shadow directors‟ with „directors‟ for all statutory purposes, 
this could have been achieved simply by extending the definition of „director‟ to include a 
„shadow director‟ (para. 1279). Whether the real intention of the legislator in separating the 
two types of directorship was really to underline the difference in fiduciary duties remains 
questionable; however, in the present form of the statutory law, it provides the courts with 
flexibility in interpreting this separation, as was the case in Ultraframe.  
The unique legal position of shadow directors to the company requires further consideration. 
The court in Ultraframe admitted that shadow directors may have different interests from the 
company‟s and, therefore, give directions that could be regarded as being opposed to the 
shareholders‟ interests. This seems logical in cases where shadow directors do not have direct 
relationships with the company in question. In this case, such requirements as loyalty and not 
pursuing goals of profiting, which are typical for legally appointed and de facto directors, 
could become too constraining. The situation, however, is different when the direct 
relationships are present, because then trust relationships deriving from property would 
necessarily emerge. This, in turn, would impose fiduciary duties on a shadow director. From 
this standpoint, while shadow directors may not have the same scope of fiduciary duties 
toward a company as de jure or de facto directors, in cases when a direct relationship to the 
company property emerges, these duties would arise from the matter of trust law. This point 
was clearly outlined in Ultraframe as well by stating that a shadow director may be subject to 
specific fiduciary duties where his acts go beyond indirect influence on the company‟s assets.  
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As seen, despite shadow directors being equal to de jure directors in terms of duties as 
outlined in the CA 2006, English case law refuses to impose all fiduciary duties on shadow 
directors. Indeed, even if we look at the wording of the CA 2006 section 270 (5), it does not 
state that a shadow director owes the same duties to a company as a legally appointed 
director: it merely states that the general duties outlined in the Act apply in special 
circumstances. As the case of Ultraframe demonstrated, shadow directors owe only the duty 
of care and skill and they are not liable, as constructive trustees, to their company. Lewison J 
stated that shadow directors are only indirectly involved in the acts concerning the company‟s 
assets, and that was the reason for not imposing fiduciary duties upon them
415
.  
 
 
4.5.3.2 A Special Case of Nominee Directors 
The legal position of a nominee director in England is a vexed one because of the likely 
presence of divided loyalties to the appointor and the company. This is also an area of 
corporate governance where the commercially recognised position of a director in a company 
may interfere with the legal principles. Yet the position of English courts in this respect has 
been ruthlessly strict: nominee directors owe their duties to the company first, and the duties 
to their appointors should be fulfilled only where these do not interfere with the interests of 
the company, thus implying the prevailing of section 172 of the CA 2006. The two recent 
cases, Cobden Investment and Hawkes, addressed the issue and outlined the scope of duties 
owed to companies by nominee directors. Cobden Investment, however, provided a more 
detailed approach to the issue and introduced some interesting observations that are worth 
considering.  
In Cobden Investment, the court held that a nominee director, just like any other de jure 
director, has, among other duties, to act in the interests of the company, avoid conflicts of 
interest, and not make unauthorized profit. It is worth noting that, in delivering his opinion, 
Warren J re-emphasised the rigid frame of English law regarding nominee directors, 
regardless of any relevant flexibility that is applied in other British countries, such as 
Australia
416
. As such, nominee directors could be held liable for the breach of duty in cases 
when they follow the instructions of their appointors which are not in line with the interests of 
                                                        
415 Ultraframe (n 400). 
416 Cobden Investments v RWM [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) [65]. 
99 
 
the company. In other words, just like regular de jure directors, nominees are considered true 
holders of fiduciary duties toward a company, and this cannot be overridden by the fact of 
their appointment to the directorship by another person or entity. This, in turn, creates a 
relationship of a constructive trust, which is triggered by the breach of duty toward a 
company. To summarise, a nominee director in the English legal system holds fiduciary 
duties toward a company, based on the notion of a constructive trust, while his or her duties 
toward the appointor are secondary in matters of legality.  
At the same time, based on the Cobden Investment ruling, it can be argued that the context of 
the application of fiduciary duties to nominee directors is subject to modification. While 
stressing the supremacy of duties owed to a company over those owed to an appointor, 
Warren J acknowledged that there could be cases where fiduciary duties could be lifted
417
. 
For this, however, he argued that the consent of all shareholders should be given. This note 
has a different power of application in public and private companies. Considering the 
dominance of dispersed ownership in public companies in England, the possibility of all 
shareholders assenting to allow the subjugation of fiduciary duties by a nominee director is 
extremely small. This means that nominee directorship in public companies imposes fiduciary 
duties on its holders in an unrestricted sense. Another matter, however, is the case of private 
companies where a small number of shareholders are present. The fewer the shareholders, the 
more likely it is that a nominee director may receive a consent to fiduciary duty relief. It is 
here, perhaps, that the extent of the fiduciary duties of nominee directors could be considered 
on a case specific basis.  
Another important point to note when considering the nature of nominee directorship is the 
application of duty, based on section 172 of the CA 2006 (promotion of the company‟s 
success). Warren J in his judgment noted that the antecedent of the matter and the matter itself 
were highly subjective. This approach seems quite logical considering the wording of the 
provision, which includes such things as consideration of what is likely to promote the 
success
418
.  Based on this, the courts could, in theory, consider nominees not liable for breach 
of duty to act in the best interests of a company provided that the directors‟ belief was such. 
However, there could be still a case for the breach of duty of care (section 174 of CA 2006).   
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4.5.3.3 Legal Position of Non-Executive Directors 
The legal position of non-executive directors in English law remains largely unsettled. In 
many aspects, it is little discussed and poorly understood in relation to their fiduciary 
relationship with a company. The major recent case that attempted to clarify the position of 
NEDs and to determine their roles and duties was the Equitable Life Assurance v Bowley
419
. 
The court considered a general approach to treating NEDs as executive directors in terms of 
the general duties owed to a company; however, in reading the judgment, Langley J admitted 
that in practice this could not be the case. By stating this, he referred to the objective test of 
negligence, which provides different degrees of the duty owed to a company. At the same 
time, the court dutifully asserted that a lack of knowledge and skill do not prevent NEDs 
from exercising their rights in monitoring the acts of executives and controlling their actions. 
Another important point emphasised by the court is that NEDs are likely to possess different 
levels of knowledge, skill and experience from the executive directors who are actively 
involved in the business operations of a company.  
This leads us to two main inferences. First, NEDs can be found in breach of duty even if they 
believe that no wrongdoing has taken place from the side of the executive directors due to 
failure, in a reasonable manner, to monitor and control the actions of executive directors. At 
the same time, it is clear that the degree of a director‟s competence has to be assessed by 
reference to the role that has been assigned to him or her. Therefore, the duties and 
responsibilities of NEDs are linked by the decision of Equitable Life to what is reasonably 
expected from an individual serving in that capacity. This deviates from the application of a 
strict standard of duties as applied to executive directors.  
The observation noted above can be reasonably applied to individual acts of NEDs acting on 
their own. However, it is unlikely that the test could be applicable in decisions involving 
boards as a whole. In this case, all directors, including NEDSs, are considered equally 
accountable. If a breach of duty occurs while all board members are present when the 
wrongful act is approved, then liability is approached from a joint perspective, and there is no 
defence on the part of NEDs such as being part-timers or having little understanding of the 
act, as was duly observed above. For these purposes, NEDs are in the same position as 
regular directors, as trustees of a fund, and can be found liable in relation to the company 
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assets and property, as demonstrated by El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc
420
. Therefore, 
the legal position of NEDs in a company can be summarized as follows: 1) as legally 
appointed directors of a company, they owe certain core duties toward it; 2) in practice, 
however, these duties could be limited based on a test of reasonably expected capacities of 
the position of an NED; 3) NEDs are in the position of trustees of company property 
whenever serving on a board when wrongful decisions are undertaken.  
A special case for fiduciary relationships in the case of NEDs is that of competing 
directorships. Unlike trust law, where a fiduciary cannot directly compete with the 
beneficiary, English company case law does not clearly provide the same rule for company 
directors. Nor does the CA 2006 provide any clarification regarding this point. Therefore, 
whether a director can compete with the company has been an open topic for discussion since 
the decision in London Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration 
Co Ltd
421
, where Chitty J recognised that directors do not breach their duties when competing 
with their companies either directly or by holding a directorship in a competing company. 
The controversy related to competing directorship arises from the clash of the inherent rules 
embedded in English law, where the heritage of Mashonaland, which has been accepted as 
authoritative by a number of cases and scholars alike
422
, allowing directors to compete with 
their companies, meets the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflict of interests when 
serving as a company director.  
While the idea of conflict of interest has been frequently referred to in English statutory and 
case law, the concept is not so easily grasped, as there is some tendency to confuse it with 
such concepts as negligence and misrepresentation. It can be stated that a conflict of interest 
arises from the fact of owing a fiduciary duty to another person or entity. To say that a 
director, for example, is a fiduciary to a company would mean that there is a special 
relationship of trust and confidence, which gives the director the ability to represent a 
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company‟s assets when dealing with third parties423. On the basis of trust and confidence 
from the side of the company, directors have access to the company‟s confidential 
information and have the ability to use this information in business transactions. However, 
directors may also use this power and information access to pursue their own interests, which 
could be contrary to those of the company. Therefore, the position of a company in this case 
is a position of vulnerability, which requires reliance on some sort of protection
424
.  
The protection from the conflict of interest that directors might have is provided by section 
175 (1) of the CA 2006. The provision reads that „A director of a company must avoid a 
situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly 
may conflict, with the interests of the company‟. What needs to be addressed here, however, 
is the absence of a direct reference to competition with a company. Can NEDs competing 
with a company be categorised under section 175 (1) of the CA 2006 and, therefore, be 
involved in a breach of fiduciary duties? Unfortunately, this has not been so clear from the 
case law evidence. In the already mentioned Masholand case, Chitty J refused to accept that 
an NED, who never acted as a director and never attended board meetings was in breach of 
fiduciary duty by being a director of a competing company. This belief was later re-
emphasised by Blanesburgh L in Bell v Lever Bros
425
. However, in Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Ltd. v Meyer
426
, Denning LJ found breach of duty in continuous 
association with the co-operative society when that society set up its own rayon department. 
Further, decisions in Bray v Ford
427
 and Cook v Deeks
428
 acknowledged that trustee-like 
duties of good faith and loyalty are inherent in the nature of directorship.  
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An attempt was made to finally clarify the controversial nature of competing directorships, in 
the recent case of Plus Group Ltd v Pyke
429
, where a director who had been excluded from 
performing his duties as a director in a company (but remained officially a director), launched 
a competing business and attracted a former company client. While the court held that there 
was no breach of duty in Pyke‟s actions, of most interest to our discussion on NEDs is the 
opinion of Sedley LJ, who on the one hand posited that a director‟s fiduciary duty to the 
company is „uniform and universal,‟430 and on the other hand held that there are elements and 
facts related to a case which may exclude a director from the breach of duty liability
431
. 
Following these statements, the two primary questions related to the context of this 
discussion are: 1) whether the Mashonaland approach is inconsistent with the modern view 
on fiduciary duties of directors (specifically, whether it is in conflict with section 175 of the 
CA 2006); and 2) whether it is possible to embrace the „special circumstances‟ that would 
exclude NEDs from fiduciary duties. 
With regard to the applicability of the Mashonaland approach to competing directorships, 
there is a substantial difference in the way that the treatment of a director‟s obligations has 
been conducted. It should be remembered that Chitty J‟s argument in allowing directors to 
compete was based heavily on the notions of the absence of contractual duties or company 
article provisions prohibiting these. However, a purely contractual approach to the resolution 
of the conflicts of interest has been struck in a number of cases that attached fiduciary duties 
to directors in a trustee-like manner even without the presence of explicit contractual 
provisions
432
. Further, the long survival of the Mashonaland approach is likely to be due to 
the doctrine of corporate opportunity, which supports the elimination of unnecessarily rigid 
limits to entrepreneurship. However, while such a concession is needed, allowing directors to 
compete with the company and rejecting the conflict of interest in this case is unlikely to be 
the best way to address it. By allowing directors to compete, the burden would be shifted onto 
the company to monitor activities to ensure that directors do not abuse their power and 
negatively affect the company‟s assets. Such activities would be needed on a continual basis, 
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while putting a burden on directors in determining the limits of conflict of interest would 
require a rather modest effort (to resign or inform the board) on their side. Therefore, 
applying the Mashonaland approach to treating competing directorships is inconsistent with 
the modern understanding of the nature of directorship and the way it is understood within 
the corporate opportunity doctrine. As a result, the fiduciary obligation to avoid a conflict of 
interest, as established by section 175 of the CA 2006, is out of question. 
A more difficult situation arises with the notion of some facts that may determine the absence 
of breach of duty. Here, Sedley LJ clearly undertook the approach of substance over facts. 
Indeed, despite remaining an NED, Pyke neither participated in the decision-making process, 
nor ran the company‟s affairs to any degree. Another aspect is that, according to Sedley, what 
relieved Pyke from the breach of duty was the poor treatment on the part of his company. 
While the facts of the case laid out by Sedley are clear, the correctness of his statement that 
actual involvement in the company affairs determines the extent of fiduciary duties seems 
questionable. Granted, given the particular circumstances of the Pyke case, where there is a 
clear hint on constructive dismissal from the director‟s duty, the Lord Justice‟s reasoning 
seems fair, but not in terms of the extent of applicability of the rules. Indeed, if Sedley‟s 
approach is true, then the courts, in determining the breach of duty, would have to determine 
the extent of the necessary involvement of a director in the company‟s affairs, and whether 
the reasons for the lack of involvement are sufficient, or whether there should be exclusion 
from all areas of company operations or only selected ones. Clearly, there is a substantial 
amount of subjectivity involved in this process, and the case law regarding NEDs‟ fiduciary 
duties would become more complicated. Therefore, with regard to the rejection (or loosening, 
for that matter) of strict applicability of the duty to avoid conflict of interest as a basis for 
fiduciary duty, serious complications may arise in determining where and why it can be 
applied.  
Further, the fact that a director is unfairly treated could also pose a threat to the objectives of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which has been applied to defend companies from inappropriate 
behaviour on the part of directors and to maintain the relationship of trust and confidence
433
. 
However, if poor treatment is taken into account, there will be no complete loyalty assurance 
until the poorly treated director resigns. In the light of the previously conducted discussion, 
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the extent of the director‟s involvement in the company‟s affairs would matter more than his 
or her loyalty.  
Continuing the discussion on this matter, it is worth noting that another recent court decision 
considered a case of an NED competing with a company, where an individual only carried 
the title of director, but was not involved in company affairs. In Coleman Taymar Ltd v 
Oakes
434
, the court found that the director owed full scale fiduciary duties to the company. 
However, the director was still acquitted of charges based on section 727 of the Companies 
Act 1985
435
. From the legal perspective, this approach is, perhaps, preferable to the one 
articulated in Pyke, since it admits the fiduciary nature of directorship, but leaves some 
leeway to the court in applying this concept fairly in specific cases. The two cases also 
establish the link to the duty of avoiding a conflict of interests, although the consequences of 
application and treatment of the breach of that duty are left to the court‟s discretion in 
reviewing each particular case.  
 
4.5.4 The legal position of a company director in Saudi Arabia 
While there is an extensive amount of literature, both academic and professional, regarding 
the legal position of a director in England, similar studies in a Saudi Arabian context are 
virtually absent. Several researchers have looked into different aspects of corporate 
governance in the Kingdom, including the issues of ownership, types of companies, structure 
of the board, and the rights of shareholders
436
, however, none have specifically addressed the 
issue of the legal position of a company director. Taking into account the scarcity of available 
research and the inability to obtain legal documents
437
, the researcher takes the approach of 
                                                        
434 [2001] 2 BCLC 749. 
435 CA 2006, s 1157 allows the court to relieve a director of liability for breach of duty in the case where the 
director acted honestly and reasonably.  
436 See Al-Ajlan W (n 355); Al-Harkan (n 271); Al-Jeber (n 345). See also an interesting discussion on the 
agency theory principles in Islamic Financial Institutions by Assem Saffieddine, „Islamic Financial Institutions 
And Corporate Governance: New Insights For Agency Theory‟ (2009) 17 (2) Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 142. 
437 In Saudi Arabia, obtaining official court minutes is nearly impossible, taking into account the government's 
prohibition on their publication. As a result, there is little academic contribution to the analysis and 
interpretations on the issues related to Saudi company law.  
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analysing the related statutory basics of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and the general 
requirements outlined within Shariah, as the supreme law of the Kingdom.  
The CL 1965 establishes directors in Saudi companies as agents who are appointed by 
shareholders. Consequently, the primary and secondary pieces of Saudi legislation heavily 
favour shareholders by granting them numerous rights over directors, including appointment 
and dismissal
438
, voting on business issues
439
, suing the board members
440
, and holding pre-
emptive rights to stock
441
. Although there has been a recent trend in legislation to increase the 
independence of the board in Saudi companies, blockholding by the government and rich 
Saudi families allow them to dictate their will to directors with little opposition. Moreover, as 
was shown above, directors are appointed by the blockholders, and they tend to 
overwhelmingly act in the latters‟ favour442.  
Considering the significant power of blockholders in Saudi companies, the statutory position 
of a director in a Saudi company as an agent is confirmed in practice. The corporate realities 
in Saudi Arabia strongly point toward the main principles of the Agency Theory, including 
the basic duties of agents and principals. This is evident in several ways. First, the Theory 
assumes agents to be acting on behalf of their principal, who exerts control over them
443
. In 
Saudi companies, extensive control over directors is exerted by the government or large 
family blockholders. Since these parties either elect or appoint directors to their positions, the 
latter primarily act on their behalf and in accordance with their interests. Directors in Saudi 
companies also act within the scope of the duties and powers attributed to them by the 
controlling shareholders
444
. The principals (large blockholders), in turn, compensate directors 
for conducting business and indemnify the claims and liabilities against their appointees.  
                                                        
438
 CL 1965, article 66 and CGR 2006, article 5 (a). 
439 CL 1965, article 89 and CGR 2006, article 5 (d). 
440 CL 1965, articles 76, 77 and 108 outline many reasons for this action. 
441 CL 1965, article 136. 
442 See Part 4.3.2. of the chapter.  
443 See Jensen and Meckling (n 241). 
444 Saudi company legislation grants many issues of corporate governance to be decided by the company 
articles. However, in the majority of cases, large blockholders use their power to establish their own agenda 
within those articles, or simply ignore company bye-laws, as is the case of the government appointment of their 
director nominees, thus circumventing the need for calling a general meeting.  
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One major difference between Saudi Arabia and Western countries is the strong influence of 
religion. Directors in Saudi Arabia are not only under a contractual obligation to maximize 
their company value, but also a more compelling duty to conduct business in a manner that is 
compliant with Shariah law. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond simply statutory analysis 
of a director‟s role and include the influence the supreme law has on it. Of particular interest 
to this discussion is the notion of wealth planning, the duty of acting in good faith, and the 
rule against uncertainty, all of which are mentioned in Qur'an.  
The first important aspect to consider is the Islamic way of wealth planning. Under Shariah 
law, any person who has duties toward others‟ property is considered a trustee of their 
property
445
. Applying this principle to the process of corporate governance, it can be stated 
that the relationship between the company and directors is that of a trustee, since directors 
have duties toward the property of the company as a separate entity. Shariah law also 
explicitly specifies the duty to act fairly and in good faith. Saudi courts often consider not 
only the legal, but also the social and moral implications of individuals conducting business 
transactions
446
. As such, there is a clear implication of the existence of a duty of honesty, 
which also fits more closely with the trusteeship relations
447
. Finally, Shariah law includes 
the rule against uncertainty. This rule, which is generally viewed in relation to the prohibition 
of gambling, also has strong implications in commercial law, because it is applied to any 
operation containing an elevated amount of risk
448
. Risk avoidance, embedded in Shariah law 
and, therefore mandatory for all to follow, once again points to the possible presence of 
trustee features in the legal position of Saudi company directors. 
As follows from the review of the legal position of Saudi directors in a company, certain 
features of both agency and trusteeship are present. While the legal framework of company 
law in the Kingdom points to the type of relationship between shareholders and directors as 
                                                        
445 More on this will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
446 See Abderrahman (n 133).  
447 It should be noted that the duty of honesty has not been so strongly relied upon in the common law countries, 
including England. In those countries, the legal constituents of the deals are considered much more important 
than moral obligations. 
448 Abderrahman (n 133) 143. At the same time, Shariah experts, taking into account present economic realities, 
admit that the literal prohibition of all kinds of risk could hamper economic development. See William 
Ballantyne, „The Shari'a: Bridges or conflict?‟ A Foreword to the Newsletter of the Arab Regional Forum of the 
IBA, 1 (1) 1994. 
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of a principal-agent kind, Shariah, as the supreme law of the land, indicates several features 
that are closer to a beneficiary-trustee type of relationship.  
4.5.4.1 Legal Position of Non-Executive Directors 
While the main company law statute of the Kingdom, the CL 1965, says nothing regarding 
the role and position of NEDs in Saudi corporate governance structure, recent legal 
developments seem to grant a stronger role to these individuals. This is clearly seen in the 
provisions of the CGR 2006. One of these states that non-executive directors should be 
present „in sufficient number‟ on all committees that might involve a conflict of interest, 
including the committees dealing with the generation of reports, reviews of deals with the 
related parties, nominations to the board and to the position of executive director, and 
directors‟ remuneration449. Another provision states that NEDs are subject to sufficient 
disclosure of information to them by the board, so that they can „perform their duties and 
responsibilities in an effective manner‟450.  
While the CGR represents a type of non-binding „soft‟ law, the intention of the Saudi 
legislator to provide NEDs with a wider degree of power and responsibilities is evident. 
However, at least at the moment it is impossible to determine to what extent the legal position 
of NEDs stretches in Saudi legal system. Besides the non-binding nature of the CGR 2006 
and the absence of an NED definition and determined roles in the CL 1965, it is hard to 
determine what construes the „duties and responsibilities‟ of NEDs. Nor it is evident to what 
extent the NEDs are fiduciaries in the context of Saudi company law. The intention of the 
Saudi legislator to introduce more NEDs to corporate boards and committees could be related 
to the desire to have better control over family controlled enterprises, which are dominant in 
the Kingdom. However, it is clear in the light of the discussion above that NEDs are likely to 
represent individuals in the form of appointees in cross-directorship links, which are common 
in Saudi corporations. In this regard, the initiative of the Saudi legislator may not be that 
effective after all. This, however, is yet more evidence that further developments in the 
country‟s company law codification are necessary in order to better define the roles and 
positions of NEDs.  
 
                                                        
449 CGR  2006, article 13c. 
450 CGR  2006, article 11g. 
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4.5.4.2 Legal Position of Shadow Directors 
Unlike English company law, Saudi statutes do not recognise shadow directors. This may be 
explained by the fact that, historically, the Saudi legal system has governed a business 
environment that did not spur the development of multiple forms of business governance 
structures. Even the recently issued regulations by the CMA draw very definite lines for 
directors in public companies by defining directors as only those who are members of the 
board. Consequently, all legal provisions regarding the roles of directors and the board of 
directors refer to one type of director: there is no statutory distinction between, for example, 
de jure and shadow directors as in English company law
451
. On the one hand, this makes the 
identity of a company director more direct and easy to establish: the only criterion is to 
determine whether the person has a position on the board. On the other hand, individuals who 
may influence the board without serving there cannot be statutorily found liable for their 
misdeeds. In this regard, the issue of property exploitation may not be adequately addressed 
in relation to all potential abusers, such as shadow directors.  
As was noted above, the situation is a little bit more encompassing in the case of non-public 
companies. But even there, the definition involves only managers and executives who 
influence the strategic decision making process. In other words, some definite managerial 
title held in the company is likely to be required in order for someone to be considered a 
director. Besides, the definition does not seem to include outside persons, who could be 
involved in the actions of the company by influencing the members of the board. Therefore, it 
seems that neither public nor privately held companies in Saudi Arabia can be protected, at 
least by means of statutory law, from the actions of those who are called shadow directors in 
England. Outside persons, even though influencing the board decisions, are in no way 
covered in the corresponding acts of Saudi company law statutes. 
So, the legal position of shadow directors in Saudi company law is neither that of agents nor 
trustees. Moreover, the concept of shadow director is not even recognised in Saudi 
legislation. Can this fact be attributed to the absence of necessity to regulate shadow 
directors? In the researcher‟s opinion, it is hardly so. When the CL 1965 was signed into law, 
there were not many variations in corporate governance structures in Saudi Arabia due to the 
newness of corporations as legal entities. Such concepts as shadow directors could have been 
easily omitted because they were unknown at that time. However, with the rapid development 
                                                        
451 CL 2006, ss 250 and 251. 
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of corporate businesses in the Kingdom and the constantly increasing complexity of the 
business and legal environment of company law, such concepts as shadow directors need to 
be reviewed and addressed appropriately. The absence of regulation of shadow directors 
(whether in the same or other manner than de jure directors) leads to the situation where 
neither the company, nor shareholders or any other stakeholders are appropriately protected 
from the acts of outsiders who may influence the company. Moreover, the present definition 
of director as provided by the CMA effectively excludes the possibility of including outsiders 
into the group of people who have fiduciary duties toward the company.   
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes the second step in the functionalist comparative approach, which 
serves as the basis for the current research, by outlining the common issue faced by the legal 
systems of England and Saudi Arabia. As was argued, effective codification of law to govern 
the multifarious nature of relationships existing between corporate directors and company 
property is acute in both countries‟ legal systems. It was also demonstrated that effective 
regulation of the fiduciary relationship that directors have toward company property is 
dependent upon the ownership structure in the companies as well as the legal position of 
company directors. After determining the major similarities and differences in the main 
aspects related to directorship institutions in England and Saudi Arabia, it is now time to 
proceed to the next step in the functionalist method of comparative study, which is the 
analysis of the approaches used to resolve the common issue in both legislations.  
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Chapter Five: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties towards Company Property in England 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the principal similarities and differences between English and 
Saudi law in terms of the definition of the term „director‟, in light of the theories and 
approaches related to the ownership structure and the classification of companies under both 
legal systems, identified the legal meaning and types of company directors in both countries, 
and examined the legal nature of a company director in both countries. By doing so, the 
chapter completed the second step in the functional analysis chosen for this research. The next 
step, accordingly, is the presentation of the systems‟ approaches in order to solve the problem 
in question
452
. At this stage, the comparatist builds his comparative framework by describing 
the legal norms, concepts and institutions of each legal system. This function can be described 
as the „epistemological function‟ of understanding legal institutions and rules as a way of 
solving the problem at hand
453
. As was noted in the previous chapter, the issue upon which 
this study focuses is the regulation of directors‟ fiduciary duties toward company property. 
The aim of this regulation is to effectively prevent exploitation of property, while not 
impeding the foundations of free enterprise.  
This chapter provides an analysis of the regulations in the English legal system to regulate 
directors‟ fiduciary duties toward company property. The chapter starts with the discussion of 
what is considered property in English company law. The major, second section of this 
chapter analyses the provisions of the statutory code that regulates directors‟ fiduciary duties 
toward property (mainly sections 175, 176, and 177 of the CA 2006) and examines to what 
extent they are consistent with the previous case law. The third section of the chapter 
analyses the approach taken by English company law in protecting company property from 
directors‟ exploitation. To obtain a broader picture of the approach, English legislation is 
compared to the other countries with common law systems: the United States and Canada. 
From a comparative perspective, the section determines whether property protection in 
English law comes into conflict with the economic laws of free market and enterprise. The 
chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
 
                                                        
452 Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 43. 
453 Michaels (n 58) 364. 
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5.2 Company Property in English Law 
The discussion about fiduciary duties toward company property should rightfully begin by 
answering the question of what is considered property for the purposes of analysis. In 
general, property can be thought of as a physical or intangible entity that belongs to an 
individual or a group of individuals. This definition suggests that the key to understanding 
property is the concept of ownership. What makes property different from the other legal 
categories, such as restitution or a contract, is the presence of two key elements: 1) property 
can be purchased and sold, and 2) property can be excluded from use by others
454
. Therefore, 
company property can be considered as something that can be bought, sold and legally 
protected from unpermitted usage by other parties, including directors.  
Traditionally, English law considers two major types of property: company assets and 
intellectual capital, such as trademarks, patents, and copyrights. Misuse of corporate physical 
or intellectual assets poses no legal problem, since it is clear that directors cannot use a 
company‟s land or trademark as though they belong to him or her. Difficulties, however, 
arise when the question of misusing corporate opportunity and information emerges. The 
heart of the problem here rests in the much more subtle nature of opportunities and 
information, which from the legal perspective are not so evidently suitable for protection as a 
piece of property would be.  
5.2.1 Information and Opportunities 
Unlike physical objects and intellectual capital, the referencing of information and 
opportunities
455
 as parts of company property has been inconsistent in English law. Indeed, 
                                                        
454 Roger Smith, Property Law (Pearson Education Limited 2009) 3-4; also see James Penner The Idea Of 
Property In Law (Oxford University Press 2000) Chapter 4.  
455 Information about opportunity and opportunity itself are, in fact, hard to distinguish for legal purposes. See, 
for example, Pearlie Koh, „Principle 6 Of the Proposed Statement of Director‟s Duties‟ (2003) 66 (6) The 
Modern Law Review, 894, 897; also consider Brown v Bennett [1999] 1 BCLC 649, where Morritt LJ noted that 
directors „form knowledge‟ based on the presentation of an opportunity; an excellent further explanation is 
provided by David Kershaw „Does It Matter How The Law Thinks About Corporate Opportunities?‟ (2005) 25 
(4) Legal Studies 533, 547: „Intuitively the idea of an opportunity suggests progression towards the realisation 
of the information about the opportunity. […] such a distinction can be made because […] it assumes the 
opportunity exists in a way distinct from information prior to it being „used‟ by the director. However, prior to 
its „use‟ an opportunity is always information and knowledge. It does not make sense, therefore, to regulate 
„opportunities‟ differently from „information‟. 
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opinions in favour and against this proposition are common
456
.  Perhaps the decision in 
Boardman v Phipps
457
 can be considered the main authority in this matter, as it directly 
addressed the issue of equating information to a piece of company property, and revealed the 
absence of a cohesive view that information and knowledge were company property. The 
case involved the purchase of a company‟s shares by two individuals (Boardman and Phipps) 
who were considered fiduciaries of a trust
458
 which held a minority stake in the company. The 
purchase put the fiduciaries into effective control of the company, which they used to conduct 
a restructuring and substantially increased the company value in the process. The information 
used by Boardman and Phipps for the company financial valuation was acquired by them in 
their capacity of trust fiduciaries. The question eventually arose as to whether that 
information could be considered as trust property, thus assigning any resulting profits to the 
trust. In the court decision, Lord Hodson openly dissented from the opinion that information 
cannot be described as property
459
. Concurring with the opinion, Lord Guest emphasised that 
there was „no reason‟ not to consider information and knowledge as trust property460, while 
extending the application of this rule beyond just confidential information. A less determined 
position was demonstrated by Viscount Dilhorne who, although admitting that some 
information may still be regarded as property, stated that the information in the case was not 
considered property in an equal sense to that of the trust shares
461
. Similarly, Lord Cohen 
argued that information was not „property in the strict sense of that word‟462. Finally, Lord 
Upjohn completely dismissed the idea that information, even if confidential, would be 
considered as the company‟s property. His lordship argued that while confidential 
                                                        
456 General discussion on uses of confidential information can be found in Lord Goff and Gareth Jones The Law 
Of Restitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 754-56. In favour of considering confidential information a piece of 
company property are decisions in Re Keene [1922] 2 Ch 475 and A-G V Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1989] 2 
FSR 81 99-100. Against such treatment are decisions in North And South Trust Company V Berkeley [1970] 2 
Lloyd‟s Rep 467 481 and Fraser V Evans [1969] 1 QB 349 361.  
457 [1967] 2 AC 46.  
458 Boardman was a solicitor and a fiduciary, while, technically, Phipps was a beneficiary and would not 
normally be considered a fiduciary. However, Phipps chose to be regarded as a fiduciary. 
459 Boardman (n 457) 107. 
460 ibid 115. 
461 ibid 90. 
462 ibid 102.  
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information is often described in property terms, that did not mean that it would be regarded 
as property
463
.  
Following the comments provided by the judges in Boardman v Phipps, it is possible to 
discern the two different approaches to the language of property employed in the case. The 
first approach treats information as property in the strict sense of the term, meaning that it is 
considered as an intangible entity that a company has the right to use and exclude others from 
using. This approach was taken by Lords Hodson, Guest, and Upjohn, who analysed the case 
from the position that information was compared to such types of property as real estate or 
shares. Consequently, Lord Upjohn‟s argument that something that is open for everyone to 
see or hear could not fall under ownership rights
464
 seems logical. However, the concept of 
property is quite flexible. As Kershaw pointed out, it does not establish the nature of the 
rights attached to information; rather, it defines the relationship of ownership that can be 
viewed in different ways
465
. This relationship of ownership, which does not fully encompass 
ownership as discussed earlier, is central to the doctrine of corporate opportunities, which 
considers the logic and language of the concept to define the nature of a qualified form of 
ownership between a company and a director.  
The corporate opportunities doctrine, as a proprietary concept, has been actively developed in 
the US legal system in recent decades
466
. The key aspect of the doctrine is the treatment of 
opportunity and information in terms of ownership. The major criterion of legal relevance in 
the doctrine is to whom, the company or the director, the presented opportunity „belongs‟467. 
This aspect of belonging has been scrutinised in the landmark Delaware case of Guth v 
Loft
468
, where the court developed a set of rules establishing the presence of opportunity 
                                                        
463 ibid 128. The same opinion was expressed in a criminal law case Oxford v Moss [1979] 68 CR App Rep 183, 
where information was deemed not to belong to property for the purposes of theft.  
464 ibid 127.  
465 Kershaw (n 455) 549; also see Goff and Jones (n 456) 755, where they argue that categorisation of 
information as property does not resolve such complex issues as the scope of duties.  
466 John Lowry and Rod Edmunds „The No-Conflict – No-Profit Rules and the Corporate Fiduciary: 
Challenging the Orthodoxy of Absolutism (2000) Journal Of Business Law 122, 123. 
467 See, for example, the decision in Re Digex, Inc Shareholders Litigation 789 A 2d 1176 At 1188 (Del, 2000), 
where the key phrase is „a corporate opportunity belonging to Digex‟. 
468 5 A 2d 503 (Del, 1939).  
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ownership by the company
469
. Importantly, however, while the language of property is 
commonly used in corporate opportunity cases, the doctrine does not aim to establish 
absolute property rights to information against third parties. Rather, it is concerned with what 
resembles personal rights between the company and the director
470
. Therefore, the use of the 
words „property‟ and „belonging‟ in this case serves as a proxy to define a different set of 
opportunity rights from those that might be attached to physical objects or intellectual 
property. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a certain commonality to the logic of property 
is present, since in the case of a successful resolution in favour of the company, the other 
party (director) will be excluded from using the opportunity.  
Returning to Boardman v Phipps, the language of Viscount Dilhorne and, perhaps, Lord 
Cohen could be considered as talking in the corporate opportunities sense when applied to 
information and the opportunities it carries. Indeed, both Dilhorne and Cohen treated 
information not as a piece of property, but as if it was a piece of property, with all the 
subsequent legal applications. The cornerstones of Viscount Dilhorne‟s argument were two 
early cases in English law: Aas v Benham
471
 and Dean v MacDowell
472
. In both cases, the 
court applied an ownership framework in addressing information and opportunity issues
473
. 
While referencing these cases, Viscount Dilhorne referred to the usefulness of the „scope of 
business test‟, arguing that the acquiring of shares by Boardman and Phipps was outside the 
scope of their trust‟s business. In other words, Viscount Dilhorne, while accepting the fact 
that information and opportunity could be treated as property in certain cases, acknowledged 
that it was not so in Boardman v Phipps: the opportunity of acquiring shares did not „belong‟ 
to the trust.  
                                                        
469 This case will be discussed in detail below. For the matters of current review, the most important fact is its 
treatment of opportunity in terms of ownership. 
470 See, for example, Graham v Mimms 111 App 3d 751 (Ill, 1982) 762; also see Re Trim-Lean Meat Products, 
Inc. 4 Br 243 (Del, 1980) 247.  
471 [1891] 2 Ch 244. This was a partnership case, which established the „scope of business‟ test to determine 
whether an opportunity could be exploited by a partner. As will be shown later, the test‟s applicability to 
company law was dismissed in O’Donnell v Shanahan [2009] EWCA Civ 751. However, there is some strong 
scholarly support to apply the „scope of business‟ test in order to relax the strict English position regarding 
conflicts of interest. These issues are reviewed in detail in section 5.3.2.2.2.5. 
472 [1876] 8 Ch D 345. 
473 Dean v Macdowell (n 472); Aas v Benhman (n 471).  
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As seen above, the corporate opportunities framework allows the language of property to be 
applied to information and opportunity in a qualified sense. Granted, information and 
opportunity cannot be considered property in the full meaning of the term, and even the CA 
2006 refers to property, information, and opportunity as separate constructs
474
.  However, 
within the corporate opportunity framework, both information and opportunity are treated as 
if they were property in order to define the nature of the rights and duties existing between 
the company and the director, when it comes to both information and opportunities. 
Considering the growing influence of the doctrine in English case law, which is evidenced 
from the majority of recent cases regarding information and opportunities within the 
organisational context, this chapter treats corporate information and opportunities as if they 
were pieces of corporate property. This distinction will become clear in the section dealing 
with directors‟ loyalty as applied to resignation cases, which have strong links to the 
maturing business opportunity doctrine.  
5.3 Directors’ Duties with Respect to Company Property 
The nature of directors‟ duties represents one of the key aspects of modern English company 
law. Taking into account that all company activities are conducted by human beings, even 
though under the veil of corporate personality, and the fact that human directors are the main 
actors in the corporate governance process, directors‟ duties toward the company and other 
parties become central to the legal control of companies. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, directors in English law are considered company agents, and are thereby subject to 
the full strictness of the fiduciary duties imposed by equity to ensure directors‟ compliance 
with the principle that they are not to benefit from their entrusted positions.   
The earliest examples of English case law where fiduciary duties were analysed date back as 
early as the eighteenth century and encompass relationships of trust
475
. By adopting the case 
law by analogy, the courts later extended the application of fiduciary duties onto directorship 
positions. Given nearly two centuries of case law development in this field, it is notable that 
the English legislator attempted to reduce the main aspects of fiduciary relationships to 
several pages in a statutory code
476
. Whether that was a successful undertaking is a major 
                                                        
474 CA 2006, s 170 (2)(a). 
475 Most notably, Keech v Sandford [1726] EWHC Ch J76. 
476 Fiduciary duties of company directors are covered by sections 170-179 of the CA 2006 on five pages of text. 
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question that the rest of the chapter will address, although, due to the nature of the research, 
which deals with fiduciary relationships concerning property, the focus will remain on three 
sections of the CA 2006: the duty to avoid a conflict of interest (Section 175), the duty not to 
accept benefits from third parties (Section 176), and the duty to declare an interest in a 
proposed transaction or arrangement (Section 177). However, before delving into a 
discussion of these sections, it is necessary to address the key question, which, hopefully, will 
help clarify the general nature and scope of directors‟ fiduciary duties, namely: to whom do 
directors owe fiduciary duties?  
5.3.1 To Whom Are the Duties Owed? 
While there has been much debate on the issue of to whom company directors owe fiduciary 
duties in the past, the CA 2006 seems to make it clear: the ambit of the statutory scheme is 
provided in Section 170 (1): „The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by 
a director of a company to the company‟. The wording of this section leaves no doubt about 
the ultimate receiver of directors‟ duties: the company only. Subsequently, this means that the 
CA 2006 established the company as the proper claimant related to directors‟ breach of 
duties.  
However, just stating that the duties are owed to the company is not really insightful. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, companies, as entities, act through human beings. The 
question inevitably arises, therefore, about the nature of the company‟s interests: would those 
constitute the interests of the relevant groups such as shareholders, employees and creditors, 
or would the company‟s interests be set aside? Surprisingly, English courts have remained 
indecisive regarding this matter. In Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd
477
, for example, 
Evershed MR held that the company is not separated from its members as a distinct 
commercial entity. As such, the court dismissed the corporate realism approach
478
 and 
aligned company interests with those of shareholders as the general corporate body. Further, 
                                                        
477 [1950] Ch 286. 
478 The corporate realism approach advocates that a company is an independent entity from its members. The 
idea was introduced by Otto Gierke Political Theories of the Middle Age (1900) in Maitland J (trs and ed) 
(Cambridge University Press 2002). The normative and legal consequence of this assertion is that a company is 
entitled to have its own interests and duties and own property. Therefore, corporate realism distinguishes 
corporate property from shareholders‟ property. Shareholders cannot own the company and therefore it is not 
run for their benefit only. The company, in essence, as a real and independent entity, may have its own interests, 
which may or may not align with those of the shareholders. With the emergence of the managerial firm, this 
theory became quite popular. See Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis The Globalisation of Corporate 
Governance (Ashgate Publishing 2009) 14. 
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in the Report of the Second Savoy hotel Investigation
479
, a Board of Trade Inspector had to 
determine whether directors‟ could remove an asset from a company to avoid its takeover. 
The Board ruled that directors could not simply act in the short-term interests of the 
company, but had to also consider the long-term interests of the members, including future 
members
480
.  
English courts have been willing to recognise certain circumstances where shareholders‟ 
interests had to be taken into account by directors. This was notable in Gething v Kilner, 
where the court held that in takeover recommendations directors owed a duty of honesty to 
the company shareholders
481
. The decision in Gething, however, effectively excluded future 
shareholders‟ interests by recognising the interests of the current shareholders only. This 
approach was further emphasised in Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade
482
, where Lawton 
LJ posited that in takeover bidding the primary company interests are with the current 
shareholders.  A similar position was expressed in Stein v Blake, where Millet J stated that in 
special circumstances a director might owe certain personal duties to a shareholder, where the 
latter sustains personal losses as a result of the director‟s actions483. Further, in Glavanics v 
Brunninghausen
484
, the court acknowledged that while directors owe duties to the company 
and not to the shareholders, in situations where the transaction concerns only specific 
shareholders and not the company as a whole, a fiduciary duty can be recognised as owed to 
those shareholders.  
A particular situation recognised by English courts is the close family company situation. In 
Coleman v Myers
485
, Mahon J found that directors owed fiduciary duties to the shareholders 
of the company, which was acquired in a takeover bid by one of the shareholders. 
                                                        
479 See Dignam and Lowry (n 287) 302. 
480 ibid.  
481 [1972] 1 WLR 337. 
482 [1983] BCLC 244.  
483 [1998] 1 All ER 724 727d and 729g. An example could be a shareholder induced by a director to part with 
shares at a loss. This was contrasted with the devaluation of shares because of a director‟s misappropriation of 
the company‟s assets, where the director would not be personally (as distinct from the company) liable for the 
loss.  
484 [1999] 46 NSWLR 538 547-560. 
485 [1977] 2 NZLR 225. 
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Interestingly, while admitting the correctness of Percival v Wright
486
, Mahon J argued that in 
small private companies with a high degree of ownership concentration, directors would have 
a duty of disclosure, which established a direct fiduciary relationship with the shareholders 
and not with the company.   
In general, the position of English courts regarding the fiduciary duties of directors can be 
summarised as the following: the duties are owed to the company, while in certain situations, 
directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders as well. Indeed, while there is a growing 
number of cases that provide specific circumstances where fiduciary duties to shareholders 
arise
487
, to say that court decisions in these cases assume a parallel fiduciary obligation to 
shareholders would be incorrect. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the judgement by 
Mummery LJ in Peskin v Anderson
488
. His lordship held that the legal relationship between 
directors and the company which gives rise to fiduciary duties does not exist between 
directors and individual shareholders; instead, „they are dependent on establishing a special 
factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in that particular case‟489.  In 
essence, Mummery LJ admitted that there could be events where „direct and close contact‟ 
with shareholders may generate duties owed to shareholders, but that these must not cut 
across the general duties that directors owe to the company. The reason for such an approach 
was explained as an attempt to protect the shareholders from „improper and unfair advantage‟ 
being taken by the directors
490
. In the broadest sense, cases like Peskin and others discussed 
above acknowledge the duty of good faith when directors act in an advisory capacity to the 
company shareholders. In a general capacity, however, the company does remain the only 
entity to whom the fiduciary duties are owed. It is to this extent that the wording of section 
170 (1) of the CA 2006 should be regarded.   
                                                        
486 [1902] 2 Ch 401. The case emphasised that directors owe a duty of loyalty to the company alone, and not to 
the shareholders. The core argument was codified in the CA 2006, s 170.  
487 In addition to the cases mentioned above, also see Re Chez Nico [1992] BCLC 192; Platt v. Platt [1999] 2 
BCLC 745; Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372; Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd [1993] 11 
ACSR 543; Glavanics v Brunninghausen [1999] 46 NSWLR 538. 
488 [2001] 1 BCLC 372. 
489 ibid [33].  
490 ibid [34].  
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While the CA 2006 emphasises the company as the only receiver of directors‟ fiduciary 
duties, attempts have been made to protect the interests of minority shareholders too. Prior to 
the Act, minority shareholders, except in certain circumstances, could not generally sue 
directors for any wrongs done to the company
491
. In theory, the CA 2006 changed this by 
introducing sections 260-264 which deal with the procedures for filing derivative claims. 
Under the sections, any member of a company can file a claim resulting from any existing or 
potential act or omission involving such acts by directors as negligence, default, breach of 
duty and breach of trust. While the attempt by legislators to protect minority shareholders‟ 
interests deserves some praise, the wording of section 260 needs further comment. It says that 
„a member‟ of an organisation may bring a claim, which might refer to a single shareholder 
who, in fact, does not even have to have been one at the time when the wrongdoing took 
place.  
Unsurprisingly, there was some speculation regarding the possibility of putting pressure on 
directors by activists and pressure groups, even despite the fact that the Act created some 
procedural barriers targeting unreasonable actions
492
. An example could be a union‟s 
acquiring of shares to bring derivative claims against directors in the takeover process that 
would lead to layoffs. Nevertheless, a number of recent court decisions have dismissed the 
possibility of filing derivative claims especially when there is unfair prejudice involved. For 
example, in Mission Capital Plc v Sinclair & Anor
493
, the court decided that a derivative 
claim under Section 261 of the CA 2006 could not be filed when there was not much 
importance attached to the claim and the alleged damage was highly speculative. In Franbar 
Holdings Ltd v Patel and Ors
494
, the court refused to give permission to proceed with a 
derivative claim based on the possibility of filing a claim under „unfair prejudice‟ and on 
several factors that a hypothetical director would consider, among which were the likelihood 
of the claim‟s success, damage to the company‟s reputation in case of the claim‟s failure, and 
                                                        
491 Certain exemptions did exist, but rather as exceptions to the well established rule formulated in Foss v 
Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189. Derivative claims have been „very scarce‟, as noted in Geoff Yates and Mike 
Hinchliffe, A Practical Guide to Private Equity Transactions (Cambridge University Press 2010) 332. 
492 For example, section 263 provides that before the court gives permission for the claim, the claimant has to 
clearly establish a prima facie case. Further, section 264 lists a number of requirements that have to be met in 
order for a claim to be processed: acting in good faith, consideration of the degree of importance of the claim, 
and consideration as to whether the action in question is likely to be authorised by shareholders. 
493 [2008] EWHC 1339. 
494 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch). 
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the cost of litigation. Similarly, in Stimpson & Ors v Southern Landlords Association
495
, a 
hypothetical director‟s test was used in order to prevent a derivative claim‟s proceeding. 
Finally, in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd
496
, the court emphasised the importance of filing 
derivative claims based on acts of negligence, default or breach of duty: none of these was 
found present since the directors followed the advice of respected professionals. As seen 
above, at least for the moment English courts are inclined to interpret strictly the possibility 
of bringing a derivative claim. It may seem, therefore, that the concerns of activist 
shareholders in the post-Act legal era are unfounded. Yet, arguably, the very fact of the 
possibility of filing a claim, which may well be dismissed by the court, might give some 
advantage to the shareholders in the short term period at least. The Act does not anyhow 
prohibit the filing of unfounded or speculative claims, which could, in theory, slow down or 
disrupt the directors‟ decision making process. 
To complete the discussion on this topic, it is useful to see how the current statutory code 
interacts with the previous case law on the matter. The key question here is whether the CA 
2006 is intended to be an exhaustive legislation codifying the major duties of the directors 
and naming the one who is the primary receiver of these duties. Section 170 (3) is helpful in 
this matter, as it reads: 
„The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable 
principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of 
those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by a 
director‟. 
This section can be interpreted as providing that the directors‟ general duties are based on the 
pre-existing case law and equitable principles; however, the statutory principles will have 
effect in place of those principles. Consequently, it can be assumed that, in the general course 
of events, the statutory code replaces the pre-existing case law on the matter with the 
exception of cases where case law could clarify unclear statements within the code. This 
should, however, be read together with Section 170(4), which provides that: 
„The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as 
common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the 
corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting 
and applying the general duties‟. 
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From this, it may be concluded that while the CA 2006 places the new rules over the pre-
existing case law, these rules are to be interpreted regarding established case law principles. It 
then follows that the duties listed in section 10 of the Act can be added and further developed 
by subsequent case law. This brings up two issues, however. First, it is not certain how the 
principles laid out in the CA 2006 could possibly be equated to equitable principles, since the 
courts are not capable of either overruling or significantly altering the sense of the sections. 
Second, it remains unclear to what extent the codified duties may replicate or replace the 
duties outlined in pre-Act case law
497
. Keeping these facts in mind, it is time to review the 
fiduciary duties of company directors which involve property rights.  
5.3.2 Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
5.3.2.1 Purpose and Codification 
The duty to avoid a conflict of interest is one of the main tenets of the law relating to 
fiduciary duties
498. The interests referred to are the directors‟ personal and fiduciary interests. 
The requirement of avoiding a conflict of interest has two important consequences in English 
law: the fiduciary has to account for the resulting profits derived from the conflict
499
 and 
avoid any situations when the conflict of interest might arise
500
. The rationale for avoiding a 
conflict of interest is further established in the prevention of situations where directors might 
exploit opportunities for personal benefit
501
. Parker LJ in Murad v Al-Saraj
502
 noted that one 
of the reasons for enforcing the policy of avoiding a conflicts of interest is „the perceived 
difficulty in determining what might have happened but for the fact that the fiduciary had 
                                                        
497 This chapter will further argue that directors‟ duties identified in sections 175 and 176 of the CA 2006 are not 
particularly reflecting the equitable principles established in the relevant case law. 
498 Hudson (n 374) sec 12.5. 
499 Regal Hastings ltd v Gulliver (n 432); Boardman v Phipps (n 457) 
500 Boardman v Phipps (n 457); CMS Dolphin Ltd. v Simonet [2001] 2 BCLC 704; Sinclair Investment Holdings 
Sa v Versialles Trade Finance Ltd (No 3) [2007] EWHC 915. 
501 See, for example, Kingsley Consulting Ltd v Mcintosh [2006] EWHC 1288 (Ch); [2006] BCC 875 55. 
502 [2005] EWCA Civ 959 107. 
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placed himself in a position of conflict‟. This view is also shared in scholarly work on 
English law
503
.   
The regulation of the rule to avoid a conflict has been codified in section 175 of the CA 2006. 
The core fiduciary duty is presented in section 175 (1): 
„A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can 
have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, 
with the interests of the company‟.  
The wording of this paragraph implies that the duty is much broader than, for instance, a duty 
to avoid profiting from the conflicts of interest or causing financial loss to the company by 
exploiting the conflict. As such, the duty is considered to have been breached if a director 
fails to avoid a situation where a conflict of interest is present or may be present. Notably, 
while the paragraph mentions conflicts of interest
504
, it does not clarify what the interest may 
mean
505. As such, the CA 2006 has somewhat failed to resolve the breadth of this rule‟s 
application. Unlike the use of tangible or intellectual property of a company, the assessment 
becomes more difficult in cases where directors take opportunities that could be used by their 
companies. Indeed, earlier cases dealing with the conflicts of interest varied in their 
approach: some applied quite a narrow view of which opportunities are caught
506
, while some 
took a broader view
507
. For example, Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver
508
 and Boardman v 
Phipps
509
 (although the latter is not a company case, it is still considered a major authority in 
English company law) took a wide view on the opportunities by considering anything of 
possible interest to the company (even impossible to practically or legally pursue) a 
„corporate opportunity‟. On the other side of the scale is the „scope of business‟ approach 
                                                        
503 See, for example, Davies (n 405) 392-394: the courts would face difficulties in assessing the fairness of a 
transaction if a director claimed that the same transaction would take place in a situation where there was no 
conflict. 
504 The final section 175(7) also emphasises that the application of the entire section 175 of the CA 2006 refers 
to both a conflict of interest and duty and the conflict of duties.  
505 Reference to defining interest was made, for example, in Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 51-52.  
506 See, for example, Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1990] FSR 385 412; Also See IDC v Cooley [1972] 1 
WLR 443. 
507 See Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424; also see Allied Business Consultants Ltd v Shanahan [2009] 
EWCA Civ 751. 
508 [1942] 1 All ER 378. 
509
 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
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mentioned above. Finally, a tighter definition, but one giving some freedom to directors in 
pursuing personal interests, is the maturing business opportunity, which limits conflicts of 
interest to real and maturing opportunities pursued by directors
510
.  In similar fashion, some 
courts have determined that a conflict arises only if a company has some „specific interest‟ in 
the relevant opportunity
511
. 
While a wider formulation of the rule has prevailed historically in English case law, the 
narrow view seems to find applications as well, especially in modern cases. The introduction 
of section 175(4)(a) in the CA 2006, too, seems to serve the purpose of relaxing the strict 
application of the conflicts of interest rule. Nevertheless, the section is not sufficiently well 
defined to clarify the extent of the exceptional situations in which the conflict of interest 
would not arise. From this standpoint, the lack of clarification in the CA 2006 is likely to 
prolong the legal debates regarding the scope of the conflict of interest rule. It could be easier 
for the courts if the statutory code made it clearer. Some suggestions regarding such 
clarifications are made at the end of this study.  
Section 175 of the CA 2006 continues with a particular definition of the scope of the rule 
stating that a director is not permitted to exploit the company‟s property, information or 
opportunities even if the company could not take advantage of these
512
. Section 175 (2), 
therefore, mentions a specific case of the rule application, which is exploitation. The Act 
suggests that exploitation should be referred to in broad terms, meaning any use of property, 
not simply the abuse thereof. The section also reinforces the equitable rule that „it is 
immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or 
opportunity‟. This generally accords with the approach that was taken in Keech v Sandford513, 
as well as in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver
514
. Notably, section 175 of the Act is applied to 
both current and former directors
515
. The primary issue, therefore, is not when the conflict 
emerged, but whether the conflict related to the exploitation of property, information and 
                                                        
510 As will be discussed later, this approach has received wide discussion in cases related to resigning directors.  
511 Balston Ltd V Headline Filters Ltd (n 506). 
512 CA 2006, s 175(2). 
513 [1726] EWHC Ch J76. 
514 [1942] 1 All ER 378. 
515 As stated in Section 170(2) (A) of The CA 2006. 
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opportunity and whether the director was „aware at a time he was director‟ of the 
exploitation
516
. The wording of the corresponding section in this sense, however, seems to 
require that exploitation, not the presence of a conflict of interest, should be within the 
director‟s consideration. This is a strange limitation, in that it concentrates on directors‟ 
avoidance of exploitation, and not all kinds of conflict of interest. 
Sections 175(3)-175(6) deal with the exceptions to the general rule of avoiding conflicts: 
namely, limitations in relation to transactions with companies; limitations arising from 
shareholders‟ consent; and limitations for situations that cannot reasonably be considered as 
likely to bring a conflict of interest. Two issues deserve attention here. First, the section 
distinguishes between the approaches taken by private and public companies in authorising 
situations potentially leading to conflicts of interests. Specifically, section 175(5)(a) states 
that in private companies the conflict could be authorised by the board of directors (unless 
otherwise disallowed by the company‟s constitution), while section 175(5)(b) states that in 
public companies, authorisation has to be expressly permitted by the company‟s constitution. 
Such a distinction seems logical, given the fact that in the majority of English private 
companies the directors also hold a significant number of shares, thus giving them 
considerable power over when to permit a conflict. In contrast, large public companies, where 
the separation of ownership and control are common, require stronger protection for 
shareholders, who have much less power in controlling directors
517
. The second point to note 
is in section 175(4) (a), that the reasonableness test can be applied to determine whether a 
conflict took place. On the basis of this section, it is possible that the courts will be able to 
somewhat loosen the strict boundaries of the conflict rule application. For example, based on 
a reasonability test, it could be that directors would be able to pursue opportunities which a 
company considers and rejects on a properly informed and bona fide basis
518
.  
 
 
 
                                                        
516 CA 2006 s 175(2). 
517 These issues have been extensively discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.1.2. 
518 This was the issue in the highly controversial case of the Canadian Supreme Court. See Peso Silver Mines, 
Ltd. (N.P.L.) v Cropper [1966] SCR 673. See section 5.3.2.2.2.4 of the current chapter for an in-depth 
discussion of this issue. 
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5.3.2.2 Avoiding Conflicts of Interest in Case Law 
5.3.2.2.1 The Principle in General 
As mentioned above, the basis for section 175 of the CA 2006 is pre-Act case law. The roots 
of the equitable principle of avoiding a conflict of interest in English case law is based on the 
need to prevent fiduciaries from usurping their position for self benefit by acting 
unconscionably
519
. The earliest example of the conflict avoidance rule is found in Keech v 
Sandford
520
, where the court decided that a fiduciary (specifically, a trustee) is not authorised 
to make profits from his position
521
. The principle was further explicitly laid out in Bray v 
Ford
522
: 
„It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary 
position […] is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make 
a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interests 
and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is […] founded 
upon principles of morality
523
. I regard it rather as based on the 
consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such 
circumstances, of one person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by 
interest rather than duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to 
protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive 
rule‟.  
The strictness of the rule defined in Keech v Sandford has been reinforced in two landmark 
cases in English law, mentioned earlier: Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver
524
 and Boardman v 
Phipps
525
, which used different approaches to regulating opportunities
526
.  In Regal, the key 
                                                        
519 See Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613, [2008] All ER 299 373, where unconscionable behaviour 
is mentioned with reference to Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] AC as the basis principle in cases 
involving a constructive trust. 
520
 Although a trustee case, it has been widely applied to fiduciary duties of directors in English company law. It 
has basically served as a foundation of a strict approach to defining the scope of duties and corporate 
opportunities. 
521 [1726] EWHC Ch J76. A good discussion of the principle itself can be found in Hudson (n 374) 535-564. 
522 [1896] AC 44. 
523 This view has been somewhat reconsidered recently. In Bhullar v Bhullar (n 507) Parker LJ mentioned 
„ethics‟ as an important factor in the case.  
524 [1942] All ER 378. 
525 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
526 Detailed analysis of both cases and the rules they relied upon is provided in the next section.  
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approach to deciding whether the conflict of interest took place was based on the question of 
whether profit was derived as a result. Drawing on trust law, the court held that the breach of 
duty resulting in the exploitation of property was established as long as: 
„(i) what the directors did was so related to the affairs of the company that 
it can properly be said to have been done in the course of their 
management and in utilisation of their opportunities and special 
knowledge as directors; and (ii) what they did resulted in profit to 
themselves‟527. 
As seen above, profit is the key factor in Lord MacMillan‟s judgment. Since the directors 
made profits on the shares while acting as fiduciaries for the company, they had to account 
for those profits. Importantly, per Lord Russell‟s judgment, the directors‟ obligation to 
account for profits did not relate to acting in bad faith; rather, the mere fact of making a profit 
in given circumstances was sufficient
528
. Lord Russell in his judgment never mentioned the 
no-conflict principle per se. Instead, he strongly relied on the Keech v Sandford principle that 
a fiduciary cannot make a profit from his position in the office. Following the judgment in 
Regal, the no-profit rule can be summarised as follows: a director is in breach of his fiduciary 
duty to a company if he makes a profit by taking an opportunity in the course of and by 
reason of being in a directorship position, whilst it is irrelevant whether he acted in good faith 
or whether the company also received profit from his actions
529
.  
In Boardman v Phipps
530
, the court took a somewhat different approach. Despite the split of 
judgments, all of their lordships in the case agreed on the presence of the core equitable 
principle, which can be seen from Lord Upjohn‟s opinion531: 
„The relevant rule for the decision on this case is the fundamental rule of 
equity that  a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of 
                                                        
527 [1967] AC 153 (Lord Macmillan). 
528 ibid 386.  
529 The decision in Regal also addressed an issue of financial incapacity of the company. It was equally 
dismissed as a relevant issue. Lord Wright, at 157f, noted that the court could not adequately assess the matter 
of financial capacity of the company in most cases. However, it does seem unlikely that the Lord Justices would 
have changed their opinion on the matter even if financial incapacity of the company were evident. See David 
Kershaw, Company Law In Context: Texts And Materials (Oxford University Press 2009) 479: „the court in 
Regal puts the deterrence of wrongdoing and a policy concern about the court‟s ability to assess financial 
capacity above issues of fairness to the parties‟. 
530 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
531 ibid [32]. 
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his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place 
himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict‟. 
As follows from this dictum, the conflict of interest approach is considered the key, while the 
no-profit rule is only viewed as its application. The exact nature of this approach was 
clarified by his lordship (although it was a dissenting opinion): „it means that the reasonable 
man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that 
there was a real sensible possibility of conflict‟532. In this sense, whenever considering a case 
where a fiduciary makes a profit from an opportunity while acting as a fiduciary, it should be 
asked whether the fiduciary‟s personal interests come into conflict with the beneficiary‟s.  
Treatment of the no-profit rule as an application of the no-conflict principle can be justified 
in several ways. The main reason lies in the interpretation of the no-profit principle. If taken 
in the manner defined in Regal, the no-profit rule would dismiss the possibility of any profit 
made by directors. This could potentially refer to the cases where the duty of loyalty, which is 
considered fundamental in fiduciary relationships, would not always apply. For example, 
what if a director is privately advised by a broker on the last block of shares that is expected 
to substantially gain in value or what if the company did not want to pursue a particular 
opportunity which a director took? Within the no-profit rule the directors would be 
accountable for profits due to profiting in the course of directorship, although such a decision 
would hardly be linked to being disloyal to the company. However, if the same shares were 
advised for purchasing at the company board meeting, but the director took an opportunity 
for himself, it would clearly involve a conflict of interest because the director made a profit in 
a disloyal manner by misusing his position. Second, the treatment of the no-profit rule within 
the context of a no-conflict framework allows for a better reading and interpretation of the 
Regal decision. Indeed, the ruling of Regal within the no-profit rule raises some potentially 
conflicting questions, such as whether the directors could have been more persistent in 
negotiations with the landlord (which was, in fact, the main argument behind the Keech v 
Sandford), or whether the transaction in question could have been arranged on behalf of the 
company. Circumstances may be such that there is no conflict of interest, but the director 
takes the opportunity in the course of directorship and by reason of directorship. In these 
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cases, the core duty of loyalty would not be infringed, thereby giving no reason for the 
director‟s accounting for profits533.  
If the no-profit rule can be considered as an application of the no-conflict rule, then a 
question arises: would the Regal decision remain the same under the no-conflict approach? 
Arguably, within a broader application of opportunity regulation than the no-conflict rule 
provides, it would be logical for the decision to remain. The opinion of the researcher is that 
it is indeed so. As was demonstrated earlier, the directors in Regal had a conflict of interest 
with their company by refusing to provide personal financial guarantees, thus paving the way 
for personal pursuit of the opportunities, and by failing to accordingly capitalise the 
subsidiary while the subsequent sale was considered, during the time that the new theatres 
were purchased. The presence of a conflict of interest, therefore, would probably be 
established
534
. From this perspective, the judgment in Regal does not interfere with the no-
conflict rule. Similarly, in the case of Boardman v Phipps, the court disallowed the solicitor 
to retain the profits in order to preserve the purity of the avoiding of conflict rule established 
in Keech v Sandford and Bray v Ford.  
Nevertheless, the status of the no-profit rule in relation to the no-conflict rule in English law 
remains far from certain. Authority exists both in favour of standalone treatment of the no-
profit approach
535
 and its treatment as an application of the no-conflict rule
536
. As will be 
                                                        
533 This notion will be further developed in the section comparing English company law to the laws in other 
common law system countries, notably, the United States and Canada. The chapter further argues that under the 
standalone principle of the no-profit approach, it is not possible to effectively develop a more balanced approach 
to regulating opportunities in English law. 
534 Another strong point in favour of this conclusion is the presence of s 175 (2) of the CA 2006 stating that „it is 
immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity‟. As a 
statutory law, this section would dismiss the claim that the company in Regal was not able to pursue the 
opportunity as „immaterial‟. In such way the court in Regal would not be in need of making speculative claims 
as to whether the company was financially capable of pursuing the opportunity. At the same time, allowing 
directors to pursue an opportunity in cases when the company has little chance of doing that could decrease 
directors‟ incentives for doing their best to promote the company‟s interests. Subsequently, the conflict of 
interest would emerge.  
535 See in case law: Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding (n 400); Plus Group Ltd. v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370; 
[2002] 2 BCLC 201; Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch); Don King Productions Inc v 
Warren [2000] Ch 291; in scholarly articles, see Koh (n 455) 406; Robert Austin, „Fiduciary Accountability For 
Business Opportunities‟ in Finn P (ed) Equity And Commercial Relationships (The Law Book Company 1987) 
146-147.   
536 Boardman v Phipps (n 457); Item Software v Fassihi (n 412). For scholarly commentators, see Kershaw (n 
455) 538-539; Ben Pettet, Company Law (2nd edn, Longman 2005) 168; Graham Moffat, Trusts Law: Text And 
Materials (Butterworths, 1999) 631. 
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demonstrated later, the CA 2006 did not manage to completely resolve the matter. Further, 
there is still much uncertainty about the extent of the application of the no-conflict rule. This 
was the reason for the split judgment in Boardman. Lord Cohen, for example, considered the 
presence of conflict of interest in a case where the fiduciary takes on an opportunity, which 
could be possibly pursued by the beneficiary. Based on the facts of the case, in relation to 
company directors, such an approach would mean that a conflict of interest is present when a 
director advises his company on an opportunity and takes it himself. In contrast, Lord Hodson 
dismissed the importance of the beneficiary‟s pursuit of the opportunity. In his view, 
„whether or not the trust or the beneficiaries in their stead could have taken advantage of the 
information is immaterial‟537.  
Lord Hodson‟s dictum has served as the basis for the CA 2006 section 175(2), which means 
that statutory law, in essence, takes a strict approach in defining conflicts of interest. It is 
necessary, however, to understand the nature of the conflict rule application to see whether it 
matches the formulation provided in the CA 2006.  In both Regal and Boardman, as well as 
in the underlying Keech v Sandford case, the beneficiaries (companies or trust) were not 
entirely excluded from the opportunity by fiduciaries.  Whether it is the landlord‟s actions in 
Keech, financial problems in Regal, or refusal to obtain court approval in Boardman, it is 
clear that the fiduciary could have acted in some way to resolve the matter. Consequently, 
that could have influenced the outcomes: for example, the fiduciary in Keech could have 
attempted to persuade the landlord, if it was possible, to renew the lease in his own favour; 
the directors could have provided financial guarantees to obtain financing in Regal; and the 
trustees could have made the case for authorisation of their actions in Boardman. While it is 
hard to judge whether those actions would have been successful, the existence of the 
possibility is always present. However, the CA 2006
538
 makes these considerations 
immaterial. The problem with this is that neither case law nor the CA 2006 provides what is 
considered „immaterial‟. Hence, it is impossible to say what exactly would fall into this 
ambit: just the circumstances of the three cases mentioned above, just the fact that the 
company could not take the opportunity as mentioned in the CA 2006, or all „capability 
facts‟. An interesting example to consider in this sense is when seizing an opportunity which 
for the company is legally impossible to pursue for a company (such as, for example, due to 
                                                        
537 Boardman v Phipps (n457) 
538 CA 2006, s 175(2).  
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anti-trust law), but is legal to pursue by a director. The opportunity is clearly there, but the 
question is whether the director will be in breach of his fiduciary duty by acquiring the 
company opportunity. 
Following the decisions in Regal and Boardman, two important cases were decided in 
relation to conflict of interest and opportunity regulation. The findings in these cases help to 
further assess the degree of compatibility between the case law and the codified principles of 
section 175. In the first case, Industrial Development Consultants (IDC) v Cooley
539
, the 
court considered fiduciary wrongdoing on the basis of information misuse
540
. The defendant, 
the managing director of the company, received information about a potentially profitable 
project but concealed that information from the company and used it for personal advantage 
after resigning under false pretences. The circumstances of the case were such that the 
director was approached as an individual and his services were regarded as those of an 
individual consultant not associated with the company where he served as a director. The 
court found those circumstances irrelevant. The information obtained by the director was 
considered by the court as being of concern to the company, hence making it the director‟s 
duty to pass it on to the company. The court re-emphasised that the company was entitled to 
the benefits despite the fact that it was unlikely to pursue the opportunity had the director 
presented the appropriate information, although „if the defendant is not required to account he 
will have made a large profit as a result of having deliberately put himself into a position in 
which his duty to the plaintiffs who were employing him and his personal interests 
conflicted‟541. The case is important for several reasons. First, it recognised information about 
opportunity as having the same value as the opportunity itself. Second, it confirmed the 
approach taken by Lord Hodson in Boardman, which is now codified in the CA 2006 section 
175(2). Finally, the ruling provides that the basis for the decision was the presence of a 
conflict of interest.  
                                                        
539 [1972] 1 WLR 443.  
540 Notably, it was information about the opportunity and not the opportunity itself which was subject to 
consideration. As Roskill J acknowledged, the chance that the opportunity would have been taken by the 
company was quite slim. ibid 454. 
541 ibid 453. 
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The second important case to consider is Bhullar v Bhullar
542
. Unlike the directors in Cooley, 
the defendants in this case did not divert the opportunities pursued by the company: by 
chance and without reliance on information confidential to the company they acquired a piece 
of property which the company later claimed it should have been informed about. Notably, 
the company, which was the claimant in the case, made a statement prior to the directors‟ 
action that it would not acquire any additional properties. The court decided that the 
opportunity represented by the property purchase had to be communicated to the claimant 
company, and that the directors held that property on constructive trust. The court, again, 
reasserted that the constructive trust is not predicated on misuse of the property, but rather is 
based on the conflict of interest due to a „sensible possibility of conflict‟,543 thus applying the 
Boardman equitable principle.  
The importance of Bhullar stems from several factors. First, the court considered whether the 
opportunity was in line with the company‟s main business activities and whether the 
opportunity would be „worthwhile‟ to pursue, to determine if the opportunity was 
corporate
544
. This is an interesting observation, which slightly resembles the „line of business 
test,‟ which is popular in US company law545, but not so much in English jurisdiction546. The 
directors in Bhullar did not pursue the opportunity in the course of or by reason of their 
directorship in the wide sense. Rather, they pursued the opportunity that was potentially 
worthwhile for the company and failed to communicate it accordingly. As such, the decision 
in Bhullar extends the criteria for defining corporate opportunity. According to Paul 
Davies
547
, this represents a positive development in English law: the decision recognises that 
                                                        
542 [2003] EWCA Civ 424. 
543 ibid 42. 
544 ibid 41. 
545 The test is one of the main differences between the ways that English and US company law regulate 
opportunities. It will be discussed in detail later. For now, it is worthwhile noting that the general provision of 
the test is that the opportunity pursued within the existing business of the company is a corporate opportunity. It 
is irrelevant in this case whether information or property is deployed by a director to acquire the opportunity.  
546 In the classic English partnership case Aas v Benham (n 471), the court established the „scope of business 
test‟ that allowed partners to take opportunities that fell outside the scope of the company‟s business. This 
approach, however, has been largely ignored by English company law courts since the decision in Boardman V 
Phipps. The Court of Appeal in O'Donnell v Shanahan (n 507) unequivocally rejected the test‟s applicability to 
English company law. 
547 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2009) 
566. 
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the fiduciary duties of directors are omnipresent, not only applied in certain particular 
circumstances. Indeed, should the directors‟ actions be justified by the court, based on the 
argument of, for example, acting in a different capacity rather than as a director, then it would 
create a strong precedent for fiduciaries who might have used the argument to justify taking 
direct or indirect advantage of their positions.  
The second important aspect of Bhullar is that the court completely ignored in its ruling the 
fact that the company, prior to the defendants‟ taking the opportunity, openly stated that it 
would not seek to acquire additional properties. Still, the company managed to reverse that 
decision, based on the opportunity presented in the case
548
. This kind of behaviour seems 
opportunist: the company, which officially limited the scope of its activities, successfully 
managed to obtain account for profits that were earned from a line of business not related to 
that of the company at the moment when the property was acquired
549
.  This issue is related 
to the first issue raised in Bhullar: if English courts decide to extend liability within the 
corporate opportunities model beyond the actual line of business of a company, then it seems 
that the no-profit rather than the codified no-conflict rule would prevail. Indeed, requiring 
directors to account for profits from the opportunities that are rejected by the company seems 
to increase the burden of a directorship position, because directors would be at risk of losing 
such opportunities to the company. This is especially true in the case of non-executive 
directors, who are not actively involved in company activities
550
.  
Subsection 175(5) of the CA 2006 considers authorisation, by the board, of directors taking 
an opportunity that is within the scope of corporate opportunity. However the Act at the same 
time fails to resolve the issue where a company, through its board, limits the scope of 
business, which could have a direct effect on the scope of corporate opportunities. Why does 
                                                        
548 Basically, it seems that the claimant seized the opportunity when it arose by ignoring its previous declaration 
of not pursuing such opportunities.  
549 Davies also considered company behaviour in Regal to be „opportunistic:‟ see Davies (n 547) 566. However, 
the two situations are not entirely similar: the company in Regal never openly stated it was limiting its scope of 
business, but the circumstances of the case led to the situation where the company, although questionably, could 
not obtain financing to acquire the properties. Besides, in Regal, the purchase of additional theatres was 
discussed at the board meeting, where directors failed to provide guarantees for the purchase thus opening an 
opportunity for personal pursuit, thus creating conflict of interest. In Bhullar, the company decided not to 
purchase additional properties not because it was financially incapable of doing so, but for other reasons, which 
were closer to its business focus.  
550 The absence of any formal distinction between different types of directors in English codified law increases 
confusion regarding the application of the no-conflict rule.  
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authorisation by the board fail to resolve this? First, a problem may arise when all directors 
(or the majority to establish a quorum) agree to pursue an opportunity. Second, if directors 
are to report on any opportunity to the board, including those from beyond the scope of the 
company‟s business, that would jeopardize the entire aspect of taking that opportunity, as far 
as the director is concerned: other directors or the company itself are likely in this case to 
pursue the opportunity as well, thus acting in an opportunistic way.  
It is perhaps worth emphasising that a company‟s ability to take advantage of the opportunity 
being „immaterial,‟ as stated within subsection 175(2) of the CA 2006, is protecting the 
integrity of fiduciaries that owe duties to the beneficiaries (in this case, directors owing duties 
to their companies) and is beneficial for the purposes of avoiding any possibility of conflict 
of interest. However, if it is extended to any line of business, including those out of the scope 
that is clearly drawn by the company, the rule could come directly into conflict with 
subsection 175(4)(a), which states that the duty is not infringed if „the situation can 
reasonably be regarded as unlikely to give rise to a conflict of interest‟. It is, therefore, 
suggested that clarifying changes related to the scope of business and opportunity should be 
introduced to resolve this issue.  
5.3.2.2.2 Exceptions to the No-Conflict Rule 
So far, this chapter has concentrated on the rule of avoiding conflicts between the personal 
and fiduciary positions of company directors in English law. It was demonstrated that there is 
no full consistency between case law and the codified duty to avoid conflicts of interest due 
to often differing views on what the conflict implies. Central to understanding the full scope 
of the rule would therefore be impossible without a detailed review of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine and the way it is applied in English law.  
As the review of the most prominent recent cases on conflicts of interest has demonstrated, 
English case law has been particularly incoherent in drawing the line between what 
opportunities can and cannot be pursued by company directors so that conflicts of interest can 
be avoided. Cases like Regal, Boardman, and Bhullar seem to take such a broad view on 
corporate opportunity that it is expanded to situations where anything pursued by company 
directors is accountable for profits, including when a company cannot or even refuses to seize 
the opportunities. Section 175(2) of the CA 2006 put this into statutory force by claiming that 
it is „immaterial‟ whether the company could take advantage of the opportunity. At the same 
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time, strong dissenting opinions expressed in these cases
551
 suggested that not every justice 
was ready to accept the strictness of the principle. Furthermore, two recent case decisions, 
Murad v Al-Saraj
552
 and Foster v Bryant
553
, have shown that English courts might no longer 
be so inclined to follow the equitable rule outlined in earlier cases.  
In Murad v Al-Saraj, two sisters formed a joint venture with Al-Saraj to purchase a hotel, a 
transaction for which Al-Saraj was to receive profits from the vendor. The court found that 
Al-Saraj acquired profits from his fiduciary position without proper authorisation (now 
required by section 175(4) (b) from the Murad sisters, thus holding him accountable for 
breach of fiduciary obligation and pursuing corporate opportunities. Importantly, however, in 
this case the court‟s ruling was based on an examination of the causal link between a 
fiduciary‟s profit and accountability for seizing the opportunity. In this regard, Arden LJ 
acknowledged that the equitable rule formulated in Boardman, which imposed a constructive 
trust on fiduciaries acting bona fide, was not universal. Instead, her approach to fiduciary 
liability was based on the wrong conducted by the defendant: 
„It may be that the time has come when the court should revisit the 
operation of the inflexible rule of equity in harsh circumstances, as where 
the trustee has acted in perfect good faith and without any deception or 
concealment, and in the belief that he was acting in the best interests of the 
beneficiary. […] it would not be in the least impossible for a court in a 
future case, to determine as a question of fact whether the beneficiary 
would not have wanted to exploit the profit himself, or would have wanted 
the trustee to have acted other than in the way that the trustee in fact did 
act. Moreover, it would not be impossible for a modern court to conclude 
as a matter of policy that, without losing the deterrent effect of the rule, the 
harshness of it should be tempered in some circumstances. In addition, in 
such cases, the courts can provide a significant measure of protection for 
the beneficiaries by imposing on the defaulting trustee the affirmative 
burden of showing that those circumstances prevailed‟554. 
In delivering the decision in Foster v Bryant, Rix LJ also raised a concern regarding the 
rigidity of the principle defined in Boardman. The case involved a company director, Mr. 
Bryant, who following the layoff of his wife, left the company and established one of his 
                                                        
551 Most notably, Lord Upjohn‟s opinion in Boardman v Phipps (n 457). 
552 [2005] EWCA Civ 959. 
553 [2007] EWCA Civ 200. 
554 Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 [82]. 
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own. Several days prior to his resignation letter taking effect, Mr. Bryant was negotiating 
with one of his former company‟s key clients, who wanted him to work on a project together 
with his former company. Eventually, when Mr. Bryant started working with the client, his 
former company sued him for breach of fiduciary duty and demanded he account for the 
earned profits. The court dismissed the company‟s claims, finding that the unusual 
circumstances of the case and Bryant‟s acting in good faith rendered the case fact-specific555. 
As such, just like Arden LJ, Rix LJ felt that the rule established in Boardman had to be 
reviewed on a merit basis, thereby acknowledging that its absolute application is, arguably, 
incorrect.  
As seen above, the absolute application of the Boardman rule may be, after all, inconsistent 
with the business realities that English company law has to deal with. Therefore, some means 
to limit the degree of opportunity prohibition needs to be established. Apparently, both case 
law and the CA 2006 have recognised this fact to a certain degree. Overall, four different 
circumstances may eventually lead to relieving a director from the fiduciary obligation not to 
pursue corporate opportunities. The circumstances in question are: 1) obtaining authorisation 
to pursue an opportunity; 2) ceasing to be a director for reasons not connected to pursuing 
corporate opportunities; 3) having no powers to act within the directorship position; and 4) in 
situations where taking a corporate opportunity „cannot be reasonably regarded as the one 
giving rise to the conflict of interest‟.556  Each of these circumstances is reviewed below. 
5.3.2.2.2.1 Authorisation to Pursue Opportunity 
Section 175(4)(b) of the CA 2006 states that a director does not exploit corporate opportunity 
if he has obtained the permission of the board to pursue such an opportunity.  Consequently, 
section 175(5) of the Act formalises the procedure that leads to the board‟s authorisation (it is 
also different between public and private companies, as was noted above). Granting the board 
such a right is, arguably, supplementing the general approval rights provided in the 
shareholder authorisation doctrine, which is common in English law
557
. Still, this presents a 
                                                        
555 Another related case, also cited by Rix LJ, was In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke (n 535), where a director, after 
being effectively excluded from his position and only technically remaining a director launched a company 
competing with his former employer.  
556 Per s 175(4) (A) of the CA 2006. 
557 It states that directors can be relieved from their duties if authorised by shareholders. See s 168 of the CA 
2006. 
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significant innovation to English common law, which traditionally did not consider the 
board‟s waiver of the duty. Indeed, the common rule has been that the impartial advice of all 
directors was required to bind the company
558
. The major innovation produced by section 
175(4) (b) of the CA 2006, therefore, is the inclusion of members of the board in the 
authorisation process
559
.  
The process of authorisation is conducted by means of a quorum, during which the director in 
question, as well as any other interested director, is excluded from voting
560
. While the 
position of the director seeking exclusion from exploitation of the opportunity rule is clear, 
the case of the „interested director‟ is somewhat confusing, because it is nowhere clarified 
who can potentially fall in this category. Further, the Act only disallows the director in 
question to vote on the matter of authorisation, while he can freely participate in the 
discussion regarding authorisation, thus having an opportunity to influence the board‟s 
decision making process. The author considers this an undesirable omission. Granted, the 
position of the director seeking authorisation has to be clearly explained in order to make a 
case for authorisation. However, this can be conducted by presenting a report in the due 
manner. The presence at the meeting of the director whose proposal for exclusion from 
exploitation of opportunity is likely to carry a potential conflict of interest is simply not 
appropriate.  
Still, the most important question remaining is whether the codified approach is a desirable 
change to English common law. Here, it is useful to look at the relationship of 
entrepreneurship and responsibility that the decision entails. The traditional requirement of 
shareholders‟ approval seems to fit well with preserving the intent to keep directors from 
acting irresponsibly. However, it is also quite a tedious process that may discourage directors 
from taking certain actions in pursuing business activities.  Besides, as was noted in Chapter 
                                                        
558 If no such advice was available, authorisation by the board was not absolute. In such a way, non-involved 
board members were excluded from authorisation process. See, for example, Benson v Heathorn [1842] 1 Y & 
Ccc 326 341-342; also see Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman [1871] LR 6 Ch.App. 558 567-
568. 
559 This is further advanced by s 180(1) of the CA 2006, which posits that no transaction or arrangement with 
the company can be set aside by reason of shareholders not giving their approval. It is mentioned that the rule 
applies to the entire section 175 of the Act, of which corporate opportunity is a part. Still, it seems that directors 
are given the right to authorise only in cases prior to potential exploitation. Refer to s 239(2).   Davies (n 547) 
568, noted, based on clause 6 of CLR Proposals to the CA 2006, that directors‟ authorisation referring to s 175 
was implied for ex ante uses only. 
560 By means of s 175(6) of the CA 2006. 
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4 of this thesis, shareholders in English public companies may have little power to control 
directors‟ actions. On the other hand, due to the small number of directors and their close 
interactions with each other, approval by the board may lead to the situation of mutual 
exploitation approvals, which would certainly involve the breach of other fiduciary duties. It 
is, perhaps, for these reasons that the CA 2006 leaves the ultimate power with the company 
articles, where such situations can be mentioned and resolved
561
. In private companies, the 
board can authorise such actions unless the articles say otherwise, while in public companies, 
the articles have to specifically provide permission for such authorisation
562
.  
As seen above, the Act imposes stricter rules on authorisation by the board members of 
public companies. This may well be based on the fact of dispersed shareholding, which is 
typical for English public companies. In this case, it is much harder to resolve all kinds of 
collective action problems, to which authorisation belongs. Nevertheless, by introducing 
directors into authorisation matters, the Act seems to shift the responsibility of authorising 
away from shareholders who, once authorisation is approved by the directors, may be 
effectively left out of such decisions. The reason for this is that the Act does not require the 
board to report on authorisation given to directors
563
. As such, shareholders are likely to be 
excluded from any developments regarding corporate opportunities that occur at the top level 
of the company, being uninformed and therefore unable to ratify or prohibit the exploitation 
in question. Consequently, it remains largely the task of the board of directors to determine 
which cases of opportunity exploitation to grant. Granted, the members of the board are 
generally subject to fiduciary duties. This means that in deciding whether to authorise a 
certain action or not, they would be, theoretically, guided by section 172 of the CA 2006. 
However, such a breach of fiduciary duties could be extremely hard to prove
564
.  
What about the situation where all directors are pursuing an opportunity? As was mentioned 
above, the Act does not provide an answer to how to resolve such gridlock. Granted, Section 
                                                        
561 CA 2006, s 180(4)(b). The effect of s 180, however, is hard to assess due to the lack of clarity regarding what 
exactly can be authorised by the members in advance. 
562 Per CA 2006, s 180(4). 
563 This is especially surprising, given that such recommendation, apparently, existed in the CLR Review: See 
Final 1, Para 3.25. 
564 See a good discussion on this in Regentcrest Plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 120 per Parker LJ: „no doubt, 
where it is clear that the act or omission under challenge resulted in substantial detriment to the company, the 
director will have a harder task persuading the court that he honestly believed it to be in the company's interest; 
but that does not detract from the subjective nature of the test‟. 
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175(5) of the CA 2006 includes the provision that authorisation is only effective if it is 
granted by the company‟s constitution; however, if such permission is given (in public 
companies) or not prohibited (in private companies) and the directors pursue an opportunity, 
the issue remains. Moreover, such permission could also serve as a protection from Section 
173 (independent judgement), which specifically mentions protection from duty whenever 
the company constitution accordingly grants it. So, in such cases, the Act evidently leaves it 
up to the shareholders to seek the solution. It would be interesting to see whether any case 
law will be developed regarding this matter.  
Directors‟ authorisation codified in section 175 of the CA 2006 is the first of its kind in 
English law, and virtually no relevant case law authority exists to support the view that 
directors could authorise the taking of an opportunity by other directors. Still, some pre-Act 
court decisions indicate that not informing the board about the opportunity taken is a breach 
of duty. In the widely known IDC v Cooley case
565
, a managing director was offered an 
opportunity by a third party on the basis that it would deal exclusively with him, and not with 
his company. The director left his company without informing it about the opportunity, and 
entered the contract. The court held that the defendant was a fiduciary to his company and 
was obliged to provide information about the opportunity to the board in order to obtain 
authorisation. Similarly, in Crown Dilmun v Sutton
566
, the court found that a director 
breached his fiduciary duty by taking an opportunity and not informing the board and 
obtaining approval of the action. It is still unlikely that had a disclosure been made by the 
directors, the board would have willingly authorised that taking of an opportunity. 
In general, it remains uncertain whether directors should be allowed to provide authorisation 
to exploit corporate opportunities. It is possible that directors, considering the subtlety of the 
process, may consider „helping‟ other directors in exchange for support in the future567. 
Further, it is unclear whether the courts will strictly follow the requirements for authorisation 
as laid out in section 175(5) of the CA 2006: for example, in consideration of the „interested‟ 
directors being included in the voting process or the active participation of the director in 
                                                        
565 [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
566 [2004] 1 BCLC 468. 
567 Arguably, this could be dangerous in view of s 173 of the CA 2006 (exercising independent judgment). 
However, it could become hard to prove in the court that the breach occurred, especially in cases where 
opportunities are extremely hard for the company to pursue. 
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question in the decision making process of the board to allow him to take the opportunity. 
From this standpoint, it seems that the general equitable rule, based on shareholder 
authorisation, could be retained. However, at present, the way it is formulated within section 
180 of the CA 2006 makes it hard to see what exactly can be authorised by the company 
members
568
. While directors are granted the right to authorise exploitation of property, 
permission to do so ultimately rests with the shareholders who vote on the company articles. 
It is through the articles that the primary role of shareholders in the company authorisation 
process can be retained. Consequently, the burden of setting the rules shifts to the company 
articles, and it is in shareholders‟ interests to unequivocally provide whether directors can or 
cannot pursue the opportunities per se, or whether the board may authorise that process.  
5.3.2.2.2.2 Ceasing to Be a Director 
It is possible for company directors to pursue opportunities not only when engaged in the 
position of directorship, but also when they leave that position. In theory, in order to avoid 
fiduciary liability when taking an opportunity, a director could simply resign from the office 
and then start actively pursuing the opportunity of which he became aware during his 
directorship tenure. This issue has become very important in English law. Firstly, it should be 
noted that directors have the full right to resign even in cases when such resignation would be 
harmful to the company
569
. Therefore, by itself, resignation in no way constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Nevertheless, the CA 2006 in section 170(2) established that the duty to avoid 
a conflict of interest is still applicable to former directors regarding information, opportunity 
and property of which he became aware whilst he was a director. The section, in essence, 
states that the duties in sections 175 and 176 of the Act are to be applied to former directors 
although „subject to the necessary adaptations‟. The true nature of these „adaptations‟ is never 
clarified, although some commentators have opined that it would refer to replacing „director‟ 
with „former director‟ whenever there was a need to do so570.  
                                                        
568 CA 2006 s 239 also deals with ratifications of directors‟ breaches of duty. According to the section, acts 
related to breaches of duty and trust, among other things, must be ratified by the members without counting the 
votes of the shareholders favouring the director or persons related to him/her. Just like s 180, however, this 
section fails to specify the actions that can be ratified. 
569 This was addressed in CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet (n 500). 
570 See, for example, Kershaw (n 529) 522. 
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The extension of the directors‟ duty to avoid conflicts of interest is a strong deviation from 
the pre-Act case, which would normally refuse to extend this duty beyond resignation
571
. The 
general approach used by English courts prior to the CA 2006 was the maturing business 
opportunity test. The two most evident cases in this regard were Island Export Finance Ltd v 
Umunna
572
 and CMS Dolphin v Simonet
573
.  In Umunna, the managing director of a company, 
who had been a central figure in obtaining from the Cameroon postal authorities an order to 
provide postal boxes, resigned from his position claiming general dissatisfaction with the 
company. Shortly after that, the director set up his own company and obtained additional 
orders from Cameroon. The director‟s company sued for breach of fiduciary duties and asked 
the court to account for profits acquired from the additional orders. In CMS Dolphin, a 
director of the company resigned from his position and set up a competing business with 
other individuals. The company sued, claiming that the director had diverted corporate 
opportunities, which included contracts and client relationships. In both cases, the English 
court heavily relied on the maturing corporate opportunity test applied earlier in Canadian 
Aero Service v O’Malley574. In Canadian Aero Service, the court combined the no-conflict 
framework with the corporate opportunities framework to establish that a fiduciary could not 
„obtain for himself […] any property or business advantage either belonging to the company 
or for which it has been negotiating‟575. Further, the Court held that a director could not seize 
the „maturing business opportunity‟ which the company was actively pursuing576, and for 
reasons of which he resigned.  
Interestingly, the Canadian Court never defined what a „maturing business opportunity‟ 
consisted of, although it duly mentioned that in deciding whether breach of duty is present, 
the court has to consider multiple factors pertaining to each case. The decisions in both 
Umunna and CMS Dolphin acknowledged the application of the maturing business 
                                                        
571 Unless it was explicitly evident that the resignation was prompted by the desire to take an opportunity and 
the true reason for resignation was not disclosed to the company. See IDC v Cooley (n 506). 
572 [1986] BCLC 460. 
573 [2001] 2 BCLC 704. 
574 [1974] SCR 592. 
575 ibid.  
576 ibid [25]. 
142 
 
opportunity test as reasonable for English law
577
. Consequently, the decisions of both cases 
were based on the maturing corporate opportunity: in Umunna, the director was found not 
liable for the reason of no presence of a maturing business opportunity, and in CMS Dolphin, 
the director was found liable because the opportunities he took were found to be maturing 
business opportunities. An important point to note here is that in Umunna, Hutchinson J 
hinted that in deciding whether there was a breach of fiduciary duties, the primary motive for 
resignation was taken into account
578
. Therefore, the court established the importance of 
whether resignation was related to pursuing the corporate opportunities.  
The inevitable questions that emerge from the cases of resigning directors are what 
opportunities are counted and how long the duties still remain in effect after resignation. The 
first question was addressed in Balston v Headline Filters Ltd
579
, where a director who had 
resigned set up his own business before one of his former company‟s clients approached him 
and offered work. In the court‟s decision, Falconer J emphasised that the case facts did not 
present a maturing business opportunity, because the director did not divert the opportunity 
himself; rather, it was presented to him after he had launched his own business. Following the 
decision in Balston, as well as the cases reviewed above, it becomes clear that English courts 
could not find a uniform application of the maturing business opportunity rule, as they tended 
to rely on many different factors that could influence the outcome of the case, as was laid 
down in Canadian Aero Service. In general, however, the extent of opportunities that could 
be seized by directors, according to English company law, could be summarised as the 
following: unless otherwise stated in the contract, nothing prevents a director from resigning 
and engaging in activities that could be considered a breach of fiduciary duty before 
resigning, although use of company property or information acquired over the course of the 
directorship to seize the opportunities, or resigning specifically to do so, is prohibited.  
The second issue is the timeframe for the fiduciary duty application. Clearly, directors still 
hold some obligations to the company, even after resigning, but for how long? Unfortunately, 
there is nothing in English company law (even after the passage of the CA 2006) that could 
                                                        
577 Notably, see Collins J in CMS Dolphin (n 500) 733: „The underlying basis of the liability of a director who 
exploits after his resignation a maturing business opportunity of the company is that the opportunity is to be 
treated as if it were the property of the company in relation to which the director had fiduciary duties‟. 
578 [1986] BCLC 476.  
579 [1990] FSR 385. 
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provide clarification regarding this matter. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to consider 
directors as fiduciaries of the company forever, because that would significantly hinder the 
economics of free competition, but the time boundaries are not so easy to establish. This was 
addressed in Southern Real Estate Pty Ltd v Dellow and Arnold
580
, where the court 
recognised that „There is an obvious tension between a reasonable period during which the 
former director remains subject to his fiduciary duties, and freedom of competition‟. 
Intuitively, the longer the time that passes after the resignation, the less likelihood there is of 
breach; however, to define a specific period after which there is no breach is extremely 
hard.
581
 This is largely because of various case specific factors, some of which could be the 
nature of the directorship position and the amount of information related to it, the type of 
company, or the kind of business that the company is engaged in.  
It seems, however, that the major issue which the courts have considered in relation to 
resigning director cases has been not when the opportunity was exploited, but when and 
under what circumstances it was acquired by the director. Consequently, if the opportunity 
was acquired when the director was in his position, then the opportunity could not be taken 
even after resignation. Once again, however, this issue strongly depends on evidence: the 
longer the time that passes after resignation, the higher the chances that the director will not 
be found accountable. Here, the classic English law case is IDC v Cooley
582
, which 
considered the resignation problem through the no-conflict lens. In that case, the director did 
not obtain any profits over the course of directorship in the company; however, he exploited 
the opportunity upon resignation. The defendant was found liable because he set up an 
opportunity while still being a director and then used it upon resignation. Subsequently, in the 
judgement, it was not mentioned whether a director has to be in breach prior to or after the 
resignation. A similar opinion was expressed in Kingsley IT Consulting Ltd v McIntosh
583
, 
where the court recognised that a director can set up the groundwork for seizing the corporate 
opportunity over the course of directorship.  
                                                        
580 [2003] SASC 318 [2003] 87 SASR 1 36.  
581 Koh (n 455) 427, suggested that a year would be an appropriate time, although it is difficult to justify this. 
Setting up a timeframe based on almost hypothetical suggestions is unlikely to find a place in statutory law.  
582 [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
583 [2006] BCC 875. 
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After reviewing the major cases pertaining to directorship resignation, which have been 
mostly based on the maturing corporate opportunity rule, it is time to consider how the CA 
2006 fits the pre-existing common law framework addressing former directors‟ breach of 
fiduciary duties. In this regard, it seems that the Act has done little to change the traditional 
position of the case law. Granted, the maturing corporate opportunity test could be considered 
as an extension of the general duty of loyalty in the case of resigning directors. As such, the 
test would be seen as an application of the no-conflict rule in case law covering former 
directorship.  However, it should be remembered that the vast majority of pre-Act cases did 
not extend the no-conflict rule to resignation cases. Therefore, the argument that the maturing 
business opportunity fits within the no-conflict rule is, perhaps, wrong. Indeed, it is hard to 
find any English case law besides IDC v Cooley
584
 that addressed the problem strictly via the 
no-conflict framework. As such, this case can be considered the primary authority in the pre-
Act case law to shed light on the extension of the no-conflict rule to former directors. Thus, 
following the decision in IDC v Cooley, a resigning director would be excused for seizing the 
opportunity (regardless of whether it was seized in business or private time) if 1) the 
opportunity was presented bona fide to the board prior to resignation; 2) no intent to exploit 
the opportunity was present prior to resignation; and 3) the reason for resignation was not to 
exploit the opportunity or because the director was effectively dismissed.  In the post-Act 
2006 era, the recent decision in Foster v Bryant
585
 (considered below) seemed to move 
English case law closer to this framework and away from the earlier maturing business 
opportunity test.  
5.3.2.2.2.3 Absence of Directorship Power 
There are, as stated, different instances surrounding the process of resignation and subsequent 
behaviour of directors. However, holding directorship office may, in fact, mean a different 
level of involvement in the company‟s affairs and different access and control over 
information.  In this sense, Koh noted that a director‟s duties should not cease after 
resignation if the director has exerted great power and influence in the company‟s affairs, 
including the main lines of business, contracts and customer relations; although in cases  
where directors have little influence or control, this should not be the position
586
.  This brings 
                                                        
584 [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
585 [2007] EWCA Civ 200. 
586 Koh (n 455) 425.  
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us to the second instance where directors may not be found liable for a breach of fiduciary 
duty: when they have little or no control over the company‟s affairs.  
The issue was raised in the unusual case In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke
587
, where a director of the 
company, after being excluded from managing the company, set up a company of his own, 
while still being technically a director of the claimant company. Later, he entered into a 
contract with one of the key clients of his former company, and was sued on the basis of 
breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeal found that the director was not in breach of his 
duty, because he neither usurped the company property nor made use of any confidential 
information acquired over the course of directorship in the company. However, the court 
primarily focused on the role of the defendant as a director. In this regard, Sedley LJ noted: 
„Quite exceptionally, the defendant‟s duty to the claimants had been 
reduced to vanishing point by the acts (explicable and even justifiable 
though they may have been) of his sole fellow director and fellow 
shareholder Mr. Plank. […] The defendant‟s role as a director of the 
[company] was throughout the relevant period entirely nominal, not in the 
sense in which a non-executive director‟s position might (probably 
wrongly) be called nominal but in the concrete sense that he was entirely 
excluded from all decision-making and all participation in the claimant 
company‟s affairs. For all the influence he had, he might as well have 
resigned‟588. 
The circumstances of the case in Pyke were unusual. As such, the case is not so easy to 
compare to „hard line‟ cases such as Regal Hastings Ltd v Gulliver. At the same time, the 
very fact that the court acknowledged that in some situations there could be exceptions to the 
corporate opportunity doctrine points to the dilution of the traditionally strict principle in 
English case law. Even though the case is largely considered as an exception to the rule, the 
subsequent court decisions started noting the extent of the necessary involvement of a 
director in company affairs, whether the reasons for the lack of involvement are sufficient, or 
whether there should be exclusion from all areas of company operations or only selected 
ones. This was extensively considered in the recent important Foster v Bryant case
589
.  
The circumstances in the Bryant case were similar to those in Pyke; however, the court 
addressed the issue in more depth.  Rix LJ, with Moses LJ and Buxton J concurring, defined 
                                                        
587 [2002] EWCA Civ 370. 
588 ibid 90.  
589 [2007] EWCA Civ 200.  
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the various situations that could arise in the course of a director‟s resignation. He argued that 
there were two extremes in resignation: one, where the director was deliberately planning a 
post-resignation exploitation of an opportunity in which he was actively involved
590
, and one 
where the director seizes the opportunity while being a director „in name only,‟ and having 
little or no involvement in the company management
591
. Rix LJ noted that the latter case 
represented a situation where the director would not be liable (and that was the case in Bryant 
as well
592
).  
The cases of Pyke and Bryant are clear examples of the modern court‟s approach to 
opportunity regulation on a fact sensitive basis. Once again, it is emphasised that these 
decisions strongly break away from the traditional strict approach to the matter. If Pyke could 
be considered an exception in case law, the decision in Bryant seems to put a serious 
affirmation mark on the flexible approach to directors taking corporate opportunities. In this 
regard, Moses LJ, while generally agreeing with Rix LJ, noted that he „almost felt nostalgic 
for the days when there were inflexible rules, inexorably enforced by judges who would have 
shuddered at the reiteration of the noun-adjective‟593. How does this fact-sensitive approach 
fit into the realities of resignation and the framework of corporate opportunity regulation 
overall? Following the discussion in the cases considered above, it is clear that various 
situations surrounding directors‟ resignation exist. Therefore, it becomes impossible to 
develop and apply firm rules that would apply to all cases without exception. It follows then, 
that in situations where it is hard to determine whether the director acted in a director‟s 
capacity or not, an approach based on common sense and the merits of the situation is 
preferable. Rix LJ opined that the flexible approach reflected the equitable principles on 
which the director‟s duty was based594.  
                                                        
590 Like In IDC V Cooley (n 506). 
591 As in In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke, (n 535). 
592 [2007] EWCA Civ 200 87. 
593 ibid 97.  
594 ibid 77. 
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5.3.2.2.2.4 Competing and Multiple Directorships 
English law does not generally prevent directors from establishing a directorship in a 
company competing with their former business
595
, even in cases where new business 
connections are a product of previous directorship
596
. What about the cases when directors 
attempt to compete with the company while still being a director? In English law, this 
situation refers not to conflicts of interest, but to the conflict of duties, which is codified in 
section 175 of the CA 2006
597
.  The issue, by any standard, is one of the most difficult ones, 
and English case law has been very unclear regarding the matter. Before the enactment of the 
CA 2006, there was no statutory law precluding directors from competing with their 
companies. The early case in this regard was London & Mashonaland Exploration Co v New 
Mashonaland Exploration Co,
598
 where the court held that a director cannot be generally 
restrained from competition with his company. A number of cases that followed, ruled that 
employees are not to breach their duty of loyalty to their employer by being employed 
simultaneously by a competitor
599
, while that duty is considered less strict than the full good 
faith duty owed by directors as fiduciaries. Therefore, clear inconsistency in the law emerged: 
the relationship based on relaxed rules was enforced much more strongly than those based on 
stricter rules. However, as discussed in Chapter 4
600
, the Mashonaland view on competing 
directorships is not standing up to the passage of time. 
The inevitable clarification of the competing directorship position came about only relatively 
recently, in the already mentioned Pyke case
601
. Referring to the court judgements, the most 
important in this matter is the opinion of Sedley LJ, who expressed his doubt that the 
                                                        
595 See British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tooling Ltd [2003] EWHC 466 (Ch); [2003] 2 BCLC 
523 90 and 93.  
596
 See Hunter Kane Ltd v Watkins [2002] EWHC 186 (Ch); In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke ( n 535); Foster Bryant 
Surveying Ltd V Bryant [2007] EWCA Civ 200; [2007] 2 BCLC 239 [8].  
597 Section 175 (7) states that any reference to a conflict of interest [in section 175] also applies to the conflict of 
duties. 
598 [1891] WN 165. The case has been deeply investigated in Chapter 4 in relation to non executive directors‟ 
legal position.  
599 See, for example, Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch. 169, CA; also see connection 
to executive director per Lord Denning in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, 
HL.  
600 See Section 4.5.3.3. 
601 [2002] EWCA Civ 370. 
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authority provided by Mashonaland was appropriate to contemporary business realities. Yet 
the court in Pyke refused to take a broad view on the matter, stating that it was beyond the 
scope of the case. Nevertheless, the court did provide a fresh look at the old rule by 
establishing that each case has to be viewed based on specific facts pertaining to it. From this 
standpoint, it would perhaps be useful to look at Mashonaland not as a case allowing 
competition per se, but as one where the no-competition rule cannot be applied. Indeed, 
according to the facts of the case, the defendant did not act as a director and did not attend the 
meetings, which made his position closer to that of Pyke. Still, a generalisation of 
Mashonaland holding to the situations where directors act in full capacities as directors of the 
company seems doubtful.  
The introduction of section 175(7), which deals with the conflict of duties, can be considered 
a positive development in English law regarding competing directorships because it makes a 
case for these by specifically introducing the conflict of duty into the codified section relating  
to the conflict of interest. However, obtaining consent prior to the CA 2006 could be a 
troublesome affair, especially in public companies where dispersed shareholding is common. 
Section 175(4) (b) of the Act, however, makes it possible to obtain permission from the 
board. Some issues, however, remain unresolved. First, section 175 does not clarify the 
general declaration of interest in the same manner as, for example, section 177 of the Act. 
This means that a director would need to seek approval from independent directors on each 
matter regarding competing companies (such as new lines of business, or new clients). 
Second, and this is much more complicated, the director would have to be cautious with both 
companies in order to avoid a conflict of duty with either one. However, that would 
eventually lead to a situation where his commitment and contribution to both companies 
diminishes
602
.  
Considering significant difficulties that individuals might face under English law when 
serving as directors in competing companies, such cases are rarely met in practice. It is much 
more likely that competing directorships in modern English companies emerge within the 
paradigm of resignation and the subsequent launch of a director‟s own company603. 
Therefore, modern English company law focuses more on the situation where a director who 
                                                        
602 A simple situation: when an opportunity arises, presenting it to either company may cause a conflict of duties 
with the other one. Therefore, there is an incentive not to present it at all.  
603 The cases of Umunna (n 578), CMS Dolphin (n 500), and Bryant (n 596), IDC (n 506) confirm this notion.  
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plans to compete with the company after resignation, takes certain steps to prepare for this 
while still being the director. Here, the general court position seems to be that making plans 
to compete does not constitute the breach of fiduciary duty
604
. However, such activities must 
not pertain to actual competitive activities (for example, recruitment of the company‟s 
employees); otherwise, it is a breach of the duty of loyalty
605
. Where the fine line between 
preparation and actual competition lies is uncertain: under the British Midland approach, for 
example, preparatory activities already constitute a breach, while under the Balston approach, 
it is necessary to find out whether the preparatory activities were set up specifically to 
compete with the company and whether these activities are in actual competition.  At first 
sight, the first approach is preferable, since it provides a more definitive guide to determining 
when an actual breach occurs. By accepting Balston’s view, it is argued that the courts would 
be faced with a complicated task of defining what constitutes actual competing activities. On 
the other hand, complete restriction of preparatory activities may not fit well with the general 
public interest of free trade
606
.  However, when considering the statutory code related to this 
matter, the former approach seems to prevail.  Allowing directors to take preparatory steps 
for competition seems to be inconsistent with section 172 of the Act, which requires directors 
to promote the success of the company. Further, section 179 indicates that more than one 
fiduciary duty can be applied in any given case concerning directorship. Therefore, even if 
Balston’s approach frees directors from liability under section 175 of the Act, they are likely 
to be liable under section 172.  
Besides the nature of preparatory steps during a directorship, the courts also identified other 
factors which influence the final decision on whether competing is permissible. One of these 
situations, as discussed earlier, is where directors are effectively excluded from functioning in 
the capacity of directors and they did not actively seek to exploit corporate opportunities. 
                                                        
604 See for example, Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd (n 506): the director embarked on some pre-competition 
steps, such as space leasing, while still employed by the company. Also see Coleman Taymar Ltd v Oakes 
[2001] 2 BCLC 749 769, where it was held that a director may form intentions to take preliminary steps in 
setting up a competitive business on condition that the competitive business is not launched until the 
directorship is terminated. See also LC Services Ltd v Brown [2003] EWHC 3024 (QB).  
605 This was emphasised in British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tooling Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 523, 
at 77-92; Hart J also suggested that a director, when taking preliminary steps to compete with the company, 
should either inform the company or resign. Additionally, see CMS Dolphin v Simonet (n 500) 16-31 where duty 
to disclose intentions is discussed. 
606 See Balston (n 506) 412. Also consider the argument in Item Software v Fassihi (n 412), where Arden LJ 
argues that the law should not be too restrictive in this sense in order not to hinder entrepreneurial activity. 
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This was demonstrated in the cases of In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke
607
 and Foster Bryant 
Surveying Ltd v Bryant
608
, discussed earlier in this chapter. It should be remembered, 
however, that despite the recognition of less fiduciary rigour in such cases, the directors after 
resigning will still be subject to any contractual restraints, the rules related to corporate 
opportunities learned while being in the directorship position, and any laws pertaining to 
intellectual property, such as trade secrets and copyrights.  
The last element to consider within the framework of competing directorship is the time 
before establishing a competing company. As discussed earlier in relation to resigning 
directors, intuition suggests that the longer the time that passes between resignation and 
establishing the new business, the less chance there is that the resignation will be linked to 
initiatives related to establishing the competitive business. In this regard, the Australian case 
of Southern Real Estate Pty Ltd v Dellow and Arnold
609
 is helpful. The defendant in that case 
took preliminary steps prior to resignation to compete with her company by diverting the 
company clients to her new business. The court held the director liable while referring to 
Robb v Green
610
, which addressed a passing of „reasonable time‟ after resignation after which 
soliciting of clients could be considered permissible. In that sense, however, the court in 
Southern held that the reasonable period did not apply since the director started trading 
immediately after termination of her directorship. Although the decision was not placed 
within the no-conflict framework, the court found the director in breach of good faith
611
.  
In order to complete the discussion on competing directorships, it is necessary to consider the 
issue of multiple positions. When talking about taking multiple directorships in competitive 
companies, the law is generally the same as described above, given that a director would be 
in a much more difficult situation regarding preserving fiduciary duties for all the companies. 
However, what about the situation where a director is engaged in multiple positions in 
companies that are not competing with each other? This, logically, creates a lesser possibility 
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of conflict
612
. Still, it remains good practice to acquire consent from the boards of all the 
companies in order to avoid any possibilities of conflict. If a transaction between the two 
companies in which one is a director occurs, it is a matter of good practice to refrain from 
active directorship in one of them. In such a case, given that company articles have such 
provision, the CA 2006 seems to relieve directors from liability
613
. Otherwise, directors are in 
a very difficult situation. Even in the case of non-competing directorships, any potential deal 
between the companies (such as, for example, a takeover) would create a situation where the 
duty of loyalty is likely to be breached for one of the companies
614
. Such an uneasy legal 
conundrum may ultimately leave the director with no choice but to resign from directorship 
in one of the companies. How the case law will develop in this direction in the post CA 2006 
era remains to be seen. However, with the present rules codified within the Act it seems that 
multiple directorships carry considerable risk.  
5.3.2.2.2.5 Opportunities Not ‘Reasonably Regarded to Give Rise to the Conflict of 
Interest’ 
The final situation allowing directors to pursue corporate opportunities is mentioned in 
section 175(4)(a) of the CA 2006: „the duty is not infringed if the situation cannot reasonably 
be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest‟. The section clearly indicates an 
attempt to provide a more flexible approach to dealing with the conflict of interest duty. It 
seems that the section echoes the famous Lord Upjohn dissent opinion in Boardman v Phipps 
referring to „real, sensible possibilities by any reasonable man‟615. Does this make the 
situation easier for directors? As discussed earlier, the courts, following the decision 
formulated in Boardman v Phipps, seemed indeed to follow the methodology presented by 
Lord Upjohn on the basis that the court agreed on the equitable principle, but not on the 
application facts of the case
616
. The analysis of Boardman and consequent cases revealed that 
                                                        
612 Further, in situations, where, for example, a non-executive director takes a non-executive position in a non-
competitive company, multiple directorships are highly unlikely to cause any fiduciary problems at all.  
613 CA 2006, s 180(4)(b) states that the general duties are not infringed „where the company‟s articles contain 
provisions for dealing with conflicts of interest‟. Therefore, if the director acts accordingly within the 
boundaries that the company articles provide, there will be no breach. The issue here is to what extent the 
company shareholders would be willing to grant such rights.  
614 The action of withdrawal considered above could be possible, but it might cause a breach of the duty to 
promote the success of the company.  
615 [1967] AC 46 [33]. 
616 See Section 5.3.2.2.1. of the chapter. 
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the company capability facts, which were not seen as „immaterial‟ by the majority of the 
Lords in Boardman, are, indeed, treated as such in the subsequent cases regarding corporate 
opportunities. It is from this point that the Act‟s intention to make the rule more flexible 
should be viewed. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that the Act would include in one section 
two opposite resolutions regarding the capability facts. Section 175(2) provides that it is 
immaterial whether a company could take advantage of the opportunity, while section 
175(4)(a) provides that, when reasonably the situation cannot be regarded as giving rise to the 
conflict of interest, the duty is not infringed. In other words, one section deems capability 
facts immaterial, and the other states that, in certain circumstances, the facts are, after all, 
material. In order to resolve such an unfortunate confusion, it is necessary to look at section 
175(4)(a) not from the point of capability facts, but from the point of other instances, namely, 
the company‟s rejection of the opportunity and how the opportunity fitted into the company‟s 
line of business.  
As the discussion above demonstrated, there is some authority to support the idea that the 
opportunity rejected by the company could be taken by directors. Perhaps the most famous 
decision in this regard was formulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Peso Silver Mines 
Ltd v Cropper
617
.  In that case, the owner of mineral claims around the mines of Peso Silver 
Ltd offered to sell the claims to the company. After bona fide consideration of the claim, the 
company rejected the offer, which was then accepted by one of its directors. The company 
sued the director for breach of fiduciary duty by seizing the corporate opportunity. The court 
did not find the director liable, arguing that the Peso Silver board rejected the offer on the 
basis of good faith and in the best interests of the company. Furthermore, the information 
about the offer was not confidential, for Peso Silver only, but open to other potential 
purchasers as well. Therefore, the court held that in purchasing the claims, the director was 
acting in a private capacity, thereby causing no breach of duty.  
Interestingly enough, the court in Peso referred to both Regal (Hastings)
618
 and Boardman
619
 
when delivering the judgement. Still, it should be remembered that Peso was decided in the 
Canadian court, and the absence of similar cases in English courts hints at the desire to 
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preserve a strict control over directors‟ actions within the boundaries of their fiduciary 
capacities. Some English authors have argued that the decision in Peso could be extended to 
English company law within section 175(4)(a)
620
. However, such a position is difficult to 
reconcile with the no-conflict principles set out in Boardman v Phipps, which is considered 
the major case authority regarding corporate opportunities. According to Lord Hodson‟s 
judgment, now codified in section 175(2) of the CA 2006, it is immaterial whether the 
director receives approval of his actions from the board. From this standpoint, pursuing 
opportunities rejected by the board is just another version of the capability facts: the director 
could always act more persistently in overcoming the board‟s rejection of an opportunity. 
This approach was taken in Bhullar v Bhullar, where Parker LJ referred to the rule of 
reasonable view on the facts of the case and argued that a director‟s taking of an opportunity 
after the company rejected it still fell under the no-conflict rule
621
.  
Following Bhullar, it is highly unlikely that English courts will consider a company‟s 
rejection of an opportunity as a special case under section 175(4)(a).  It is almost obvious that 
Lord Upjohn‟s test for a „real sensible possibility of conflict‟ has been used to provide that 
capability facts are immaterial to the identification of a possible conflicts of interest. At least 
two such facts can be identified in Bhullar: first, the board openly declared they had no 
interest in acquiring further properties; second, the company was in the obvious process of 
effectively ending its existence in its current form due to internal conflict. The presence of 
these facts significantly decreased the probability that the company would take on the 
opportunity in question or even, perhaps, any other opportunity at that time at all. From this 
standpoint, when directors seized the opportunity, there was only a hypothetical situation of 
corporate interest present. Nonetheless, the mere possibility of the conflict was emphasised in 
the ruling. This reinforces the strict position of the English courts in relation to corporate 
opportunity cases.  
The other possible application of section 175(4)(a) of the CA 2006 is in the area of business 
restrictions. As discussed above, English courts have been generally following the strict 
formulation of the no-conflict rule by including the no-profit rule in their decisions. However, 
in some cases, it was noted that a very broad view of the rule could be somewhat unrealistic, 
even though the original goal was to ensure directors‟ loyalty. Indeed, should directors be 
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liable for profits from writing a book on general business or giving a speech at a university? 
Clearly, these activities fall outside the opportunities that directly relate to a company‟s 
business. However, do they fall outside the scope of the no-conflict rule now codified in 
English company law?  
In other common law jurisdictions there is a „line of business‟ test that determines whether a 
director could be excused for taking opportunities not related to company‟s activities. The 
test is particularly well established and applied by the United States courts, based on the 
landmark decisions of Guth v Loft
622
 and Broz and RFB Cellular Inc v Cellular Information 
Systems
623
. First introduced in Guth, then refined and expanded in Broz, the line of business 
test allows directors to take an opportunity if: „(1) the opportunity is presented to the director 
or officer in his individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is not essential 
to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and 
(4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the corporation in 
pursuing or exploiting the opportunity‟624.  Under any of these tests, the existence of a 
corporate opportunity is recognised when there is a reasonable link between the opportunity 
and the current or prospective business of the company, which it also has a capacity to 
pursue. The American case law considers such cases on a factual basis, taking into account 
the circumstances that surround the issue.  
In England, the classic case of Aas v Benham
625
 established an equivalent test in the context 
of partnerships.  However, while acknowledged by English courts to a certain extent, the test 
is not regarded as an applicable authority in company law. This is evident from the recent 
cases of Wilkinson v West Coast Capital
626
 and Allied Business Partners v Shanahan
627
. The 
court in Wilkinson addressed a situation where directors pursued a business opportunity of 
which they learnt in a non-corporate personal capacity. One of the company owners sued two 
                                                        
622 5 A. 2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939). 
623 Del. Supr. 637 A2d 148 (1996) 155. 
624 Broz And RFB Cellular Inc v Cellular Information Systems Del. Supr. 637 A2d 148 (1996) 155. 
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directors for acquiring and selling a company through their own enterprise, which held 60% 
of the original company. The plaintiff argued that in doing so, the directors diverted a 
corporate opportunity that belonged to the original company. The original company had a 
shareholders‟ agreement that restricted the purchasing of property unless there was an 
approval by 65% of the shareholders. The plaintiff argued that the directors had to use all 
means necessary to persuade the shareholders to purchase the company and not to do it 
through their own enterprise.  
In delivering the judgment, Warren J stated: 
„So Aas v Benham is an illustration of the importance of defining the scope 
of the duty before being able to decide whether a person is in breach of it 
and in particular whether the „no conflict‟ rule or the „no profit‟ rule 
applies‟. […] The case possibly establishes, or re-affirms, a negative 
proposition that there is no principle which entitles a firm to benefits 
derived from the use of information for purposes which are wholly outside 
the scope of the firm‟s activities‟628. 
His lordship‟s judgment is interesting from two positions: the objects clause and the company 
business area. On the side of the objects clause, Warren J suggested that the company‟s 
interests can be restricted by the articles if these clearly state what business activities the 
company may engage in. On the other hand, a restriction similar to the one presented in the 
case (approval of property purchase by the majority of shareholders) would have no effect on 
limiting the interests, albeit in the situation where a director holds a sufficient amount of 
shares to block specific actions in order to exploit the opportunity. Therefore, only when a 
director is also a shareholder with sufficient power to influence the company‟s actions, would 
the restriction rule for the purposes of the no-conflict rule apply: in this case, the conflicts of 
interest will be present. As such, Warren J made a useful distinction between the capability 
facts and structural limitations that a company can place on its business. Capability facts 
(such as company financial limitations), as was noted from the discussion of the cases above, 
are immaterial to the presence of a conflict of interest.  On the other hand, structural 
restrictions (such as a clear indication, in the articles, of the businesses that the company is 
engaged in) do not seem immaterial
629
.  
                                                        
628 ibid [281] and [284]. Also note that the approach taken by the court is that no-conflict and no-profit rules are 
independent from each other. 
629 Subject to the exception noted above: directors who have substantial power are capable of exerting additional 
effort to block or pass specific resolutions related to corporate opportunities.  
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On the side of the company business area, Warren J‟s judgment reflects on the actual and 
potential lines of business that could comprise the company‟s interests. According to Warren, 
activities significantly different from the company‟s business do not fall within the no-
conflict rule, if the company does not express its interest in expanding into that business area. 
Warren J, however, abstained from clarification of how close the activities have to be to the 
actual area of business. Furthermore, in discussing hypothetical examples, he provided that a 
business that presents „synergies with the company‟s area of business‟ would still fall within 
the company‟s interests630, thus implying a breach of fiduciary duty in the case of acquisition. 
This seems misleading, since synergies could be achieved between companies carrying on 
different lines of businesses
631
. Therefore, while attempting to provide a flexible view on the 
issue of corporate interest in terms of business area, Warren J, in effect, provided more 
reasons to consider such situations on a case by case basis. 
In general, the holding in Wilkinson could be considered as a restatement of the view 
expressed in Bhullar v Bhullar: there could be some scope for business restraints on the 
corporate opportunity doctrine. Warren‟s contribution in this matter can be considered 
recognition of the board members‟ power in limiting or broadening the scope of the 
company‟s interests. Still, the decision in Wilkinson can hardly be considered a definitive 
authority regarding the corporate opportunity exemptions as defined by section 175(4)(a). 
Looking at the judgment as a whole, it becomes clear that in attempting to integrate „the 
scope of business‟ test into the no-conflict framework, Warren J could not define exactly how 
the limitation of the scope of business would restrict the company‟s interests. Perhaps, had 
the Act been in force by the time when the judgement was delivered, a more precise and 
robust discussion would have been available.  
A more recent case, Allied Business Partners v Shanahan
632
, rejected the applicability of the 
scope of business test within the corporate context. The case revolved around the purchasing 
of an office floor by one of the company directors for his own company. The director was 
sued for diverting a potential business opportunity. The High Court held that there was no 
breach, by considering the case within the Aas v Benham „scope of business‟ test: the 
                                                        
630 [2009] EWCA Civ 751 301. 
631 Kershaw (n 529) 506 provides a good argument in this regard.  
632 [2009] EWCA Civ 751 301.  
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opportunity was found to be outside the company‟s business interests. The decision, however, 
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which argued that the director was accountable for any 
profit, even one within an area of potential conflict only. Consequently, the „scope of 
business‟ test was rejected on the grounds that it applied to partnership law, where fiduciary 
roles are much more clearly defined within the partnership agreement
633
.  
It should be noted that the decision in Shanahan was delivered without consideration of the 
changes introduced by the CA 2006 generally and section 175(4)(a) specifically. Still, the 
position taken by the court (which relied heavily on Keech v Sandford) can be described as 
quite restrictive.  However, the decision is not without flaws. As was noted above, the 
primary reason for rejecting the „scope of business‟ test was the perceived differences 
between the fiduciary positions of partners and directors. This distinction, however, does not 
make much sense in practice, since both parties undoubtedly have certain universal 
obligations before their partners or companies, and the duty of loyalty remains the same 
regardless of fiduciary status. In the case of limited liability partnerships, to which the scope 
of business test is applied, partners‟ roles resemble those of corporate directors in the sense 
that LLPs are independent entities and partners do not carry individual responsibility for each 
other‟s actions. While the fiduciary duties of partners are generally defined within the 
contractual obligations, the CA 2006 Chapter 10 can be regarded as a universal contractual 
obligation for all directors. Therefore, considering the fiduciary role of directors as less 
explicitly defined is misleading at least.  
It is useful to consider whether the court in Shanahan would have ruled otherwise following 
the Aas v Benham rule. The answer is not that obvious. It should be remembered that the 
company‟s business was not that well defined to easily decide whether the director‟s 
purchase of property was, indeed, outside its scope of business. Therefore, arrival at a 
different conclusion using the „scope of business‟ test could be problematic. In that case, 
there would have been the need to clearly outline the boundaries of the scope of business test, 
which would have had to be much more precise than, for example, Warren‟s review in 
Wilkinson. On the other hand, holding the director liable in Shanahan under „the scope of 
business‟ test, would create a precedent, where companies with unclear businesses and an 
absence of a clear business strategy would have an upper hand in holding their directors 
liable for potential breaches of duty. This would dilute the entire purpose of the „scope of 
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business‟ test. For these reasons, following a strict, well defined rule stated in Keech v 
Sandford may seem preferable.  
Unfortunately, the CA 2006 does not clarify what the real intention behind section 175(4)(a) 
was
634
. What is clear, however, is the intention of the English legislator to introduce some 
flexibility to the matters related to corporate opportunity regulations. On the other hand, the 
English courts, which have been accustomed to follow the strict equity approach, would be 
unlikely to easily loosen the boundaries of the strict equity rule, and the decision in Shanahan 
serves as the best proof of this. Thus, the absence of specifics in section 175(4)(a), such as the 
areas of opportunity rejection by the company and opportunities not falling within the scope 
of the company‟s business, does not help the idea of flexibility to materialise.  
5.3.3 Duty Not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties 
5.3.3.1 Purpose and Codification 
While section 175 of the CA 2006 regulates the issues within the no-conflict rule, section 176 
deals with a special application of the no-profit rule, which, as was demonstrated above, is a 
part of the no-conflict framework. Section 176 deals specifically with the receipt of benefits 
from third parties. As such, the section serves as an attempt to prohibit personal gain by the 
misuse of a directorship position. The section is, therefore, connected with the no-conflict 
rule: if directors accept benefits from third parties, this might well involve some services in 
return (or vice versa, which does not change the essence of the application of the law), 
leading almost certainly to a breach of loyalty. It should be noted that, while not formally 
written as a „duty of loyalty‟ in the CA 2006, this duty is universally recognised in English 
law, as well in other common law countries. With regard to English law, it can be argued that 
the duty of loyalty is expressed through the duties of promoting the company success 
(Section 172) and the duty to avoid a conflict of interest (Section 175). 
Section 176 starts with the general provision that directors are not to accept benefits from 
third parties by reason of being a director or by doing (or not doing) anything as a director
635
. 
Therefore, the section implies that in order to prove wrongdoing, it is necessary to establish 
that there is a connection between the receipt of benefit and acting in the capacity of 
                                                        
634 Neither do the Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006. 
635 CA 2006, s 176(1). 
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director
636
.  In this regard, the section seems to proscribe what can be referred to as bribes 
and secret profits, which are detrimental to the duty of loyalty
637
. The section is also linked to 
the no-conflict rule formulated in section 175 within sections 176(4) and (5) which cover 
situations where the duty is not infringed („if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably 
be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest‟) and mentioning that „any reference 
in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty and a conflict of 
duties‟ respectively. But these sections are, essentially, echoing sections 175(4)(a) and 
175(7). Based on these findings, it may be questioned what the purpose of section 176 is, 
since it seems that the situations it deals with could generally be handled by section 175 of 
the CA 2006. In answering this question, one should pay attention to the fact that actions 
under section 176 cannot be authorised by the board. Receipt of benefits from third parties, 
therefore, is considered by English legislators as being too risky for the integrity of the 
director‟s conduct and performing his core duties. Therefore, it is accordingly left only for the 
general shareholder meeting to resolve (although the lack of clarity in section 180 regarding 
in advance authorisation plays a negative role here as well)
638
.  Further, reliance upon section 
176 and section 175 at the same time is granted by section 179 of the CA 2006
639
. Therefore, 
the purpose of section 176 is to extend the application of the no-conflict rule, and it should 
therefore be considered together with section 175.  
5.3.3.2 Benefits from Third Parties in Case Law 
While section 176 of the CA 2006 deals specifically with benefits, it does not provide an 
explanation of what benefits are. During the debates on the Act in Parliament, the Solicitor 
                                                        
636
 It seems that the legal permission to accept benefits not related to directorship stems from agency law, which 
allows acceptance of benefits outside the agency relationship. See, for this matter, Aas v Benham (n 471). 
637 This provision is in line with the equitable rule against bribes and secret commissions formulated in Attorney 
General For Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, Pc.  
638 Even though shareholders‟ permission is not covered within section 176, it is provided in section 180(4)(a). 
This, of course, almost certainly leads to a complete ban on receiving benefits from third parties, especially in 
public companies, where dispersed shareholding is common, making it extremely hard to obtain consent from 
the majority of shareholders. It is unlikely that English legislators did not consider this fact when drafting 
section 176. Therefore, it seems that the effort has been to exclude any attempts to receive such benefits by 
directors in order to avoid conflict with other duties. This, once again, demonstrates the dominance of the strict 
approach in English legislation: it nearly dismisses the possibility of situations where accepting benefits from 
third parties could be done without infringement of other fiduciary duties.  
639 „Except when otherwise provided, more than one of the general duties may apply‟. 
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General proposed that the ordinary dictionary definition of the word be applied
640
. But what 
exactly can be attributed to this definition? Obviously, there are some items that can easily be 
defined as a benefit from third parties, such as financial rewards (money, stock, property 
holdings, etc.) or money‟s worth items such as paid travel, tickets to sports events or 
entertainment
641
. Other cases, such as the receipt of corporate hospitality, are reviewed in the 
context within which they are given
642
. Most usually, however, common law has applied the 
term „benefits from third parties‟ to bribes and secret commissions.  
As mentioned above, section 176 is predicated on the equitable rule formulated in Lister v 
Stubbs
643
, which imposed only a personal, not proprietary duty on a fiduciary who accepted a 
bribe. In other words, the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to any investment proceeds made 
as the result of not accounted profits by the fiduciary. This approach was strongly criticised in 
Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid,
644
 where the Privy Council stated that bribes and 
secret commissions received by fiduciaries have to be held on constructive trust, and all the 
profits acquired from this are also to be held on constructive trust. Technically, the decision 
in Reid is not binding on the English courts; however, it was approved in a number of High 
Court decisions
645
, although the most recent decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v 
Versailles Trade Finance Ltd
646
 followed the rule established in Lister. The apparent tensions 
between the approaches in Lister and Reid are preserved up to date. Arguments can be found 
in favour of either approach: the Lister approach proponents may claim that it is not fair to 
put the victim of the fiduciary wrongdoing ahead of the other creditor parties of the 
properties; while the Reid approach deprives the wrongdoer not only of the immediate 
benefits of the bribes, but of all future benefits related to it. 
                                                        
640 HC Comm D 11 July 2006, At Col 621-622. According to Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) benefit is „A favourable or helpful factor, circumstance, advantage or profit‟ 162.  
641 These are mentioned in ICSA Guidance On Directors’ General Duties (2008) para 3.6.5. 
642 ibid. 
643 (1890) 45 Ch D 1. 
644 [1994] 1 AC 324. 
645 Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289; Dubai Aluminum Company Ltd v Alawi 
[2002] EWHC 2051; Tesco Stores Ltd v Pook [2003] EWHC 823; Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland 
International Ltd [2004] EWHC 622.  
646 [2011] EWCA Civ 347. It should be acknowledged, however, that the court called for a balanced approach 
between the two contradictory authorities. 
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Modern English law considers bribes through the lens of the no-conflict rule. Much of it has 
been said within the agent-principal framework. The Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006 at 
para 344 specifically mention bribes as a form of secret profits. This was confirmed in Anagel 
Atlas Compania Naviera SA v Ishikawajimaa-Harima Heavy Industries Co Ltd
647
, where the 
court held that a bribe „consists in a commission or other inducement, which is given by a 
third party to an agent as such, and which is secret from his principal‟. Smith J in Fiona Trust 
& Holding Corporation Ors v Privalov Ors
648
 reasoned that the test as to whether a benefit 
offered is equal to a bribe is whether the agent is put in a position where his and his 
principal‟s interest may conflict. He further noted that it is not necessary for the bribe to be 
linked to a specific transaction; rather, the possibility of either the conflict of interest or the 
conflict of duty emerging was what counted
649
. Here, once again, the English courts apply the 
„possibility of conflict‟ test to deter wrongful conduct by fiduciaries. However, if in the case 
of section 175 the strictness of the rule could be challenged on the grounds of hindering 
entrepreneurial activities, as regards benefits from the third parties, in relation to whom the 
acceptance of bribes is the most frequently mentioned misconduct, the strictness of the law is 
completely justifiable. 
Bribes are commonly associated with secret commissions in the sense that both are received 
without the knowledge of the principal. There is no concrete legal distinction between the 
terms for legal purposes in section 176 of the CA 2006, although epistemological differences 
are noted by some authors
650
. More important for the courts are the facts of the case. For 
example, English law recognises that some third party benefits can be too small to even fall 
under the possibility of the conflict rule
651
. Such cases, however, are reliant on drawing a 
distinct line between what can be considered a „little present‟ and when it becomes a bribe or 
                                                        
647 [1990] 1 Lloyd‟s Rep 167 171.  
648 [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm) [73].  
649 ibid.  
650 See, for example, Francis Reynolds (ed) Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell 1993) 246-
247, who states that the difference is in the corrupt intent: when there is no corrupt intent in payment, it is more 
appropriate to consider it a secret commission. But the courts do not define the terms separately. See, for 
example, Fiona Trust [2011] EWHC 1312 [70], where Smith J treats bribes and secret commissions in the same 
way; also see Daraydan Holdings Ltd V Solland International Ltd [2004] 3 W.L.R. 1104, where „kickback‟ 
commissions were deemed equivalent to a bribe. 
651 See The ‘Parkdale’ [1897] P 53 58-9, where Barnes J decided that a „little present‟ does not create a 
possibility of conflicts of interest or duties.  
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a secret commission. In this regard, the English courts refer to what is a „real possibility‟ of a 
conflict
652
. From the little authority available on this matter, it seems that there is no secret 
commission if the agent is not expecting the gift at the time of transaction.  
As seen, the benefits covered under section 176 of the CA 2006 are different from those 
covered in section 175. Section 175 deals primarily with the corporate opportunities, which 
can be considered as benefits from third parties, because it assumes the acquisition of profits 
and other gains resulting from seizing an opportunity
653
. This type of benefit, however, is a 
legitimate one to be pursued by the company. Hence, the law protects companies from being 
„ripped off‟ from what they can gain by pursuing the opportunity that is beneficial to them. In 
the case of section 176, however, neither bribes nor secret commissions can be regarded as 
legal ways of obtaining profits. These „benefits,‟ therefore, the company cannot request, 
obtain, and use for itself under normal circumstances. While this distinction is not clearly 
apparent from the wording of the sections, it makes perfect sense in terms of their conceptual 
separation.  Indeed, section 175(2) is worded quite broadly, which makes it possible to 
include the opportunities that the company cannot legally pursue. This means that there is no 
inherent separation of legal and illegal opportunities within the section itself. But then, 
section 175(2) makes it immaterial whether the company can take advantage of the 
opportunity. It is blatantly clear that taking advantage of illegitimate opportunity is by no 
means „immaterial‟. This also explains why section 176 does not contain a similar provision 
or why it does not accept the board‟s authorisation for receiving benefits from third parties. 
Most importantly, it helps narrow down and clarify the meaning of sections 175 and 176, 
which should be considered on a cumulative, not separate basis. 
This was the position in the recently decided Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd
654
. In 
the case, a company supplier provided one of the directors (Towers) with some machinery to 
renovate property that the director owned. Some equipment repairs were consequently passed 
through the company books, and the company was charged for them. Upon receiving the 
invoice, Premier Waste Management sued Towers for the breach of duty owed. In deciding 
the matter, the court looked at the issues of the conflict of interest and the issue of receiving 
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benefits from third parties as codified in sections 175 and 176 of the CA 2006
655
. The court 
decided that Towers breached his fiduciary duties to the company by receiving the benefit 
and breaching the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Importantly, while it was established that 
Towers did not receive any valuable benefits from the equipment, that the company would be 
unlikely to receive any benefits from leasing it either, and that the loss for the company was 
negligible, the court found that none of that was relevant. As Mummery LJ
656
 held: 
„The absence of evidence that the Company would have taken the 
opportunity, or has in fact suffered any loss, or that Mr Towers […] had 
any corrupt motive or that, if there had been no free loan, Mr Towers 
would have hired that sort of equipment in the market; the fact that the 
value of the benefit to Mr Towers was small […]: none of those matters 
supported the contention that there was no breach of the duty of loyalty or 
the no conflict duty‟. 
As follows, the breach of duty here arose not from depriving the company of some benefits 
that could be obtained from the third party, but, rather, from depriving the company of the 
consideration as to whether it wished to pursue the opportunity. In this regard, the breach of 
duty was established in accordance with the traditionally strict approach of English law in 
regulating the fiduciary duties of company directors. This creates a serious precedent in the 
post-Act case law, as even in the presence of relaxing the rules to regulate directors‟ duties, 
traditionally strict views seem to be applied. Consequently, with regard to section 176 of the 
CA 2006, neither proof of loss, fraud or corruption (as in bribery cases) is likely to be 
required in the future: the wrongdoing of the director will be confirmed even on the legal 
basis and secret profits can be accounted for even though no profits, or negligible profits, 
were actually made.  
Two major critical conclusions can be drawn after the analysis of section 176 of the CA 
2006.  First, section 176 of the CA 2006 does not allow authorisation by the board, although 
the possibility for authorisation by shareholders is still possible under section 180(4) which 
deals with the consent and approval of the company members and section 239 which deals 
with ratification of directors‟ acts. These sections, respectively, allow prior and post approval 
of the breach of duty. However, in the light of the current discussion, section 176 is drafted to 
protect the company from the illegitimate acts of directors that it cannot pursue legally by 
                                                        
655 CA 2006, s 177 (Declaring Interest in the Transaction) did not apply because the matter was not considered 
as a transaction with interest; although the lack of disclosure became one of the key points of the case.  
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itself. As such, there seems to be a significant problem where a possibility of approving of an 
illegitimate act remains. Unfortunately, the Act does not provide an answer as to whether 
there are non-ratifiable breaches. Therefore, although it is clear that there are breaches in 
common law that should not receive the power of ratification, it remains very unclear as to 
how wide the rule actually is. What is clear, however, is that the general law does not prevent 
members‟ approval or ratification of directors‟ receipt of third party benefits. It could be 
argued that conscious shareholders would never allow receipt of such benefits by directors in 
view of the serious loyalty consequences that this entails and because it would entail 
tampering with the company property, actual and potential.  However, the rule may not easily 
be followed in practice in companies where directors are also major shareholders. In this 
sense, the absence of statutory barriers to such behaviour is clearly unfair toward minority 
shareholders.  
Second, in the light of the Towers case, it is clear that English courts are likely to follow the 
strict approach in the application of section 176 especially when considered within the 
framework of avoiding conflicts of interest. However, while the decision in Towers may 
seem to create a harsh precedent for directors, the Act still provides sufficient mechanisms to 
avoid such issues by declaring the interest to the board or the company members where 
appropriate. In this regard, section 177 also plays an important role in regulating the fiduciary 
duties of company directors towards property in England.  
5.3.4 Duty to Declare Interest in Proposed Transaction or Arrangement 
5.3.4.1. Purpose and Codification 
Section 177 of the CA 2006 is the third of the general provisions of the Act which was 
designed to deal with the conflicts of interest and exploitation of property. Specifically, it 
deals with the conflict arising in the proposed transactions with the company. It is a major 
feature of English company law that a director has to avoid a conflict of interest with the 
company in situations where he might have personal interest in a transaction (it is known as 
the „no self-dealing rule‟). This principle is covered by section 175 of the CA 2006. Section 
177 can be considered as an addition to this duty, because it requires directors to disclose any 
personal interest in a transaction or an arrangement
657
. The section provides that
658
: 
                                                        
657 It is, perhaps, worth noting that a conflict of interest covered by section 175 can eventually develop into a 
conflict of interest covered by section 177. For example, section 175 would regulate a situation where a 
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„If a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested 
in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must 
declare the nature and extent of that interest to the other directors‟. 
A director‟s interest in transactions within the company may arise in different circumstances, 
although the term is not defined within section 177 of the CA 2006. It can be assumed, 
however, that such situations would arise when the director acts as a sole trader or acts as the 
other party in contracts that the company enters into. The key word here is „interested‟: if it is 
considered in legal terms to cover property, then it would include transactions with trusts 
where the director has some equitable interest (direct or indirect). Therefore, the principle 
formulated in section 177 would also cover transactions with subsidiaries in which the 
director holds equity or in which he also serves as a director.  
Section 180 of the CA 2006 introduces a serious change in how company law treats 
transactions with the companies
659
. According to the new rule, if directors act in compliance 
with section 177 of the Act, then, subject to the constitution, the transaction in question 
cannot be set aside based on the usual equitable rule demanding the shareholders‟ consent. 
What are the situations where declaration of the interest is not required? According to section 
177(5), declaration of interest is not necessary if the director is not aware of the interest or the 
transaction or arrangement in question. This defence is likely to be based on the belief that in 
modern complex business environments directors may not be aware of all the transactions 
that the company is engaged in, and thus, logically, be unaware of the resulting interest. 
Further, section 177(6) of the CA 2006 provides that directors are not obliged to declare an 
interest in situations that cannot be reasonably regarded as conflict of interest, if other 
directors are aware of the interest, and in cases where the interest relates to service contracts 
that were or will be considered by a meeting of directors or a remuneration committee. As 
seen, section 177, like sections 175 and 176, includes the provision of reasonable 
consideration of the conflict situation, which, once again, indicates the potential desire of 
English legislators to introduce some flexibility into the traditionally strict approach to the 
treatment of directors‟ fiduciary duties. There is also another possible defence, which is not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
company director holds shares in the company‟s most valued suppliers. However, when a delivery contract with 
the supplier is signed, section 177 comes into force. 
658 CA 2006, s 177(1). 
659 Compare Companies Act 1985, s 317.  
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covered by section 177, although it is present in section 186: the sole director of a company is 
exempted from presenting a declaration to himself
660
.  
5.3.4.2 Declaring Interest in the Proposed Transactions in Case Law  
The founding equitable principle that is expressed in section 177 was expressed in Aberdeen 
Railway Co v Blaikie Bros
661
: 
„[...] it is a rule of universal application, that no one, having [fiduciary] 
duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he 
has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may 
conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect‟. 
Section 177 serves a preventive function within the conflict of interest framework, because it 
requires the provision of a declaration about a director‟s personal interest in a transaction 
before it is initiated. It may be recollected that the equity of the self-dealing principle, which 
in English law strongly relies on Keech v Sandford, entitles the company to avoid any 
transactions where a director‟s interests are likely to come into conflict with the company‟s 
and that even a possibility of bad faith or fraud can be opposed and rejected
662
. Therefore, 
English case law provides companies with the option of setting aside the undesired 
transaction. However, section 177 of the CA 2006 provides some leeway in this regard: 
directors are allowed to proceed with the transaction if all the requirements under the section 
are met. Consequently, no defence can be applied in a situation where the parties entered the 
transactional terms as though acting at arm‟s length. Similar provisions in English case law 
are valid in relation to a director‟s purchases from other companies663. Importantly, English 
case law recognises that if the beneficiary allows the transaction, he cannot later demand its 
being set aside
664
.  
                                                        
660 The terms of arrangement still have to be presented in the company minutes.  
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Notably, in Holder v Holder
665
, the Court of Appeal expressed some flexibility by holding 
that the court, in general, could look into the nature of a trustee‟s intentions and knowledge 
about the transaction and then decide whether the beneficiary can void it
666
. In the case, an 
individual, who effectively stopped acting as an executor and purchased a piece of land next 
to his former place of tenancy at an auction was permitted to finish the transaction based on 
the good faith argument. Based on this case, it may be wondered then, whether a trustee (or a 
company director for that matter), who acts in good faith, can acquire property from a trust 
(or company) publicly available and at a standard market price. Apparently, the answer is 
negative. The reason is that such action would be in violation of the strict Boardman
667
 rule, 
which argues that even when no harm is done to the beneficiary and no advantage is taken of 
the beneficiary
668
, there is a conflict of interest. Therefore, the subsequent court decisions 
were relying more on Lacey
669
 rather than on Holder
670
. However, as mentioned above, the 
passage of section 177 of the Act provides certain flexibility to the rule. This, however, raises 
certain issues that need to be resolved.  
Prior to the CA 2006, a company was allowed to automatically void any transaction if one or 
more directors had an interest in it, unless it was properly disclosed and approved at the 
general meeting
671
. The rule is applied irrespective of whether the director acted bona fide for 
the company‟s benefit. Consequently, the company could recover any benefit acquired by the 
director from such transactions. This was primarily retained by the Act, which also extended 
the need to disclose an interest beyond the contracts entered into by directors, to those where 
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666 Specifically, acting in good faith could help the trustee maintain the transaction.  
667 [1967] AC 46. 
668 An additional point of strictness comes from the fact that the defendant was not even an express trustee, but 
rather, a trustee de son tort.   
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670 See, for example, Re Thompson’s Settlement [1986] Ch 99.  
671 See Aberdeen v Blaikie, (1854) 1 Macq 461. The first EC directive did not affect the right to hold 
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he had an interest by acting in such roles as a partner, a shareholder, and others
672
. At the 
same time, these do not apply to directors‟ spouses and personal contacts673.  
Another difficult issue to address within section 177 of the CA 2006 is what represents a 
disclosable interest. The issue was addressed in Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle 
Trust
674
, where the court had to decide whether a sales contract between two parties, where 
the defendant was a director in one and a shareholder in another, was an interest to disclose. 
The court was inconclusive on this, claiming that the interest would not be diclosable in most 
cases, but acknowledging that there could be exceptions, thereby informally acknowledging 
the reasonable likelihood of a conflict. Later, in Runciman v Walter Runciman plc, the court 
held that even in cases where the interest of a director was blatantly obvious, there is a need 
to disclose it
675
.  
The situation described above, however, raises a question as to whether there is such a thing 
as an implied disclosure of interest to the board. Indeed, in the context of section 177(6)(b), 
the disclosure is not required if other directors are already aware of the interest, and this is 
one of the major relaxations, regarding the declaration of interest, introduced by the Act. The 
pre-Act case law‟s major decision regarding this point was expressed in Lee Panavision v Lee 
Lighting
676
. In this case, all the directors of the company were openly interested in one 
transaction with the company, but none appeared to disclose it. The Court of Appeal refused 
to consider non-disclosure of an interest as a breach of duty. In an obiter dictum, Dillon LJ 
separated a technical from a substantive breach, stating that the director‟s breach in this case 
was purely technical, which cannot be considered as a reason to void the transaction. This 
seems quite in line with what section 177(6)(b) of the CA 2006 implies.  
There is, however, an issue with this approach. Formal declaration of an interest at the 
meeting discloses the interest not only to the directors but also to the shareholders because of 
                                                        
672 See relevant case law in: Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium (Transvaal) Land & Development Co. [1914] 2 
Ch. 488, Ca; Costa Rica Ry. v Forwood [1901] 1 Ch. 746, Ca. 
673 Only regular fiduciary duties will apply in this case, although the burden of proof is on directors. See 
Newgate Stud Company v Penfold [2004] EWHC 2993 (Ch). 
674 [1991] BCLC 1045. 
675 [1992] BCLC 1084. The same idea was expressed in Re Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd (No. 1) 
[1995] 1 BCLC. 
676 [1991] BCLC 575; [1992] BCLC 22 Ca. 
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its being recorded in the board meeting minutes. The importance of these notes cannot be 
underestimated, because these help avoid suspicions of secret dealings and some potential 
abuses from shadow directors. Indeed, a sole director or several directors may engage in 
beneficial transactions for themselves without due disclosure because the board apparently 
knows about their interest in the transactions. However, these transactions might not be 
recorded anywhere at all, thus allowing directors to be involved in such operations without 
due knowledge of shareholders. Similarly, such a rule greatly favours shadow directors who 
might easily engage in undisclosed transactions through their influence on the board or on its 
individual members. In other words, it is submitted that the rule declared in Lee Panavision 
and codified in section 177(6)(b) of the CA 2006 leads to a much lower degree of 
transparency, which favours directors but downplays the interests of shareholders.  
Perhaps the court in Re Neptune
677
 considered at least some of these concerns, when holding 
that a sole director of a company had to disclose a self-authorisation of a redundancy 
payment for himself and duly report it in the board minutes. Granted, the subsequent full trial 
in Neptune
678
, found that the director had no authority in making the transaction per se, thus 
bringing up the issue of „substantive,‟ not technical, non-disclosure. For these reasons, it still 
remains unclear what liabilities technical non-disclosure would involve. However, for the 
reasons outlined above, the absence of any certainty in this regard does not make the situation 
easier for the company shareholders. In the absence of well-defined liability for technical 
non-disclosure, the directors are given, perhaps, too much freedom and, hence, incentive to 
breach their fiduciary duties. At the same time, in the absence of information regarding such 
omissions to shareholders, it becomes much harder to bring a case against mischievous 
behaviour of company directors. In this regard, it is surprising that in the dominantly strict 
English company law there is such an evident fiduciary loophole. 
The issue of technical non-disclosure, left open in Neptune, was also unresolved in 
Runciman
679
, where Brown J did not provide any definitive view on this, although the court 
allowed the transaction to go through. Further, in Re Dominion International Group plc
680
, it 
                                                        
677 Re Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) (No 2) [1995] BCC 1000. 
678 ibid.  
679 ibid. 
680 [1996] 1 BCLC 572. 
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once again distinguished between technical and substantive default, finding that if a genuine 
informed consent of shareholders is present, only technical non-disclosure applies (in the 
failure to hold a formal meeting), which is not substantial enough to make a transaction 
disqualification order. As in the other decisions above, however, the court failed to determine 
what consequences follow as a result of a technical non-disclosure. Recently, there was some 
shift in terms of the courts‟ perceptions regarding disclosure, as some cases argued in favour 
of a formal rather than partial or informal disclosure
681
. However, indecisiveness regarding 
this issue is still prevalent in English courts
682
.  
5.3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an extensive review of the present situation in English law with regard 
to director‟s fiduciary duties related to company property, including information and 
opportunities. It was noted that the approach taken by English law has traditionally been 
stricter than in other common law countries, such as the United States and Canada. It also 
seems that English law has taken some cautious steps toward relaxation of some of its strict 
rules governing the relationship between companies and directors. In this regard, it was noted 
several times that the law has to walk a fine line between the certainty and stability that the 
strict approach provides and the liberty and innovation that the flexible approach brings. 
Regardless of which approach is chosen, however, to be effective the law has to be clear in 
application and enforcement and free of ambiguities, so that the rules of equity are effectively 
reflected in the statute, and thus easily applied in case law.  
English company law has evolved from centuries old equitable rules and principles, yet the 
power of statute cannot be underestimated, especially in view of the fact that many provisions 
of the CA 2006 are the product of these equitable rules and principles. In this regard, the 
English approach to regulating the fiduciary duties of company directors towards property 
can prove a useful source of knowledge for legal systems where the statutory governance of 
company law has not yet reached full fruition. Therefore, certain aspects of regulating such 
duties can be studied for application in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it was noted that 
English company law is not without flaws either. The problematic areas of the law identified 
                                                        
681 See, for example, Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) [2004] 1 BCLC 131 Ca; also see Re 
MDA Investment Management Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 217. 
682 See, for example, Re Marini Ltd [2004] BCC 172, where the court did not consider the absence of formal 
minutes as a decisive argument regarding non–disclosure.  
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in this chapter are addressed again in the final chapter of the thesis, where suggestions for 
improvements in the Companies Act will be provided.  
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Chapter Six: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties towards Company Property in Saudi Arabia 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the discussion of the approaches that the legal systems of England and 
Saudi Arabia apply to resolve the issue of effectively regulating fiduciary duties of company 
directors toward corporate property. This is, in effect, a continuation of the third step in the 
functionalist approach in comparative law
683
 which this study follows. Specifically, this 
chapter focuses on how the Saudi Arabian legal system deals with regulating the 
aforementioned issue.  
The third and fourth chapters of the current thesis provided some insight into the specifics of 
the Saudi legal system, which is founded on principles and a philosophy different from those 
of the legal system of England. As mentioned, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises 
Shariah law as the primary legal source. Because the Shariah law a priori plays such a 
fundamental role in the Kingdom‟s legal system, it inevitably influences all matters within 
company law, including directors‟ duties and behaviour toward company property. Therefore, 
the discussion of the Shariah principles in relation to company property in Saudi Arabia is a 
logical start to this chapter. While the previous chapters defined the structure of the Shariah 
and the main sources of it, this chapter specifically concentrates on the corporate governance 
aspects of Shariah law and its perspectives on property exploitation. For a more effective 
discussion, some parallels with western law are provided. This is necessary because modern 
corporations that operate in the Kingdom are very similar in nature to their traditional 
Western counterparts.  
The second section of this chapter presents the analysis of the fiduciary duties that directors 
owe in respect of company property. Such an analysis, however, has first to be placed within 
the appropriate context in which the duties would conventionally apply. This involves a 
discussion on what is considered property in Saudi law. The importance of Shariah law in the 
Kingdom prompts the discussion of property as defined in statutory company law and the 
Shariah as well as the analysis as to how these definitions match.  
The third and main section of the chapter provides the analysis of the statutory code for 
director‟s fiduciary duties toward property, specifically, Articles 69, 70, 71, 72, and 73 of the 
CL 1965. The goal of this section is to examine to what extent there is a consistency or 
                                                        
683 Zweigert and Kötz (n 53) 43. 
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inconsistency between the Shariah principles on the one hand and the codification of 
directors‟ duties on the other. Following the same format as in the previous chapter, this 
section starts by defining to whom the company directors in Saudi Arabia owe fiduciary 
duties. Each duty‟s purpose and codification in the CL 1965 is discussed and compared to its 
traditional treatment within the Shariah.  
6.2 The Shariah Law and Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
6.2.1 Importance of the Shariah Principles in Company Law   
Chapter 3 of this thesis provided some insight into the importance of the Shariah as a set of 
legal rules governing any aspect of life in Saudi Arabia. This importance emanates from the 
philosophical foundations and attitudes of Saudis to Islam and its teachings. Islam can be 
translated as „submission,‟ and „Muslim‟ is, therefore, „one who submits‟ to the will of God. 
The core belief of each Muslim is that God‟s will was conveyed to the Prophet through the 
Angel Gabriel and then imprinted in the Qur’an after the Prophet‟s passing away684. 
Therefore, the Qur’an is believed to include the very works of God. Similarly, the second 
major source of the Shariah, the Sunnah, is the practice of the Shariah that the Prophet 
instituted and of which he was the best exemplar
685
. An important consequence of these 
indications is that the authority of the Shariah is based on the will of God, not men. This is a 
fundamental distinction from the state basis of modern Western law, such as the one present 
in England. Nevertheless, one should understand that in Saudi Arabia the Shariah has a much 
broader definition and application than one might expect from a „religious‟ law. In the 
Kingdom, the Shariah represents a fully-fledged legal system, which not only provides 
mandatory norms and behaviour in specific situations, but literally lays out the way of Saudi 
life in all its aspects: from political governance to real property transactions, dining etiquette 
and even sexual relations
686
.  
                                                        
684 See Foster (n 14) 5. 
685 See Amin Islahi Fundamentals of Hadith Interpretation (Hashmi T trans) (Lahore, Al-Mawrid 1989) 28-29. 
http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/DownloadContainer.aspx?id=71 , accessed 7 July 2011. The Qur’an also 
teaches that the Prophet was sent to teach God‟s law: „It is He who has sent among the unlettered a Messenger 
from themselves reciting to them His verses and purifying them and teaching them the Book and wisdom - 
although they were before in clear error‟ (62:2). Note: hereafter all Qur’an passages are given as translated in 
www.quran.com.  
686 See Wael Hallaq, „Muslim Rage‟ and Islamic Law (2003) 54 Hastings Law Journal 1705, 1707. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the Shariah also contains applicable rules and mechanisms 
that have to be followed by company directors. Granted, the ambit of the traditional Islamic 
law does not cover specific aspects of corporate governance, and the newly emerged 
economic entities in the Kingdom, such as corporations, required some kind of legislation to 
cover various aspects of their operations, which prompted the borrowing of company laws 
from abroad. However, in many respects, the Shariah covers general human behaviour and 
establishes the rules of behaviour that everyone must follow
687
. Therefore, directors in Saudi 
companies have to follow the general Shariah principles in all their actions. According to 
Lewis
688
, the Shariah establishes two major sets of duties: the ones that the individual owes 
to God (Ibadat) and the ones that the individual owes to others (Muamalat). The second set 
of mandatory duties inevitably covers the behaviour of company directors, who must follow 
the requirements and regulations of Muamalat as any Muslim would do.  
How does the Shariah specifically influence the way that Saudi companies are run? In a 
broad sense, the Shariah establishes certain mandatory moral standards that have to be 
followed by the company directors and adhering to which is as important as producing high 
profits
689
. Lewis defined two major ways in which the Shariah influences Islamic corporate 
governance
690
. First, it determines the major ethical and social boundaries to which all 
Muslims must conform in their actions
691
. Every individual has to follow these guidelines 
irrespective of their social status or position. With respect to company directors, these rules 
define the nature of their responsibilities and social priorities, which become an undeniable 
part of corporate governance standards. Second, the Shariah provides some specific 
principles and ethical business standards that guide company practices
692
. Business ethics in 
                                                        
687 See Nabil Baydoun and Roger Willet, „Islamic corporate reports‟ (2000) 36 (1) Abacus 71, 80: „The Unity of 
God is defined by the Tawhid, which requires a total commitment to the will of God and involves both 
submission and a mission to follow the Shariah in all aspects of life‟.  
688 See Mervyn Lewis, „Islam and accounting‟ (2001) 25 Accounting Forum, 103. Ibadat is evident through 
such instances as prayer (Salat), charity (Zakat), witness (Shahada), fasting (Saum), and pilgrimage (Hajj). 
Muamalat, on the other hand, covers such aspects of life as family relationships, economic transactions, and 
behaviour toward others.  
689 Susan Gooden, „Participation of Stakeholders in the Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial Institutions‟ 
(2001) 114 New Horizon 12, in Lewis (n 688) 13–14. 
690 Lewis (n 18) 14-15.  
691 ibid. 
692 ibid. 
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Islam provides that these have to be Godly, ethical, humane and moderately balanced
693
. As a 
result, all actions of corporate governance by directors have to reflect these four 
characteristics to be fair and just toward others. As a matter of fact, many traditional Islamic 
concepts and rules determine the nature of contemporary business activities: the positive 
values to pursue, such as moderation (iqtisad), justice (adallah), patience (sabr), and meeting 
social obligations (istislah), and the negative values to avoid, such as greed (hirs) and 
hoarding of wealth (iktinaz)
694
.  
Finally, the importance of the Shariah to company law in Saudi Arabia is reflected through 
its full state support and enforcement. The Shariah, based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, is 
the official state law in the Kingdom, as emphasised by Article 1 of Chapter One of the Basic 
Laws of Governance
695
: 
„The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its 
religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, the Holy 
Qur’an, and the Sunnah (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the 
language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital‟.  
This is a notable exception even from other Muslim states, whose constitutions either make 
the Shariah the principal source of law or create statutes based on it
696
. In either case, the 
ultimate power of the Shariah and its influence on society are diminished: in the former case, 
the Shariah is subject to interpretations for the legal purposes; in the latter, the ultimate 
power is transferred to the state. The supremacy of the Shariah, as a legal system in Saudi 
Arabia, does not mean, however, that it is the only law. In some respects, especially when 
modern economic and social developments are involved, the Holy Texts cannot provide a 
comprehensive answer to certain issues. As a result, the Shariah is supplemented by 
government issued regulations, and in the case of corporate governance these are the CL 
                                                        
693 Azaddin Kaliffa, „The Multidimensional Nature and Purpose of Business in Islam‟ (2003) 7 Accounting, 
Commerce & Finance: The Islamic Perspective Journal 1. 
694 These are discussed in Yahia Rahman Interest Free Islamic Banking (Kuala Lumpur: Al-Hilal Publishing 
1994). 
695 Basic Law of Governance 1992 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/countryinformation/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx accessed 8 
July 2011. 
696 Foster (n 14) 8. For example, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution (as amended in 1980) provides that 
Islamic law is the principal source of law; Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution establishes Islamic law as the 
main source of law. Neither, therefore, considers Shariah as the state law; but rather, as a source of it.  
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1965 and the CGR 2006. Still, these codes, like any other government-issued statutes, have to 
be fully compliant with the Shariah as with the supreme law of the Kingdom.  
To sum up, the Shariah is an essential legal concept to consider when discussing any issues 
pertaining to corporate governance in general and directors‟ duties specifically, in Saudi 
Arabian companies. The Shariah creates a system of accountability that all Muslims 
(company directors among them) have to accept and follow. Directors, as the chief 
representatives of their companies, have to work within this system and be accountable to 
both God and the others (investors, stakeholders, and society as a whole) in all their actions.  
6.2.2 Comparison to Western Style Company Law 
As seen from the discussion above, the Shariah regimes are an undeniable part of modern 
company law in the Kingdom. Being superior to any government issued piece of legislation, 
the Shariah requires compliance in the same manner as, or even to a higher degree than the 
statutory codes governing all aspects of corporate governance. However, despite being an all-
encompassing law, the Shariah does not provide specific guidance regarding the governance 
of contemporary corporations that have become common in the Kingdom. Perhaps this stems 
from the fact that the emergence of these corporations have occurred largely under the rules 
established in the regimes where the very form of corporation has been well accepted and 
understood
697
. As a result, a peculiar situation has emerged: the new economic entities have 
to be governed in compliance with the traditional Islamic law. In order to fully understand 
how this relationship might work, it is necessary to determine the main similarities and 
differences between the Shariah and traditional Western company law, under which 
corporations evolved.  
 
 
                                                        
697 The concept of „corporation‟ is, indeed, alien to the Shariah. There are various arrangements such as shirkah 
al-inan (similar to limited partnership), mudarabah (similar to trustee financing), and even mudarib (similar to 
entrepreneurship). However, it is questionable whether and to what extent these arrangements fit the rules and 
arrangements of the contemporary corporations. The closest in this sense could be mudarabahh, where some 
individuals provide capital and others manage the business on their behalf. This was implied by Abdul Rahman, 
„Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Islamic Perspective‟ (1998) 15 (1) American Journal 
of Islamic Social Sciences, 15. However, the similarity falls apart when goods or services are acquired on credit 
or when profits are reinvested further in the business. In this case, the workers (managers) become liable as 
partners. See Imran Nyazee Islamic Law of Business Organizations: Partnerships (New Delhi, Kitab Bhamn 
1999) 275. Also see Lewis (n 18) 21. In addition, there is a clear distinction between corporate investors and 
„investors‟ under mudarabahh: the latter does not give the depositors the rights of voting or exiting.  ibid.  
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6.2.2.1 Similarities between the Shariah and Western Company Law 
While Islamic law is often viewed as an impediment to business development
698
, it is, in fact 
quite the opposite: in many aspects, Islam has views similar to Western ones on the 
usefulness and benefits of business commerce. Shariah laws do not prohibit such activities as 
wealth creation, business or trade, but consider them morally justified and useful for 
society
699
.  Therefore, Islamic law supports enterprising attitudes of individuals, respects 
contractual rights, and protects property and ownership
700
.  In fact, the Qur’an uses the notion 
of contract to elucidate an individual‟s relationship with Allah and emphasises the importance 
of contract fulfilment
701
.  In addition to similarities in views on business and contracts, the 
Shariah displays a number of characteristics that are considered indispensable by Western-
style company law. For example, both the Shariah and Western company law are founded on 
the principles of the facilitation and regulation of business and commerce where they can be 
practised by more than one individual and where profitable exploitation of capital is allowed 
and encouraged
702
. Further, each of these law systems provides a number of mechanisms to 
regulate capital and commercial activity in different instances: where the source of capital is 
combined (partnership in Western law and sharikah in the Shariah), and where it is separated 
(limited liability company in Western law and mudarabah in the Shariah)
703
.  
                                                        
698 Rodney Wilson, „Islam and Business‟ (2006) 48 (1) Thunderbird International Business Review 109.  
699 See, for example, Kurshid Ahmad, „The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective‟, in J 
Dunning (ed) Making Globalisation Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism (Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 192; also see Syed Uddin, „Understanding the Framework of Business in Islam in an Era of 
Globalisation: A Review‟ (2003) 12 (1) Business Ethics: A European Review 23; also see Imad-ad-Deen 
Ahmad, „Islam. Commerce, and Business Ethics‟ In Plenary address at the Loyola Institute for Ethics and 
Spirituality in Business International Ecumenical Conference (2004) 
<http://www.minaret.org/islamcommercebusinessethics.pdf> accessed 9 August 2011. 
700 Miles and Goulding (n 18).  Miles and Goulding also explain that property ownership is embedded in 
Muslims‟ fulfilment of their calling as the stewards of Allah: stewardship is impossible without property, ibid 
132. 
701 In relationship to God, see, for example, Qur’an 2.245 „Who is it that would loan Allah a goodly loan so He 
may multiply it for him many times over? And it is Allah who withholds and grants abundance, and to Him you 
will be returned‟; also 57:11 „Who is it that would loan Allah a goodly loan so He will multiply it for him and 
he will have a noble reward?‟ and 64:17 „If you loan Allah a goodly loan, He will multiply it for you and forgive 
you. And Allah is Most Appreciative and Forbearing‟.  The importance of contract fulfilment is given in 5.1. „O 
you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts‟. 
702 Foster (n 14) 28.  
703 ibid. 
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There are also similarities in the reasoning enveloping the legal models of both the Shariah 
and Western company law. For example, early justification of the mudarabah by Al-Sarakhsi 
resembles the modern Western description of a limited corporation
704
: 
„people have a need for this contract. The owner of capital may not find 
his way to profitable trading activity, and the person who can find his way 
to that activity may not have the capital. And profit cannot be attained 
except by means of both of these, that is, capital and trading activity. By 
permitting this contract, the goal of both parties is attained‟. 
The same kind of legal thinking can be traced in both jurisdictions with respect to agency, 
property, contract and fiduciary concepts: in the West these concepts are derived from the 
rules of equity, and in the Shariah from the notion of amana (meaning „trust/fidelity‟)705. 
Trust, on the other hand, may be considered in Western law as an obligation governed by 
equity, which brings the two concepts very close. Therefore, to some extent, it can be 
considered that the sources of such legal thinking are quite similar in England and Saudi 
Arabia. There are also similarities between the rules of a partnership: as in Western law, 
mudarabah and sharikah under the Shariah cease to exist when one of the partners 
withdraws, passes away, or become incapacitated (it should be noted, however, that under the 
Shariah no exceptions have been granted to this rule, unlike in Western law)
706
. On a more 
technical level, Cizakca
707
 noted a number of similar mechanisms between sharikah and 
mudarabah and Western forms, such as an English partnership and French société.  
6.2.2.2 Differences between the Shariah and Western Company Law 
Having discussed the existing similarities between the Shariah and contemporary Western 
company law, it is necessary to consider the numerous differences existing between these two 
legal systems. These differences encompass various aspects of the legal framework, from the 
defined business entities and the underlying governance theories to the guiding moral 
principles and ethics.  
                                                        
704 ibid 28. 
705 See the discussion on amana in Abraham Udovitch, Partnership and profit in Medieval Islam (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press 1970) 88-89. 
706 Foster (n 14) 28. 
707 Murat Cizakca, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with 
Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives (Danvers, MA, EJ Brill 1996): see Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis 
of practical convergences.  
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The first primary difference between the legal systems under consideration has already been 
mentioned above: it is the absence of corporations as legal entities, and the presence of only 
partnerships, which do not possess either legal personality or limited liability
708
. These 
concepts (legal personality, corporation, limited liability) are inherent in Western law, and 
their absence in the Shariah can be explained by the specifics of social environment and the 
needs of society, within which the Islamic law has evolved. According to Foster, the Shariah 
legal system has historically functioned in a much simpler environment than Western law: 
this environment has not been affected by such factors as vast trading systems of colonialism, 
industrial revolutions, development of capital markets, and the creation of complicated 
banking systems
709
. Consequently, commercial activities in the Arab world were conducted 
on a small scale or in form of joint ventures. Kuran went even further to identify various 
religious, social and political impediments to the development of a corporation as a legal 
entity in Islam
710
.  
Another significant point of distinction is the dominant underlying theoretical model. As was 
discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis, the English model of corporate governance stands 
upon the theory of agency. The major premise of this theory is that corporate directors act as 
self-interested agents, who may not have the same goals as the company owners 
(shareholders)
711.  As a result, the creation of mechanisms ensuring protection from directors‟ 
abuse of power has become necessary. However, the principles of Shariah law reject the 
agency theory. Instead, company directors are considered faithful keepers and managers of 
the assets entrusted to them (much like the trustee theory envisions
712
), and the demonstration 
of devotion and faithfulness to the interests of the company is equated to an act of worship
713
. 
Therefore, the Shariah considers directors as having a diametrically different role to that in 
                                                        
708 See n 697 above. Whether these concepts are recognised in Islamic law today is discussed later in the 
chapter.  
709 Foster (n 14) 30.  
710 Timur Kuran, „The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence‟ (2005) 53 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 785.  
711 See Jensen and Meckling (n 241); also see Ross (n 365) 134–39. 
712 See James Davis, David Schoorman and Lex Donaldson, „Towards a Stewardship Theory of Management‟, 
(1997) 22 (1) Academy of Management Review 20.  
713
 Miles and Goulding (n 18).  
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Western law: it does not assume that directors‟ powers have to be controlled and/or curbed; 
rather, there is an a priori assumption that each Muslim lives and acts by the word of Allah.  
It is commonly implied that the Western model of economy focuses on fulfilling the needs 
and wishes of human beings
714
. Hence, an individual and his/her desires are the central theme 
of capitalism. Consequently, for as long as the rights and freedoms of the other members of 
the society are not infringed, an individual is free to pursue these desires. In contrast to that, 
Islam attributes the right to satisfy man‟s desires as belonging to God only. Although the 
Shariah does not deny the needs and desires of men, it sets clear guidelines as to how these 
can be fulfilled
715
. Since one of the main goals of Islam is to achieve justice and equal 
opportunities, and ensure that the basic needs of all are satisfied, and it disallows such 
activities as exploitation, waste or indulgence. Within the Western law tradition, to which 
English law belongs, any lawful activity is permitted (even though it could be harmful to 
society at large). An example here could be the case of Adams v Cape Industries plc
716
, where 
the English court had to decide whether a British corporation was liable for breach of duty of 
care and negligence when its subsidiary sold asbestos to a company in the US, thereby 
making the company employees sick with asbestosis. By holding the company not liable, the 
English Court of Appeal generally established that the corporate veil should not be pierced if 
a group of companies operated as one business entity. As such, the decision opened the door 
to corporate structure manipulations to divert certain rights and responsibilities, especially in 
relation to third parties.   
Following the discussion above, the Islamic tradition promotes the „value maximisation‟ 
approach, which requires consideration of the interests of other stakeholders, beyond the 
company and its shareholders. For quite a long period of time, Anglo-American corporate 
governance model has been following the „shareholder wealth maximisation‟ model717. This 
approach, however, has been increasingly questioned, especially in the light of, and as a 
consequence of cases like Adams. A number of stakeholder-focused initiatives have been 
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716 [1990] Ch 433. 
717 Mervyn Lewis, „Accountability in Islam‟ (Fourth International Conference on Accounting and Finance in 
Transition, Adelaide, Australia) 
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implemented by the UK government in recent years, among which the CA 2006 is, perhaps, 
the most important one. Section 172 of the Act introduced some significant changes to the 
way that company directors in England should act and the interests they should take into 
account. Section 172(1) is the most prolific in this regard: it imposes a duty to act in a way 
that a director, in good faith, considers best for the company and its members as a whole, 
while taking into account, at the same time, the consequences of such acts in the long term, 
employee interests, fostering relationships with the suppliers and customers, and considering 
the impact of the acts on the community and the environment. As such, the CA 2006 
attempted to introduce a wider context of social responsibility into the framework of 
directors‟ decisions and acts. While suggesting that shareholders‟ interests are still 
superior
718
, the Act suggests that they should not be the cause of disregarding other parties‟ 
interests in the process. 
Still, whether the effects of the new provisions in the CA 2006 will represent a move toward 
the stakeholder oriented model remains to be seen. After the passage of the Act, many 
scholars, commenting on provision 172(1) predicted that directors would eventually be more 
cautious during the decision making process because of the potential censures and derivative 
claims by company shareholders. However, there is little evidence to suggest that it has been 
really so in practice. For example, a study conducted by Loughrey, Keay and Cerioni 
suggests that there has not been a significant increase in derivative claims since the passage 
of the CA 2006, and that lawyers, in general, discourage shareholders from filing such claims 
due to the apparent difficulties of succeeding with them
719
. Similarly, some scholars have 
argued that employee groups could be even worse off after the Act‟s passage since they have 
no enforceable rights mentioned in the Act and their interests might be de-emphasised when 
considered alongside the interests of other stakeholder groups mentioned in Section 172(1) of 
the CA 2006
720
. Therefore, while the recent changes to company law in England introduced a 
certain shift toward recognition of the stakeholder model, the implications of the changes 
remain largely theoretical, due to the apparent difficulties of bringing an action against 
directors‟ misdeeds in relation to the third parties‟ interests.  
                                                        
718 CA 2006, s 172(2). 
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As seen, in many aspects the Shariah legal regime is more different than similar to Western 
law. Primarily, this has been dictated by the significant differences in the historic context 
within which the compared legal systems evolved. While the Western legal system has been 
influenced by structural economic shifts that brought an intensification of trade and 
commerce, Islamic businesses have existed in a much simpler environment. As a result, the 
Shariah system historically has not considered such fundamental concepts of Western law as 
corporation, ownership and limited liability. Still, to say that the Shariah represents an 
inferior legal system for the contemporary business environment would be wrong. Indeed, the 
Shariah does not prohibit the major concepts of internationally accepted business principles 
and practices such as wealth creation, competition and contracts. What the Shariah does, 
however, is increase the level of corporate responsibility and accountancy. The religious 
duties emphasised by the Shariah transcend the required legal obligations typical for Western 
law practices and add moral obligations toward all stakeholders and the society at large. In 
this sense, the Shariah can even be considered superior to Anglo-American law, which only 
emphasises the duties of directors owed toward shareholders, while the obligations to 
company stakeholders are quite loose and often not legally enforceable
721
. 
6.2.4 The Shariah and Contemporary Business Associations 
As already mentioned, the inability of the Islamic tradition to provide a comprehensive legal 
basis for managing new forms of business, such as corporations, has led to the widespread 
adoption of Western style company law across the majority of the Middle East countries. 
Saudi Arabia was no exception in this case, as it borrowed a French-based company regime 
previously adopted in Egypt. As a result, the traditional Islamic rules embodied within the 
Shariah became added to by the new set of rules defining new business associations and 
corporate governance as prescribed by Western style law
722
.  In justifying the introduction of 
Western-style law to the Kingdom‟s legal system, the Explanatory Memorandum to the CL 
1965 states: 
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„[…] companies created by mutual agreement where one or more partners 
agree to conduct business for profit with a view to sharing profits and 
losses as agreed [are] sanctioned by the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) 
and Ijma' (the consensus of the authorities in Islam). In the Sunnah, it is 
supported by the holy tradition (ascribed to God), stating: „I am the third 
(partner) of every two partners, unless one of them deceives the other, in 
which case I shall dissociate Myself from them‟; and by the tradition that 
Usamah ibn Shurayk came to the Prophet, God bless him and grant him 
salvation, asking: „Do you know me?‟ The Prophet answered: „How can I 
not know you, when you were my partner and the best partner, never 
deceiving nor quarrelsome!‟ Moreover the Prophet was sent to the people 
at a time when they formed companies and he consented to what they were 
doing without any prohibition or objection. This consent constitutes one of 
the aspects of Sunnah. As for the consensus (of authorities in Islam), it is 
evidenced by Muslims' engaging in trade as partners from the advent of 
Islam to date without anyone objecting thereto‟723. 
By accepting the new rules of business governance, the legal environment of Saudi Arabia 
had to also consider the application of the major principles that come with it. Islamic scholars 
have questioned whether Western corporate law can be compatible with the principles of 
Shariah, and specifically, whether Islamic law accepts the notions of legal personality and 
limited liability. Indeed, the legal reasoning for the acceptance of corporation in the Shariah 
should come from the fact that both of these main corporate terms are compatible with it.  In 
the absence in the Shariah of such a form of business as a corporation, it is necessary to 
examine the classical Shariah mechanisms and basic principles to search for possible 
analogies of legal personality and limited liability.  
6.2.4.1 Legal Personality in the Shariah 
Since the Shariah does not provide explicit explanations regarding the term „legal 
personality‟, jurists had to look into interpretations of Shariah principles and draw analogies 
from other concepts in an attempt to justify the acceptance of the term. However, up until 
now, there is no clear agreement among the scholars regarding this issue. Zuhariah Ariff 
pointed out that some modern Islamic law scholars justify the existence of legal personality in 
the Shariah, based on the al dimmah theory of fiqh
724
. Al dhimmah, which means 
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„accountability‟ and „guarantee,‟ is sometimes linked to the term al-ahliyyah (meaning 
„capacity‟) and iltizamat (meaning „obligation‟)725 Therefore, if an entity is recognised as 
having existence, either real or artificial, then it will have a capacity and certain obligations, 
which creates, in theory, a separate legal entity. This position, however, is criticised by other 
Islamic law researchers who claim that the very nature of al dhimmah assumes its 
applicability to real persons, for whom the Qur’an and the Sunnah have been written726.  
Another line of argument has evolved around the rules of analogy. Some scholars seem to 
support the idea that legal personality has historically existed in Islam in such concepts as the 
waqf, the bayt al-mal, and the mosque
727
. The waqf refers to holding and preserving property 
for philanthropic purposes with the prohibition of using that property for any purpose outside 
these objectives. It is functionally similar to trusts under common law. According to Usmani, 
after contributing the properties to the waqf, individuals no longer own them, but the entity 
does: the fact that Usmani considered to prove that the waqf is a separate legal entity
728
. Any 
property acquired by the proceeds of the waqf becomes the property of the waqf as an 
institution, and not that of the waqf contributors
729
. In a similar manner, donations to the 
mosque (masjid) including bequests, become the property of the mosque as an institution, and 
this is not prohibited in Islam
730
. Finally, Islamic scholars who support the idea of legal 
personality in Islam refer to bayt al-mal, which is the Islamic financial institution 
administering taxes and paying state salaries. Usmani, with reference to Al-Sarakhsi, noted 
that bayt al-mal as an institution was allowed to lend money or borrow it from other state 
departments, an activity which is attributed to a separate legal entity
731
. However, other 
scholars openly disagree with these ideas. Nyazee, for example, explicitly states that Islamic 
jurists did not assign al dhimmah to either the bayt al-mal or the waqf
732
. The Mujlisul Ulama 
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(Council of Islamic Scholars) refuted the claim of legal personality in the Shariah based on 
the waqf and masjid for the following reasons: 1) the property purchased with the waqf 
income cannot be the property of the waqf institution because it requires a human person 
(waaqf) for this purpose; 2) all properties possessed by the masjid are in the hands of Allah, 
who is not fictitious
733
.  
6.2.4.2 Limited Liability in Shariah Law 
The concept of limited liability in Shariah law should be given special attention. The absence 
of the concept of corporation in the Shariah prompts the review of basic Shariah principles 
and the use of analogies to find the answer to the question of whether Islam accepts the 
notion of limited liability. The main principle of relevance in this case is al-kharaj bi al-
daman, which links profits to the liability for losses
734
. Based on this principle, Islamic law 
scholars argued that a contributor of capital in a business entity has full liability resulting 
from the entity‟s transactions, which renders limited liability unacceptable735.  
In terms of analogy, liability in Islamic law is generally understood through the description of 
the major forms of partnership, which are sharikahs and mudarabahs.  Sharikahs have 
historically been trade partnerships, and in all forms of sharikah, unlimited liability has been 
out of the question
736
. The situation with mudarabahs is more complicated. Under a 
mudarabah contract, there is a capital provider (rabb al-mal) and a work provider (mudarib), 
who manages the capital on a limited or absolute basis. In general, the capital provider is not 
jointly liable, except for „special circumstances,‟ with the mudarib in transactions arranged 
with third parties
737
. Consequently, it has been the mudarib who acted as the defendant or the 
plaintiff in all cases regarding mudarabah
738
. The separation of asset management from asset 
ownership in mudarabah has led some Islamic scholars to consider this fact as justification of 
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the compliance of Western corporations with the Islamic principles. In this regard, Abdul 
Rahman wrote
739
: 
„the structure of a modern joint stock company is more or less a variation of 
the Islamic concept of mudarabah [in which] one or more persons supply 
capital and others run the business on their behalf at an agreed rate of profit. 
The modern corporation has many similarities with the mudarabah. The 
notion of separation of ownership and control can also be found in the 
principles of mudarabah‟. 
However, in cases when the mudarib acquires something on credit and the acquired property 
is destroyed, then the rabb al-mal would have to cover the expenses
740
. Therefore, 
mudarabah does not completely correspond to the principle of limited liability as it is 
understood in the West. Developing this idea, Foster also noted that mudarabah cannot 
justify the applicability within Shariah of the limited liability concept as understood in 
Western company law
741
. Nevertheless, the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy generally 
accepted the notion of limited liability under Islamic law, stating that Shariah does not object 
to the creation of a business entity which has liabilities limited to its capital
742
. However, 
Islamic scholars have argued that the concept of limited liability is only acceptable in the case 
of publicly held companies, where the large numbers of shareholders makes it impossible to 
hold any of them liable for the company affairs
743
. In this regard, Usmani noted that in public 
companies the number of shareholders can be so large that none of them can be responsible 
for the business affairs on a daily basis and for company liabilities exceeding the assets
744
. He 
generally dismissed the possibility of limited liability for privately held corporations and all 
forms of partnerships
745
.  
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6.2.4.3 Modern Trends in the Saudi Legal Business Context 
Despite the apparent divergence of Islamic scholars‟ opinions regarding legal personality and 
limited liability in the Shariah, Saudi Arabian law has been steadily moving in the direction 
of accepting Western style business forms. Article 2 of the CL 1965 mentions limited liability 
partnerships and limited by shares companies among the major business forms acceptable in 
the country (along with mutual partnerships, joint ventures and joint-stock companies). The 
Article mentions that these types of businesses are Shariah compliant. Furthermore, the CL 
1965 accepts the notion of legal personality for three types of business entities: limited 
partnerships, limited by shares companies, and joint stock companies
746
. Therefore, despite 
the ongoing debate among Islamic scholars on the presence of limited liability and legal 
personality in the Shariah, the Saudi government seems to support the existence of these 
concepts, or, at least, that they do not contradict the Shariah principles.  
The acceptance of Western style forms of business in Islamic law has occurred gradually, but 
the major reasons for the „acceptance mentality,‟ as Foster puts it747, can be explained as the 
expected difficulties in developing a comprehensive legal code based on the Shariah 
principles and the popularity of Western style corporations as forms of business elsewhere in 
the world. The first reason for the acceptance of Western style corporations in Saudi Arabia is 
based on the notion that Western corporations, as legal entities, are well established. At the 
same time, developing an alternative well defined entity based on Islamic law seems 
problematic in view of the absence of a clearly defined term in the Shariah. Therefore, the 
creation of Shariah defined business associations fit for modern practices would require 
considerable time and resources
748
. In this regard, accepting the existing forms of business 
entities seems like a reasonable choice. Second, it is an established fact that the majority of 
foreign businesses dealing with Saudi counterparts are incorporated, which inevitably raises 
the issue of effective transaction regulation.  
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It can be said that the Shariah is more suitable for governing the aspects of human life, which 
are not prone to quick and fundamental changes
749
. These include family law, criminal law, 
property law, endowments, and trusts. Business activities, on the other hand, represent an 
area of regulation where rapid changes have occurred over the course of recent decades as 
Saudi Arabia has firmly entered the global business arena. Because the Shariah does not 
provide clear answers to many questions posed by the modern business environment, the 
Saudi legislator has had to search for quick and reliable solutions for the welfare of the 
society as a whole. This principle is known as almasalih almursalah (public interest), and it 
assumes that the governing body of the country can establish new laws and regulations for 
which there no clear answers in the Holy Texts, if these are dictated by the pressing needs of 
society. Still, by accepting the notion of limited liability and corporations, the law of Saudi 
Arabia in no way diverges from the principles of Shariah. Article 2 of the CL 1965 explicitly 
states any rules and regulations mentioned in it are Shariah compliant.  
6.2.4.4. The Shariah and the New Business Concepts 
As the new concepts of corporation, limited liability and corporate governance have steadily 
entered the legal plane of Saudi Arabia, it is worthwhile to determine the kind of relationship 
that exists between the Shariah, which still remains the superior law of the Kingdom, and 
these new concepts, which encompass the majority of the contemporary business entities in 
Saudi Arabia. It is obvious that the classical approach to the definition of a corporation and 
its governance, as identified in Western law, would be affected by the principles of the 
Shariah due to its focus on somewhat different values than those that Western company law 
propagates. This inevitably leads to a differently conceived concept of corporation and its 
goals. 
The first important influence of the Shariah is on the function of capital exploitation, which is 
one of the main aspects of Western (Anglo-American) company law. This function is 
determined by the ability of those who have expertise (company directors) to use the capital 
of those who invest in a corporation (shareholders). As discussed in the previous chapters, 
English law, which is based on the principles of separated ownership and control and 
principal-agent relationships between shareholders and directors, recognises this problem and 
creates various mechanisms to counter it. In contrast, property exploitation is inherently alien 
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to the Shariah. The basis for this is the principle of al-kharaj bi al-daman (profit through 
risk), which links responsibility to the revenue entitlement
750
. Foster also noted that any 
capital contributed on a basis different from al-kharaj bi al-daman can be regarded as a loan, 
and in this case the Shariah prohibits the lender from receiving more than the amount of 
capital lent (riba)
751
. Therefore, the Shariah requires responsible treatment of the corporate 
capital and prohibits its risky use (exploitation). 
Another conventional aspect of a corporation as defined in Western company law is the 
primacy of the shareholders. This means that the board of company directors is expected to 
pursue the goals which are first of all in the interests of the company shareholders, while the 
goals of the other groups of stakeholders are pushed aside
752
. Lewis outlined several 
assumptions that follow as a consequence of this: emphasis on the financial welfare of one 
specific group of stakeholders (shareholders in this case); rational self-interest of the main 
actors (the agency problem); and irrelevance of morality and religious principles
753
. 
Arguably, this model of corporate governance assumes the pursuit of purely materialistic 
goals, the primary of which is wealth maximisation of the company shareholders. Granted, 
this model has not gone unchallenged. Some European countries, like Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland have developed corporate governance models that seek to create 
a socially responsive corporation, where the interests of all relevant parties are considered
754
. 
In such a corporation, supervisory roles are separated from executive roles, and the presence 
of company supervisory committees ensures that the actions of the long term interests of 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and society as a whole are considered
755
. Even 
within the „managed corporation‟ Anglo-American model of corporate governance, 
institutional investors are starting to play a stronger role in regulating the acts of directors. 
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Moreover, many researchers have been calling for the development of a „stakeholder 
approach‟ in corporate governance, which would have the objective of protecting the interests 
of all related parties
756
. Yet these theories, although widely popular, are still called 
„alternative‟ theories of corporate governance. The traditional approach based on shareholder 
wealth maximisation still prevails in Anglo-American company law, while the interests of 
other parties are recommended to be considered within legislative accounts of these 
countries.  
The Shariah-based approach is contrary to this. One of the fundamental principles of the 
Shariah is justice, which does not allow one group‟s interests to be placed above those of the 
others. Consequently, the corporate resources have to be distributed on a fair basis among all 
stakeholders for the overall benefit of the community
757
. This approach resembles the 
Western approach of corporate social responsibility, which was described above. The 
difference is that the Shariah essentially brings together this approach with the notion of 
effective corporate governance. They are, in effect, inseparable under the Shariah law. As 
was demonstrated above, the Western school of corporate governance thought might not be, 
as a whole, concentrated on strictly maximising the value of shareholders. Indeed, leading 
Western management gurus, like Peter Drucker and Charles Handy, have been actively 
advocating governance approaches based on the long-term overall prosperity of society and 
treating businesses more like communities and not properties
758
. Consequently, a range of 
ethical and moral principles have been embedded in the suggested best practices of corporate 
governance. Still, despite these endeavours, there are a number of issues with the Western 
approach to corporate governance from the Islamic point of view.  
First, business ethics within the Islamic tradition has deep roots in the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, which outline general principles of behaviour that are considered desirable. These 
rules, founded on faith, are starkly different from Western ideas of ethics, which have 
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evolved on the basis of secular humanist values as the society progressed and where the 
fragmentation of ethical ideologies is such that it is difficult to establish a unified view
759
. A 
general view on the Shariah-based business ethics was expressed by Slahudin
760
: 
„The hallmark of Islamic business ethics lies in the high values that underpin 
the business operations and transactions. Islam stresses the practice of justice 
and equality, truthfulness and transparency, and protection of minorities, 
accountability and adequate disclosure, just as it prohibits all forms of 
exploitation, in all walks of life, including business dealings […]. The three 
underlying principles (transparency, accountability and adequate disclosure) of 
the OECD code, developed after a series of reports and researches, also 
underlie good practice in Islam, as known since the religion was consolidated 
1400 years ago‟. 
Second, despite the recent development of the principles of corporate governance based on 
social responsibility, the entire Anglo-American business culture is rooted in self-interest. As 
a result, even if the system is eventually modified, it will still lack the overarching 
requirement to consider the interests of society. Finally, as was demonstrated in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, the Anglo-American system of corporate governance is based on the theory of 
agency. Therefore, the main parties of the corporate governance process are not considered as 
stewards who are either motivated to act in the wider interests of the society or observed and 
guided to do so
761
. This approach is alien to Islam, which demands authority over totality and 
does not admit the divergence between what is sacred and what is secular. Therefore, each 
and every act of a Muslim has to conform to the standards and principles defined within the 
Shariah, and business activities are not excluded from this.  
As seen, Shariah regime significantly deviates from some traditionally accepted aspects of 
business law as developed in the West. It requires a more diligent approach to corporate 
governance and places more responsibilities on the corporate governing body, which has to 
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consider traditional Islamic values and rules of behaviour. In Saudi Arabia, where the 
Shariah is the supreme law of the land, more than in any other Muslim country, these rules 
have to be abided by all, including the company directors. These, however, represent what 
should be the ideal situation. Whether, in fact, Shariah laws are strictly followed in Saudi 
corporate settings is debatable. 
Following the discussion above, an ideal from the Shariah perspective is that an Islamic 
corporation would focus on the creation of wealth for the entire Islamic community, avoid 
taking excessive risks, be transparent, and its directors would avoid any temptation to self-
interest. In reality, large distortions from the written Shariah rules exist. Ali coined the term 
„sheikocracy‟ to define the corporate reality in the Arabic world762. The main features of 
sheikocracy, according to Ali, are strict hierarchical authority, subordination on the basis of 
personal relationships and authority, the dependency of rules and regulations on the personal 
powers of those who create them, and the overall patriarchal approach in the decision making 
process
763
. Following these statements, it becomes clear that connections and social status 
determine the role in corporations and those whose interests normally prevail. This idea was 
expressed by Muna, who wrote that  
„The Arab executive lives in a society where family and friendship remain 
important and prevalent factors even in the functioning of formal institutions 
and groups. Consequently … the Arab executive relies upon family and 
friendship ties for getting things done within his organization and society‟764. 
Further, any claims for a high moral ground in the case of Saudi corporate executives and a 
high level of transparency in Saudi organisations are overshadowed by the country‟s 
relatively poor place in the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is annually published by 
Transparency International. According to the 2010 list
765
, Saudi Arabia ranked only 50
th
 in 
the world. Such divergence between the theoretical and practical execution of the Shariah 
principles in Saudi corporate governance has been explained by researchers as the presence 
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of two identity forms in Arabs
766
. The first type of identity is historically determined, cultural 
and global: it epitomises the ideal devout Muslim
767
. The second type of identity is 
immediate and particular to everyday situations
768
.  The presence of these two identities often 
leads to strong beliefs in the former, but following the latter in practice. Within the realm of 
corporate governance, the selective, authoritarian management, which is based on 
relationships and status, often only creates an illusion of such concepts as consensus, 
transparency and common interest
769
.  Therefore, to say that the Shariah rules are strictly and 
undeniably followed within the context of Saudi corporations is, perhaps, an overstatement. 
The question is, however, whether the discrepancies between the Shariah-stated rules and 
actual behaviour of Saudi corporate executives are the results of imperfect human nature or 
the loopholes provided within the adopted company codes. This chapter attempts to provide 
at least a partial answer to this question by looking into the codification of directors‟ duties 
towards company property and the major principles of the Shariah law to identify possible 
gaps between the two.  
6.3 Property in Sharia Law 
In order to acquire a full understanding of the various aspects in Saudi law covering the 
fiduciary duties of directors towards company property, it is necessary to first discuss the 
concept of property itself, because it is different from what is commonly understood in the 
West (including English company law). The Islamic concept of property is based on the 
Shariah law, which treats it in a sacred manner
770
. The primary difference from Western law 
is the belief that, ultimately, all property is owned by Allah, which is clearly implied in the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah771. All forms of property which are assigned to human beings are 
                                                        
766 See Ali (n 762); also see Eqbal Ahmad, „Islam and Politics‟ in Haddam Y, Haines B and Findley E (eds) The 
Islamic Impact (New York, Syracuse University Press 1984). 
767 Ahmad (n 766). 
768 Ali (n 762). 
769 ibid.  
770 Joseph Brand, „Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice‟ (1986) 9 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 1. 
771 See, for example, Qur’an 5:120 „To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and whatever is 
within them. And He is over all things competent‟ and Quran 3:26 „Say, „O Allah , Owner of Sovereignty, You 
give sovereignty to whom You will and You take sovereignty away from whom You will. You honor whom 
You will and You humble whom You will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things 
competent‟. 
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therefore given on the basis of trusteeship (amanat)
772
. Consequently, property in Islam is not 
an end in itself; rather, it is a means of effective distribution of wealth which Allah assigns to 
his trustees. This makes people accountable for appropriately managing property in this 
universal trust under the rules prescribed by the Shariah
773
. In relation to company property, 
this rule posits that directors are the trustees of God, who are accountable for their rightful 
management of the company assets. Importantly, no restrictions on property and wealth 
accumulation are given by the Shariah for as long as this is conducted by legal means, such 
as work, contracts, inheritance, transfer or exchange
774
.  
While the Shariah attributes all property to Allah, it does not forbid human beings from 
owning thereof: the possession is simply considered within a different context than in 
Western jurisdiction. Contemporary Islamic jurists consider private property one of the three 
major property types, the other two being public and state properties
775
. Justifications for 
private property can be found throughout the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which discuss taxes, 
legality of ownership, inheritance, and prohibition of stealing. The Prophet also implied the 
importance of private property
776
 and even stated that protection of one‟s property makes one 
a martyr
777
. Consequently, a well known Hanbali
778
 jurist, Ibn Taimiya, acknowledged that 
respect for private property is one of the fundamental duties of Islamic state
779
.  
                                                        
772 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (Singapore, John 
Wiley & Sons (Asia) 2007). 
773 See Qur’an 24:33 „Give to them from the property of Allah which he has bestowed upon you‟. 
774 Mohammed Alsanosi, „The Concept of Corporate Governance in Shariah‟ (2009) 20 (2) European Business 
Law Review 343. Alsanosi contrasts these with the illegal forms of acquisition of property, such as gambling, 
cheating, bribery, forgery, illegal trading, and coercion, which are banned by the Shariah.  
775 Farhad Nomani and Ali Ranhema, „Islamic Economic Systems‟ (London, Zed Press 1994) 66-70. Public 
property includes natural resources, such as water, forests, ocean, mines, and pastures: everyone has equal rights 
to these and can use them for as long as other citizens‟ rights are not infringed by these actions. State property 
refers to those natural resources that cannot be immediately privatised. This generally includes unclaimed 
properties such as uncultivated land.  
776 The Book of Pilgrimage (Kitab Al-Hajj) Chapter 17, No: 2803 ‘Verily your blood, your property are as 
sacred and inviolable as the sacredness of this day of yours, in this month of yours, in this town of yours’. 
<http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/007.smt.htm> 
accessed 9 August 2011. 
777 „Kitab Al-Iman‟ (Online version). Chapter 63. http://www.msapubli.com/hadiths/muslim/001_smt_0063.htm 
accessed 9 August 2011. 
778 Hanbali is the predominant Islamic school of thought in Saudi Arabia. 
779
 Saba Habachy, „Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law‟ (1962) 62 (3) Columbia Law Review 453. 
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As seen, the Shariah, in general, recognises human rights to property; although it is not 
considered ultimately as possession by man. But what can be considered private property in 
Islam? The concept of property (mal) in the Shariah is viewed differently according to each 
school of Islamic thought. Of relevance to the current discussion is the definition provided 
within the Hanbali school, which considers mal as „something in which there exists a 
lawfully permissible benefit without resulting from pressing need or necessity‟780. Al-
Buhuti
781
 further explained the principle of mal by saying that it included everything except 
for 1) things in which there is no benefit in essence; 2) things that are legally prohibited; 3) 
things permissible only in a situation of pressing need; and 4) things permissible only in a 
situation of necessity. Following the definition of property in the Shariah, there are several 
key characteristics that qualify for this definition. According to Muhammad Islam
782
, Islamic 
tradition defines five key aspects of property: 1) it has to be desired by man, or, in 
contemporary meaning, have some commercial value; 2) it can be possessed and owned; 3) it 
can be stored; 4) it is beneficial in the eyes of the Shariah; and 5) its ownership can be 
assignable and transferable.  
What about intangible things? In Western law, certain intangibles are considered to be  
property in the form of intellectual capital and, as was have seen in the previous chapter, 
English law treats corporate opportunities as if they were property. In general, the Hanbali 
definition of mal seems not to pose any obstacles. However, if we look at the key 
characteristics of property defined above, some of them (for instance, the ability to be stored) 
cannot be easily met by intangibles. Perhaps for these reasons the Hanbali school allows 
certain intangibles to be regarded as mal, but only if they are somehow linked to material 
objects and items
783
. This is a significant allowance on the side of what is, in other legal 
senses, a very strict legal framework that exists in Saudi Arabia. It should be mentioned that 
intangible forms of property are nowhere mentioned in the Holy Texts
784
, which are 
                                                        
780 Al-Kharqi, Matan al-Iqna, cited in Muhammad Islam „The Concept of Property in Islamic Legal Thought‟ 
(1999) 14 (4) Arab Law Quarterly 365. 
781 Al-Buhuti (Mansur Ibn Yunus) Kashshaf al-Qana' Matan al-Iqna' (1983) in Alam al-Kutub vol 3 152. 
782 Islam (n 780) 365. 
783 See Amir Khoury, ‘Ancient and Islamic Source of Intellectual Property protection in the Middle East: A 
focus on Trademarks’ (2003) 151 The Journal of Law and Technology 172. 
784 Silvia Beltrametti, „The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights in Islamic Law‟ in Mach T and others (eds) 
The Prague Yearbook of Comparative Law 2009 (Prague 2010) 55-94. 
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rigorously followed by the Shariah scholars in the Kingdom. Therefore, the support for 
intangible forms of property in Saudi Arabia is derived from various forms of ijma and 
qiyas
785
. In statutory company law, certain forms of intangibles are equated to company 
assets. What exactly can be attributed to intangible assets is defined by the Board of the 
Capital Market Authority
786
:  
„non cash assets, without physical substance, capable of providing the firm 
with services or benefits in the future, and in which the firm has acquired the 
right as a result of events that have occurred or operations that have been 
completed in the past. Intangible assets could be separately identifiable (could 
be separated from other assets), such as formation costs, trademarks, 
copyrights, industrial samples and designs, franchises and licenses. Intangible 
assets could also be unidentifiable in a separate manner such as goodwill, 
management skills and qualifications, and other factors which constitute the 
reputation [of the company]‟. 
Therefore, Saudi company law formally accepts the notion of intangible property, which can 
be beneficial to business. Importantly, the definition does not include either opportunities or 
information about opportunities. Within the interpretation of property provided by the 
Hanbali law, it is unlikely that these could be considered as property either, because they are 
not attached to the company‟s tangible assets. However, as will be demonstrated later, one of 
the Articles of the CL 1965 considers secret information as something that belongs to a 
company, thus prohibiting its exploitation in the same manner as for tangible assets.  
An important and unique attribute of private property in the Shariah is the notion of its 
rightful use. Starting from the traditions attributed to the Prophet, when private property is 
used in such way that it is harmful to the others, Islam has the right to curtail the rights to 
it
787
.  This view is supported by a number of prominent scholars in Shariah law. For example, 
Naqvi believed that property ownership has strong links to the good of the community: those 
who do not understand this notion can have the property removed from them
788
. Similarly, 
                                                        
785 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for the discussion of the main sources of the Shariah.  
786 The Board of the Capital Market Authority (2007) „Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and 
Rules of the Capital Market Authority‟. 
787 This belief is attributable to Hanbali school of thought, which argues that the state has the right to bound 
individual‟s property rights, if private ownership endangers community interests. Other schools of Islamic 
thought debate this proposition. For discussion, see Nomani and Ranhema (n 775) 71-77.  
788 Syed Nawab and Haider Naqvi, Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Perspective (London, The Islamic 
Foundation 1981). The justification for stripping of property rights is that the property is owned by God, and 
men are serving as His trustees.  
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Haneef considered that ineffective use of land justifies its confiscation by the state for 
redistribution to those who would be able to use it for the public good
789
. The reason for such 
a strict (and it may seem harsh) attitude toward personal property in the Shariah stems from 
the fact of self-interest, on which property rests. However, as follows from the discussion 
above, self-interest should not prevail in managing God‟s property on trust. Therefore, all 
actions involving private property have to be tested on the basis of Shariah rules and serve to 
fulfil, among other things, ethical obligations to society
790
.  
The analysis conducted above shows that the Hanbali school of Islamic law recognises both 
tangible and intangible types of property. While the Holy Texts provide a clear indicat ion of 
personal ownership only of tangible objects, the concept of mal has been extended to include 
some forms of intangible property, which indicates the Shariah‟s adaptability to the 
contemporary economics and business environment. In this view, the traditionally 
emphasised religious fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia seems to partially give way to the 
modern tendencies in an attempt to justify them on the basis of a re-interpretation of the 
traditional Islamic principles. Nevertheless, the strictness of the Shariah is still reflected in 
the rules of rightful property use, which provide the Islamic state with powers to reject 
property rights in a case when the property is not used in an effective and responsible 
manner.  
6.4 Directors’ Duties with Respect to Company Property in Saudi Arabia 
Codification of directors‟ duties in Saudi Arabian legislation has been introduced as part of 
the overall corporate governance framework established in response to the needs of the 
market and the creation of the new business environment in the country. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, the primary secular piece of legislation governing directors‟ duties is the 
CL 1965 (CL 1965). The major provisions defining the nature of directorship and the 
directors‟ duties in Saudi companies are listed in Articles 66 to 82. Not all of these Articles 
deal with the fiduciary duties towards company property. Of particular interest to this study 
are Articles 69 para 1 (avoiding conflict of interest), 69 para 2 (declaring interest in 
                                                        
789 Mohamed Haneef, Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought: A Selected Comparative Analysis, (Kuala 
Lumpur, Ikraq Books 1995) 124. 
790 See Ahmad (n 699) 195; also see Muhamad Arif, „Towards Establishing the Microfoundations of Islamic 
Economics: The Basis of the Basics‟ in Ghazali A and Omar S (eds) Readings in the Concept and Methodology 
of Islamic Economics (Selangor Darull Ehsan, Pelanduk Publications 1989) 86. 
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transactions), 70 (not competing with the company), 72 (not disclosing company secrets), and 
71 with 73 para 2, which deal directly with the prohibition of property exploitation. These 
Articles provide the legal treatment of the fiduciary duties of company directors towards 
company property in Saudi Arabia.  
While the CL 1965 provides a list of the codified duties of company directors, the Shariah 
provides a set of rules and behaviour that all company directors have to follow. As discussed 
above, these duties are based on the principles of general morality and ethics that Islam 
imposes on its followers. Unlike the government-issued laws regulating business affairs, 
Shariah rules are neither codified nor organised into a single comprehensive list that is easy 
to comprehend and follow. Instead, the Holy Texts are studied and interpreted by religious 
scholars to provide what is right in different situations. Despite the lack of codification and 
organisation, Shariah principles are strictly applied and followed in Saudi Arabia, where the 
Hanbali school of thought interprets the Holy Texts‟ teachings very close to their classic 
form, with few modifications
791
. Therefore, at least in theory, Saudi company directors have 
to follow both the rules prescribed in the Articles within the CL 1965 and the teachings of the 
Shariah. In situations where the Shariah comes into conflict with the secular law, it is the 
Shariah, as the supreme law of divine nature in the Kingdom, that prevails. Consequently, the 
laws, rules, and regulations that come into conflict with the Shariah are rendered invalid in 
Saudi Arabia
792
. Therefore, an understanding of the underlying principles of the Shariah that 
might be relevant to a particular suggestion in relation to the law is required to ensure that it 
will be accepted from the perspective of Islamic law. The following sections follow this logic 
by considering directors‟ fiduciary duties towards company property from the perspective of 
the company law epitomised in the CL 1965 and from the perspective of the applicable rules 
of the Shariah. However, before delving into a discussion of the duties, it is necessary to 
identify the subjects to whom Saudi company directors owe their duties. 
6.4.1 To Whom Are the Duties Owed? 
Directors‟ duties in Saudi company law are determined both by the laws enacted by the 
government (including the CL 1965 and, to some extent, the Listing Rules issued by the 
                                                        
791 Beltrametti (n 784). 
792 In relation to company law, this is explicitly mentioned in the CL 1965 Article 2.  
199 
 
Capital Market Authority)
793
 and by the divine laws that are put forward by the Shariah. 
Quite surprisingly, there is no clear consistency among the pieces of Saudi law pertaining to 
this matter. The directors‟ duties under the CL 1965 go beyond the company and extend to 
the company shareholders and other entities, as formulated in Article 76: 
„Directors shall be jointly responsible for damage to the company, or the 
stockholders, or third parties, arising from their maladministration of the 
affairs of the company or their violation of the provisions of these 
Regulations or of the company‟s bylaws794. Any stipulation contrary to 
this one shall be considered nonexistent‟.  
Nevertheless, the term „third parties‟ is nowhere clarified in the Act. As such, the CL 1965 
fails to either name the other entities to which directors might owe their duties or to define 
the scope of this term. Besides, the LRs for the joint stock companies that are issued by the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) seem to ignore the third parties in this sense overall. In this 
regard, Article 28 of the LRs provides:  
„Directors of an issuer [meaning the joint stock company] must exercise 
their powers and carry out their duties in such a way as to serve the 
interests of the issuer‟. 
It can be assumed that the „third parties‟ defined within the CL 1965 may refer to the 
stakeholders named in the CGR 2006, who are „Any person who has an interest in the 
company, such as shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community‟795. 
However, two important issues arise here. First, both the LRs and the CGR have been issued 
by the CMA. In this regard, it becomes unclear why the Authority would explicitly state that 
                                                        
793 See Section 3.2.2. for the discussion on the legislative developments and legal authorities in Saudi Arabia.  
794 In Saudi Arabia, company by-laws are the primary documents setting forth the rules of corporate governance. 
Their purpose and functionality resemble those of the articles of association used in England. In general, the 
bylaws establish such things as the number of directors and their remuneration, the way that shareholder 
meetings are conducted, how consent and approval are achieved at the meeting, and other important issues.  
Bylaws are mentioned in many provisions of the CL 1965 as the tools to regulate various company affairs. This 
proves the intent of Saudi legislators to transfer the responsibility for managing some of the company 
governance affairs to companies themselves. Company bylaws in this sense play an important role in the 
regulation of directors‟ duties, but many large companies use them as a tool to circumvent the rules established 
by the CL 1965. A typical example here is the bylaws of Alahsa Development Company, a Saudi company with 
a market capitalization of nearly £133 million, whose bylaws clearly establish the ability of the board to grant 
loans for the terms exceeding three years, to buy, sell and mortgage the property and assets of the company and 
to release the debtors of the company from their liabilities. These are exceptions to Article 73 of the CL 1965.  
795 CGR 2006, Article 2(b). Article 1(a) also clearly assumes the protection of stakeholders‟ rights: „These 
Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the management of joint stock companies listed in the 
Exchange to ensure their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure the protection of 
shareholders‟ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders‟. 
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the duties are owed to the company only, and in the other include all the stakeholders. One 
explanation is possible: the documents imply that the duties are owed to the company, but 
there is also an obligation to protect the rights of the stakeholders. This is in line with the 
wording of the Articles provided in both documents. However, in this case, it is unclear 
which one of these documents ties in better with the CL 1965: on the one hand, Article 76 of 
the CL 1965 mentions some „third parties‟, which could be stakeholders; on the other hand, 
the CGR, unlike the LRs, has a recommendatory character, which means that its Articles are 
not binding.  
This brings us to the second issue, which is the recognition of the duty to other parties beyond 
the company. To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, neither incorporation nor listing on 
Saudi Stock Exchange explicitly requires the recognition of duties to anything or anyone 
other than the company.  Besides, Article 1 of the CL 1965 provides that a company is a 
„contract pursuant to which each of two or more persons undertake to participate, in an 
enterprise aiming at profit, by offering in specie or as work a share, for sharing in the profits 
or losses resulting from such enterprise‟. Granted, an introductory part of the CL 1965 does 
recognise social responsibility (that is, an obligation to act so as to benefit society at large, 
not only specific entities) as a consequence of incorporation
796
; however, this part of the Act 
does not impose any specific obligation upon company directors. Furthermore, the CL 1965 
does not give a right for any „third parties‟ to sue the directors for breach of their duties, 
although such a right is clearly given to the shareholders on behalf of the company by Article 
78
797
.  As a result, it can be observed that the duties or responsibilities that directors might 
owe to any entity besides the company are given mostly advisory character in government-
issued pieces of legislation. This explains why the majority of the actions pertaining to the 
stakeholders (or „third parties‟ for this matter) are described in the CGR 2006798, which does 
not have a legal binding power.  
                                                        
796 CL 1965 Explanatory Introduction: „The number of companies has risen by leaps and bounds in a few years 
from a few score to several hundred, and is still constantly increasing due to the great benefits that such 
companies have in actual practice achieved in furtherance of the public interests and of the private interests of 
the people, individually as well as collectively‟. 
797 CL 1965, article 78: „Every stockholder shall have the right to institute the action liability against directors 
on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by them is of a nature to cause him personal prejudice‟.  
798 For example, in addition to defining the stakeholders and emphasising the responsibility of directors to 
respect their rights, the CGR 2006 Article 10(e) suggests that the company board of directors should create a 
written policy defining the nature of their relationships with the stakeholders and protection of their interests. 
The article requires, among other things, mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders for infringement of 
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Following the discussion above, it is logical to conclude that Saudi company laws and 
regulations put the emphasis on the company (and to some degree on the shareholders) as the 
main entities to whom directors owe their duties. Even if we assume that the term „third 
parties‟ extensively covers the company stakeholders as described in the CGR 2006, it is still 
unclear what practices would trigger a breach of duty to these parties. The point is that the 
only explicit mentioning of such a trigger is provided in Article 76 of the CL 1965, which 
mentions „maladministration of the company affairs‟ as a case for liability to the third parties. 
Again, however, this term is neither clarified, nor defined. This leaves too much room for 
interpretation of the term, which in turn gives the courts considerable flexibility when such 
issues arise. The provision in Article 76 of the CL 1965 is similar to misfeasance covered by 
Section 212 of the IA 1986 in England. In England, however, the definition of the term and 
its applicability is determined based on the precedents in case law, which is not a common 
practice in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, on the basis of the existing government issued laws 
the only clear case when directors will owe the same duties to stakeholders seem to be when 
failure to consider them also affects the company.  
While the state-issued company legislation gives clear priority to the company in terms of 
directors‟ duties, the rules of Shariah are applicable on a wider basis, as they prioritise the 
welfare of society and place a duty of care to the third parties and to society in general on 
those who find themselves in the position of authority. As such, the duties imposed on 
directors under the Shariah can be compared to the general duty of care, which is owed to the 
company, its shareholders and other interested parties. This can be regarded as placing 
additional responsibilities on the company directors to act in a way which is not harmful to 
others and society as a whole. From the Shariah standpoint, directors are entrusted with the 
company, business and property from God, who is the only and ultimate owner of all things. 
Therefore, they have to follow the rules and principles of the Shariah and be accountable 
before God for this
799
.  
As seen, there is some divergence between the government-issued laws and the Shariah in 
terms of views on directors‟ duties. Whether the reason to this is the absence of codification 
of Shariah rules, or because legislators feel that the Shariah imposes duties on each 
                                                                                                                                                                            
their rights, a code of conduct and ethics that directors should follow in relationships with the stakeholders, and 
the company‟s social contributions.  
799 Lewis (n 18). 
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individual regardless of their position and therefore the law does not have to be specific, or 
because making the law too specific could bring apparent tensions with the Shariah 
principles, is not clear. However, the fact is that the CL 1965 does not provide clear answers 
to many legal questions, which seems to undermine its very purpose of filling the legal gaps 
in the areas which are not effectively explained by the Shariah.  
The binding legal documents that govern corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia give 
preference to the company, to which directors owe duties, while the Shariah emphasises 
general duties owed to society at large. While Shariah concepts are not codified in Saudi 
company law, it should be remembered that all man-made laws are only supplementary to the 
Shariah, which are considered the laws of God
800
. Still, there is a clear need for the Shariah 
to be codified in the form of laws and regulations to ensure their widespread compliance
801
. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that each of the Articles present in the company law statutes of Saudi 
Arabia has to be in compliance with the rules of Shariah. Consequently, each of the Articles 
dealing with the duties of directors towards company property has to be considered within the 
scope of both the government-issued legislation and the Islamic tradition laid out by the 
Shariah.   
6.4.2 Article 69: Conflict of Interest and Declaration of Interest 
6.4.2.1 Purpose and Codification 
Unlike English company law, which distinguishes the duty to avoid conflict of interest from 
the duty of declaring interest in transactions involving the company (Sections 175 and 177 of 
the CA 2006), the Saudi CL 1965 has one Article to cover both. Article 69 of the CL 1965 
includes three paragraphs that oblige the directors not to have interests in company 
transactions and to declare such interest whenever it might be present. We shall consider the 
two parts of the Article on a separate basis.  
The first paragraph of Article 69 of the CL 1965 reads: 
                                                        
800 Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion on this.  
801 See Fadi Dahar, „Directors‟ Duties Under Saudi Law‟ (2011) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/133486/Corporate+Governance/Directors+Duties+Under+Saudi+Law> accessed 
10 August 2011.  
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„A director may not have any interest, directly or indirectly, in the 
transactions or contracts made for the account of the company except with 
an authorisation from the regular general meeting, to be renewed annually. 
Transactions made by way of public bidding shall, however, be excluded 
from this restraint if the director has submitted the best offer‟. 
In the absence of other mentions of the possible conflicts of interest between a director and 
the company in the CL 1965 or other government issued laws
802
, it is logical to assume that 
this is the provision that has the exact purpose of regulating such conflicts. By reading the 
provision, however, it becomes obvious that it is rather narrow in scope and open to a wide 
range of interpretation. In essence, the entire complex aspect of conflicts of interest is 
explained in just two lines, while the other two lines describe the exceptions to the rule. The 
wording of the provision strongly implies that the rule applies specifically to the transactions 
or contracts for the account of the company. This is a serious deviation from Section 175(a) 
of the English Companies Act 2006 discussed in the previous chapter, which provides that 
directors should avoid situations where a conflict of interest may arise. In fact, the provision 
of Article 69 of the CL 1965 does not literally address the conflicts of interest. Instead, it 
seems to prohibit directors from having interests in the transactions of the company. This 
makes it unclear whether potential conflicts of interest are included in the provision
803
.  
Further, the paragraph does not clarify the idea of „indirect‟ interest. This is important, 
because nowhere else in the Act is it defined either. Theoretically, indirect interest can be 
related to the „related parties‟ connected to a director having an interest in the transactions. In 
this case, however, such parties have to be clearly identified. For example, the English CA 
2006 lists the following parties connected to a director: family members, a body corporate to 
which the director is connected, a person acting in his capacity as trustee of a trust, a person 
acing as a partner of the director, or firms in which the director has interest and/or stake. The 
Saudi CL 1965 does not elucidate this point. A simple example where the CL 1965 may find 
it difficult to provide a clear answer is: if a spouse was involved in a company which was 
tendering for a contract with the director‟s company, under CL 1965 would the director be 
                                                        
802 Article 18 of the CGR 2006, basically, restates the provisions of Articles 69 and 70 of the CL 1965. As such, 
it simply duplicates rather than clarifies the position of Saudi company law regarding conflicts of interest.  
803 As noted in the previous chapter, English company law recognises situations where a director has or can have 
a potential conflict of interest with the company. This includes the actual transactions of the company that a 
director may divert for his own benefit, or potential transactions in which a company may hypothetically 
engage. The CA 2006 clearly indicates that both present and potential conflicts are covered by the statute. The 
CL 1965 applied in Saudi Arabia fails to clarify whether all types of transactions or only potential ones are 
covered. 
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deemed to have an interest? Therefore, it is necessary to define indirect connections and 
interest in order to create the boundaries within which the transactions mentioned in Article 
69 paragraph 1 are permissible by law.  
Another serious omission of paragraph 1 is the absence of clarification regarding the nature 
of the transactions that are covered by the Article. Specifically, there is no indication of 
whether the transactions include real property, intellectual property, information or 
opportunity. As noted in Chapter 5 of this thesis, English company law places information 
and opportunities in the same context as company property. It does not consider information 
and opportunity as property in the full meaning of the term: the existing case law in England 
dismissed this idea in Boardman v Phipps
804
 and Bhullar v Bhullar
805
, while the CA 2006 
regards property, information and opportunity as separate constructs
806
. However, within the 
corporate opportunities framework, both can be as if they were property in order to define the 
nature of the rights and duties existing between the company and the director. This was 
demonstrated in Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna
807
 and CMS Dolphin v Simonet
808
. 
Finally, for the purposes of law, the CA 2006 included information and opportunities in 
Section 175 dealing with the directors‟ duties to avoid interest. The Saudi CL 1965 does not 
clarify this point, despite the fact that the concept of mal (property) in the Shariah, as 
discussed above, includes intangible objects in its modern interpretation. Moreover, Article 
72 of the CL 1965 includes intangible objects (company secrets) in the category protected 
from directors‟ exploitation. Therefore, it seems surprising that Article 69 of the CL 1965 did 
not mention what types of transaction are covered. In the absence of clear guidelines as to 
what can cause the conflicts of interest, the provision of Article 69 is likely to be a serious 
cause of confusion with regard to cases where it can be applied.  
Article 69 also leaves a wide lacuna in a number of related corporate governance aspects. For 
example, the Article (and the entire CL 1965 for this matter) does not specify whether 
engaging in a transaction for the benefit of the company members and managers can be 
                                                        
804 [1967] 2 AC 46. It should be noted, however, that in their opinions Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Cohen 
admitted that in some cases information could be considered company property.  
805 [2003] BCC 711 720.  
806 CA 2006, s 175 (2)(a). 
807 [1986] BCLC 460. 
808 [2001] 2 BCLC 704. 
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considered a breach of duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Nothing is said regarding the 
transactions or agreements that directors may enter into with the company itself, for the 
benefit of both parties. The wording of the Article also seems to prohibit directors from 
engaging in a transaction with the third party where both the director and his company are 
likely to acquire benefits. Finally, neither the Article, nor the other provisions of the CL 1965 
explain whether the conflict of interest duty is extended to the directors who resign from their 
position and to what extent this duty could be applied. Once again, all these matters arise as a 
result of a provision that is too vague and broad regarding the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest, and it is clear that additional details could make the position of Saudi company law 
much clearer in this regard.  
Another omission of Article 69 paragraph 1 is that it does not include the conflict of duties as 
a situation where its provisions should apply. As discussed in Chapter 4, ownership in the 
majority of Saudi corporations is much more concentrated than in Western countries. 
Moreover, family ownership and block shareholding normally determine who will be placed 
on the board of directors. As a result, even though nominee directors are not separately 
recognised in Saudi company law, they are a common occurrence. Consequently, nominee 
directors can be naturally put under pressure to behave in the interests of block shareholders. 
As was mentioned above, Article 28 of the LRs provides that directors‟ duties are owed to the 
company or to other parties
809
. However, the case when the duties to large shareholders may 
not be in line with the duties to the company in general is not considered by Article 69
810
. 
Granted, the provisions of Articles 76, 77, and 78 of the CL 1965 allow shareholders of 
public companies to bring legal actions for mismanagement of company property; however, 
this can be regarded as a measure dealing with the consequences of a breach of the fiduciary 
duty to avoid conflict of interest (as described by the provisions of Article 69 of the CL 
1965), not with the root of the problem itself.  
Article 69 also includes two exceptions to the conflict of interest rule. These are authorisation 
by the regular general meeting and public bidding for a transaction. Notably, Saudi company 
law does not allow the board to grant permission for some specific transactions to be carried 
out by a director. This can be explained by the fact that it is typical for a Saudi company 
                                                        
809 As Article 76 of the CL 1965 implies. 
810 Nor is it clarified where to look for legal explanation of such situations.  
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board to include large shareholders or their nominees
811
; therefore, for the board to forfeit its 
right of authorisation can be considered as a protecting measure for the company 
shareholders in general. Still, the Article does not outline the procedure for granting 
permission at the shareholder meeting, nor does it indicate whether such permission is 
granted by a simple majority of votes or by a specific quorum. The power of large 
shareholders is likely to make it easier for directors to obtain permission for acts bordering on 
the conflict of interest premise, while it could also easily block the transaction in question. In 
either case, it would be helpful to determine who can be allowed to vote on the issue and 
what the procedure for the approval involves.  
The second protection from the conflict of interest rule is also worth noting. According to 
Article 69, a director can be exempt from liability if he submits a winning bid for the 
transactions made as a public offer. Interestingly, this provision seems to allow direct 
competition with the company, even though it is only in specific cases. However, Article 70 
of the CL 1965 explicitly prohibits directors‟ participation in business activities carried out 
by the company. As such, there is an obvious tension between the two Articles, which breeds 
a lack of clarity regarding the overall notion of competing with the company. This issue will 
be discussed later, in the section devoted to Article 70 and the duties attached to it.  
The second and third paragraphs of Article 69 deal with the declaration of interest by 
directors. The paragraphs oblige the company directors to declare any interest and they 
outline the correct procedure for doing this. The paragraphs read
812
: 
„The director must declare to the board of directors any personal interest 
that he may have in transactions or contracts made for the account of the 
company. Such declaration must be recorded in the minutes of the board 
meeting, and the interested director shall not participate in voting on the 
resolution to be adopted in this respect.  
The chairman of the board of directors shall communicate to the regular 
general meeting when it convenes the transactions and contracts in which 
any director has a personal interest. Such communications shall be 
accompanied by a special report from the auditor‟. 
As seen, these paragraphs supplement the first provision of the Article that deals with an 
interest in related transactions. Declaration of interest is to be made to the board of directors, 
                                                        
811 See Chapter 4 of this thesis for the discussion on this point. 
812 CL 1965, Article 69 para 2-3. 
207 
 
which, in turn, presents it through the chairman to the general meeting. This two-step process 
of declaration seems logical: on the one hand, the board of directors needs to know about the 
interest in order to ensure fair voting on the resolutions related to such transactions; on the 
other hand, the shareholders have to be aware of the interest, because it is they who 
ultimately decide whether the director may have an interest in the transaction. However, the 
provision does not require a declaration of interest before the transaction takes place. In other 
words, a director with an interest in the transaction is not prohibited from waiting until the 
company considers the transaction or the corresponding arrangement and only then declaring 
the existing interest. Nor does the Article require the directors to explain the nature and extent 
of their interest in the transaction, which could, potentially, have a significant impact on the 
outcome of the resolution related to the matter. It might be argued that such issues can be 
addressed by shareholders themselves: the provision of Article 96 of the CL 1965 states that 
shareholders are allowed to ask questions related to the matters raised at the General 
Assembly meeting and demand answers from both the board of directors and the external 
auditor. This provision, however, is of a limited scope: it only allows questions to be asked 
within the agenda presented by the board and „in a manner that does not prejudice the 
company‟s interest‟813.  
As seen above, the provisions of Article 69 of the CL 1965 leave quite a few questions 
unanswered and many points not clarified. This, in turn, means that the courts are given a 
significant degree of freedom in interpreting these provisions
814
.  However, for the purposes 
of the discussion, one of the core fiduciary duties of directors in Saudi companies seems to 
remain largely unresolved by the provisions of the CL 1965.  A very broad definition of the 
conflict of interest provided by Article 69 leaves too much room for interpretation, and 
uncertainty regarding several key issues, such as the types of interest and transactions 
covered by the Article or the appropriate procedure in declaring interest, still persist.  
6.4.2.2 Duty in Shariah Law 
Following the discussion of the general Shariah perspectives on commerce and business, it is 
impossible to distinguish any rules that could apply specifically to corporate governance. 
                                                        
813 CL 1965, article 96.  
814 The courts in Saudi Arabia have to yet develop a comprehensive and consistent approach to regulating 
various issues of corporate governance and directors‟ duties. See for discussion Al-Jeber (n 345) cited in 
Almajid (275). 
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This is because in the times when the Holy Texts were written, there was no such thing as 
incorporation in the Middle East; instead, partnership was the main type of business entity
815
.  
As noted earlier in this chapter, the contemporary Saudi company law recognises both 
corporation and its two key features: legal personality and limited liability. However, the 
traditional Shariah principles were built upon and applied to partnerships, while its 
acceptance of the main features of modern corporations is still debated among Islamic 
scholars
816
.  Foster
817
 warned about some dangers in linking the classical Shariah concepts to 
modern corporations: „The concepts of the corporation, legal personality and limited liability 
belong to Western-style law. It follows that asking whether the Shariah had these concepts is 
an analysis of one system in the terms of reference of another system. This is dangerous 
because, unless the systems compared are very similar indeed, the second system's terms of 
reference will not fit the first, resulting in a distorted view of the first system‟. Foster‟s 
solution involves considering the main differences between the systems and the context 
within which different forms of business entities emerged and developed. Considering the 
differences that exist between Western style corporations and partnerships described in the 
Shariah, it is necessary to look at the general provisions that can be applied in the context of 
both corporations and partnerships.  
The general principle of declaring personal interest in a transaction can be linked to the 
notions of honesty and promise keeping. As the directors become appointed to govern the 
company, they can be considered as entering a contract, which obliges them to behave in a 
certain manner and to act in the best interests of the company under Shariah law. Therefore, 
the promise to act in the best interests of the company is inherent in an Islamic directorship 
contract. Keeping a promise, on the other hand, is one of the key aspects of Islamic teachings. 
The Qur’an teaches818: „O you who have believed, fulfil [all] contracts‟. Consequently, a 
contract is considered to be one of the major bonds that exist between people
819
. By entering 
                                                        
815 Foster (n 14) 29.  
816 Section 6.2.4.4 provides an overview of this issue. 
817 ibid. 
818 The Qur’an, 5:1.  
819 Consider in this regard Cherif Bassiouni, „Business ethics in Islam‟ in Minus P (ed) The Ethics of Business in 
a Global Economy (Norwell, MS: Kluwer Academics 1993) 121: „the fulfilment of obligations in good faith and 
in accordance with [the] principles of ‘business ethics’ is not only required; it is inseparable from the general 
obligation of piety’. 
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the position of a director, an individual is obliged to act in the interests of the company, while 
being prohibited from pursuing self-interest, including in related transactions. Therefore, the 
duty not to pursue a personal interest in company transactions is fully compliant with the 
Shariah. 
Another important aspect in the Shariah that justifies the provision of Article 69 is honesty. 
This aspect primarily refers to the declaration of interest in relevant transactions. The Shariah 
not only treats honesty as a virtue; it expects it as a trait of every devout Muslim: „And those 
who are to their trusts and their promises attentive, [...], those are the inheritors‟820.  
Similarly, dishonesty is rejected by the Qur’an: „Woe to those who give less than due. Who, 
when they take a measure from people, take in full. But if they give by measure or by weight 
to them, they cause loss. Do they not think that they will be resurrected for a tremendous Day 
- The Day when mankind will stand before the Lord of the worlds?‟821. The general 
interpretation of these verses can be that truthfulness and honesty are expected, and that Allah 
punishes those who are dishonest in their deeds with others. Dishonesty can also be linked to 
cheating, and any gains of property, money or opportunity by cheating are prohibited by 
secondary Shariah sources through the notions of ghabn and gharar
822
. Therefore, a director 
attempting to advance his personal interests at the expense of the company will be considered 
as a cheat and a dishonest man with all the applicable consequences, which are expropriation 
of any profits and properties, with their consequent transfer to the company.  
6.4.3 Article 70: Competing with the Company 
6.4.3.1 Purpose and Codification 
The issues related to directors‟ competition with the company in Saudi Arabia are regulated 
by Article 70 of the CL 1965. The Article outlines both the rule and the consequences of its 
breach. According to Article 70: 
„A director may not, without authorisation from the regular general 
meeting, to be renewed annually, participate in any business competitive 
with that of the company, or engage in any of the commercial activities 
                                                        
820 The Qur’an: 23: 8-10.  
821 The Qur’an: 83: 1-6. 
822 Mahmoud Almadani, „The Role Of Shariah Law In Protecting Minority Shareholders In Private Companies‟ 
(2010) 21 (12) International Company and Commercial Law Review 398. 
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carried on by the company; otherwise, the company shall have the right 
either to claim damages from him or to consider the operations he has 
conducted for his own account as having been conducted for the account 
of the company‟. 
The text of the Article clearly and explicitly prevents directors from participating in a 
competing business or engaging in any commercial activities that a company carries. In this 
sense, Saudi company law differs from English law, reviewed in the previous chapter, which 
recognises the non competition duty as a part of the conflict of interest rule within Section 
175(7). The codification of the principle in Saudi law hints at the strict approach of dealing 
with the issue in such a way that it prohibits any business activity, a restriction that can only 
be lifted by the authorisation of the general meeting. In this regard, the English Companies 
Act 2006 treats competing directorships as a conflict of duties within the no conflict 
framework. Consequently, the same rules and provisions are applied as to the conflict of 
duties, which can be avoided if there is an authorisation issued by the board of directors and 
where the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of 
interest
823
. English law does not generally prevent directors from establishing a directorship 
in a company competing with their former business
824
, even in cases where new business 
connections are a product of previous directorship
825
. Even in the case of an existing 
directorship, English case law somewhat relaxed the application of the conflict of duty rule, 
as in the case Plus Group Ltd. v Pyke
826
. The Article being considered here, in Saudi Arabia‟s 
CL 1965, leaves much less room for interpretation of the conflict of duties rules and provides 
only one acceptable exception, authorisation by the general meeting, which can be much 
harder to achieve than the permission from the board.  
Article 70 seems to complement Article 69 discussed earlier, which prohibits directors from 
pursuing benefits on their own account at the expense of the company. However, Article 70 
also leaves many blank spaces and much room for interpretation of its provisions. The first 
issue with the provisions of Article 70 is that it does not elucidate the issue of current and 
past directorships. From the wording of the Article, which is given in the present tense, it 
                                                        
823 CA 2006, s 175 (4).  
824 See British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tooling Ltd (n 605).  
825 See Hunter Kane Ltd v Watkins (n 596); In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke (n 535); Foster Bryant Surveying Ltd v 
Bryant (n 596). 
826 [2002] EWCA Civ 370 
211 
 
may follow that it covers the instances of current directorship. However, even if this is so, it 
remains unclear what the legal status of past directorships are in relationship to the provisions 
of the Article. Unfortunately, neither the CL 1965 nor any other main pieces of government 
issued legislations are enlightening in this regard
827
. These are, however, important issues. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, competition with the company is one of the key issues considered in 
the English legal system with respect to the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Even though it 
cannot be said that the issue has been successfully resolved by English courts, there is, 
nevertheless, a wide body of case law related to the matter, which specifically considers 
situations of former directorship. Not recognising the issue per se can arguably lead to such 
problems as resigning with the intention of usurping corporate opportunities, engaging in 
preparatory activities with the goal of resigning and taking the opportunity, and not acting in 
good faith if the possibility of diverting a very profitable transaction may come.  
The second issue with Article 70 of the CL 1965 is that it specifically refers to competition 
with the directors‟ companies. As such, the Article does not recognise the act of competing as 
a conflict of duty. Consequently, it becomes very difficult to determine which duties prevail 
in cases when a person occupies a director‟s chair in more than one company. Surprisingly, 
the CL 1965 nowhere considers such a possibility. At the same time, practice shows that 
multiple directorships are quite common in the Saudi business landscape where large cross-
holdings in companies are not uncommon
828
. Therefore, the absence of company law 
provisions regulating duties of directors who hold positions in more than one company is 
striking. Importantly, the resolutions regarding multiple directorships cannot be easily 
regulated by means of corporate articles, because it would require that the articles address the 
issue in a similar manner across all the companies in which the position of a director is held. 
Therefore, the issue of multiple directorships represents one of the main unregulated aspects 
of competing directorships in Saudi law.  
Finally, it should be made clear that the provisions of Article 70 (as well as any other Article 
of CL 1965) refer to joint stock companies only. At the same time, Saudi company law 
remains generally silent in respect of competition as related to directors of limited liability 
companies. This area of corporate governance and applicability of directors‟ duties, therefore, 
remains largely self-regulated by means of the articles of association.  
                                                        
827 Again, the provisions of Article 11 of the CGR 2006 simply restate what is said in Article 70 of the CL 1965.  
828 See Section 4.3.2. of this thesis.  
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6.4.3.2 Duty in Shariah Law 
While the Shariah lacks specific insights into the nature of director-company relationships, it 
has a number of provisions that have been applied historically to the most popular form of 
business in the Middle East – partnership. The concept of a partnership bond is defined in the 
Sunnah
829
: 
„Abu Hurayrah said that: The Prophet [PBUH] said: Allah says: I am the 
third [partner] of the two partners as long as they do not deceive each 
other. When one of them deceives the other, I depart from them‟. 
This concept can be also applied within the modern corporate setting, meaning that if a 
director betrays the company (by competing with it), God Himself turns away from such 
business. Based on this hadith, fiqh within the Islamic tradition has interpreted as breach of 
fiduciary duty the situation where one of the parties acts in a way which is harmful to 
another, unless he has received permission to do so
830
. Consequently, on the same basis, the 
Hanbali school of Islam acknowledged that a partner should not compete with the entity 
formed with the other partners if competition is harmful to the association
831
.  
Notably, the rules outlined in the Hanbali school only prohibits harmful competition, while 
allowing it when no harm to the business is present. This contrasts with the all-encompassing 
prohibition rule outlined in Article 70 of the CL 1965, which disallows any kind of 
competition, no matter whether it is harmful or not. Therefore, the Shariah rules covering 
competition with the company seem closer to the position taken by the English legislature, 
where there is some legal relaxation of the rule, to allow competing with the company in 
specific circumstances
832
. Still, it should be remembered that the Shariah principles in this 
regard apply generally to partnerships, not to modern corporations. Therefore, it would not be 
entirely correct to state that company law and the Shariah diverge from each other in this 
case. In the researcher‟s opinion, the fact that both recognise competing with the company (or 
partnership) as a breach of fiduciary duty, represents a positive direction in protecting the 
                                                        
829 Sunan Abu Daud, „Draft of Shariah Parameter Reference 4: Musharaka Contract‟, Cited in Bank Negara 
Malaysia (2010) 4 <http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/05_shariah/04_draft_shariah%20parameter_spr4.pdf> 
accessed 15 August 2011.  
830 Saleh (n 723) 97. In cases when such behaviour takes place, the party committing the wrong must 
compensate for the damage resulting from its actions.  
831 Al Moghni, vol 5 46, cited in Saleh (n 723) 41. 
832 See Section 5.3.2.2.2.4. of this thesis. 
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weaker parties (such as minority shareholders) and a step towards a more organised approach 
to managing directors‟ duties. More clarity, however, is needed in terms of codification of 
this duty in the CL 1965. This is especially important in view of the fact that the Shariah does 
not provide a definitive guide to this matter.  
6.4.5 Article 72: Disclosure of the Company Secrets 
6.4.5.1 Purpose and Codification 
Article 72 of the CL 1965 is somewhat unique because it deals explicitly with the intangible 
form of company property. Specifically, the article prohibits directors from disclosing 
important information. The wording of Article 72 proceeds as follows
833
: 
„Directors may not disclose to the stockholders outside of a general 
meeting, or to third parties, such secrets of the company as may have come 
to their knowledge by reason of their directorship; otherwise, they must be 
removed and held liable for damages‟.  
As seen, the Article imposes the duty to maintain confidentiality and avoid disclosure of 
company secrets to other parties. While the term „secrets‟ is not defined in the Article, it can 
be generally understood as involving information in one form or another. In fact, the existing 
legal literature does not recognise the concept as „secrets of a company,‟ preferring either 
„confidential information‟ or „trade secrets‟ instead. In either case, the term „information‟ is 
at the core of the definition. For example, MacQueen, Waelde, and Laurie wrote that „trade 
secrets [...] provide [...] alternative means to protect valuable knowledge, for by definition, 
trade secret‟s protection [...] is concerned with keeping valuable information from [the] 
public domain‟834. In relation to a director‟s duty to not disclose company trade secrets, in 
Facenda Chicken v Fowler
835
 the English court defined what makes information a trade 
secret: whether information was provided by the terms of confidentiality, whether 
information indicates a high level of secrecy, whether there was an implied confidentiality in 
the information disclosed, and whether the information in question can be easily separated 
from what can be easily circulated, used, and disclosed. Consequent cases further refined the 
                                                        
833 CL 1965. 
834 Hector MacQueen, Charlotte Waelde Graeme Laurie and Abby Brown, Contemporary Intellectual Property: 
Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2011, 2nd ed.) 5. 
835 [1986] ICR 297. 
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dominion of trade secrets and the situations where the protection of company information 
may apply. None of these are present in Saudi company law at the moment. Although secret 
information is clearly listed as something protected from directors‟ exploitation, neither the 
nature of such information, nor the cases where the protection would apply, are mentioned in 
the CL 1965.   
Therefore, Article 72 formally recognises information as something that belongs to the 
company and can be considered as the company‟s property. At the same time, it seems that 
the courts are given a substantial amount of freedom to interpret the meaning of the term. 
Nevertheless, the strict liability imposed by the provisions of the Article makes the breach of 
this duty a very serious matter in Saudi law
836
. Because of this fact, the absence of 
explanation regarding two of the key aspects involved in the breach of duty (the definition of 
„secrets‟ and the definition of „third parties‟) is a very serious legal oversight that can 
potentially lead to negative consequences. On the one hand, too wide an interpretation of the 
law may impose unduly hard punishments for rather minor misconduct, such as accidental 
disclosure of information that can be potentially regarded as belonging to the public domain. 
On the other hand, a lack of clear guidance regarding the actions that trigger liability may 
impose behaviour that is too cautious on the directors‟ side and thus inhibit the process of 
communication.  
The importance of clarifying Article 72 also comes from the fact that some of the „company 
secrets‟ may carry a negative character. For example, if a company engages in unethical 
market behaviour, and the information comes to the surface during the board meeting, can 
this be considered a company secret coming to a director‟s knowledge in the course of his 
directorship? If this is so, then revealing the fact will legally cost a director his position in the 
company and impose additional liabilities based on Article 72 provisions, which do not 
distinguish company secrets from negative, concealed information. Consequently, a director 
may find himself in a difficult situation where fear of losing his position with the company 
may prevent him from revealing certain facts in respect of the company‟s inappropriate 
actions. This could be harmful to the company stakeholders and society as a whole.  
 
                                                        
836 No other Article of the CL 1965 pertaining to directors‟ duties includes removal from the office as part of the 
liability for the breach of duty. Article 72, however, mentions removal as a definite, not merely possible, 
measure of punishment.  
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6.4.5.2 Duty in Shariah Law 
Before considering the duty of non-disclosing company secrets under the Shariah, it is first 
necessary to make the case for inclusion of intangible objects (which company secrets 
represent) in the concept of property as the Shariah explains it.  Intangible property rights are 
not specifically regulated by Islamic law. However, the concept of intangible property does 
not contradict the provisions of the Shariah developed within the Qur’an and Sunnah, which 
justifies its inclusion in the category of mal
837
. Unlike the Hanafi school of legal Islamic 
thought which links the concept of property strictly to tangible objects, the Hanbali school 
(prevalent in Saudi Arabia) recognises intangible objects as possible pieces of property for as 
long as they are related to tangible property
838
. Company secrets, therefore, can be considered 
acceptable as recognised pieces of company property, if they can be attributed to some 
material objects, such as company products. Examples may include product manufacturing 
(process know-how, design pattern, or product formula), sales of goods (market information), 
or product delivery (logistics plans). Since the CL 1965 fails to define the term „company 
secrets,‟ and the Shariah does not contain any specific provisions that may pinpoint the 
definition, it remains up to the courts to interpret the term. However, by following the major 
rule prescribed by Hanbali school (regarding the link to material objects), there is a 
possibility that the list of potential objects falling under the scope of the term can be limited 
to some extent.  
The duty of non-disclosure of the company secrets can be traced to the notions of honesty and 
trust in the Shariah, which have been explored above in the section dealing with Articles 69 
and 70 of the CL 1965. Obviously, if directors become entrusted with the information that 
belongs to the company, they are obliged by the Shariah to be honest and maintain 
faithfulness to the company by not disclosing the information to the others. The problems, 
however, arise where the information in question is harmful to other parties and society. In 
this case, a clash of the concepts of honesty and trust on the one hand, and the responsibility 
before other parties and society, becomes apparent. Both duties are clearly implied in the 
Shariah, but following one of them automatically breaches the other. This dilemma, however, 
seems to exist merely based on the fact that Article 72 does not define the term „company 
secret‟, and so allows within its definition a broad range of information and opportunity 
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concepts, including those which are good for the company but harmful to other parties 
involved. Therefore, clarification of the terms provided by Article 72 of the CL 1965 is 
needed, not only for the purposes of legal consistency, but also to establish harmony with 
Shariah law.  
6.4.6 Articles 71 and 73 (para 2): Property Exploitation through Loans 
6.4.6.1 Purpose and Codification 
In addition to the restrictions that the CL 1965 has imposed on directors in terms of diverting 
company transactions for personal interest, competing with the company, and disclosing 
company secrets, there are also the provisions that directly prohibit exploitation of the 
company property and assets. These provisions are outlined in Article 71 and Article 73 
paragraph 2. They cover directors‟ personal transactions with the company and prohibit 
certain actions related to the company property.  
Article 71 of the CL 1965 provides: 
„A corporation may not grant any cash loan whatsoever to any of its 
directors; nor may it guarantee any loan contracted by a director with a 
third party. Banks and other credit companies shall be excepted from this 
provision, for these may, within the limits of their objectives and under the 
same terms and conditions as they apply to their transactions with the 
public, grant loans to or open credits for their directors or guarantee loans 
contracted by them with third parties. 
Any contract concluded in violation of the provisions of this Article shall 
be considered null and void‟.  
As seen, this Article prevents directors from taking loans from the company or obtaining 
guarantees from it in order to receive a loan from other parties. While company property is 
nowhere mentioned in the provisions of the Article, its relevance is implied indirectly: a 
director is prohibited from receiving and using property in the form of money and using 
company property as a form of guarantee for personal loans from third parties. Article 71 is 
analogous to the provision of Section 175 in English Companies Act 2006, which addresses 
the exploitation of all forms of property as well as information and opportunities. The 
primary reason for inclusion of the Article in the CL 1965 seems to be an attempt to prevent 
the usurping of a position of directorship for personal gain at the expense of the company 
and, ultimately, its shareholders.  
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The very first thing which is evident from the phrasing of the Article is the absence of the 
possibility of ratifying any loan by means of a shareholders‟ meeting. This differs from the 
other Articles dealing with directors‟ duties under the CL 1965, which were discussed above. 
In the absence of a ratification provision, the rule of the Article is made absolute: it provides 
no exceptions for non-financial companies in terms of granting loans to company directors. 
There can be two possible explanations for making the rule under Article 71 absolute. From 
one perspective, it simply provides additional protection for the stakeholders involved against 
possible directors‟ misconduct: by granting personal loans to directors the shareholders might 
be putting at risk not only the company‟s assets, but also the company employees and 
customers, who could eventually feel the adverse financial impacts of directors not repaying 
the loan. From another perspective, the absolute prohibition of loan granting averts blatant 
and direct company property exploitation by directors. Since Shariah law prohibits riba 
(charging interest)
839
, company loans are likely to be provided interest-free, thereby allowing 
directors to use their position to obtain free personal financing by diverting the funds from 
the company. In either case, the absolute prohibition of loans by the company seems fully 
justified from both legal and religious perspectives.   
In terms of clarity, Article 71 represents perhaps the best worded paragraph related to 
directors‟ duties within the CL 1965. The Article is free from ambiguous definitions and 
leaves little room for interpretation of its meaning. The functional application of the Article is 
also fully justified: in the absence of other direct regulation of directors‟ behaviour in relation 
to various forms of corporate property, the Article‟s provisions lay out clear guidelines 
related to the prohibition of corporate property abuse by means of directorship.  
Another set of duties prohibiting exploitation of corporate property in Saudi company law is 
provided in Article 73 paragraph 2 of the CL 1965, which reads: 
„[...] the board of directors may not contract loans for terms exceeding 
three years, or sell or mortgage the real property or the place of business of 
the company, or release the debtors of the company from their liabilities, 
unless so authorised in the bylaws of the company and subject to the terms 
set forth therein‟. 
As seen, the provision regulates the actions of the entire board of directors, not its single 
members. This is logical, considering that the actions described (and prohibited) by the 
                                                        
839 See, for example, the Qur’an 2: 275-276. 
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Article can be potentially ratified only within the overall scope of the board of directors‟ 
decisions. This is also a novel approach to treating directors‟ duties compared to English 
jurisdiction, whose legal provisions focus on regulating the duties of individual directors. The 
provisions of Article 73 should be considered in concert with Articles 75 and 76, which 
define the scope of the board‟s collective duties and liabilities. Article 75 provides that the 
company is bound by all the decisions and acts of its directors within the limits of their 
competence. In the absence of the balancing Article 73, the company would be, therefore, 
obliged to follow the collective decisions of the board, which could be exploitive to its 
property. Such acts could be a release of the company debtors from their liability to pay or 
the sale of company property to, for example, pay for losses or debts incurred as the result of 
the board‟s actions. Obviously, the company position and especially the position of the 
shareholders in this situation would be vulnerable. From this standpoint, Article 73 serves as 
a safeguard against certain actions of the board that can cause unnecessary burden to the 
company through directors‟ exploitation of its property.  
At the same time, it can be argued that such a blanket prohibition as Article 73 imposes on 
directors is somewhat restrictive in respect of raising capital to develop the company. 
Perhaps, in order to avoid excessive restrictions, paragraph 3 of the Article also provides that 
the board may perform such acts if authorised by the general meeting or if „such acts fall by 
virtue of their nature within the scope of the company‟s objects‟840. However, the wording of 
this sentence is too vague to be interpreted conclusively. It is, for example, very unclear what 
is within the „scope of company‟s objects‟ or what the „virtue of their nature‟ means: it does 
not clearly establish what acts can be considered as falling within this scope. Granted, this 
could have been eventually refined within an active case law. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the court decisions in Saudi jurisprudence are not made available to the public, nor 
can they serve as precedents for future cases, since the legal system of the country is one of 
civil law. Unfortunately, in this particular case, the inability of the court decisions to refine 
the meaning of the statute does more harm, since the provision of the Article fails in terms of 
clarity and precision. 
Another important link with Article 73 is Article 76 of the CL 1965, which secures the 
collective responsibility of the board of directors for any maladministration. While the term 
„maladministration‟ is nowhere defined in the statute, it is likely that the courts will pay 
                                                        
840 CL 1965, Article 73 para 3.  
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attention to the provisions of Article 73 in deciding which acts of the board can be 
categorised as giving rise to liability before the company and the shareholders. From this 
perspective, Article 73 also plays an advisory role to the courts. At the same time, Article 73 
cannot be regarded as an all-encompassing guide to potential acts of maladministration. It 
does not include, for example, such important acts as negligent business dealings, failure to 
take action, or failure to follow procedures outlined by law. For these reasons, the term 
„maladministration‟ needs definition, either in Article 76 or somewhere else in the statute.  
Article 73 considers the primary mechanism of exempting the board of the duties by means 
of authorisation in the company articles (by-laws). This is probably done to avoid the 
situations where directors, who can be large blockholders of shares themselves or appointees 
of large shareholders, could easily pass the resolution through the shareholders‟ meeting. 
Nevertheless, paragraph 3 of the Article still leaves ratification by shareholders as a means of 
exemption from the duties outlined in paragraph 2. This, on the one hand, prevents the board 
from exempting themselves from the duties implied by the Article. At the same time, in a 
situation such as the one described above, it can serve as little protection from this. However, 
in the absence of any other regulating authority except for the board and the general meeting 
of shareholders, the safeguards provided by Article 73 may be the only possible legal way to 
ensure the board‟s compliance with the rules outlined in paragraph 2.  
While Article 71 prohibits loans and loan guarantees to directors in relation to third parties, 
Article 73 is less restrictive: loans may be granted if they are allowed by the company 
bylaws, approved by company shareholders, or conducted within the scope of the company 
objects. This brings the possibility of granting loans to the parties connected to directors. In 
its current form, Article 73 does not distinguish between other third parties and those third 
parties that can be connected to a director by means of business, family or friendship. 
Consequently, a distinction between these groups of potential debtors is not drawn. This is an 
omission in the statute that needs to be addressed in order to avoid potential property 
exploitation by directors with the help of such „related‟ parties. Consequently, appropriate 
procedures have to be established to provide the company members with the requisite 
information regarding such transactions. These suggestions are made in the last chapter of the 
thesis.  
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6.4.6.2 Duty in Shariah Law 
Articles 71 and 73 of the CL 1965 both deal with the direct exploitation of company property, 
although in different forms and on a different scale. We first consider the Shariah approach to 
treating possible company loans to directors (the provision of Article 71 of the CL 1965) and 
then discuss the exploitation of company property, such as the sale of company property and 
relieving company debtors from liability (the provisions of Article 73 of the CL 1965).  
Loans under the Shariah are treated as a form of social service where those who are wealthy 
reach out to the poor to provide financial assistance. In general, Islamic law allows issue of 
loans under two conditions: the loan has to be repaid, and the loan should be gratuitous, i.e. 
free from interest
841
. This is best described by the following verse from the Qur’an842: 
„And whatever you give for interest to increase within the wealth of people 
will not increase with Allah. But what you give in zakat, desiring the 
countenance of Allah - those are the multipliers‟. 
At the same time, the Shariah does not encourage asking for loans or any form of financial 
assistance even in hard times. The Prophet was quoted saying that: 
„The inmates of Paradise are of three types: one who wields authority and 
is just and fair; one who is truthful and has been endowed with power to 
do good deeds, and the person who is merciful and kind-hearted towards 
his relatives and to every pious Muslim, and who does not stretch out of 
his hand in spite of having a large family to support‟843. 
From this perspective, a director asking for a loan from his company would not be considered 
as worthy. Besides, the very purpose of the loan, as identified above, is to provide financial 
assistance to the needy. A director of a company can be hardly considered as such. At the 
same time, the issue of loans to directors can also fall under the concept of gharar 
(uncertainty), which is also prohibited in Shariah law. The uncertainty in this case would 
increase for the other parties (stakeholders), who may financially suffer if the director fails to 
repay the loan.   
                                                        
841 Interest (riba) is strictly prohibited by the Holy Texts. See, for example, the Qur’an 2: 275, 2: 276; 2:278, 3: 
130.  
842 The Qur’an: 30: 39.  
843 Mohammad Hossain, „Al-Qard al-Hasan: A Practical Approach‟ (2004) <http://www.witness-
pioneer.org/vil/Articles/shariah/al_qard_al_hasan_A_Practical_Approach.htm> accessed 20 August 2011.  
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Protection of property from unjustified use is also a well established practice in the Shariah. 
Although, according to the Holy Scripture, all property is in the possession of Allah, it does 
not prevent humans from having rights over it
844. As mentioned above, the Holy Texts‟ 
mentioning of property in a commercial context is often cited with reference to partnerships. 
In this context, the usurping of partnership property and its use for self benefit is strictly 
prohibited in Islam. As Hanbali fiqh established, it is prohibited for a partner to use the 
property of the partnership for personal purposes or for the benefit of third parties
845
. At the 
same time, however, partners are allowed, under authorisation, to enter into contracts with 
their partnerships for their own merit
846
. For example, Hanbali fiqh does not prohibit an 
individual from buying some partnership property on his own account, if such an action is 
authorised by his partners
847
. Therefore, with respect to the using of company property, the 
Shariah provides more relaxed rules than are codified in the CL 1965. However, the rules of 
Shariah are based on partnerships, where the number of individuals involved in business is 
much smaller than in publicly owned companies. In partnerships, therefore, it can be much 
easier to communicate specific business arrangements, including those relating to the 
partnership property, and to ensure that none of the involved parties is hurt in the process. 
This logic, however, is much harder to apply to public companies, where protection of every 
company member would be a rather difficult endeavour. In this sense, putting restrictions on 
directors‟ dealings with the company property is justified848. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an extensive review of the present situation in Saudi law with regard to 
a director‟s fiduciary duties related to company property, including information and 
opportunities. As noted, all human laws in the Kingdom have to be in compliance with the 
superior law of the land, which is the Shariah. Based on the provisions of the CL 1965, the 
CGR 2006, and the corresponding ethical principles outlined in the Shariah, ideally company 
                                                        
844 Islam (n 780). Numerous mentions of property in the Qur’an and Sunnah refer to it as „your property.‟  
845 Al Moghni vol 5 18 and 45, cited in Saleh (n 723) 41.  
846 ibid. 
847 ibid. 
848 This also does not contradict the principles of the Shariah, which do not prohibit restrictions on dealings with 
business properties. In addition, Article 73 para 2 and 3 duly provide mechanisms to authorise property dealings 
by the board.  
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directors in Saudi companies would take care of the interests of their company and its 
stakeholders, be righteous and considerate in managing the company property, and pursue 
high moral standards to ensure that the best traditional values of Islam are applied in their 
companies. 
Unfortunately, practice shows that not all directors of Saudi corporations behave in the 
manner described above. According to Grais and Pellegrini
849
, full commitment to the core 
Islamic values and traditions cannot be taken for granted. Consequently, not all business 
owners and directors willingly comply with these principles and choose instead to pursue 
their own interests
850
. This, in turn, results in the gap between what the laws prescribe and 
actual behaviour in practice. Hirschman noted that such inconsistencies between rational, 
law-abiding behaviour and behaviour in reality are common to any social, political or 
economic system
851
. Therefore, it is no surprise that breaches of fiduciary duties by directors 
occur in the Saudi corporate landscape as well. Even with the company codes in place, 
effective governance of directors‟ duties in Saudi jurisdiction remains problematic. The 
problematic areas of the Companies statute identified in this chapter will be addressed again 
in the final chapter of the thesis, where suggestions for improvements of the statutory code 
will be provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
849 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, „Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services: Issues and Options‟ (World Bank Policy Research Working Thesis No.4052 2006) 6 
<www.kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Companies/l111.pdf> accessed 20 August 2011.  
850 Almadani (n 822) 399.  
851 Grais and Pellegrini (n 849) 6. 
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Chapter Seven: Functional Comparison of the Treatment of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
towards Company’s Property in England and Saudi Arabia 
7.1. Introduction 
Up until now, this thesis has discussed different aspects of the treatment of fiduciary duties of 
company directors toward corporate property in England and Saudi Arabia. Applying the 
functionalist approach to the research, the study started by reviewing the two legal systems 
and determined how the systems are similar and how they are different. The socio-cultural 
environment was considered in this step due to its tremendous impact on the way that the law 
operates in both countries. The second step involved the introduction of the common problem 
that the systems in both countries have to address by legal means: directors‟ exploitation of 
corporate property. The third step in the research process presented the means that English 
and Saudi legal systems employ to regulate fiduciary duties of company directors toward 
corporate property. The fourth step introduced a comparative analysis of the approaches that 
both systems use to regulate the fiduciary duties of directors towards corporate property and 
the assessment of their effectiveness. The final step in the analysis is a critical evaluation of 
the findings and building the proposals for improving the ways to treat the issue in both legal 
systems. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to outline the major similarities, differences and 
outcomes of the existing legal treatment of directors‟ fiduciary duties toward company 
property in England and Saudi Arabia. Another important task is to elucidate the factors that 
can help explain the differences between the two systems‟ approaches and suggest possible 
improvements to both systems as they can borrow from each other the best practices in this 
area. Following the structure of the thesis, this chapter starts with the discussion of the legal 
macro environments pertaining to the topic of the study. The first part of the chapter 
compares the English and Saudi legal systems in terms of property definition. The second 
part of the chapter deals specifically with the regulations of directors‟ fiduciary duties in the 
context of the law within both countries. Besides analysing the differences in codification of 
duties and the applicable equity rules, this part will also consider such issues as clarity of the 
existing regulations, their legal impact, and the degrees of consistency that exists between 
various sources of law regulating the fiduciary duties of company directors towards property. 
The final part of the chapter provides major conclusions and recommendations based on the 
research conducted. These include both academic and practical suggestions. 
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7.2 Definition of Property 
The comparative analysis of the ways that the English and Saudi legal systems regulate the 
fiduciary duties of company directors toward property should rightfully start with the 
comparison of how property itself is understood in each legal system. In terms of the context 
within which the concept of property has been evolving, significant differences can be noted 
between England and Saudi Arabia. In England, the concept of property has developed from 
the foundations of land ownership and created an entire system of property rights defined 
within secular law. Private property is a cornerstone of the capitalist market that has 
developed in England over the course of history, and it is one of the major legal rights 
protected by law. Company property can be considered as something that can be bought, sold 
and legally protected from unpermitted usage by other parties.  
The concept of property (mal) in Saudi Arabia is somewhat different. The primary difference 
lies in the perceived nature of property ownership. The Shariah attributes all property to 
Allah. However, it does not forbid human beings from ownership thereof: the possession of 
property is simply considered within a different context to that in the English jurisdiction. 
Islamic law allows private property on the basis of trust between men and God, which implies 
taking care of the property and using it in a righteous way. This is, perhaps, the most striking 
difference in the treatment of property between the English and Saudi legal systems: in 
England, private property cannot be confiscated for what may be „improper use‟ that is 
harmful to the public. Saudi jurists, however, justify this rule on the basis that, ultimately, 
human beings are not the owners of property: it belongs to God. Therefore, all actions 
involving private property have to be tested on the basis of the Shariah rules and serve to 
fulfil, among other things, ethical obligations to society
852
. 
In terms of applicable types of property, both countries recognise tangible (real assets) and 
intangible (intellectual capital) forms. Intangible forms of property are nowhere mentioned in 
the Qur’an and Sunnah; therefore, their acceptance in Saudi legislation comes primarily from 
secondary sources, the ijma and qiyas, which accept intangible forms of property for as long 
as they are connected to the real property of the company. Consequently, the company law in 
the Kingdom secures the protection of company intellectual capital in the form of formation 
                                                        
852 See Ahmad (n 699) 195; also see Arif (n 790) 86. 
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costs, trademarks, copyrights, industrial samples and designs, franchises and licences
853
. 
Difficulties, however, arise in both countries when the question of misusing corporate 
opportunity and information emerges. The heart of the problem here lies in the much more 
subtle nature of opportunities and information, which are not so evident from a legal 
perspective as being suitable for protection as a piece of property. 
It can be argued that both England and Saudi Arabia recognise information as something that 
should be protected from exploitation. This is provided by Section 175(2) of the CA 2006 in 
England and Article 72 of the CL 1965 in Saudi Arabia.  In England, Section 175(2) of the 
CA 2006 distinguishes information and opportunities from property for the purposes of the 
fiduciary obligations of directors. In many respects, this echoes the court decision in 
Boardman v Phipps
854
, where the majority of the judges held that information and 
opportunities are not to be considered as company property. Importantly, however, English 
jurisdiction has been treating information and opportunities as if they were company 
property. This treatment provides no absolute rights of property to information and 
opportunities, but reflects the nature of the relationship thereof to directors and the company. 
This notion has been developing in English company law within the corporate opportunities 
doctrine, which emerged in North American legal systems, specifically from the famous 
decision in Canadian Aero v. O’Malley in the Canadian Supreme Court855. Based on the 
corporate opportunity framework, a number of notable case decisions treated corporate 
information and opportunities as if they were property
856
. A notable exception was the 
decision in Bhullar v Bhullar
857
, where the court explicitly rejected the idea that an 
opportunity might „belong‟ to a company or that a company may have a beneficial interest in 
it. However, as was noted in chapter 5, the ruling in Bhullar was based on the possible 
misinterpretation of opportunity in the purely proprietary context. The issue of treating 
information and opportunities as or as if company property has been particularly acute in the 
court decisions dealing with former directors in England.  
                                                        
853 Capital Market Authority (n 786). 
854 [1967] 2 AC 46 
855 [1974] SCR 592. 
856 See Island Export Finance Ltd. v Umunna [1986] BCLC 460, CMS Dolphin v Simonet (n 500), and Foster v 
Bryant [2007] (n 596). 
857
 [2003] BCC 711, at 720. 
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Company law in Saudi Arabia recognises the concept of information, although it does not 
provide any mentioning of opportunities as subject to protection from exploitation by 
company directors. The term „company secrets‟ is unlikely to include corporate opportunities, 
because many such opportunities cannot be regarded as secret. Moreover, Hanbali fiqh in 
Saudi Arabia is unlikely to recognise opportunities as mal because they cannot be directly 
attached to tangible corporate assets. Neither information nor opportunities are included in 
the list of what can be considered intangible property of a company, as provided by the 
Capital Market Authority
858
. In the absence of available relevant case law, it is hard to say 
whether information is treated in Saudi Arabia as if it were property in a similar manner to 
the English courts. However, the fact that secret information is covered by one of the Articles 
of the CL 1965 and granted protection by it seems to confirm the idea that Saudi company 
law may treat information as property in the same manner as tangible assets on the basis of 
the prohibited exploitation thereof.  
Another important point that emerges from the comparative analysis of the two legal systems 
is that the application of legal rules of property to information and opportunities remains an 
open issue, although for different reasons. English company law, being in a constant process 
of amendments and improvements to the existing rules to better adapt them to new economic 
and social realities, has been testing the applicability of the corporate opportunity doctrine in 
the country‟s legal context. As the analysis showed, the doctrine has been accepted by the 
courts with mixed results. In Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, it is the lack of active case law 
that does not allow information and opportunities to be defined clearly in the context of 
company law, since the applicable provisions of the statutes are vague in this regard.  
7.3 Statutory Recognition of Directorship Forms 
7.3.1 The Legal Concept of Company Director 
Recognition of the legal definition of directorship and identifying the differences in the 
approaches to it legally and in practice is a major step in determining what kind of duties the 
directors owe and how they are applied in different countries. Therefore, it becomes essential 
to compare the types of directors, and their powers and roles in corporate governance in 
England and Saudi Arabia in order to effectively realize what duties they owe (if any) to the 
company and how those duties are applied in practice.  
                                                        
858 Capital Market Authority (n 786) 
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In terms of the legal definition of „director,‟ legislation in both countries is rather vague. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the primary legislation in both England and Saudi Arabia leaves too 
many unclear areas in relation to this. Neither legislation defines directors‟ rights and 
obligations, or distinguishes between different types of directors. This fact has led to the 
identification of directors‟ rights and obligations within the company‟s by-laws, which are 
guided by soft law introduced in both countries, and which clarifies certain points related to 
directorship, types of directors, and their roles. As in any common law country, the English 
courts have played a significant role in interpreting ambiguities in legislation and clarifying 
certain points omitted by it, while in Saudi Arabia strict government control and corporate 
self-regulation have been common. 
Despite the different origins of the two countries‟ legal systems, both England and Saudi 
Arabia have adopted a single-tiered board structure. This fact points to the legislative focus 
on shareholders, rather than stakeholders. Although such an approach is, arguably, not 
common for a civil law country, as Saudi Arabia is, it was demonstrated that large 
blockholders (the government and the rich families) play too significant a role in business and 
have too much influence over the process of corporate governance to allow other groups to 
interfere with their interests. In terms of board composition, both countries have applied the 
„one size does not fit all‟ approach, allowing companies the flexibility to determine the right 
size of the board for themselves. As such, only the minimum number of board members is 
established by law, while no upper cap is present
859
.  
Perhaps the major difference between the two countries in terms of their approach to 
directorship is in the legal separation of the different types of directors. While neither country 
has legislation explicitly defining legal types of directors, business realities have led to their 
establishing such definitions, although to a differing extent. In England, the CA 2006 
recognises de jure and shadow directors, while non-executive directors are recognised in the 
CGR 2010. The courts, and to some extent the legislation
860
, have identified these types in 
order to apply different forms of responsibilities and liabilities to individuals who are 
appointed directors or act as such. However, while the courts have had seemingly no 
problems in applying full scale liabilities and duties for de jure (legally appointed) directors 
                                                        
859 Although it should be noted that both countries have soft laws recommending certain limits to the number of 
directors. These are not mandatory, however.  
860 The CA 2006 does recognise the term „shadow director.‟  
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and their varieties
861
, the situation is more complicated with the shadow directors. While the 
CA 2006 states that shadow directors owe the same duties and responsibilities as the general 
directors, the courts have not been convinced of this. The only duty owed by shadow 
directors that seems widely accepted by English courts today is the duty of care and skill. 
Therefore, in terms of shadow directorship, there is no agreement in English law either on the 
application of the term, or on the duties that it assumes. 
The situation with regard to the legal definition of directorship is, at least theoretically, easier 
in Saudi Arabia.  Unlike in England, Saudi law does not distinguish between different types 
of directors. The non-binding CGR 2006 in the Kingdom recognise non-executive directors 
and apply good corporate practices to them. However, all binding statutory provisions and 
laws in the country assume only one type of directorship, a general one. While that type is not 
defined as being de jure or shadow, it is logical to think of it as the first one. This assumption 
is based on the fact that the appointment of directors in the Kingdom is a more linear process 
than in the England, largely due to the former‟s dominant shareholding patterns. 
Blockholders have no need for engaging in other types of governance rather than the direct 
one simply because they have such power of appointing the directors as they deem 
appropriate. At the same time, the appointed de jure directors are almost fully controlled by 
their appointors, who, however, are not recognised as directors anywhere in Saudi law. 
Finally, the definition of a director to whom the duties apply in Saudi law is very narrow, 
since it only includes individuals who are members of the board of directors. As argued in 
Chapter 4, the absence of controlling mechanisms for outside influences on the board may be 
detrimental to the issue of property exploitation. Therefore, suggested amendments to the CL 
1965 provided in Appendix B include specific provisions recognising shadow directors as 
having the same duties as their de jure counterparts.  
As for non-executive directors, both legal systems recognise the importance of having them 
on companies‟ boards, although in both cases, this recognition only goes as far as 
recommendations within the corporate governance regulations, which are not binding. The 
legislation of both countries also recognises the importance of the independence of NEDs and 
identifies their primary functions as monitoring and advising the executive directors. In 
practice, however, these goals are hardly met in either England or Saudi Arabia, although for 
different reasons. In England, the NEDs‟ involvement in corporate affairs is typically low due 
                                                        
861 The nominees and alternative directors.  
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to lack of incentives and time, the selection process (potentially „non-active‟ members are 
preferred), and the control exerted by the executives. Less influential, but still important, is 
„insider‟ non-executive directorship based on business connections and relationships. In 
Saudi Arabia, the NEDs‟ involvement is theoretically higher; however, their independence is 
questioned. This stems from the fact that NEDs are commonly appointed by large 
shareholders and therefore serve their interests. Further, corporate boards in the Kingdom 
tend to include representatives of the same families, appointees by the government, or cross-
directors from friendly businesses. As a result, the effectiveness of NEDs in both countries is 
doubtful: their involvement in companies‟ affairs is such that their main purposes do not 
surface. Therefore, the very idea of introducing more NEDs onto corporate boards becomes 
questionable.  
Until recently, English law equated NEDs to executives in terms of their duties and 
responsibilities. However, as in the case of shadow directors, there has been a shift toward 
limiting these, as demonstrated in recent cases. The primary responsibility of NEDs in Saudi 
Arabia, by law, is to act in favour of the shareholders, who are, in most cases, their 
appointors. Therefore, even though the law assumes full responsibility for NEDs, it is highly 
unlikely that their acts can deviate from the direct orders of their appointors and disagree with 
the executives. Therefore, in both countries, there is a clear tendency towards the limited 
effect and limited liability of NEDs on the corporate board.  
7.3.2 Legal Position of a Company Director 
The discussion on the approaches to directorship definitions and types within the legal 
systems of England and Saudi Arabia has shown some important similarities and differences 
between the two. However, in order to complete the discussion on the role of directors, it is 
important to identify the legal position of a company director as seen in both jurisdictions. 
Depending on the definition (agent or trustee), it will be easier to determine what duties 
directors owe and to whom. 
In England, the nature of the director‟s office evolved historically, and today directors are 
widely considered as agents of a company. However, they are more than that, because, as 
practice shows, directors are not strictly controlled by shareholders, especially in large public 
companies. Further, directors in England possess certain features of trustees, taking into 
account the fiduciary duties laid upon them, which are very close to the constructive trust 
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relationship with beneficiaries. On the other hand, English directors are not trustees in the full 
sense, because they are not entitled to the company property and are certainly more able to 
take risks than regular trustees can. Overall, the dual nature of English directors can be 
summarized by the expression „fiduciary agents‟.  
The dual nature of the directorship office is also evident in Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, 
the company laws adopted in the Kingdom, coupled with the strong control of shareholders 
over the board, suggest a principal-agent type of relationship. However, the nature of the 
Saudi director office is such that it has to not only follow the rules outlined by the company 
laws, but also make sure that the director‟s conduct is in line with the Shariah laws, which 
are considered supreme in Saudi Arabia.  In this sense, obligations imposed on Saudi 
directors by the Qur’an suggest a form of relationship which is closer to the beneficiary-
trustee relationship. Nevertheless, the current statutory legislation in the Kingdom only 
applies to those individuals who directly govern the company. The statutory law has excluded 
outside parties who can influence companies (like shadow directors) from owing the same 
fiduciary duties as the company directors themselves. This seems like a serious omission in 
the law, considering the potentially harmful effect of not holding influential outside parties 
responsible in the same manner as de jure directors. Again, for these reasons, recommended 
amendments presented in Appendix B address this issue.  
7.4 To Whom Are the Duties Owed? 
As discussed, English and Saudi company laws are the products of different legal systems: 
common law and Islamic law (with the elements of civil law). Therefore, it could seem that 
these systems would establish very different rules regarding those to whom company 
directors owe their duties. The analysis of the two legal systems, however, has revealed that 
the expected differences are largely theoretical, while in practice, English and Saudi company 
laws have much in common
862
.  
The English Companies Act 2006 makes it clear that directors owe duties to their 
company
863
. Almost the same formulation is found in Saudi company law, where Article 28 
of the LRs issued by the CMA obliges company directors to exercise their duties for the 
                                                        
862 Arguably, this practical resemblance is yet another factor that makes the systems comparable from the point 
of view of a functional law analysis.  
863 CA 2006, s 170(1). 
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benefit of the company. Therefore, statutes in both countries establish the company as the 
major claimant with regards to directors‟ duties. Further, in both jurisdictions companies are 
treated as separate legal entities which may have interests other than those of the 
shareholders
864
. What about the other parties? Theoretically, company directors would owe 
the duty of care to society as a whole under the Shariah, while in England the concept of the 
socially responsible corporation, which has emerged recently, would imply at least 
consideration of the interests of the other parties besides the company. Again, seemingly 
different jurisdictions of England and Saudi Arabia provide nearly identical responses to this 
question. 
Both English and Saudi company law codes formally recognise the importance of considering 
the interests of parties other than the company. The CA 2006 in Section 172(1) obliges 
directors to promote the success of their companies in a manner that has regard for 
employees, customers, suppliers, the community and the environment. As such, the CA 2006 
attempted to introduce a wider context of social responsibility into the framework of 
directors‟ decisions and acts. Still, the extent and efficacy of Section 172(1) are questionable 
because none of these parties is capable of suing directors for specific breaches of duty. It can 
be argued that Saudi company law attributes more power to the relevant groups of 
stakeholders, especially in view of Article 76 of the CL 1965, which imposes liability on the 
board of directors for acts of „maladministration‟ toward „third parties‟. However, in the 
absence of clear definitions of either term, it is very unclear who the receivers of the fiduciary 
duties might be, and what specific acts are equated to the board‟s wrongdoing towards 
them
865.  Consequently, Saudi company law does not grant the assumed „third parties‟866 the 
right to sue the directors nor does it establish the procedures for filing any claims resulting 
from the directors‟ „maladministration‟. Drawing the parallels to English company law, the 
provision of Article 76 of the CL 1965 is similar to the „misfeasance‟ covered by Section 212 
                                                        
864 As was noted in Chapter 6, there is no agreement among Islamic scholars as to whether the concept of 
corporate personality is Shariah compliant. Nevertheless, the Saudi government included this concept, along 
with limited liability, into the context of modern company law in the Kingdom. Limited partnerships, companies 
limited by stock companies, and joint stock companies, according to Article 2 of the CL 1965, enjoy the statuses 
of both corporate personality and limited liability.  
865 As was noted, the CGR 2006 in Article 2(b) mentions the term stakeholders, whose rights have to be 
protected within the corporate governance framework. The term includes „any person who has an interest in the 
company, such as shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community.‟ However, since the 
same authority issued the CL 1965 and the CGR 2006, it is unclear why two separate concepts would be used to 
define the same subjects. In addition, the CGR 2006 has a recommendatory, non-binding character. 
866 The exception is company shareholders. See discussion below.  
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of the Insolvency Act 1986 in England.  In England, however, the definition of the term and 
its applicability is determined based on the precedents in case law, which is not a common 
practice in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, on the basis of the existing government-issued laws 
the only clear case when directors will owe the same duties to stakeholders seem to be when 
failure to consider them also affects the company. 
None of the other sources of Saudi company law provides an explanation of these concepts 
either, which leaves it up to the courts to define them. However, given the wide range of 
possible legal interpretations of the Articles based on these terms, it is recommended that 
they should be clarified in statutory law. This would ensure consistency of legal applications 
and decrease the amount of speculation regarding the nature of duties outlined in the 
corresponding Articles of the CL 1965. The definitions of the terms can be provided either 
within the corresponding Articles themselves or in a separate Article that can outline the 
terms and link them either to the Articles related to fiduciary duties only or to the entire code, 
since these terms can be used in other Articles as well. Appendix B provides a set of 
recommended definitions.  
In terms of liability claims, both English and Saudi jurisdictions seem to grant more powers 
to shareholders than to other stakeholders. The statutory codes in both countries have 
provisions that allow shareholders to bring claims against the directors either as a group or 
individually
867
.  The English Act is, however, more precise and comprehensive in this regard: 
it outlines specific misdeeds (negligence, default, breach of duty, and breach of trust) that 
may trigger the filing of the claim and the procedures for doing so. Article 78 of the CL 1965, 
on the other hand, remains unclear regarding this matter by mentioning the misdeeds in 
general terms („wrongful acts‟) and providing no clear guidelines as to how the claim should 
proceed. However, detailed or not, derivative claims by shareholders, as outlined in both 
jurisdictions, have not seen much success recently. This is proved by the fact that English 
case law has still seen a dearth of derivative claims even after the passage of the CA 2006
868
, 
while in Saudi Arabia, the only provision dealing with recitative claims is unclear and 
                                                        
867 CA 2006, ss 261-264; CL 1965, article 78.  
868 Yates and Hinchliffe (n 491) 332; Loughrey, Keay and Cerioni (n 719) 111. 
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confusing, which makes it extremely hard for such claims to succeed, especially when 
brought by minority shareholders
869
.  
Following the discussion above, it is logical to conclude that English and Saudi company 
laws and regulations put the emphasis on the company (and to some degree the shareholders) 
as the main entities to which directors owe their duties. The legal systems are also similar in 
that they allow shareholders to file derivative claims against the directors, although the 
effectiveness of this remains questionable. In relation to other stakeholders (such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, the environment, and society as a whole), statutory laws 
mostly assign the responsibility of „having regard‟ for their interests, while no duties are 
imposed that could be similar to those owed to the company.  
7.5 Conflicts of Interest 
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest is directly recognised and dealt with in both English 
and Saudi jurisdictions, although the degree of depth of the law and the comprehensiveness 
of the applicable legal rules is quite different.  In English law, the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest is codified in Section 175 of the CA 2006, which includes a number of provisions 
clarifying the scope of the duty, exceptions to the duty, and the procedures for obtaining 
exceptions where appropriate. The section is largely a product of the long history of related 
case law, which has been dealing with the issue of conflicts of interest for quite a long time. 
Saudi company law, however, provides a very limited overview of the conflicts of interest 
issue by confining the entire complex issue to only two lines of text within Article 69 of the 
CL 1965. The comparative analysis of how English and Saudi company law treat the 
conflicts of interest issue is provided below by reviewing the underlying rationale for the duty 
in law, the wording of the duty in the statutes, the scope of the duty, and the exceptions 
provided in each jurisdiction. 
7.5.1 Rationale and Wording  
The need for regulating conflicts of interest in both England and Saudi Arabia has been 
determined historically, although based on different rationales. In England, the rationale for 
avoiding a conflict of interests has evolved from the concept of the constructive trust, where 
                                                        
869 Even though the Article allows derivative complaints, it restricts them to being made prior to the completion 
of the conduct that is impugned; otherwise the right to complain is denied. It could be claimed that the purpose 
of this provision is to keep power and control over the company‟s affairs in the hands of the majority 
shareholders.  
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profiting from the position of trust was established as illegal in Keech v Sandford
870
, which 
formed the basis for future conflicts of interest cases. The modern understanding of the need 
to manage the conflicts of interest in company law is to prevent situations where directors 
might exploit opportunities for personal benefit
871
.  Parker LJ in Murad v Al-Saraj
872
 noted 
that one of the reasons for enforcing the policy of avoiding a conflict of interest is „the 
perceived difficulty in determining what might have happened but for the fact that the 
fiduciary had placed himself in a position of conflict.‟ This view is also shared in scholarly 
work on English law
873
. While a corporate form of ownership did not exist in the traditional 
forms of business treated within the Shariah, the links to the modern treatment of the issue of 
conflicts of interest can be found in Islamic law. Any property, money or opportunity gained 
by usurping the position of power is prohibited by secondary Shariah sources through the 
notions of ghabn and gharar
874
. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, a director attempting to 
advance his personal interests at the expense of the company will be considered as a cheat 
and a dishonest man, with all the applicable consequences, which are the expropriation of any 
profits and properties, and their consequent transfer to the company. Therefore, despite the 
distinctively different traditional legal systems of England and Saudi Arabia, both countries 
established their own rationales for legal treatment of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. 
The contemporary legal systems in England and Saudi Arabia have codified the duty of 
avoiding such conflicts of interest in their major company law statutes. Interestingly, while 
the provisions of both Section 175 of the CA 2006 and Article 69 of the CL 1965 prohibit 
conflicts of interest, neither statute actually defines what an „interest‟ may entail875. This, in 
the opinion of the researcher, is a serious omission in both cases, although the consequences 
of such omission are, arguably, different.  
                                                        
870 [1726] EWHC Ch J76. 
871 See, for example, Kingsley Consulting Ltd v McIntosh [2006] EWHC 1288 (Ch); [2006] BCC 875 at 55. 
872 [2005] EWCA Civ 959, at 107. 
873 See, for example, Davies (n 435) 392-394: the courts would face difficulties in assessing a transaction‟s 
fairness if a director claimed that the same transaction would take place in a situation where there was no 
conflict. 
874 Almadani (n 822) 398. 
875 No explanations are provided in the explanatory notes to the statutes or any other statutory code used in the 
company law of either country.  
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In England, the absence of a definition of „interest‟ creates issues regarding the breadth of the 
rule‟s application. Specifically, it leads to difficulties with the interpretation of the rule 
regarding the corporate opportunities which can be used by directors. Earlier case law 
traditions took quite a wide view of such opportunities, considering anything of possible 
interest to the company as a „corporate opportunity‟ (even where impossible to pursue, in 
practice or legally), while more recent case decisions seem to have followed a narrower view. 
The introduction of section 175(4)(a) into the CA 2006, too, seems to serve the purpose of 
relaxing the strict application of the conflicts of interest rule. Still, the section is not 
sufficiently well defined to clarify the extent of the exceptional situations in which the 
conflict of interest would not arise. From this standpoint, the lack of clarification in the CA 
2006 is likely to prolong the legal debates regarding the scope of the conflicts of interest rule. 
It could be easier for the courts if the statutory code made it clearer.  
In Saudi Arabia, the issue of conflicts of interest within the context of modern corporations is 
a relatively new legal area. The introduction of the CL 1965 was, in fact, the first attempt to 
govern many areas of company law which have not been clearly defined within the traditional 
concepts of the Shariah.  As such, the main issue with the absence of definition of „interest‟ 
is not so much related to the necessity of clarifying the breadth of the rule‟s application, but, 
with the absence of explanation, what exactly may fall under the provision of Article 69. The 
Article even distinguishes between direct and indirect interests, but it never makes clear how 
each of them is defined. Based on this, it becomes difficult, if not impossible
876
, for the courts 
to consider all aspects within which the rule of the conflicts of interest would apply.  
7.5.2 Scope and Application 
The scope of the rule provided by the statutes of English and Saudi company laws vary 
significantly. In England, the application of the rule is quite broad, which follows from 
statutory provisions of the CA 2006. The English statute provides that avoiding the conflicts 
of interest involves exploitation of the company‟s property, information or opportunities even 
if the company could not take advantage of them
877
. Exploitation is mentioned as a specific 
way of applying the rule, and it is implied that the term exploitation extends to any use of 
                                                        
876 Since the previous court decisions are not binding in Saudi Arabia, the scope of the term „interest‟ as defined 
within particular court decisions cannot be readily applied in subsequent case law.  
877 CA 2006, s 175(2).  
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property, not simply its abuse
878
.  The broad application of the rule is further enforced by the 
fact that „it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, 
information or opportunity.‟  Finally, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest relates not only to 
current, but also to former directors
879
.  
Article 69 of the CL 1965 is the only provision that deals with the conflicts of interest in 
Saudi company law. It provides that the rule applies specifically to transactions or contracts 
on behalf of the company. As such, the scope of the rule is limited by the statute to interests 
in the transactions of the company. This, however, leaves out many potential situations of the 
conflicts of interest rule that have to be considered. Following the discussion on the scope of 
the duty in English law, Saudi company statute fails to address such important issues as 
exploitation, in relation to what leads to triggering the rule or whether former directors are 
subject to it.  Nor does the scope of the rule in Saudi statutory law consider whether 
information and opportunity can be pursued by the company. However, as was previously 
discussed, opportunities are not given the same protection in Saudi law as property, and 
protection of information is mentioned in another Article of the CL 1965
880
. Still, the scope 
of Article 69 is very obscure. In addition to the issues mentioned above, the Article does not 
mention the nature of the transactions covered and whether potential conflicts of interest are 
included in the provision.  
In terms of the application of the rule, English law has been somewhat divisive, as two 
approaches in the case law have emerged: no-profit and no-conflict rules. Under the no-profit 
rule, company directors are not allowed to make a profit while serving in their positions, and 
it becomes irrelevant whether directors might have acted in good faith and whether the 
company profited from their actions
881
. Under the no-conflict rule, however, a broader view 
on the conflict of interest is provided: if a director made a profit, the court would consider 
whether a conflict of interest with the company took place
882
. Case authority exists in favour 
                                                        
878 CA 2006, s 175 (2). 
879 CA 2006, s 170(2) (a).  
880 CL 1965, article 72. 
881 The approach was applied in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (n 432). 
882 The approach was applied in Boardmann v Phipps (n 457). 
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of both the no-profit approach as a separate rule
883
 and within the broader no-conflict rule
884
. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the CA 2006 did not manage to completely resolve the matter, 
although it can be argued that Section 175(4)(a) has been a step towards accepting the no-
conflict rule in English company law. Within this approach, the application of the duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest is more flexible: it does not dismiss the possibility of earning profit 
per se; rather, each case is considered on a factual basis that determines whether an actual 
conflict of interest with the company was present.  
Unlike England, the application of the duty to avoid a conflict of interest is not certain in 
Saudi company law. In the absence of public access to case law, it is impossible to determine 
how Saudi courts treat ambiguities and blank spaces left by Article 69 of the CL 1965. 
Article 69 leaves a wide lacuna in a number of related corporate governance aspects. For 
example, the Article (and the entire CL 1965 for this matter) does not provide whether 
engaging in a transaction for the benefit of the company members and managers can be 
considered a breach of the duty to avoid a conflict of interest. Nothing is said regarding the 
transactions or agreements that directors may enter into with the company itself, for the 
benefit of both parties
885
. Finally, neither the Article nor the other provisions of the CL 1965 
explain whether the conflicts of interest duty is extended to the directors who resign from 
their position and to what extent this duty could be applied. The fact is that the courts‟ 
decisions in Saudi Arabia do not contribute to the further development of company law as a 
whole and to refining the application of Article 69 specifically. Therefore, clarification of the 
law in this regard can be done by extending the provisions of Article 69 and eliminating any 
ambiguities that the Article has in its current form.  
An important aspect of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest is the situation of directors 
competing with their companies. Both the English and Saudi legal systems have created 
statutory arrangements that regulate these matters. In England, the corresponding provision is 
found in Section 175(7), which prohibits the conflict of duties between directors and their 
companies. This indicates that the issue is considered within the conflicts of interest 
framework. Saudi Companies Law 1965 attributes a separate section to govern the conflict of 
                                                        
883 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding (n 400); In Plus Group Ltd. v Pyke (n 535); Wilkinson v West Coast Capital 
(n 535); Don King Productions Inc v Warren (n 535).  
884 Boardman v Phipps (n 457); Item Software v Fassihi (n 412).  
885 This is an exception to the conflicts of interest rule in England. See CA 2006, s 175(3). 
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duties: Article 70 prohibits company directors from participating in competitive businesses 
and/or engaging in any of the commercial activities carried on by their companies.   
From the formulations of the statutory provisions that regulate competing with the company, 
it is obvious that Saudi law takes a much stricter stance on the issue. It establishes clear 
barriers to competing, from two standpoints: personal competition (participating in the same 
commercial activities as the company) and involved competition (being part of a competing 
business). English law, on the other hand, treats competing with the company in the same 
manner as the conflict of interest, which means that it provides the same exceptions to the 
rule. As a matter of fact, up until the CA 2006, there were no statutory provisions in English 
law regulating directors‟ competition with their companies. For quite a long time, the only 
authority in this regard was over a century old, in Mashonaland Exploration Co v New 
Mashonaland Exploration Co,
886
 where the court held that a director cannot be generally 
restrained from competition with his company
887
. Only recently, in Plus Group Ltd. v 
Pyke,
888
 did the court cast doubt on the applicability of Mashonaland to modern economic 
realities, although it did not go on to amend the rule. 
The issue of competing directors has indeed been a very hard one for the English legal system 
to handle. Granted, significant hurdles established by the statutory law have made it difficult 
for directors to serve on boards of competing companies. The major point of concern for the 
courts, however, has been the case when directors planned to compete with the company after 
resignation.  In this regard, the courts have generally considered such aspects as preparatory 
steps
889
, the circumstances leading to resignation
890
, and the time passed before engaging in 
                                                        
886 [1891] WN 165  
887 With some restrictions, the rule was later upheld in Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161. The restrictions 
imposed by the decision included the absence of concern in the contracts of the original company and not using 
property or information belonging to the original company. For the complete analysis, see Lord Blainsburgh‟s 
opinion. Later cases followed suit by establishing that being engaged in a competitive company is not a breach 
of fiduciary duty. See, for example, Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch. 169, CA; also 
see connection to executive director per Lord Denning in Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd v  Meyer [1959] 
AC 324, HL. 
888 [2002] 2 BCLC 201. 
889 Planning by itself is not considered a breach of duty in English case law: see Island Export Finance Ltd. v 
Umunna (n 856); CMS Dolphin v Simonet (n 500); IDC v Cooley (n 506). However, actual preparatory steps 
while being a director constitute a breach: Coleman Taymar Ltd v Oakes (n 604); British Midland Tool Ltd v 
Midland International Tooling Ltd (n 605). 
890 In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke (n 535); Foster v Bryant (n 596). Informing the board of the intention to pursue an 
opportunity was linked to the duty of loyalty in O’Donnell v Shanahan (n 507). 
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competing activities
891
. All these factors lead to the conclusion that the English legal system 
still has issues in regulating competing directorships.  
In this regard, the clear and unambiguous provision of Article 70 of the CL 1965 may seem 
superior to the uncertainty of English company law. However, Article 70 leaves many blank 
spaces and much room for interpretation of its provisions as well. For example, it does not 
make a distinction between present and past directorships. In fact, the issue of directors who 
have resigned is nowhere addressed in the CL 1965 at all. Therefore, issues such as resigning 
with the intention to usurp corporate opportunities, engaging in preparatory activities with the 
goal of resigning and taking the opportunity, and not acting in good faith if the possibility of 
diverting a very profitable transaction may come, remain open. Secondly, the degree of 
competition between the companies for possible directorship is not clarified. This is, 
however, a serious issue in Saudi Arabia, where multiple directorships are quite common in 
the Saudi business landscape as large cross-holdings in companies are not rare
892
. Finally, the 
code goes further than the established Shariah rules, which only condemn competitive 
activity if it harms the company
893
. In this regard, the Shariah rules seem closer to the 
position taken by the English legislature, where competition is allowed in specific 
circumstances
894
. 
There is a rule in both legal systems that provides an exemption from the conflict of duties. In 
both legal systems, authorisation is required. However, the types of authorisation are 
different: English law considers it sufficient for the board of directors to exempt one of the 
directors from the conflict of duties liability, while Saudi company law only allows 
authorisation by the general meeting of shareholders. Whether one of these approaches is 
superior to another is hard to judge. On the one hand, allowing the board to grant protection 
from liability allows the tedious process of shareholder‟s approval to be avoided; on the other 
hand, shareholders‟ approval provides a higher degree of protection. It can be said, however, 
that the chosen approaches of both jurisdictions fit the legal realities of both countries. The 
board‟s approval seems suitable for England, where dispersed shareholding and consequent 
                                                        
891 Southern Real Estate Pty Ltd v Dellow and Arnold [2003] SASC 318; [2003] 87 SASR 1. Discussion on the 
passing of „reasonable time,‟ although there was no indication of what this may consist.  
892 See Section 4.3.2. of this thesis.  
893 Saleh (n 723) 97.  
894 See Section 5.3.2.2.2. of this thesis. 
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low involvement of shareholders may create the rather tedious process of granting an 
approval. At the same time, for the strict purposes of law that are strongly implied in Article 
70 of the CL 1965, to relax the rule by allowing the board of directors to approve competition 
by one of the directors would be illogical.  
Another difference between the two legal systems with regard to authorisation is the presence 
of guidelines for the authorisation process. The English CA 2006 outlines the procedure in 
Sections 175(5) and 175(6), while the Saudi CL 1965 remains silent in this regard.  As a 
matter of fact, shareholders‟ approval is nowhere clarified in Saudi statutory law. Therefore, 
it remains unclear whether the authorisation is provided by a simple majority and whether a 
specific number of participant shareholders is required for the authorisation. However, 
despite the guidelines provided for the process of authorisation by the board, the CA 2006 is 
not without its flaws. Two main issues in this regard are: the absence of a definition of an 
„interested director‟, who, along with the director in question, should be excluded from 
voting; and allowing the related director (and „interested directors‟) to participate in the 
discussion of the meeting prior to voting on the matter.  
Finally, and this is extremely important, English law makes the rule applicable to both public 
and private companies. It even establishes different approaches to the process of granting 
directors permission to avoid a conflict of duties.  In contrast, Saudi CL 1965 applies, in 
general, to joint stock companies only. In other words, any of the provisions of the statute, 
including Article 70, do not cover governance issues related to private companies. The 
absence of statutory regulations for private companies is, however, a serious detrimental 
feature in the overall legal fabric of Saudi company law. While the discussion on this matter 
is beyond the scope of this study, it is, nevertheless, strongly suggested that statutory 
provisions to regulate corporate governance in private companies are developed in Saudi 
Arabia.  
7.5.3 Exceptions 
English and Saudi company statutes contain a number of provisions that may deem the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest not infringed. Here, again, the legal systems significantly diverge 
from each other. The exceptions to the rule provided by the CA 2006 in England include: 
transactions or arrangements with the company; situations which cannot reasonably be 
regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; and when an authorisation is obtained 
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from the board of directors
895
. Article 70 of the CL 1965, in turn, provides two forms of 
protection: authorisation by shareholders and public bidding. The issues related to the 
authorisation process have been reviewed above on the basis of competing directorships. 
Therefore, the discussion proceeds by focusing on the remaining types of protection. 
Section 175(4)(a) of the CA 2006 provides that the duty to avoid a conflict of interest in 
English law is not infringed if „the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give 
rise to a conflict of interest.‟  The introduction of this section in the statute was possibly 
aimed to relax the traditional strict approach in regulating conflicts of interest in England. 
However, the extent to which this rule could and would be accepted by the courts remains 
questionable. The provision itself does not contain any specific terms, which makes it widely 
interpretable. Chapter 5 considered possible applications of the rule based on a company‟s 
rejection of opportunity and the „line of business‟ test. Neither of these, however, was well 
received by English courts in the pre-Act era
896
. Therefore, despite the intention of the 
English legislator to relax the traditional strict approach of the courts in relation to the 
conflicts of interest rule, it yet remains to be seen whether it will succeed.  
Unlike English company law, which has demonstrated an intention to relax some its rules in 
regulating conflicts of interest, Saudi Arabia remains somewhat conservative in this regard. 
Neither the CL 1965 nor recent statutes such as the LRs 2004 provide many exceptions to the 
rule of conflict of duties except for the authorisation by shareholders. In fact, the only other 
exception to Article 69 of the CL 1965 is public bidding. Specifically, the Article provides 
that if a director submits a winning bid, he is not considered liable for breach of the duty to 
avoid a conflict of interest. However, the provision seems to be in clear conflict with what 
Article 70 says, since the latter prohibits any type of competition with the company.  Article 
70 does not provide an exception like public bidding, which makes the situation rather 
confusing and generates a lack of clarity regarding the overall notion of competing with the 
company. Further, Article 69 also fails to clarify such issues as a resigning director‟s 
transactions with the company or for the benefit of the company. While the absence of a test 
similar to Section 175(4)(a) can be explained by the intention to preserve a strict approach to 
                                                        
895 CA 2006, ss 175(3)-175(4).  
896 See Bhullar v Bhullar (n 507) where rejection of opportunity by the company was not considered sufficient 
to grant protection from liability. See O’Donnell v Shanahan (n 507) for rejection of the „line of business‟ test.  
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regulation of the duty to avoid a conflict of interest, the issues raised above have to be 
addressed in order to provide full clarity in relation to the duty in Saudi company law.  
7.5.4 Suggested Changes to the Statutes 
7.5.4.1 The CA 2006 
The very first problem identified in the course of the review of Section 175 was the 
unnecessary specificity that might be considered a limitation of the scope of the no-conflict 
rule. Specifically, section 175(2) provides a particular definition of the scope of the rule, 
stating that it is not permitted to exploit the company‟s property, information or opportunities 
even if the company could not take advantage of these. The primary issue raised in the 
section seems to be not when the conflict emerged, but whether the conflict related to the 
exploitation of property, information or opportunity and whether the director was „aware at a 
time when he was director‟ of the company. The wording of the corresponding section in this 
sense seems to require that exploitation, not the presence of a conflict of interest, be within 
the director‟s consideration. This is a strange limitation, in that it concentrates on the 
director‟s avoidance of exploitation, not all kinds of possible conflicts of interest. It seems 
that the main idea behind the section was to emphasise the avoidance of all kinds of such 
conflicts, not specific ones. Not that the exploitation of company property is unimportant for 
this matter, but clarification on what exploitation entails and to what degree it can be applied 
under the section would be helpful. Otherwise, the introduction of other types of conflicts of 
interest in the section is desirable.  
Second, too vague a definition of the reasonability defence leaves it up to the courts to look 
into specific cases of the taking of corporate opportunities by directors. However, as the 
recent cases demonstrate, traditionally conservative English courts are not likely to diverge 
from the comfortable absolute rule shaping conflict of interests, as formulated in Keech v 
Sandford
897
 and later approved in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver
898
 and Boardman v 
Phipps
899
.  This makes the intended changes to the strict rules very difficult to implement in 
practice. In order to shift the process, it is submitted that statutory clarification of section 
175(4)(a) should be provided. What situations should be included here? Following from the 
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analysis above, such situations could be when the opportunity is out of the scope of the 
company business and where there is no legal possibility for a company to pursue an 
opportunity (but there is a legal possibility for the director to do so). This would represent a 
partial adoption of the Guth-Broz corollary, while not threatening the integrity and 
foundations of the strict approach used within English equity
900
. 
Finally, issues were noted in section 175(6). It seems that by limiting the number of required 
individuals to approve of taking corporate opportunities only increases the likelihood of these 
opportunities being exploited by directors
901
. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the 
requirement of shareholders‟ approval can be very hard to meet, especially in public 
companies. This was possibly the main reason for introducing the provision of the board‟s 
approval in the first place. However, leaving the section in the way it is formulated decreases 
the security that the company shareholders may have with regard to company property. For 
these reasons, reformulation of the section is required. According to the Act, the process of 
authorisation is conducted by means of a quorum, during which the director in question, as 
well as any other interested director, is excluded from voting
902
. While the position of the 
director seeking exclusion from exploitation of the opportunity rule is clear, the case of the 
„interested director‟ is somewhat confusing, because it is nowhere clarified who can 
potentially fall in this category. Further, the Act only disallows the director in question to 
vote on the matter of authorisation, while he can freely participate in the discussion regarding 
authorisation, thus having an opportunity to influence the board‟s decision-making process. 
This is an undesirable omission that can lead to an increased risk of property exploitation, 
especially when a director has a very strong influence over the board. Granted, the position of 
the director seeking authorisation has to be clearly explained in order to make a case for 
authorisation. However, this can be conducted by means of presenting a report in the due 
manner. The presence at the meeting of the director whose proposal for exclusion from 
exploitation of opportunity is likely to cause a potential conflict of interest is simply not 
                                                        
900 Indeed, this thesis does not submit that any capability facts should be taken into account to allow the seizing 
of the opportunity by directors. The thesis does not, for example, suggests the inclusion of a financial capacity 
test or the rejection of opportunity by the company. When a company cannot legally pursue an opportunity, it 
cannot be considered as a capability fact and, therefore, cannot be regarded as immaterial.  
901 See a good discussion on why section 175(4)(b) could increase the likelihood of property exploitation, in 
Davies (n 405) 567-570. 
902 By means of section 175(6) of the CA 2006. 
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appropriate. An appropriate change to the statutory law is, therefore, required in order for the 
company shareholders to be duly notified about any relevant board authorisations. 
Suggested amendments to Sections 175(2), 175(4)(a) and 175(6) are provided in Appendix A.  
One of the serious issues within the no-conflict framework remains that of competing after 
resignation. Considering the significant difficulties that individuals might face under English 
law when serving as directors in competing companies, such cases are rarely met with in 
practice. It is much more likely that competing directorships in modern English companies 
emerge within the paradigm of resignation and the subsequent launch of that individual's own 
company
903
. Therefore, modern English company law focuses more on the situation where a 
director who plans to compete with the company after resignation takes certain steps to 
prepare for this while still being the director. In this regard, two conflicting approaches have 
emerged in English case law: one that considers the preparatory activities for competition to 
be an outright breach of fiduciary duties
904
, and the other that takes a case sensitive approach 
in deciding whether it is so
905
. Considering these approaches from the perspective of 
consistency with the other fiduciary duties and protection of the company property, the first 
approach is preferable. However, in order to provide more clarity in this matter, it seems that 
an entire section on fiduciary duties related to resigning directors should be introduced
906
. 
This is quite a complicated task, which leaves the issue most likely to remain in the hands of 
the courts to decide. 
7.5.4.2 The CL 1965 
Much criticism has been voiced regarding the way that Article 69 of the CL 1965 treats the 
issue of the conflicts of interest and declaration of interests. Inconsistencies and lack of 
clarity are, in fact, evident throughout the entire provision of the Article, which, in the 
opinion of the researcher, needs serious rethinking and reconstruction. To sum up, the 
following problems were noted in the course of reviewing the Article: 
                                                        
903 The cases of Umunna, CMS Dolphin, Bryant, and IDC confirm this notion.  
904 British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tooling Ltd (n 605); CMS Dolphin v Simonet (n 500). 
905 Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd (no 506); Item Software v Fassihi (n 412). 
906 Section 170(2) applies to directors who have already resigned, thus extending fiduciary duties to where 
directors leave the company. The issue reviewed here is different, because directors still remain in a directorship 
capacity when preparations for competition are initiated. 
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In relation to paragraph 1: 
- The Article only deals with interest in the company transactions and contracts, 
while leaving out what potentially can be beneficial to the company; 
- The Article does not clarify what is covered within the transactions in question; 
- The Article leaves unanswered the question of whether engaging in transactions 
for the benefit of both the company and the director is acceptable; 
- The Article does not clarify whether directors can engage in transactions with the 
company for mutual benefit; 
- The Article does not include provisions related to former directors or to directors 
sitting on the boards of more than one company;  
- There is a conflict between this section, which allows directors to publicly bid 
against the company, and Article 70, which prohibits any form of competition 
with the company; 
It is obvious that the introduction of all these amendments in the Article would require 
substantial rewriting of its provisions. However, each of these amendments has been 
explained and justified above, and their introduction will, it is believed, make the provisions 
under Article 69 more comprehensible and easier to enforce, thus leaving much less 
ambiguity than is currently in the Article. Finally, none of the suggested amendments go 
against the Shariah principles, and therefore they would be totally legitimate within the Saudi 
jurisdiction.  
The text of the original Article 70 of the CL 1965 clearly and explicitly prevents directors 
from participating in a competing business or engaging in any commercial activities that a 
company undertakes. The main criticisms regarding the Article were the absence of 
consideration regarding past directorships and occupation of director positions in more than 
one company. The Article was found unable to provide clear guidance regarding such issues 
as intentional resignation to compete with the company and the situation where a directorship 
was held in two competing companies. Therefore, the amendments to Article 70 are aimed at 
resolving these issues specifically. The proposed amendments (Appendix B) prohibit 
intentional resignation for the purposes of competing with the company, prohibit directorship 
in competing companies, and oblige the directors not to participate in board meetings 
whenever a conflict situation unexpectedly arises.  
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The following amendments are suggested to deal with the issues for Article 69 and Article 70 
as noted above: 
1) Replacing the duty to avoid interest in company transactions and contracts by the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest per se, existing or potential; 
2) Extending the nature of the definition of transaction by including real property, 
intellectual property, information and opportunities; 
3) Disallowing transactions with third parties for the benefit of both the company and 
director as well as transactions between the company and director, so as to avoid 
situations where only these kinds of opportunities are pursued;  
4) Introducing provisions regulating situations of resignation and multiple directorship in 
the context of the conflict of interest; 
5) Introducing the required minimum number of votes to allow directors to pursue the 
opportunities and transactions when there may be a conflict of interest with the 
company; 
6) Resolving the conflict between Article 69 and Article 70 by allowing directors to 
engage in public bidding only if there is no bidding on the side of the company and 
thus no competition with the company. 
7.6 Declaration of Interest 
Within the context of conflicts of duty, both the English and Saudi legal systems have 
introduced statutory provisions that oblige directors to declare their interest in company 
transactions.  In both countries, the duty serves as complementary to the general duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. In Saudi Arabia, it is presented in the same Article as the general duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest
907
. In England, the duty is codified in a separate provision, Section 
177 of the CA 2006, but the nature of its provisions directly point out to the general duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest. The treatment of this duty in both jurisdictions has more parallels 
than the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, although certain fundamental differences still 
persist.  
 
 
                                                        
907 CL 1965, Article 69 para 2-3. 
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7.6.1 Rationale and Wording 
As mentioned above, both the English and Saudi jurisdictions consider the duty to declare an 
interest in the transactions of the company within the broader context of the application of the 
general duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Again, however, the rationale for the introduction 
of the duty is somewhat different. In English law, Section 177 of the CA 2006 serves 
primarily a preventive function, because it requires a declaration to be made of a director‟s 
personal interest in a transaction before it is initiated. It may be recollected that the equity of 
the self-dealing principle, which in English law strongly relies on Keech v Sandford
908
, 
entitles the company to avoid any transactions where a director‟s interests are likely to come 
into conflict with the company‟s, and that even the possibility of bad faith or fraud can be 
opposed and rejected
909
. Therefore, Section 177 allows companies to avoid undesired 
transactions in this regard. In Saudi Arabia, the main rationale for the duty rests upon some 
fundamental principles of the Shariah, which are fulfilment of contract and honesty. Seizing 
a transaction for oneself would be considered a breach of the former, while failure to declare 
a personal interest in such a transaction would be a breach of the latter.  
In terms of the wording of the duty in the statutory laws of both countries, the primary issue 
of not defining „interest‟ still remains. Once again, the absence of this term leads to certain 
confusion as to what could fall within the scope of the statutory rules. In addition, an 
interesting point can be observed in the Saudi statute: while the provision relating to the 
conflicts of interest mentions direct and indirect interest in the transactions, the provision 
dealing with declaration of interest mentions „personal interest‟ as the main subject of the 
duty. This, in turn, means a difference in the scope of the duty application
910
, as noted in the 
next section. However, it is still unclear why the Saudi legislator decided to limit the scope of 
the rule‟s application911.  
 
 
                                                        
908 [1726] EWHC Ch J76 
909 Ex p Lacey (n 662).  
910 English law considers both direct and indirect interest for the purposes of Section 177 of the CA 2006.  
911 Although, truth be told, the absence of a clear definition of the term „interest‟ makes this concern somewhat 
irrelevant. 
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7.6.2 Scope and Application 
The scope of the duty to declare transactions remains unclear within statutory law in both 
jurisdictions due to the absence of a definition for the term „interest.‟ Consequently, even 
though English law mentions direct and indirect interest for the purposes of the duty, it is 
hard to determine how far it goes beyond „any personal‟ interest as defined in the statutory 
code of Saudi Arabia. It has been, largely, up to the courts in England to decide how far the 
term „interest‟ may be extended. Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust912 was one 
such case, where the court had to decide whether a sales contract between two parties, where 
the defendant was a director in one and a shareholder in another, was an interest to be 
disclosed. The court was inconclusive on this, claiming that the interest would not be 
diclosable in most cases, but acknowledging that there could be exceptions, thereby 
informally addressing the reasonable likelihood of a conflict. Later, in Runciman v Walter 
Runciman plc, the court held that even in cases where the interest of a director was blatantly 
obvious, there is a need to disclose it
913
.  
Unlike Saudi company law, which, apparently, does not distinguish between type and levels 
of interest for the purposes of their declaration, the English legal system has distinguished 
between technical and substantive breaches of disclosure. Technical non-disclosure, in 
general, can be defined as the failure to disclose an interest in situations where it is clear and 
obvious. This point was addressed in Lee Panavision v Lee Lighting
914
 and codified in 
Section 177(6)(b) of the CA 2006, which states that in cases where company directors are 
aware of personal interest, it does not have to be disclosed. Therefore, the English approach 
to a declaration of interest seems more flexible than in Saudi Arabia. However, whether such 
an approach is preferable is questionable.  
The main issue with the separation of secret disclosure between technical and substantive is 
that in the absence of a requirement to report an interest under technical non-disclosure, 
information regarding directors‟ interests remains with the board only. It is not, however, 
recorded in the minutes of the board meeting and is not be available to shareholders. The 
importance of the information in the minutes cannot be underestimated, because it helps 
                                                        
912 [1991] BCLC 1045. 
913 [1992] BCLC 1084. The same idea was expressed in Re Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd (No. 1) 
(n 675). 
914 [1991] BCLC 575; [1992] BCLC 22 CA. 
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avoid suspicions of secret dealings and some potential abuses from shadow directors. Indeed, 
a director or a group of directors may engage in beneficial transactions for themselves 
without due disclosure because the board apparently knows about their interest in the 
transactions. In other words, the rule of technical non-disclosure declared in Lee Panavision 
and codified in Section 177(6)(b) of the CA 2006 leads to a much lower degree of 
transparency, which favours directors, but downplays the interests of shareholders. While a 
number of recent cases addressed the need for a more formal disclosure of interests
915
, the 
active provision of the CA 2006 that provides protection from non-disclosure on the technical 
basis is likely to determine future decisions of the court in this regard.  
Another point of difference between the laws related to the duty to declare transactions may 
be speculative, since no clear definitions of the terms in this regard are provided in either 
jurisdiction. However, the English courts seem to take a broader view of the scope of the duty 
by applying it to directors‟ related parties (if this is what meant by „indirect interest‟).  As 
noted above, Article 69 of the CL 1965 in Saudi Arabia only treats personal interests as 
subject to the duty application. Therefore, while English law provides more freedom to 
directors in terms of declaring interests, it seems to be more inclusive than its Saudi 
counterpart by reason of the introduction of related parties.  
7.6.3 Process of Declaration 
The duty to declare an interest in the transaction implies that there has to be some procedure 
for doing so correctly. The English and Saudi legal systems developed their own approaches 
in this regard, with some of the elements being similar and some of them being drastically 
different. Both legal systems oblige directors to declare an interest in relevant transact ions to 
the board of directors. English jurisdiction provides two possibilities for this: either in writing 
or by means of a general declaration, while Saudi law does not provide clarification on the 
matter, nor does it require such important details as the nature and extent of interest. Finally, 
Saudi legislation does not have a provision that requires the interest to be declared prior to the 
transaction taking place
916
. This last point is, perhaps, the main weakness of the Saudi 
legislation, since the entire purpose of the duty to declare interest is based on timely provision 
of information in this regard.  
                                                        
915 Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) (n 681); see also Re MDA Investment Management Ltd 
(n 681). 
916 All these issues are covered in Section 177 of the CA 2006 in English law.  
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At the same time, the procedure for declaring interest in a transaction outlined in Saudi 
company law does have its advantages. Unlike English jurisdiction, Article 69 paragraph 3 of 
the CL 1965 requires that any expressed interest in a transaction by directors should be 
recorded in the company minutes and presented to the shareholders in due manner. Moreover, 
the Article also provides that such communication has to be accompanied by a report from 
the auditor.  It can be argued that these procedures provide an additional degree of protection 
to the company shareholders by providing vital information about the transactions involving 
company board members. Compared to the shareholders in English companies, who may 
remain uninformed about some dealings involving company directors under the rule of non-
technical disclosure, shareholders in Saudi companies enjoy a higher degree of board 
transparency.  
7.6.4 Legal Defences 
While English law provides a number of possible legal defences to a declaration of interest in 
company transactions, Saudi law offers none. It remains unclear whether this is dictated by 
the attempt of the Saudi legislator to create an all-encompassing strict rule for a higher degree 
of shareholder protection or whether it is a product of reliance on the Shariah duty of 
honesty, but the fact is that in the absence of exceptions to the rule, Article 69 of the CL 1965 
seems to be a very strict piece of legislation. In contrast, English law provides a whole list of 
protections from the main provisions of Article 177: 1) director not being aware of the 
interest; 2) director not being aware of the transaction which involved interest; 3) situations 
that cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; 4) if other 
directors are aware of the interest; and 5) if the situation concerns terms of his service 
contract that have been or are to be considered by a meeting of the directors or by a 
committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the company‟s constitution917. In 
addition, section 177 of the CA 2006 provides some leeway in this regard: directors are 
allowed to proceed with the transaction if all the requirements under the section are met. 
Consequently, no defence can be applied in a situation where the parties entered the 
transactional terms as though acting at arm‟s length. Similar provisions in English case law 
are valid in relation to a director‟s purchases from other companies918. Importantly, English 
                                                        
917 Sections 177(5)-177(6) of the CA 2006.  
918 However, articles of association in general give permission to such transactions. In this regard, see Ireland 
Alloys Ltd v Dingwall (n 663): the requirements for disclosure were listed in the articles, but not followed, 
which invalidated the board‟s decisions.  
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case law recognises that if the beneficiary allows the transaction, he cannot later demand it be 
set aside
919
. Based on these facts, the treatment of the duty to declare an interest in 
transactions is more relaxed in English jurisdiction.  
To some extent, relaxation of the rules within the English legal system in terms of declaration 
of interest may be regarded as corresponding to the requirements of time. Indeed, due to the 
ever more complex nature of company transactions, it is, for example, becoming increasingly 
difficult for directors to keep track of all transactions so as to avoid liability. In this regard, 
protection from liability seems justified. However, for the reasons outlined above, in the 
absence of well-defined liability for technical non-disclosure, the directors are given, perhaps, 
too much freedom and, hence, an incentive to breach their fiduciary duties. At the same time, 
in the absence of information to shareholders regarding such omissions, it becomes much 
harder to bring a case against mischievous behaviour of company directors. In this regard, it 
is surprising that in the predominantly strict English company law there is such an evident 
fiduciary loophole. 
7.6.5 Suggested Statutory Changes 
7.6.5.1 The CA 2006 
As was discussed above, breach of fiduciary duty under section 177 of the CA 2006 is 
interpreted as either substantive or technical
920
. While the substantive breach of duty carries 
full liability for the breach of fiduciary duty, the courts seem to refuse its application to 
technical breaches. As such, technical breaches, for example, are not commonly subject to a 
transaction being declared voidable. The courts are normally guided by the fact that section 
177(6)(b) does not require a declaration of an interest if other directors are aware of it. The 
primary issue with this approach is that formal declaration of an interest at the meeting 
discloses the interest not only to directors but also to shareholders because of its inclusion in 
the board meeting minutes.  As mentioned earlier, the importance of these notes should not 
be underestimated, because these help avoid suspicions of secret dealings and some potential 
abuses from shadow directors. Indeed, a sole director or several directors may engage in 
beneficial transactions for themselves without due disclosure because the board apparently 
knows about their interest in the transactions. However, these transactions might not be 
                                                        
919 Holder v Holder (n 664).  
920 Lee Panavision v Lee Lighting [1992] BCLC 22. 
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recorded anywhere at all, thus allowing directors to become involved in such operations 
without the due knowledge of the shareholders. For these reasons, denying the need for a 
formal declaration of interest in any transaction leads to increased uncertainty regarding 
directors‟ dealings, and it becomes much harder to bring a case against mischievous 
behaviour by company directors. Hence, some changes to the statutory law are proposed in 
Appendix A. 
7.6.5.2 The CL 1965 
While declaration of interest in related transactions by company directors is made mandatory 
in the CL 1965, the technique for the declaration is not clearly defined. Specifically, the 
following issues remain with regard to paragraphs 2-3 of Article 69, which deals with 
declaration of interest:  
- The Article does not establish the procedure for board or shareholder voting on 
the issue; 
- The Article does not require directors to declare an interest before the transaction; 
- The Article does not require directors to explain the nature and the extent of their 
interest in the transaction in question. 
Consequently, statutory changes to Article 69 of the CL 1965 have to be directed at resolving 
these issues. These changes are noted in Appendix B for Article 69, along with the changes 
suggested for the conflicts of interest matters.  
7.7 Other Duties: Benefits from Third Parties and Disclosure of Secrets 
So far, the analysis of the fiduciary duties of company directors toward company property in 
English and Saudi jurisdictions have covered the rules that were similarly worded and 
codified in both countries‟ statutes. However, each legal system also has a duty towards 
company property that is not found in the other‟s statutes. In English law, there is a duty to 
not accept benefits from third parties, while in Saudi Arabia, there is a duty not to disclose 
company secrets. For the completeness of the analysis, it is important to discuss these duties 
and see whether they can be respectively adopted by the countries in question to improve the 
regulation of directors‟ fiduciary duties towards property. Therefore, each of these duties is 
presented below.   
253 
 
7.7.1 Duty to Not Accept Benefits from Third Parties 
The duty to not accept benefits from third parties can be considered an extension of the no-
conflict approach in English company law. The duty prohibits directors from receiving 
benefits, which would possibly involve something in return as a result of acting in a director‟s 
capacity. As such, acting in the interests of third parties in return for material or other benefits 
involves a breach of the duty to avoid conflicts of personal interests with company interests. 
The rationale for including this duty in Section 176 of the CA 2006 is that it specifically 
covers profits received in the course of directorship
921
.  
Importantly, Section 176 does not explain the nature of the „benefits‟ covered by its 
provisions. While there are some things that can be easily defined as a benefit from third 
parties such as financial rewards (money, stock, property holdings, for example) or money‟s 
worth items such as paid travel or tickets to sports events or entertainment
922
, other cases, 
such as, for example, receipt of corporate hospitality, are reviewed in the context within 
which they are given
923
. In most cases, however, the common law has applied the term 
„benefits‟ from third parties to bribes and secret commissions924. However, the recently 
decided case of Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd
925
 established that virtually any 
benefit received by directors while serving as a director can be attributed to the breach of 
duty. The strict application of the rule holds that it does not matter whether the benefit was 
substantial or whether the company itself would find value in the benefit. The decision, 
however, has to be read together with the applicable duties of the conflicts of interest and 
declaration of interests.  
Saudi company law does not include any statutory provisions regulating directors‟ duties to 
avoid accepting benefits from third parties. Nor does it have any regulations of such activities 
in the CL 1965 or other company statutes. It can be argued that the inclusion of such 
provision in the company law is not needed since the Shariah explicitly prohibits acts of 
                                                        
921 Section 175 deals primarily with information and opportunities.  
922 These are mentioned in the ICSA Guidance on Directors’ General Duties (2008) at para 3.6.5. 
923 Ibid. 
924 This is predicated by the equitable rule established in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] AC 
324, which stated that bribes and secret commissions received by fiduciaries have to be held on constructive 
trust, and that all the profits acquired from this are also to be held on constructive trust. 
925 [2011] EWCA Civ 923. 
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dishonesty, usurping of power, and breach of loyalty, which seem to be the main constituents 
of Section 176 of the CA 2006. However, the term „benefits‟ can be extended beyond secret 
commissions and bribes (which was very possibly the intention of regulations under Section 
176 of the CA 2006), and provisions of law regulating gift giving within the corporate 
context can become a strong addition to the existing company law in the Kingdom. 
Moreover, in the absence of the Shariah rules, it is sometimes difficult to link specific issues 
in corporate law to applicable Shariah tenets.  From this perspective, adopting a duty to avoid 
acceptance of benefits from third parties is beneficial to both company law and the Shariah.  
7.7.2 Duty to Not Disclose Company Secrets 
Saudi company law has a distinctive provision in its statutory law that regulates the non-
disclosure of company secrets coming to the directors‟ knowledge within the capacity of their 
directorship. While the term „secrets‟ is nowhere defined in Saudi company law, it can be 
logically linked to the confidential information of a company. As such, Article 72 of the CL 
1965 deals directly with exploitation of company information by treating it as something that 
belongs to the company. The strict liability imposed by the provisions of the Article makes 
the breach of this duty a very serious matter in Saudi law
926
. This proves the fact that it 
accepts and treats intangibles as pieces of company property and rightfully protects them. But 
for this very reason, it is important that clarification is provided as to what „secrets‟ (and 
„third parties‟) mean in the context of the Article. The problem is that secret information can 
be of either a positive or negative character. For example, if a company engages in unethical 
(but not necessarily illegal) market behaviour, and the information comes to the surface 
during the board meeting, such information could be protected by Article 72 as „a company 
secret.‟ Consequently, revealing this fact may legally cost a director his position in the 
company and impose additional liabilities. Therefore, a director may find himself in a 
difficult situation where fear of losing his position with the company may prevent him from 
revealing certain facts in respect of the company‟s inappropriate actions, which could be 
harmful to the company stakeholders and society as a whole. 
The idea of codifying protective measures for a company‟s secret information could be 
considered within English company law. While Section 175 of the CA 2006 mentions 
                                                        
926 No other Article of the CL 1965 pertaining to directors‟ duties includes removal from the office as part of the 
liability for the breach of duty. Article 72, however, mentions removal as a definite, not merely possible, 
measure of punishment.  
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information as something protected from exploitation, it has primarily been viewed as 
information about opportunities that directors may pursue for their own benefit disregarding 
company interests. Article 72 of the CL 1965, however, protects confidential information 
from being revealed to third parties. The scope of this rule is likely to apply to something that 
does not belong to the domain of public information, and that therefore can be considered as 
the property of a company. On these grounds, the introduction of a provision similar to 
Article 72 in English company law is justified. In any case, however, it is clear that 
adaptation of the rule in its present form is not acceptable: it has some undefined terms which 
may cause ambiguous interpretation of the Article. Suggestions to modify the statutory 
provisions of Article 72, therefore, are provided in Appendix B.  
7.7.3 Suggested Statutory Changes  
7.7.3.1 The CA 2006 
The general issue that caused concern in relation to section 176 of the CA 2006 is the issue of 
ratification. Specifically, this chapter argued that section 176 covers largely illegal acts, 
which the company itself is not allowed to pursue.  Perhaps for these reasons the section 
disallows a board authorisation procedure akin to the one noted in section 175.  However, 
authorisation by shareholders is still possible under section 180(4), which deals with the 
consent and approval of the company members, and section 239 which covers the ratification 
of directors‟ acts. As such, there seems to be a significant problem where the possibility of 
approving of an illegitimate act remains. Unfortunately, the Act does not provide an answer 
anywhere as to whether there are non-ratifiable breaches. Therefore, although it is clear that 
there are breaches in common law that should not be given the power of ratification, it 
remains very unclear how wide the rule actually is. Therefore, there is a suggestion in 
Appendix A to introduce a limitation on the scope of the ratification rule.  
7.7.3.2 The CL 1965 
Article 72 was determined as a desirable provision in terms of regulating the fiduciary duties 
of company directors. However, in its present form, it is doubtful whether it is effective in 
creating clear boundaries for the effective protection of company information from 
exploitation. As discussed above, the primary reason for this is the presence of several 
concepts that are nowhere defined. In particular, the terms „secrets‟ and „third parties‟ are 
crucial to understanding the meaning of the Article and the true intention of the Saudi 
256 
 
legislator behind it. Without clarification of what these terms mean, it is impossible to 
determine what exactly the Article is intended to protect and what constitutes a breach of the 
duty. Therefore, the suggestions for amendments to the Article mainly relate to defining these 
terms, as demonstrated in Appendix B.  
7.8 Property Exploitation through Loans 
The final form of potential exploitation of company property considered in this study was 
exploitation through loans. As noted in the discussion related to company directors in Saudi 
Arabia, the CL 1965 does not provide adequate protection from property exploitation by 
means of company loans and loan guarantees for persons connected with company directors. 
In its present form, the CL 1965 does not explicitly distinguish between such persons and 
other third parties dealing with the company. Consequently, company loans and loan 
guarantees provided to these parties are the same. This, however, provides an opportunity for 
directors to use other parties to obtain loans and guarantees which are prohibited to them 
directly by means of Article 71. In order to avoid this, it is recommended that the 
amendments to Article 73 are made to 1) distinguish third parties from parties related to 
directors; 2) prohibit the issue of loans to related parties without shareholders‟ approval; and 
3) establish appropriate procedures for the declaration of such transactions and their approval. 
Appendix B provides a suggested modified version of Article 73. These suggestions are 
drawn from the English Companies Act 2006, which covers similar transactions in a much 
more detailed manner.  
7.9 Conclusions and Recommendations 
As a country that is becoming actively integrated into the global economy, Saudi Arabia 
requires a strong, clear and transparent legal system that will ensure the application of the 
rules of law in a manner that is beneficial to the country‟s society and economy. Company 
law in this regard is a relatively new area in the legal fabric of Saudi Arabia. In many 
respects, it is also one of the hardest legal areas to govern. This stems from the fact that the 
traditional Islamic law can offer little advice in terms of effective governance of the modern 
business entities that have emerged in the Kingdom as a result of rapid economic expansion, 
the growth of foreign investments, and the strengthening of commercial ties with the rest of 
the world.  
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Saudi Arabia has come a long way since the adoption of its first statute regulating corporate 
governance issues. However, despite its apparent developments in the area of company law, 
many gaps and ambiguities still remain. This is especially true regarding the CL 1965 – the 
major statutory law regulating corporate affairs in the Kingdom. Despite numerous 
amendments, the statute has become obsolete in many respects, and requires significant 
changes in order to effectively meet the demands of the modern Saudi economy. This was the 
primary motivation for the research that has been conducted, which has focused on an area 
that has been given little attention by contemporary scholars in the Kingdom, namely, the 
fiduciary duties of company directors towards property.  
The purpose of the study was to conduct a comparative analysis of the ways that fiduciary 
duties of company directors towards property are treated in England and Saudi Arabia. 
England was chosen because of its strong reputation in terms of its commercial legal system 
and company law in particular. The goal of the study was to determine the elements of 
statutory law in England that can be successfully adopted and adapted in Saudi Arabia to 
improve the existing way of treating the fiduciary duties of company directors toward 
property. At the same time, by critically evaluating the positive and negative aspects of the 
existing law in both countries, the study aimed to discover any inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in their legal systems and to provide useful suggestions for improvement.  
As expected, the results of the study demonstrated that the English legal system is much 
better developed and suited for the treatment of the fiduciary duties of directors towards 
company property. Yet it is also not without some minor flaws that have been duly noted by 
the researcher with suggestions for improvement. At the same time, the research showed how 
poorly developed, incomplete and unbalanced the regulations of fiduciary duties of directors 
towards company property in Saudi Arabia are. There are issues that need clarification, 
amendments, and/or rewriting in nearly every related Article of the CL 1965.  Using English 
company law as a peer to Saudi company law, the study provided many suggestions that the 
researcher believes will be able to contribute to the development of a new, more 
comprehensive and better company statute in the Kingdom. At the same time, it was found 
that some elements of the Saudi legal system could provide useful suggestions for improving 
English statutory law, thus making the work practical for both jurisdictions. The main 
contribution of the thesis, therefore, lies in the insights into the issues of managing the 
fiduciary duties of company directors towards property in England and Saudi Arabia, and 
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practical suggestions for reforming the statutory codes in both countries. The main 
contribution, however, is to Saudi company law, which is still struggling to introduce the new 
statutory provisions aimed at regulating business entities in the Kingdom.  
Based on the outcomes of the research, a number of suggestions of both an academic and 
practical nature are provided. Academic research recommendations cover mostly the topics 
that could be beneficial for further development of the Saudi legal system. The current 
research compared Saudi company law with English company law. While there is no doubt 
that the English legal system is one of the most developed in the world, there is a need to 
compare such aspects as the treatment of fiduciary duties towards company property to the 
legal systems that are closer to the Saudi one in terms of the nature of law as well as the 
cultural and social environments. In this regard, it would be useful to compare Saudi 
jurisdiction with the legal systems of developed civil law countries, such as France or 
Germany. It would be also useful to conduct such an analysis with the Islamic countries that 
have more flexible systems and make the case law available to the public. This is necessary 
in order to understand how the various aspects of company law are working and being 
interpreted in practice in environments that closely resemble the one in Saudi Arabia. Finally, 
as the study emphasised many time throughout the thesis, research is needed with regard to 
the possible codification of Shariah rules, at least for the purposes of their inclusion in the 
statutory codes, so as to better align traditional Islamic law with modern corporate law.  
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Appendix A: Suggested Revisions to the Companies Act 2006 
 
Section 175 
Original section 175(2):  
‘This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, 
information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company 
could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity).’ 
Modified section 175(2): 
‘This applies in particular, but is not limited, to the exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the 
company could take advantage of the property, information or 
opportunity).’ 
The original section 175(4) (a): 
This duty is not infringed— 
(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest. 
The modified section 175(4) (a): 
This duty is not infringed— 
(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest, such as in the case of pursuing an opportunity which is 
outside the scope of the company’s business or when a company cannot 
legally pursue an opportunity. 
The original section 175(6) 
The authorisation is effective only if— 
(a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is 
considered is met without counting the director in question or any other 
interested director, and 
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(b) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been 
agreed to if their votes had not been counted. 
The modified section 175(6) 
The authorisation is effective only if— 
(a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter 
is considered is met without counting the director in question or any 
other interested director,  
(b) the director in question did not participate in the meeting at which 
voting on the matter was conducted;  
(c) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been 
agreed to if their votes had not been counted; 
(d) the act of authorisation is duly communicated to the shareholders. 
Sections 180 and 239 
The original section 180(4)(a): 
The general duties— 
(a) have effect subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give 
authority, specifically or generally, for anything to be done (or omitted) by 
the directors, or any of them, that would otherwise be a breach of duty; 
The original section 239(1): 
This section applies to the ratification by a company of conduct by a 
director amounting to negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust in relation to the company. 
The modified section 180(4)(a): 
The general duties— 
(a) have effect subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give 
authority, specifically or generally, for anything to be done (or omitted) by 
the directors, or any of them, that would otherwise be a breach of duty, but 
which is not otherwise illegal; 
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The modified section 239(1): 
This section applies to the ratification by a company of conduct by a 
director amounting to negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust in relation to the company, but which is not otherwise illegal. 
Section 177 
The original section 177(4): 
Any declaration required by this section must be made before the company 
enters into the transaction or arrangement. 
The modified section 177(4): 
Any declaration required by this section must be made before the company 
enters into the transaction or arrangement and duly recorded in the board 
meeting minutes.  
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Appendix B: Suggested Changes to The Companies Law 1965 
 
Definition of Terms 
Company Secret: a piece of information possessed by the company, which 
is not publicly accessible, and which renders the company any potential 
economic advantage. A company secret may be any of the following (but 
not limited to): design of a product or production process, formula, 
instrument, pattern, or practice, for as long as they can be considered by 
the company as beneficial. Information about malpractices, unethical 
behaviour, or any illegal activity, even though profitable to the company, is 
not considered a company secret.  
Maladministration: any action by a director or a board of directors that 
causes injustice in relation to the company and its shareholders or might 
cause such injustice. Injustice includes – but is not limited to – financial 
loss, unjustified financial expense, and the loss of right or amenity.  
Third parties: persons or organisations not directly involved in the 
company management, but who, in view of their connection with the 
company, can be strongly affected by its actions. Third parties include (but 
are not limited to): employees, suppliers, customers, and business partners. 
Shadow Directors: persons or organisations not directly involved in the 
company management, but in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. Shadow 
directors are subject to the duties mentioned in Articles 69-73 of the 
current Act in the same way that company directors are. Individuals acting 
in a professional capacity while advising the board of directors shall not be 
regarded as shadow directors.  
 
Article 69 
‘A director has the duty to avoid situations where he has or may have a 
direct or indirect conflict of interest with the company. This applies in 
particular to the exploitation of real property, intellectual property, 
information or opportunities that a company pursues or intends to pursue. 
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The duty also includes transactions with third parties or between a 
company and a director for mutual benefit, unless otherwise provided in 
the company articles. The duty will not be infringed in cases where there is 
authorisation issued by the quorum of shareholders at the general meeting 
with the minimum percentage of votes as determined by the company 
articles (but not less than 50%). Such authorisation is to be renewed on an 
annual basis. Transactions made by way of public bidding shall be 
excluded from this restraint if the director submits a winning bid and the 
company does not participate in the bidding process.  
The director must declare to the board of directors any personal interest 
that he may have in transactions or contracts made on behalf of the 
company. Such declaration should be made before the company enters into 
the transaction or arrangement. The declaration must be recorded in the 
minutes of the board meeting stating the nature and extent of the interest, 
and the interested director shall not participate in voting on the resolution 
to be adopted in this respect.  
The chairman of the board of directors shall communicate to the regular 
general meeting, when it convenes, the transactions and contracts in which 
any director has a personal interest. Such communications shall be 
accompanied by a special report from the auditor.’ 
Any reference in this section to conflicts of interest also includes the 
conflict of duties. Former directors have to maintain the duty to avoid a 
conflict of interest for a reasonable amount of time to be regulated by the 
company articles. Prior to taking a seat on more than one board, a 
director must declare his position to all relevant company boards and 
obtain permission from all these companies to serve on a new board.’ 
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Article 70 
‘A director may not, without authorisation from the regular general 
meeting, to be renewed annually, participate in any business which is in 
competition with that of the company, or engage in any of the commercial 
activities carried out by the company, or intentionally leave the company 
in order to engage in such activities; otherwise, the company shall have 
the right either to claim damages from him or to consider the operations 
he has conducted on his own account as having been conducted for the 
benefit of the company.  
The directors shall not accept board positions in companies that are 
directly competing with their current companies. In the case where a 
competitive situation arises between companies previously not engaged in 
competition, and where the director serves on the boards of these 
companies, he shall not participate or vote in the board meetings of either 
company on questions related to the competitive situation.’  
Article 73: para 4-5 
‘Any transaction covered within this section has to be approved by the 
shareholder meeting if it is conducted with a party related to the company 
director(s).  A related party, for the purposes of this Article, is any person 
or entity with whom or with which the director(s) in question has close ties 
by means of personal relationships (such as immediate relatives and 
spouses) and business relationships (such as business entities owned or 
operated by a director, or where the director has a controlling stake). 
The appropriate procedure for such transactions includes the issuing of a 
resolution to the company members with a reasonable amount of time 
allocated for a decision. The resolutions should include as a minimum: 1) 
the nature of the intended transaction; 2) the transaction’s purpose and 
financial value of the transaction; 3) the degree of the company’s possible 
liability in relation to the transaction.’ 
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